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UNITED ARAB EMIRATESa new perspective

Edited by IBRAHIM AL ABED

PETER HELLYER

First published as Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates 1997, edited by Edmund Ghareeb andIbrahim Al Abed. (ISBN 1-900724-04-9)This edition, with four new chapters and eleven original chapters revised and updated, published asUnited Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, 2001.

Editors: Ibrahim Al Abed, Peter HellyerEditorial assistant: Gabrielle WarnockProduction editor: Paula VineTypesetting: Johan HofsteengeCover design: Jane Stark

Printed at Bookcraft, UK

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, digitising,recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Trident Press Ltd.

Published with the cooperation of the Ministry of Information and Culture, PO Box 17, Abu Dhabi,United Arab Emirates.

The views expressed by the contributing authors are entirely their own and do not necessarily reflectthe opinions of the publishers or the UAE Government.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Trident Press Ltd, Empire House, 175 Piccadilly, London W1V 0TBTel: 0207 4918770; Fax: 0207 4918664E-mail: [emailprotected]: www. tridentpress.com

ISBN 1-900724-47-2

Contents

Introduction 6

Evolution of the Emirates’ Land Surface: an Introduction 9Kenneth W. Glennie

Before the Emirates: an Archaeological and Historical 28Account of Developments in the Region ca 5000 BC to 676 ADDaniel T. Potts

The Coming of Islam and the Islamic Period in the UAE 70Geoffrey R. King

The Tribal Society of the UAE and its Traditional Economy 98Frauke Heard-Bey

The Beginning of the Post-Imperial Era for the Trucial States: 117From World War I to the 1960sFrauke Heard-Bey

The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation 121Ibrahim Al Abed

Formation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions 145Malcolm C. Peck

Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy 161Peter Hellyer

Dimensions of the UAE–Iran Dispute over Three Islands 179Mohamed Al Roken

Evolution and Performance of the UAE Economy 2021972–1998Ali Tawfik Al Sadik

Oil and Gas in the UAE 231Gerald Butt

Economic Development in the UAE 249Mohamed Shihab

Industrialization in the UAE 260Shihab M. Ghanem

Environmental Development and Protection in the UAE 277Simon Aspinall

Poetry in the UAE 305Shihab M. Ghanem

Author Profiles 312

Index 316

Introduction

At the end of 2001, the United Arab Emirates celebrates the completion of its first 30 yearsas an independent federal state. Over the period since its formal creation on 2 December 1971,the country has witnessed dramatic changes as the revenues from its oil and gas productionhave been put to good use in the building of a modern infrastructure, while its population hasgrown by over ten fold.

That process of change has taken place against a backdrop of social stability and politicalcontinuity that is all the more remarkable because of the upheavals and conflicts that haveaffected other parts of the Arabian Gulf region.

Prior to the establishment of the UAE, few outside the region knew much of the sevenemirates of which it is comprised, and fewer still had visited the area. Although oil productionand export had commenced a few years earlier, the process of modern development had stillto get properly under way. Many observers felt, indeed, that the new state had little chanceof surviving as a viable entity.

Yet, 30 years later, the United Arab Emirates is the longest surviving successful experimentin federation anywhere in the Arab world, and has matured to become a country which notonly offers its population a modern lifestyle but also is widely recognized as having a significantrole to play within the global community of nations.

Parallel with the development that has taken place since 1971, there has been an explosionin academic research on the country, as scholars both from within the UAE and abroad havestudied a wide range of aspects of the state, including not only its recent history and development,but also its past and the nature of country itself.

This book brings together a collection of papers by leading scholars and is designed toprovide a broad introduction to the UAE, its origins, environment, people and development.It seeks, thereby, to provide an outline of the country and, for those eager to learn more, tooffer a starting point for further reading and research.

An earlier collection of papers, entitled Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates, waspublished in early 1997, to coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the state. Since then,much has happened, not only in terms of the development of the country, but also in terms ofresearch. While some chapters from that book are included in the present volume, severalnew chapters have been written, on foreign policy, industrialization, oil and gas, the environmentand poetry, and other chapters have been extensively rewritten and updated to incorporate theresults of new research as well as recent developments. This second collection of papers, witha new title, seeks to present, therefore, an overview of the country at the beginning of thetwenty-first century.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the landscape of the country is well described by Kenneth Glennie, whohas undertaken extensive research into the geology of the Emirates, including the formationof the oil and gas bearing rock strata which today provide the major source of nationalrevenues. He also examines the impact of global changes in climate and in the moving of theworld's continental plates to explain how the country was formed.

The origins of the people of the Emirates are discussed in two chapters by Daniel Potts andGeoffrey King, who trace the prehistory and history of the UAE from the dawn of humansettlement in the country around 7500 years ago. Through their own research, as well as thatby other archaeologists and historians, it is now plain that, although the UAE may be a smallcountry with an unfavourable climate, it has played a significant role in the evolution ofcivilization in the region for many thousands of years.

Frauke Heard Bey provides two chapters on the traditional lifestyle of the Emirati people,including the important tribal structure, and on the history of the twentieth century evolutionfrom a collection of disparate sheikhdoms on the periphery of the British Empire into thefederation of today.

The nature of the federation itself, and the way in which a successful sharing of authoritybetween the federal government and those of the individual emirates has emerged, is examinedby Ibrahim Al Abed, who provides an authoritative background to the discussions that led upto the formation of the federation and to the adoption of the national constitution.

The circ*mstances under which the federation was formed and the institutions of thefederation are also discussed by Malcolm Peck, who studies the operation of those institutions,and also reviews the way in which modern governmental structures have been able to co-exist with the traditional, and still relevant, forms of local and tribal authority.

The way in which the country has earned itself respect in the global arena is analysed in achapter on foreign policy by Peter Hellyer, who reviews the basic elements of the country'sforeign policy and the way in which it has evolved over the three decades since the formationof the federation, moving from a focus on purely regional issues to a more global approach.

A second chapter on foreign policy issues, by Mohammed Al Roken, examines thedispute with Iran over the three UAE islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb,occupied by Iran since just before the federation was established. This chapter reviews thehistorical status of the islands and legal issues arising out of the Iranian occupation, goingon to record the attempts made by the United Arab Emirates to achieve a peaceful resolutionto the dispute.

Turning back to internal affairs, and, in particular, the modern development of the country,Ali Al Sadik investigates the process of economic development in the oil era, providing auseful array of statistics that show the contrasting growth of the oil and non oil sectors in theUAE Gross Domestic Product. He also deals with the economic aspects of the dependenceupon a largely expatriate labour force and with the widely recognized need for a further diversi-fication of the national economy.

The oil and gas industry itself is examined by Gerald Butt, who traces its evolution fromthe early days of exploration in the 1950s to the major role it plays today as a source of revenuesand of employment for the people of the Emirates. Without these revenues, the developmentof the UAE could not have taken place in the same way, and this chapter shows clearly howthe country's hydrocarbon reserves have provided the fuel for growth.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Mohammed Shihab enumerates and analyses the factors that have led to the socio-economictransformation of the country since 1971. He notes, inter alia, that the accessibility to revenuesfrom the oil and gas industry has permitted the UAE to compress decades of economic growthinto a relatively short period.

That has been made possible in part by the way in which the UAE has developed itsindustrial sector, first as a downstream sector of the oil and gas industry, and then, increasingly,in the non-oil sector. The achievements and problems of this process are scrutinized byShihab M. Ghanem.

Simon Aspinall looks at the wildlife and environment of the Emirates, providing data tochallenge the common misconception that deserts have little to offer in the way of Nature,and examining the way in which conservation of wildlife and the environment has become akey priority of Government policy over the course of the last three decades.

Finally, taking a look at an aspect of the cultural development of the country, Shihab M.Ghanem, himself a prominent local poet, traces the evolution of the country's poets and poetry.

In the nature of books such as this, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive review of theculture, history, heritage, development and landscape of the United Arab Emirates. Moreover,the process of scholarly study into a wide range of topics is continuing to produce valuablenew data. It is our hope, however, that this new collection of papers will not only provide auseful introduction to the United Arab Emirates, but will also prompt further study. Throughsuch a process, not only can researchers, and others, learn more about the country, but alsocitizens and residents of the UAE can come to know the country better. That, in turn, will beof benefit for the process of further development.

The Editors

Evolution of The Emirates’ Land Surface:an Introduction

K.W. Glennie

Introduction

With the exception of the Omani territory in the north-eastern Ru’us al-Jibal (Musandampeninsula) and north-central Oman Mountains, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) occupies abroad strip of land flanking the southern shores of the Arabian Gulf between the Qatar peninsulaand the Gulf of Oman. Much of that land consists of relatively low-lying rolling dunes andinterdune areas forming the north-eastern limit of the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter of SaudiArabia), which reach 150 m above sea level in the region to the north of Al Liwa. In thenorthern emirates, the dunes extend up to the Oman Mountains. To the south-east, however,the eastern limit of the dunes coincides approximately with the Oman border, where theyoverlie the deflated (wind eroded) surface of sub-horizontal fluvial sediments that had earlierbeen transported westward from the mountains (Fig. 1).

A general lack of rainfall ensures that most of Arabia is a desert. Summer temperatures canapproach 50°C on the Gulf coast of the Emirates, where relative humidity averages between50 and 60 per cent. Inland, however, temperatures can exceed 50°C and relative humidity beless than 20 per cent (United Arab Emirates University). Over the western lowlands of theEmirates, annual rainfall is mostly less than 40 mm. In Al Ain the mean annual rainfall is96 mm and yet the potential yearly evaporation is over 3000 mm (op.cit. Plate 44). With ahigh rate of evaporation and an annual rainfall over the Oman Mountains that rarely reaches200 mm, this highland area, which has elevations within the Emirates of over 1500 m, mustalso be classified as desert; its desert status is emphasized by its surface of almost continuousbarren rock and a sparse vegetation confined mostly to the floors of wadis.

With the exception of the south-western Ru’us al-Jibal, the rocks exposed within themountains of the Emirates differ markedly from those that contain deeply buried oil and gasfields in the west and beneath the southern Gulf. Also, the extensive plains of fluvial sedimentsthat flank the mountains are evidence of a former, much wetter, climate than is indicated bythe younger dune sands and salt-covered sabkhas that overlie their extremities. The historyof deposition and deformation of these rock units, the much more recent evidence of rapidchanges in climate from very humid to hyper-arid, together with the geological processes thatculminated in today’s desert surface, form the topic of the following pages.

Mountain and Subsurface Geological Framework

The subsurface

The oldest exposed rocks underlie the whole of the Emirates except the Oman Mountains andimmediate flank areas; they are seen at only two localities on the mainland, Jebel Ali south-west of Dubai and Jebel Dhanna in the western part of Abu Dhabi, but also occur on severaloffshore islands (e.g. Sir Bani Yas, Sir Abu Nu’air: Fig. 1). These jebels and islands are dome-shaped at the surface and are cored by Hormuz Salt (named after similar salt on Hormuz Islandin the Straits of Hormuz). The salt was deposited almost 600 million years ago on the floorof an almost enclosed sea when evaporation resulted in its water becoming super-saturatedwith respect to halite (common salt) (see also Glennie 1987: Fig. 12a). About 20 million yearsbefore the present (20 Ma BP), the Red Sea was also floored by salt in a similar way. Salt canflow and, unlike the sedimentary rocks that overlie it, cannot be compacted with increaseddepth of burial. For this reason, the salt is now less dense than most of its overburden and,using any vertical weakness, penetrates upward (diapirism) through the overlying rocksequence to form salt domes at the surface. In the south-eastern Gulf, the source of the diapiricHormuz salt now lies at a depth of some 10 km (Beydoun 1991). Hydrocarbon source rocksof similar age occur in Oman, and may be present in the Gulf area, but because of deep burial

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

D S

ARABIA

RUB AL-KHALI

GULF OF ADEN

ARABIAN SEA

UAE

ARABIAN

GULF OFOMAN

QATAR

SAUDI

ARABIA

NODATA

0 100km

SABKHAMATTI

D U N E S Y S T E M S

JBARAKAH

J.DHANNA

SIR BANI YAS

DALMA

ABU AL ABYAD

ABU DHABI

ARABIAN GULF

SIR BU N'IER

SABKHAS

JFAIYAH

SHARJAH

RAS AL-KHAIMAH

LIWA

ALLFANS

SHARJAH

ALLU

VIA

L FAN

AL AIN

ALLU

VIA

L FAN

DUBAI

ZAGROSM

TNS

COASTAL

SILA

JIB

ALLUVIALFANS

TERTIARY & LATEST CRETACEOUS

LIMESTONE

SEMAIL OPHIOLITES

RUUS AL JIBAL

PAR-AUTOCHTHON

HAWASINAAUTOCHTHON

BAYNUNAHBNH

JHAFIT

DUNES & INLAND SABKHA

Fig. 1. Simplified geological map of the United Arab Emirates. Inset diagram indicates some of thecomplex geometrical relationships between rock units of the mountains and flanking areas. See also Table 1.

must long since have generated their oil and gas. Several of the offshore salt domes are associatedwith the occurrence of oil and gas where reservoir rocks have been deformed by the risingsalt to create a trap (e.g. Umm Shaif, Zakum).

Arabia, as part of the megacontinent Gondwana, was located south of the Equator throughoutthe Palaeozoic era (Table 1). Initially it was geometrically ‘up-side-down’ (Fig. 2) relative tothe poles as Gondwana moved south across the south pole (and came up the other side the‘right-way up’) under the influence of plate-tectonic processes (see below). Because Arabia’ssouthern traverse was undertaken largely in temperate latitudes, most of the Palaeozoic rockscomprise sandstones and shales, a small exposure of which occurs in Jebel Rann, south-westof Dibba. Hydrocarbon source rocks of Silurian age are known in both Oman and Saudi Arabia,and might be viable for the generation of oil also in western Abu Dhabi.

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

In complete contrast, between the Late Permian (about 260 Ma BP) and Late Miocene (partof Neogene on Table 1; about 5–10 Ma BP), Arabia slowly drifted northwards across theTropics, where warm, shallow, tropical seas were ideal for the growth of corals and othershallow-marine creatures with calcareous shells; their accumulation after death led to theformation of varieties of limestone. Depending partly on a water depth that varied with time,the sea floor was intermittently covered by a variety of rocks that included organic-rich muds,mostly of Jurassic and Cretaceous age, but also some Triassic formations, which later becamethe source of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) now stored in porous carbonate rocks (limestonesand dolomites) (see Table 1). Reservoir rocks range in age from the Late Permian (KhuffFormation) to the Jurassic, where the Arab reservoirs are important, and Cretaceous (Shuaiba,Mauddud and Mishrif), to the Lower Tertiary (Pabdeh Formation). Seals, preventing therelatively buoyant hydrocarbons from escaping to the sea floor, cap the reservoirs. The bestof these are evaporites such as gypsum and anhydrite inter-bedded with the different Arabreservoir horizons, or the overlying latest Jurassic Hith Formation (Al Silwadi et al. 1996).These seals were probably deposited on extensive coastal sabkhas similar to those now foundalong the shore and on the offshore islands of Abu Dhabi (Alsharhan & Whittle 1995).

For source rocks to become mature and give up their oil, they need to be buried to a depthwhere the temperature approaches that of boiling water (about 3 km, depending on the localtemperature gradient through the underlying rock sequence). At a depth of around 4 km, itstarts to become mature for gas production but post-mature for the generation of oil, and by

Fig. 2. Distribution of continental platesduring the early Palaeozoic. Arabia

then formed part of a megacontinentcalled Gondwana, which includedAustralia, Antarctica, India, Africaand South America. Gondwana

was separated from eastern Asia byan ancient ocean called Tethys

(adapted from Smith et al., 1981).

60°N

30°N

EQUATOR

30°S

60°S

N. AMERICA

SCOTLAND

ENGLAND

EASIA

ARABIA

AFRICA

INDIA

ANTARTICAAU

STR

ALI

SAMERICA

6 km, the temperature is so high (around 180°C) that even gas generation ceases (post-maturefor gas). Newly generated oil is squeezed out of its source bed and migrates (usually upward)into a porous reservoir rock (e.g. sandstone, dolomite). The oil or gas can be retained in thereservoir rock only if it is kept in by an impervious cap rock or seal, and the reservoir/sealcouplet forms a trap. Structural deformation of the reservoir/seal couplets, preventing theformation of traps, can occur in a variety of ways; these can include fault movement atbasem*nt level, which affects all overlying rocks, differential compaction of underlying sandsand shales and, most prominently in the southern Gulf area, diapiric uplift of the Eo-Cambrian

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

AGEMa

PERIOD

QUATERNARY

NEOGENE

PALEOGENECE

-Z

OIC

CRETACEOUS

FARS

PABDEH

ARUMA

WASIA

THAMAMA

JURASSIC

TRIASSIC

SAHTAN

AKHDARHS

PLATFORM AREAGROUP FORMATION

PABDEH (G)

LAFFAN (S)MISHRIF (O)

MAUDDUD (O)SHUAIBA (S/O)

ARAB (O)DIYAB (S)ARAEJ (O)

MARRAT (O)

JILH (S)KHUFF (G)

PERMIAN

CARBONIFEROUS

DEVONIAN

SILURIAN

ORDOVICIAN

CAMBRIAN

PAL

OIC

IAN

145

208

251

290

360

410

440

500

540

700

800

MAJOR HIATUS

HORMUZ SALT

CRYSTALLINE

BAsem*nT

FIRST FORMED

AROUND 950 Ma B.P.

MUSANDAM PENINSULA2

(PARAUTOCHTHONOUS)

ERODED/

NOT DEPOSITED

MUSANDAM

ELPHINSTONE

RUUS AL JIBAL

THRUST OVER

ARUMA & HAWASINA

OMAN MOUNTAINS3

(ALLOCHTHONOUS)

SEMAIL NAPPEH A W A S I N ASU

INI

AL A

RID

NOTES:

1. Autochthonous rock units - Geological groups in L.H.column. R.H. column lists some important source rocks(S) and oil- (O) & gas- (G) bearing formations. NoteBasal Cambrian Hormuz Salt.

2. Parautochthonous rocks of Musandam Peninsula aresimilar to those of the platform area but have been thrustshort distance over Aruma and Hawasina covering deeperplatform rocks, probably at end of Paleogene.

3. South of the Musandam Peninsula, the Hawasinacomprises an imbricate sequence of continental slope(Sumeini) and ocean floor sediments (Hamrat Duru toUmar groups). They are overlain by the Semail Nappecomprising former oceanic crust. Obduction of bothHawasina & Semail took place during time span ofdeposition of the Aruma Group on the Arabian Platform.

indicates sense of thrusting

HSG = Hajar Supergroup

Table 1. Rock units of the United Arab Emirates. A simplified outline emphasizing differences betweenthe Oman Mountains and subsurface of the desert plains. Some important oil and gas horizons withinthe autochthonous Hajar Super Group of the Arabian Platform are shown (R= reservoir rock; S= sourcerock and C= cap rock or seal). Note that the Hawasina and Semail Nappes were obducted onto theArabian continental margin during the Late Cretaceous.

Hormuz salt and its sideways withdrawal from the deep salt horizon to feed that diapirism(Fig. 3). A simple outline of the maturation and migration of hydrocarbons from source rockto reservoir and trap is given in Glennie (1995). For a general discussion of Arabian petroleumgeology, see Beydoun (1991) and more specifically for the Emirates, Alsharhan (1989).

The Oman Mountains

The origin of the subsurface rocks that underlie the greater part of the Emirates has been toldin relatively simple terms, but that of the mountains is much more complex and its interpre-tation is not without controversy (Robertson and Searle 1990; Glennie 1995). Its presentationthus requires more space.

The creation of the Oman Mountains is closely connected with the plate-tectonic processesmentioned above. This hypothesis is based on two observations:

• The continents are composed of relatively thick (20–70 km), light and buoyant crust(continental crust), while the oceans are floored by a thinner (4–10 km), denser crust (oceaniccrust); both ‘float’ on a slightly plastic mantle that is capable of flowing as a slow-movingconvection current under the influence of radioactive heat generated in the core of the Earth.

• New oceanic crust is created from molten magma filling tension gashes within existingcrust and extruded as lava on the ocean floor at mid-ocean ridges, while a similar amountof older crust is carried back down into the Earth’s mantle at arcuate oceanic trenches(subduction zones); thus the Earth’s circumference remains more or less constant as thecontinents and adjacent oceanic crust move away from the ‘spreading’ oceanic ridges andconverge elsewhere at subduction trenches.

Perhaps the clearest example of the above processes is seen today on either side of the Americas.In the Atlantic Ocean, depending on location, the Americas have been moving away from Europeand Africa at an average rate of about 5 cm a year for the past 60 to 100 million years (60–100Ma) or more, the axis of spreading being the submarine Mid Atlantic Ridge; while at the westernmargin of South America, oceanic crust of the Pacific Plate is being subducted beneath the Andes(see e.g. Glennie 1992, 1995).

For much of the Palaeozoic era, Gondwana was separated from Asia by a major oceanknown as Tethys (Fig. 2). In the Late Permian, some 260 or 270 Ma BP, a continental blockcomprising Anatolia, Central Iran, Helmand (south Afghanistan) and perhaps Tibet, separatedfrom the Arabian-Indian margin of Gondwana to form a microcontinent (Glennie 1995: Fig. 16).

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

10 km

0 100 km

Hawasina

WSWSILA

Salt Dome

SIR BANI YAS

Pre-Cambrian Basem*nt

Palaeozoic

Mesozoic Hajar Super Group

CENOZOIC

Oman Mountains

DHAIDJ.ALI

Aruma

ENE

Gulf ofOman

Hormuz Salt

Semail

Fig. 3. Schematic W-E geological cross-section through the United Arab Emirates. Deformation leadingto the creation of hydrocarbon traps within the Hajar Super Group resulted from movements associatedwith basem*nt faults and the Hormuz salt (small diapir at J. Ali not shown) generally too small to showat scale of section. The nappes of the Oman Mountains were obducted when the eastern margin of Arabiaand adjacent ocean floor attempted to underthrust oceanic crust now represented by the Semail Nappe.

The intervening area became floored by a relatively narrow spreading ocean called Neo-Tethys1 (sequentially, there were two), which probably was rather like the modern Red Sea. Althoughthere are some doubts about the oceanic nature of its underlying crust (it may have been‘thinned’ and volcanically ruptured continental crust (Béchennec et al. 1988, 1990)), Neo-Tethys 1 seems to have had a spreading life of probably less than 50 Ma, for, in the LateTriassic, the newly formed microcontinent was itself split into two by a new axis of spreadingand the creation of another ocean (Neo-Tethys 2: Fig. 4) that was to exist for over 100 Ma.Neo-Tethys 1 ceased to spread from then on. The southward narrowing microcontinent betweenthe two oceanic areas, Neo-Tethys 1 and 2, comprised Anatolia, the Sirjan-Sanandaj zone ofIran (Glennie et al. 1990; Glennie 1995), and possibly a number of mountain-size ‘fragments’of shallow-marine limestone and marble within the Hawasina Series referred to as ‘Exotics’(Al-Aridh and Kawr groups of Table 1); exotic because these whitish marbles look out ofplace in their surroundings of the much darker rocks of the adjacent Semail Nappe (formeroceanic crust) and the deep-water sediments (limestone and red-brown chert; see below) ofthe Hawasina Series.

The Hawasina comprises sequences that vary in thickness from about 1000 to 200 m andrange in age from the Triassic (locally mid Permian) to the mid Cretaceous. The thinner and,more particularly, the uppermost parts of the sequences are commonly distorted and tightlyfolded. Furthermore, a large part, or even the total sequence, is commonly repeated in animbricate fashion (like a row of books on a shelf, all leaning in one direction) as they partlyoverlie each other. A simplified picture of sedimentation on the ocean floor can be deducedby reconstructing the imbricate pile back into their original positions relative to each other(Glennie et al. 1973, 1974, 1995 Fig.8).

When Neo-Tethys 1 formed, its floor was covered with sediments derived from the edgeof the Arabian continental shelf; at the continental shelf edge, shallow-marine organisms,including calcareous grasses, thrived in well-oxygenated waters, and shells or, in the case ofthe grasses, lime mud, accumulated when they died. The shells were partly fragmented bywave action and also by burrowing organisms. The whole formed a metastable mass ofsediment that could be dislodged by the shock of an earthquake or even a violent storm. Suchdislodged sediment would slide down the continental slope and develop into a relatively high-velocity flow called a turbidity current, which finally deposited its entrained sediment overthe lower continental rise and abyssal plain of the ocean as a bed called a turbidite. Turbiditycurrents have been recorded in modern environments at speeds of up to 70 km/hour (Holmes1978), and their momentum carries them far across the abyssal plain.

At depths greater than some 3000 to 4000 m, calcium carbonate is unstable. The fine calcareousmuds that settle out from suspension in the oceanic waters are especially susceptible toreplacement by silica to form reddish brown cherts (a rock rather like flint), which are charac-terized by the siliceous framework of very small unicellular creatures called radiolaria (i.e.they form radiolarian cherts). Turbidites and radiolarian cherts make up much of the Hawasinasedimentary sequence. The volumetrically greater calcareous turbidites dominated depositionclosest to the Arabian continental shelf edge, while the much thinner red cherts were in thedeepest water farthest from the shelf edge (Glennie et al. 1973, 1974; Glennie 1995).

In complete contrast to the turbidites and cherts, the ‘Exotics’ form large blocks of whiteshallow-marine limestone, commonly recrystallized to marble (a process that destroyed many

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

of the fossils that may have been present initially). The ‘Exotics’ seem to have been derivedfrom the far side of Neo-Tethys 1 relative to the Arabian continental margin (Kawr Ridge onFig. 4). Most ‘Exotics’are underlain by an association of a red siltstone and pillow lavas formedby extrusion of lava at the sea floor. At Jebel Rann, south-west of Dibba, however, ‘exotic’limestone overlies Ordovician sandstone, which indicates the presence of continental crust.These observations suggest that the ‘Exotics’ probably formed as the outcome of continentalbreak-up and the creation of a new intervening ocean. The largest known ‘Exotic’ in themountains is Jebel Kawr, in Oman, which is almost 1000 m thick and over 25 km across.

The Anatolia-Sirjan-Sanandaj microcontinent that separated Neo-Tethys 1 and 2 narrowedsouthward (Fig. 4), and along much of the Oman coastline of Arabia was probably representedby little more than the ‘Exotic’ Limestones (Kawr Ridge). As the Kawr Ridge had little or noexposure above sea level, it generated no sediment by erosion other than carbonate fragments;thus this part of Neo-Tethys 2 was deprived of sediment other than a rain of the finest clay-sizeparticles settling out of suspension in the oceanic waters and eventually forming radiolarianchert (Umar Group, Table 1).

Sedimentation in the relatively narrow Neo-Tethys 1 took place from the Late Permianto the mid Cretaceous, and, in Neo-Tethys 2, from the Late Triassic until the mid or LateCretaceous. As Neo-Tethys 2 continued to widen, so the Africa-Arabian and adjoined SouthAmerican portions of Gondwana moved to the west or south-west away from the Neo-Tethyan axis of spreading. Sometime during the Early Cretaceous, however, Africa andSouth America began to separate to create the intervening South Atlantic Ocean (Glennieet al. 1990; Glennie 1995). South America continued to move to the west, but Afro-Arabiahad to reverse its sense of motion and move away from the South Atlantic spreading axis.With Neo-Tethys 2 continuing to spread, very strong compressional stresses soon developed.These were relieved by the creation of an easterly-dipping trench down which the oceaniccrust of first the western part of Neo-Tethys 2 and then Neo-Tethys 1 was subducted. Duringthat process, the sediments covering the floor of both Neo-Tethys 1 and 2 were scrapedoff the down-going oceanic plate to form the accretionary wedge of imbricate sequencesof the Hawasina mentioned above (Glennie et al. 1990; Glennie 1995).

Subduction zones are of two types (see Fig. 6 in Glennie 1995):

• Andean Type: oceanic crust at the eastern edge of the Pacific Plate is currently beingsubducted beneath the Andes mountain range. As the sedimentary cover is scraped off thedown-going oceanic crust, the Andes are elevated a little more. The uppermost sediments

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

ARABIANCONTINENTAL

SHELFNEO-TETHYS

SANANDAJ-SIRJANZONE

SEALEVEL

ACTIVEMID-OCEAN

RIDGEOCEANICCRUST

(VERY THIN COVEROF SEDIMENTS)

KAWRRIDGE

(CONTINENTALCRUST)

HAWASINASEDIMENTS

OFNEO-TETHYS 1

THICKENS TO WEST

CONTINENTAL CRUST

SHALLOWSEA

SW NE

NEO-TETHYS2

Fig. 4. Block diagram to illustratethe spatial relationships between theArabian continental margin, Neo-Tethys 1 and 2, and the interveningSirjan-Sanandaj-Kawr microcon-tinent during the Jurassic and EarlyCretaceous.

being subducted are considerably younger than the overlying rocks of the Andes mountains;moisture associated with the descending plate lowers the melting point of rock and causesvolcanic activity (together with the intrusion at depth of granite) in the overlying Andes.

• Ocean-ocean subduction: the oceanic crust of Neo-Tethys 2, when initially subducted, waspossibly up to 100 Ma old and had therefore had enough time since its formation at a spreadingridge to cool down. The old and cold crust was relatively dense, and preferred to descendsteeply rather than at a gentle angle; this, in turn, caused the axis of bending to roll backaway from the subduction trench, thereby creating crustal tension in a geological structurethat had developed initially because of crustal compression. Crustal tension inevitably leadsto volcanic activity and the creation of new oceanic crust; this new oceanic crust becamethe Semail Nappe of the Oman Mountains (see Lippard et al. 1986).

Because the new axis of spreading developed behind the subduction trench, the newly createdoceanic crust is said to have resulted from back-arc spreading. It is noteworthy here that thenewly formed oceanic crust was younger than most of the ocean-floor sediments that werebeing subducted nearby.

Subduction of the oceanic crust and the growth of an accretionary wedge of ocean-floorsediments beneath the future Semail Nappe began some 110 Ma BP (Lippard et al. 1986).The difficulty of trying to ‘swallow’the thick ‘exotic limestones’down the subduction trenchcan be imagined from the amount of recrystallization and fracturing that affected thelimestones; they were sheared from their mixed continental and ocean-margin substrate. When,later, the even thicker continent margin of Arabia reached the subduction trench, it couldneither be sheared off nor ‘swallowed’; it became jammed within the upper part of thesubduction zone, and subduction ground to a halt.

The South Atlantic Ocean continued to widen, however, and the back-arc spreading axisjust east of the subduction trench was still active. Compressional stresses built up until anothersubduction trench formed further to the east. In the Oman Mountains, the Late Cretaceoustiming of nappe emplacement (obduction) can be dated by the fossil content of the ArumaGroup sediments (Table 1) being deposited adjacent to the nappes being emplaced. In theInner Makran of Iran, the presence of volcanic bombs in slightly younger Late Cretaceousmarine sediments indicates that a new subduction process had already been in progress therefor a few million years (Glennie et al. 1990). The Makran subduction trench is still activetoday, and has built an accretionary wedge of marine sediments that extends to the presentsouthern coastline of Iran east of the Straits of Hormuz.

When the new subduction trench formed in Iran, compressive stresses in the Oman Mountainssector were removed, allowing the leading edge of the Arabian continent to rise isostatically (likea piece of wood being released under water), causing the separation of what now became theSemail Nappe from its formerly contiguous oceanic crust of back-arc type. This uplift causedthe accretionary wedge of Hawasina sediments, together with the Semail Nappe, to slide a littlefurther onto the essentially immovable autochthonous continental shelf sequence, the wholeprocess being known as obduction. At this time (end Cretaceous), the Hawasina and Semail didnot form a high mountain range, but rather an island chain, the flanks of which were covered byEarly Cenozoic shallow-marine limestones that extended westward across the rest of the Emirates.

Uplift into the present mountain range did not begin until about the end of the Paleogeneor early Neogene, possibly as a result of continental collision between Arabia and Iran

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

associated with the opening of the Red Sea and perhaps of other plate movements includingthat of India. As part of this event, the highland area of Ru’us al-Jibal (Fig. 1) was pushedwestward slightly and compressed along a series of reverse faults, and now at the mountainedge locally overrides Paleogene strata in the subsurface (Fig. 3); other examples of the structuralstyle can be found in Boote et al. 1990 and Dunne et al. 1990. This compression is clearlyexpressed by the steep western flank of the coastal mountain just north of Sha’am. East ofRa’s al-Khaimah, in the Hagil Window just north of the exit of Wadi Bih, the shallow-marinerocks of the Ru’us al-Jibal and Elphinstone groups can be seen to overlie units of the Hawasinawith a thrust contact. The amount of horizontal over-thrusting is believed to have been nomore than a few kilometres and does not extend south of Dibba.

The surface of Jebel Hafit, just south of Al Ain, consists of Lower Cenozoic limestonesand marls that have now been deformed into a sharp, steeply flanked anticline whose axisplunges to both north and south. The time of its deformation is believed to have coincidedwith uplift of the Oman mountains, possibly by reactivation of one of the underlying thrustplanes within the Hawasina. Further north, Jebel Faiyah forms a similar structure that hasbeen dissected sufficiently to expose underlying rocks of the Semail Nappe. Cenozoicrocks are also exposed along the mountain edge to the east and north-east of Jebel Hafit(e.g. Jebel Qamar).

Along the coast of Oman in the vicinity of Muscat, and to the south-east almost as far as Sur,are a number of elevated horizontal wave-cut terraces, up to 150 m above present sea level, whichindicate that the Oman Mountains have continued to rise during the past few million years or so.A similar terrace in the northern Emirates has been cut into the western edge of the southernRu’us al-Jibal, south of the exit of Wadi Bih (due east of Ra’s al-Khaimah). In contrast, the northernextremity of the Oman Mountains is being depressed below sea level as its offshore continuationacross the Straits of Hormuz is subducted beneath the Makran coast. According to Vita Finzi(1979), the northern tip of the Musandam peninsula is subsiding at the very rapid rate of about6 mm per year.

The rate of horizontal closure between Arabia and Asia is not known. That it continues todo so, even if relatively slowly, is attested by the many violent earthquakes experienced inIran as the outer edge of the Arabian Plate (north-east edge of the Zagros Mountains) grindsagainst the adjacent Sanandaj-Sirjan Zone; geologists have aptly named this earthquake-pronecontact the Crush Zone.

Miocene Terrestrial Sediments of Western Abu Dhabi

At the time of continental collision between Arabia and Asia during the early Miocene (earlyNeogene), shallow-marine sedimentation was replaced by terrestrial conditions over much of theGulf region. In western Abu Dhabi, the Shuwaihat Formation comprises deformed evaporiticsediments that are replaced upwards by dune sands which, like those of today, were depositedunder the influence of a northern (shamal) wind; the sands are riddled with the moulds of plantroots (Glennie and Evamy 1968), which indicate the former proximity of the water table at fairlyshallow depth. Among other places, such sediments are exposed on Shuwaihat island, at JebelDhanna and south of Sila (Fig. 1).

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

With an erosional interval representing several million years, the dune sands are overlain byfluvial gravels and sands of the Baynuna Formation (Fig. 1), which contain a wide variety ofvertebrate fossils of both terrestrial and aquatic types: crocodile, turtle, hippopotamus, an earlytype of elephant, buffalo and ostrich, as well as smaller mammals (Whybrow and Hill 1999).The change from arid dune and sabkha to the more humid conditions needed for the hippopotamusand crocodile to thrive requires a considerable change in climate, a change that seems to havetaken place repeatedly during the past million years or so. The erosional time gap between theShuwaihat and Baynuna formations is possibly the result of a considerable fall (100 m?) inglobal sea level when Antarctica used that volume of water to form its thick cover of ice.

Quaternary Sediments of the Emirates

The influence of high latitude glaciations on Arabian deserts

During the past million years or more, one event has repeatedly affected global climate, includingthat of tropical deserts. With a cyclicity of around 100 ka (100,000 years), the whole ofScandinavia and the northern half of North America, including Greenland, suffered a repeatedslow build-up of an ice cover up to two or three kilometres thick, which then melted veryrapidly (Shackleton 1987; Boulton 1993); because global temperatures were lower duringglaciations, many highland areas became the sites of mountain glaciers, whereas the ice capover Antarctica, which had been a permanent feature of the southern hemisphere from at leastthe Miocene onward, only expanded and contracted in size.

Apart from lowering global temperatures, these glaciations affected climate in two other ways:

• Because the ice caps became the centres of very large areas of high atmospheric pressure,all other air-pressure belts around the globe were squeezed towards the low-pressureequatorial area. With isobars much closer together than is the case today, global winds willhave been much stronger and more persistent than any we now experience.

• So much water went into building the ice caps that global sea level at the last glacialmaximum, about 20 ka BP, was some 120 or 130 m lower than today’s. Since the floor ofthe Arabian Gulf is everywhere less than 120 m deep, during glacial maxima the exposedfloor of the Gulf would have been the site of sand dunes migrating southward and acrossthe Emirates into the Rub’ al-Khali under the influence of the northern (shamal) wind; theonly sign of water in the Gulf area would have been in the combined Tigris-Euphratesriver, which derived its water from the wetter Anatolian highlands and reached the opensea south of the Straits of Hormuz.

The high-latitude glaciations took some 80 to 100 ka to reach their maximum extent; the lastthen melted within little more than 10 ka to produce a global sea level similar to the presentone by about 6 ka BP; thus sea level rose at an average rate of about 1 cm per year but possiblyexceeded 4 cm/year for short periods (Boulton 1993). This flooding is thought to have beenthe origin of the biblical story of ‘Noah’s Flood’, perhaps around 9 ka BP (Teller et al. 2000).Noah is thought to have lived in an area now covered by the Arabian Gulf. Over the almostflat floor of the Gulf, any continuous rise in sea level would have been noticed by the peopleliving there. Noah’s family possibly lived in the drier environment of a gentle rise to escapethe effects of a rainfall that was considerably higher than any experienced today. As sea level

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

rose in the Gulf, Noah’s slightly elevated pasturage would have been cut off from the mainlandand then be seen to shrink in area, leading to the need for a barge or raft if he and his familyand flocks were to survive the encroaching sea; necessity is the mother of invention.

Many desert areas, including much of the Sahara, had a higher rainfall between about 10and 6 ka BP. This induced the growth of much more vegetation, which fed abundant game,leading to the term ‘Climatic Optimum’; since then, most topical deserts have become morearid again (e.g. Petit-Maire 1994).

Flooding of the Gulf had a profound effect on the Emirates. Instead of sand dunes migratingfreely into the area from the north, the supply of wind-driven sand was progressively cut offby the increasing extent of sea water. The wind continued to blow, however, so that in areasclose to the expanding sea, sand was deflated (removed by wind action) down to the level ofthe water table, which was rising in concert with the rising sea level. The resulting moistsurface developed into sabkhas, which are described later.

Fluvial sediments

When there is sufficient rainfall, fluvial gravels and sands are transported down the mountainsides and across the valley floors within the mountains; today, such rainwater reaches the seaabout once in every ten years in the northern emirates, but south of Jebel Faiyah it always dissipateswithin the sand dunes that block the lower reaches of the wadis and never reaches the sea.

West of the mountains is a broad sheet of fluvial sands and gravels that spread for a consid-erable distance beneath the present cover of dune sands. In south-east Oman, the samespread of alluvial fans reaches as much as 200 km south of the mountains; in the north,they extend beneath the floor of the Arabian Gulf. The time of deposition of some of theyounger gravels now exposed in incised wadi banks have been dated at around 30,000 and70,000 thousand years before present (30 and 70 ka BP), while others, in Wadi Dhaid forinstance, coincided with the Climatic Optimum (Sanlaville 1992). The fans have beensubjected to repeated deflation, however, and near-surface sediment has been dated at over400 ka, while the degree of alteration of some ophiolite-rich fluvial sediment suggestsdeposition up to a million or more years ago. The extent of these sediments, and the sizeof the pebbles and boulders found in them, indicate that at the time of their deposition therewas much more rainfall over the area than is experienced today. The surfaces of such alluvialfans are exposed between some of the large linear dunes of the eastern emirates (Fig. 1).

Quaternary fluvial sediments are rarely exposed between the dune cover of most of thewestern emirates. Along the western side of Sabkha Matti, however, at the western limit ofAbu Dhabi, another sequence of fluvial gravels is exposed at the surface. The attitude of thebedding laminae indicates that there, an ancient river flowed towards the north or north-east.The types of rock (e.g. limestone, volcanic lava) represented by the pebble content of thegravels point, in this case, to a source in the south-western highlands of Saudi Arabia. Thetime of their deposition has been dated at over 200 ka BP (Goodall 1995), which obviouslywas another period of higher rainfall than now.

Sabkhas

Sabkhas are flat areas of sand, silt or clay that are covered by a crust of salt (halite) for atleast a part of the year. Coastal sabkhas may be flooded by the sea during storm and spring

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

high tides, whereas the inland variety has no direct marine influence but derives its moisturefrom rare rainfall and the proximity of the water table at shallow depth, within capillaryreach of the surface.

Coastal sabkhas and lagoonsAs already mentioned above, coastal sabkhas formed when the supply of wind-driven sand fromthe north was cut off during the post-glacial flooding of the Gulf and deflation removed dry sanddown to the level of the water table. Water evaporates from the damp surface, especially duringthe hot summer months, which becomes saturated with halite (common salt) that crystallizes toform a hard crust. Beneath the surface, calcium sulphate also becomes concentrated and formsa mush of gypsum crystals about 50 cm below the surface. At ground temperatures greater thanabout 42°C, the water of crystallization is driven from the gypsum crystal lattice to create anhydrite.Shinn (1983) has many illustrations of sabkhas in the emirates and other areas of the Gulf.

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of a coastal sabkha is a widespread mat of thin,black, algae. Most of the time, this algal mat is dry, and commonly cracked and curled upat the edges like flakes of mud in a dried-out pond. During high spring tides, however, orwhen storm winds drive sea water over the almost horizontal sabkha surface, the algaespring to life and regenerates into a slimy, wrinkly, rubbery layer. The slimy surface trapsfine calcareous particles carried over the surface by the waves, and when it cracks and curls,wind-blown sand and silt can be trapped beneath its edges; with time, the sabkha againacquires a crust of halite.

When halite crystallizes, it does so by growing horizontally rather than by increasing itsthickness vertically. Aspace problem ensues, which is resolved by the salt sheets over-thrustingeach other if thin, or by forming polygons (ideally hexagons) as it grows thicker.

Coastal sabkhas cover the surfaces of much of the extensive system of low islands south-west and just to the north-east of Abu Dhabi island. Along the coast, especially of Ummal-Qaiwain and Ra’s al-Khaimah, however, the development of longshore bars has resultedin the creation of a series of shallow lagoons, which have tidally formed deltas at their mouths(Glennie 1970: Figs 98–100). Wave action builds the longshore bars into beaches, from whichsands (mostly the wave-broken remains of shells and carbonate skeletons of sea grasses) areblown into the lagoon behind. In addition, as small carbonate-shelled creatures die, they leavetheir shells on the lagoon floor, which becomes shallower and eventually builds up to, or evenabove, normal high-tide level, and then acquires its own cover of coastal sabkha including amat of black algae. North of Ra’s al-Khaimah town, the longshore bars formed the sites ofsmall fishing communities, which progressively moved seaward as each site became separatedfrom the sea by the next bar to extend northward.

Inland sabkhasInland sabkhas differ from the coastal variety in having no direct marine influence on theirdevelopment. Their supply of water comes from rare rainfall and the presence of a water tablewithin capillary reach of the surface; a balance is achieved between evaporation and deflationat the surface and the supply of water from below which can trap wind-blown sediment, bothbeing affected seasonally. Algae may be present, but extensive algal mats are not well developed;like coastal sabkhas, gypsum crystals form a layer below the surface.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Within the Emirates, extensive inland sabkhas are found in three areas: at the landwardmargins of the coastal sabkhas beyond the reach of storm tides and extending into someadjacent interdune areas; in the large broad interdune areas between the huge dunes of AlLiwa; and in Sabkha Matti, a low lying area in the far west of Abu Dhabi, about 60 kmacross and extending south from the coast for almost 150 km, much of it being withinSaudi Arabia. The surface of Sabkha Matti is still no more than 40 m above sea level some100 km south of the coast.

In the Liwa area, small flat-topped hills (mesas) are capped by a gypsum-cemented layerindicative of former sabkha conditions. Lightly cemented dune sand, whose bedding attitudesindicate sand transport towards the south south-east (the same as today) is exposed in theflanks of these mesas; similar dune sands can be seen in pits dug below the gypsum-cementedsurface of the interdune sabkhas, which are at an elevation of some 80 to 90 m above sealevel. The time of deposition of the dune sands has been dated as 12 ka (in pits) and 40 and141 ka BP in the mesas, thereby indicating that both dune and sabkha-producing conditionshave been repeated in the area; the younger dune sands were preserved by the rise in the levelof the water table during the melting of the last high-latitude ice caps. In Sabkha Matti, thedeflated relics of former dunes surrounded by damp sabkha indicate that, prior to the last risein the level of the water table, this area also was the site of dunes migrating southward awayfrom the present Arabian Gulf. Both the Sabkha Matti and Liwa sabkhas are products of thepresent high water table, which is associated with the current interglacial high sea level. Duringglaciations, sabkhas occurred in neither inland nor current coastal areas.

The sabkha is a dangerous place and chances should never be taken with one, its salt-encrustedsurface often looking deceptively firm. Beneath the thin crust of the coastal sabkha the algalmat and underlying mush of gypsum crystals and clay-size carbonate has little bearing strength.Unwary humans are likely to break through the surface and sink to their knees, especially ifthe crust is new, while narrow-tyred vehicles can become a total loss. Inland sabkhas are littlesafer. A bedouin tribesman in search of fresh pastures after rain, is likely to test the feasibilityof crossing a suspect surface by sending first sheep and goats in the care of young light-weightchildren, followed in turn by himself with the heavier camels, and then his wife driving aladen Toyota Landcruiser pickup truck.

Sand dunes

Away from the Oman Mountains and the Abu Dhabi coastline, the surface of the Emiratesis dominated by the presence of sand dunes. Dunes migrate in the direction of the sand-transporting wind. With a linear dune, this is achieved by the movement of sand along thedune flanks and deposition (causing elongation) at its down-wind end; if the up-wind supplyof sand ceases for any reason (e.g. flooding of the Gulf), that end of the dune ‘shrivels’and the dune shortens as sand is removed and not replaced. The same principle applies totransverse dunes, but because their long axes are at right angles to the wind, sand istransported over the top of the dune to its leeward side (where it forms an avalanche slopewith a maximum inclination of 34°) rather than around its flanks. Where the supply ofsand is limited, crescent-shaped barchans are formed; here, in addition to the movementof sand over its crest to the avalanche slope, sand is also readily transported along the duneflanks, which are drawn out into the long ‘horns’ that point down wind. On a much smaller

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

scale, the axes of ripples are always at right angles to the wind that formed them, so theirdistribution gives an indication of the pattern of wind flow over and around the dune.

Across central Abu Dhabi, a broad belt of large, partly eroded (deflated) north-west to south-east trending linear dunes skirt the north-east margin of the Liwa, and lose their linear characteras the Oman border is approached; this is re-established where the dunes overlie the alluvialfans that flank the Oman Mountains (Fig. 1). To the north of Jebel Hafit, the dune axes swingtowards the north-east as the mountains are approached (Besler 1982). These variable trendsare thought to outline the fairly constant direction of dune-forming winds at, or shortly after,the peak of the last glaciation; since that time, the outlines of the dunes have been modifiedbut the basic plan is still recognizable. Fitting into the same wind pattern are the giant barchanoiddunes (up to 150 m above the interdune sabkhas) of the Liwa. The axes of these dunes are alsotransverse to the dune-forming wind, which blew towards the south south-east. Travelling furtherto the west, the modern (and perhaps also the ancient) winds blow increasingly towards thesouth, eventually to veer south-westward across the central Rub al-Khali towards the mountainsof Yemen. This semi-circular pattern is typical of what are known as trade wind deserts(following the same sort of path as the trade winds sought by sailing ships heading westwardto the Americas) such as the Sahara or, in the southern hemisphere, the Australian desert.

The broad pattern of large dunes outlined above has been modified by the effects of changingsea level in the Gulf. When sea level rose at the end of the last glaciation, the supply of aeoliansand from the north was stopped. Although the wind still blew, its direction was out ofequilibrium with the geometry of the existing dunes, so their shape became modified; thesemodifying winds apparently were not so strong as formerly, so the new resulting dune formswere smaller than the pre-existing large dunes. This can be seen by the belt of small transversedunes that drape the northern and north-eastern margins of the Liwa.

Over the course of recent history, the trade winds have not been so constant in direction asone might imagine. Today’s strongest sand-transporting wind (the northern shamal) at AbuDhabi airport has shifted about 30° to the north relative to its Glacial equivalent, and the windsare more variable than they used to be. This variability is indicated by small west-east trendinglinear dunes that cross the interdune areas of the Awir oasis in southern Dubai, for instance,and other similar areas further north; it is also indicated south-west of Jebel Hafit by star-shaped peaks on some of the large linear dunes, which form when winds blow in more thanone direction. Today’s more variable dune pattern is thought to be a product of a wind systemthat is weaker than it was in Glacial time.

Every time the Arabian Gulf was flooded by the sea, shallow-marine organisms flourishedand eventually died, many leaving the evidence of their former existence on the sea floor inthe form of calcareous shells. When the Gulf floor was exposed to the wind during sub-polarglaciations, the smaller of these shells were transported southward to the Emirates where theyformed carbonate dunes. Similar dunes near the coast of north-western India are known as‘miliolite’ after their content of miliolid foraminifera, and the same name has been applied insouth-eastern Arabia. Inland from the coast, miliolite is widely exposed, in many cases withinthe core of, or adjacent to, modern dunes (e.g. draping exposures of the Baynuna Formation inwestern Abu Dhabi, from Silmiya south to Hameem,at the eastern end of the Liwa, or the AbuDhabi – Al Ain road south-east of Bani Yas). Along the Hameem road, two sequences of milioliteare separated by evidence of a wetter climate; the lower sequence has a depositional age of 99

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

ka BP and the upper of 64 ka BP, times when the sea surface was about 25 and 80 m, respec-tively, below the present level of the Arabian Gulf. A study of the bedding attitudes of themiliolite indicates variations in wind direction similar to those deduced for the modern dunes(Glennie 1994).

It is clear that the dune systems of the Emirates have been controlled not only by globalshifts in wind direction, but also by glacially controlled changes in exposure of the Gulf floor,which in turn have controlled the distribution of both coastal and inland sabkhas. Those dunesand sabkhas are still reacting to today’s climate and associated wind directions.

Brief History of the Quaternary in the Emirates

The early Quaternary history of the Emirates is very poorly known. The limited evidencefrom sparsely dated alluvial fans suggests that it was probably a time of much higher rainfallthan now. By about a million years ago, or perhaps as late as half a million years BP, near-polar glaciations led, in the Gulf area, to cyclic repetitions of lower sea level and strongerwinds that caused sand dunes to migrate southward, with the warmer interglacials givinghigher rainfall and less active dunes. For the past 5000 years, we seem to have been headingslowly in the direction of increased aridity associated in the long term (80,000 years later?)with another full glaciation in high-latitude areas.

Conclusion

By extrapolation from elsewhere, the geological history of the Emirates and adjacent areasof Arabia over the past 600 million years or so seems to have been mostly one of relativestability. Following tropical shallow-marine conditions of sedimentation in the late Precambrian,the area was largely terrestrial during much of the succeeding Palaeozoic time span. Deeperosion preceded the Permian separation of a microcontinent from the eastern margin of Arabia;the following marine transgression was associated with the successive creation of Neo-Tethys1 and 2. Throughout most of the Mesozoic era, the Emirates was the site of shallow-marinesedimentation except in the two branches of Neo-Tethys, where deep-marine deposition tookplace. This situation was brought to an end by closure of Neo-Tethys 1 and 2, and the obductionof deep-oceanic sediments and a slice of newly formed back-arc oceanic crust onto the Arabiancontinental margin to form an island arc. The succeeding shallow-marine limestone depositionwas terminated in the east when the Oman Mountains began to be uplifted into a high rangesome 30 Ma BP, but stable conditions of sedimentation continued over the bulk of the Emiratesuntil major glaciations began to induce lower global sea levels perhaps some two to fivemillion years ago and created the present land surface. Near-polar glaciations have controlledsea level in the Arabian Gulf for at least the last 500,000 years, thereby also controlling thesupply of dune sand from the north or the cutting off of that supply, with the resultingwidespread deflation and creation of sabkhas.

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

Glossary of Geological Termsabyssal plain: the almost horizontal floor of an ocean between the continental slope and mid-ocean ridge, commonly

found at depths in excess of 4000 m.accretionary wedge: a wedge of sedimentary rocks that was scraped off the surface of a down-going plate during

subduction.aeolianite: a consolidated sedimentary rock formed of wind-deposited sand; commonly, but not necessarily, rich in

carbonate grains.algal mat: a sheet of rubbery algae that covers the coastal sabkha surface after flooding.allochthonous: term implying derivation or transport from elsewhere; the Hawasina and Semail are allochthonous

because they did not originate where now found.alluvial fan: a fan-like spread of fluvial distributary channels, commonly at the junction of mountain and plain; fans

coalesce along the length of the Oman Mountains.anhydrite: an evaporite mineral composed of calcium sulphate, CaSO

4, found in some sedimentary rocks. Often

derived from gypsum by losing its water of crystallization.autochthonous: a term implying an origin where now found, i.e. not transported from elsewhere. Noun: “autochthon”.avalanche slope: also known as slip-face. The slope that forms when wind-blown sand from the windward side of

a dune passes into the calm air of the leeward side. The sand will start to slip if further deposition would result inthe maximum angle of repose for dry sand of 34o being exceeded.

back-arc: the arcuate area ‘behind’ the hanging wall of a subduction zone; it may be subjected to either compressionor extension.

back-arc spreading: the process of creating new oceanic crust in the back-arc area behind a subduction trench.barchan: see dune.barchanoid dunes: see dune.BP: abbreviation of Before Present, often given in Ka, thousands (K) of years (a).capillary: resembling a hair; of very small bore. If a tube of very small bore is immersed in water, the water will

rise up within the tube as a result of capillary attraction.cap rock/seal: an impervious rock (seal) overlying a fluid-bearing reservoir.carbonate: general term for calcium and magnesium carbonates (limestones and dolomites).carbonate-compensation depth: the depth below which most carbonate particles become unstable and slowly dissolve. chert: beds of finely crystalline deep-water silica.Climatic Optimum: the state of an ideal climate; inferred for existing desert regions to have had sufficient annual

rainfall to render the area an ideal place for man to live. Such conditions are thought to have prevailed over muchof the Saharan and Arabian deserts between about 9000 and 6500 years ago.

continental crust: the lighter (less dense) of the two main types of the Earth’s crust, which forms most land massesbut may extend below shallow seas.

continental shelf: that part of the sea floor between the coast and the marked change in slope at the shelf edge,whose depth averages about 120 m. Continental shelves vary in width from a few kilometres to over 1000 km.

continental slope & rise: the two form the slope (upper part, to perhaps 1500 m) of the ocean floor between thecontinental shelf edge and the abyssal plain at depths of about 4000 m or more.

convection current: the transfer of heat from one part of a fluid or gas to another by flow of the fluid or gas fromthe hotter parts to the colder. A fluid will rise if heated from below because, through expansion, it becomes lessdense than the cold.

deflation: the blowing away of dry fine-grained rock material (sand and dust), by the wind. A form of aeolian erosionat work chiefly in deserts.

diapir, diapirism: salt (halite) is less dense than most other rocks and is easily deformed. When buried at depth, saltis more buoyant than overlying rocks; it may then withdraw sideways to create a vertical bulge (salt pillow) thatdeforms overlying strata into anticlines and, by breaking through them, create salt domes and even salt walls. Thisprocess is known as diapirism; the product of diapirism is a diapir.

dolomite: a calcium-magnesian limestone, commonly formed by alteration of shallow-marine limestone.dune: accumulation of wind-blown sand that possesses one or more slipfaces. Its size is dependent on the

availability of sand and the ability of the wind to carry sand to the top without removing it again. The finestsand grains are usually found at the crest. There are several types of dune but only those common in easternArabia are described here.barchan: crescent-shaped sand dune, which migrates downwind in the direction of its horns. It has a gentle windward

slope and a slipface on its lee slope. Barchans sometimes unite laterally to form rather irregular barchanoid dunes.barchanoid dunes: cross between a barchan and a transverse dune.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

linear dune: dune whose long axis is parallel to the prevailing dune-forming wind; it grows by extending downwind.Avalanche slopes, where present, are almost parallel to the axis of the dune and can face towards either flank.May occur as a swarm of parallel dunes as in the Rub al Khali or the Wahiba.

megadune: any large dune whose height exceeds about 60 m and has a crestal spacing of about 500 m or more.Most are thought to have formed during the last major glaciation.

star dune: a roughly star-shaped pyramidal dune with three or more radiating arms with slip faces. Thought toform where seasonal winds are strongly oblique to each other. May result also by modification of older transverseor longitudinal dunes.

transverse dune: a dune whose long axis is at right angles to the prevailing dune-forming wind. Likely to breakup into barchanoid and then barchan dunes if the supply of sand is not maintained.

evaporites: minerals, mostly anhydrite, gypsum or halite (common salt), that are typically formed in areas wherethe rate of evaporation exceeds that of rainfall or fluvial influx (i.e. in desert areas).

Gondwana: an ancient mega-continent named after the Gond tribe of northern India. Comprised Antarctica, Australia,India, Afro-Arabia and South America. It began to split up into its modern components in the later Mesozoic.

gypsum: an evaporite mineral, Calcium Sulphate (CaSO4.- 2(H

2O)), typically found just below the surface of coastal

and inland sabkhas. Alters to anhydrite when it loses its water of crystallization.Hawasina: an imbricate wedge of sediments of mid Permian to mid Cretaceous age that were deposited over the

floor of Neo-Tethys 1. hydrocarbons: any organic compound comprising carbon and hydrogen, usually refers to oil and gas.Ka: abbreviation for thousands (K) of years (a).limestone: calcium carbonate (CaCO

3), mostly of biogenic origin, and largely formed in shallow seas.

linear dune: see dune.Ma: abbreviation for millions (M) of years (a).magma: molten rock when still within the Earth’s crust or mantle.mantle: the part of the Earth, nearly 3000 km thick, that underlies crust of both continental and oceanic type.maturation, maturity: the process of ‘ripening’ a source rock to the state where it generates oil or gas; the state of a

source rock with respect to its ability to generate oil or gas. Considered to range from immature, before any oil orgas has been generated, through mature to post-mature, when no additional oil or gas can be generated from it.

megadune: see dune.mesa: a mesa is a flat-topped plateau bounded on at least three sides by steep, commonly cliffed slopes. The bedding

is normally horizontal. A butte is a very small mesa. Both are found in the Miocene strata of western Abu Dhabi.microcontinent: a sub-continent or continental sliver calved from a major continental plate by processes of crustal

separation and spreading.mid-ocean ridge: a (mostly) submarine ridge that transects an oceanic area and is a locus of generation of new

oceanic crust.migration: the passage of a newly generated oil or gas out of a source rock (primary migration), and its movement

via rock conduits to other locations, including hydrocarbon traps (secondary migration).nappe: a large sheet-like rock unit that has been tectonically emplaced (thrust) over a dominantly sub-horizontal or

low-angle floor (e.g. Semail Nappe of Oman Mountains); at the contact, older rocks overlie younger rocks, whichis the reverse of what happens during deposition of normal sedimentary sequences.

nappe emplacement (obduction): the placing of a nappe above another (usually autochthonous) rock unit withoutimplying whether this relationship was the result of over-thrusting or underthrusting.

Neo-Tethys I: that part of the ancient ocean Tethys formed when the Sirjan-Sanandaj microcontinent separated fromthe eastern (Arabian) margin of Gondwana.

Neo-Tethys 2: the ocean that separated Central Iran from Siran-Sarandaj.obduction: the process by which former oceanic crust or a wedge of oceanic sediments comes to lie upon crust of

continental type.oceanic crust: the type of crust that characteristically underlies the Earth’s oceans; it is denser than continental crust.ophiolite: obducted oceanic crust, now separated from previously contiguous crust of oceanic type.parautochthonous: a rock unit that is not quite autochthonous, and has undergone some (thrust) transport; e.g. the

Ru’us al-Jibal rock units. pillow lava: the pillow-like masses of rock that form when magma is extruded below water and chilled rapidly.plate: one of the major areas of the Earth’s crust, normally comprising continental and contiguous oceanic crust.plate tectonics: the processes by which the Earth’s crustal plates are formed and interact with each other. porosity: the pore spaces within a rock; in oil fields, these pores are filled with oil or gas.reservoir, reservoir rock: any rock that can contain moveable fluids in its pore spaces.ripple: a surface undulation, generally of unconsolidated sand, whose wavelength depends on wind strength and is

constant with time. The ripple axis is always transverse to the wind. The coarsest grains are found at the crest.

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

The ripple height depends on the range of grain sizes present and the wind strength.sabkha: a flat area of clay, silt or sand, commonly with crusts of salt. Subdivided into:

1) coastal sabkha: a coastal flat at or just above the level of normal high tide. Its sediments consist of sand, siltor clay and its surface is often covered with a salt crust formed by the evaporation of water drawn to the surfaceby capillary action or from occasional marine inundations. The coastal sabkha is characterized by the presenceof algal mats and the occurrence of gypsum and anhydrite within its sediment. It is subject to deflation downto the water table.

2) inland sabkha: a flat area of clay, silt or sand, commonly with saline encrustations, that is typical of desertareas of inland drainage and some interdune areas. Their salts may be formed by evaporation of surface water,or of water drawn to the surface from the water table by capillary action.

salt dome: a dome-shaped structure caused by the upward penetration of a circular plug of salt, commonly 1-2 km indiameter, through overlying strata; the plug may also give strata through which it fails to penetrate a domal shape.

Semail Nappe: the name given to the huge ophiolite nappe of the Oman Mountains.Semail ophiolite: the huge ophiolite slab of the Oman Mountains typically comprising peridotites and harzburgites,

partly serpentinized, gabbros and basaltic pillow lavas.shamal: Arabic word for north: applied to north or northwest wind that blows down the Arabian Gulf and clockwise

across the Rub al-Khali. star dune: see dune.source rock: a rock rich in organic matter which, if heated sufficiently, will generate oil or gas.subduction: the process at a plate margin of crustal consumption down a subduction zone.subduction zone: a sloping linear zone down which crust and overlying sediment of mostly oceanic type passes into

the mantle beneath the edge of another plate, commonly but not exclusively of continental type.temperature gradient: the change in temperature measured over a given distance; usually measured in °C/km. Often

used to calculate depth at which source rocks become mature.thrust: a reverse fault or slide plane, on which older rocks have been emplaced over younger ones.thrust sheet: a sheet of rock that has been tectonically emplaced over a younger rock sequence, the two units commonly

being separated by a relatively low-angle thrust plane: a nappe.Trade Wind Desert: a term sometimes applied to those deserts in subtropical land areas that are crossed by the trade

winds.transverse dune: see dune.trap: any deformation (fold, fault, wedge-out) of a reservoir rock/seal couplet that can cause hydrocarbons to be

trapped as they migrate from their source rocks.turbidite: the sedimentary deposit that settles out from a turbidity current; its sediment is commonly graded from

coarse at the base to fine at the top.turbidity current: high velocity current of relatively dense turbid sediment and water that occasionally flows across

the floor of some ocean basins from a site usually high on the adjacent continental slope.wadi: desert watercourse, dry except after rain, or a valley where water may continue to flow intermittently.water of crystallisation: the water present in hydrated compounds such as gypsum (CaSO

4.2H

2O). If the temperature

of the gypsum crystal is raised above about 50°C, either by deep burial or by near-surface heating in a desert, it losesits water of crystallisation (2H

20) and becomes the anhydrous mineral anhydrite (CaSO

4).

window: an area where erosion has cut down through a thrust plane to expose the underlying rocks: e.g. HagilWindow in the south-west Ru’us al Jibal.

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253–88.Alsharhan, A. S. & Whittle, G. L. ‘Carbonate-Evaporite sequences of the Late Jurassic, southern and south-western

Arabian Gulf’, American Association Petroleum Geologists Bulletin, 79 (11) (1995) pp 1608–30.Al-Silwadi, M. S., Kirkham, A., Simmons, M. D. & Twombley, B. N. ‘New insights into regional correlation and

sedimentology, Arab formation (Upper Jurassic), offshore Abu Dhabi’, GeoArabia, 1(1) (1996) pp 6–27.Béchennec, J., Le Métour, J., Rabu, D., Villey, M. and Beurrier, M. ‘The Hawasina Basin: a fragment of a starved

passive continental margin, thrust over the Arabian Platform during obduction of the Semail Nappe’, Tectono-physics, 151 (1988) pp 323–42.

Béchennec, F., Le Metour, J., Rabu, D,. Bourdillon-de-Grissac, Ch.,Wever, P., de. Beurrier, M. & Villey, M. ‘TheHawasina Nappes: stratigraphy, palaeogeography and structural evolution of a fragment of the south-Tethyanpassive continental margin’ in A.H.F. Robertson, M.P. Searle, & A.C. Ries, (eds), The Geology & Tectonics of the

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Oman Region, Geological Society Special Publication 49 (1990) pp 213–23.Besler, H. ‘The north-eastern Rub al-Khali within the borders of the United Arab Emirates’, Zeitschrift für Geomor-

phologie, N.F. 26(4) (1982) pp 495–504.Beydoun, Z. R. ‘Arabian Plate Hydrocarbon Geology and Potential – a plate tectonic approach’, AAPG Studies in

Geology, 33 (1991) pp 1–77.Boote, D. R. D., Mou, D. & Waite, R.I. ‘Structural evolution of the Suneinah Foreland, Central Oman Mountains’

in A.H.F. Robertson, M.P. Searle, & A.C. Reis (eds), The Geology & Tectonics of the Oman Region, GeologicalSociety Special Publication 49 (1990) pp 397–418.

Boulton, G.S. ‘Ice Ages and Climatic Change’ in P. McL. D. Duff (ed), Holmes’Principles of Physical Geology (4thed) London, Chapman & Hall (1993) pp 439–69.

Dunne, L. A. Manoogian, P.R. & Pierini, D. F. ‘Structural style and domains of the Northern Oman Mountains (Omanand United Arab Emirates)’in A.F. Robertson et al. (eds), The Geology & Tectonics of the Oman Region, GeologicalSociety Special Publication 49 (1990) pp 375–86.

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Glennie, K. W. Desert Sedimentary Environments, Developments in Sedimentology 14, Amsterdam, Elsevier (1970).Glennie, K. W. ‘Desert Sedimentary Environments, present and past– a summary’, Sedimentary Geology , 50 (1/3)

(1987) pp 135–65.Glennie, K. W. ‘Plate Tectonics & the Oman Mountains’, Tribulus , 2(2) (1992) pp 11–21.Glennie, K. W. ‘Wind Action and Desert Landscapes’ in P.McL.D Duff (ed) Holmes’Principles of Physical Geology

(4th ed) London, Chapman & Hall (1993) pp 470–504.Glennie, K. W. ‘Quaternary dunes of SE Arabia and Permian (Rotliegend) dunes of NW Europe: some comparisons’,

Zeitblad Geol. Paläontol. Teil 1. 11/12 (1994) pp 1199–1215.Glennie, K. W. The Geology of the Oman Mountains: an outline of their origin, Beaconsfield, Scientific Press (1995).Glennie, K. W., Boeuf, M.G.A., Hughes Clarke, M.W., Moody-Stuart, M., Pilaar, W.F.H. & Reinhardt, B.M. ‘Late

Cretaceous nappes in the Oman mountains and their geologic evolution’, American Association PetroleumGeologists Bulletin , 57(1)(1973) pp 5–27.

Glennie, K. W., Boeuf, M. G. A., Hughes Clarke, M. W., Moody-Stuart, M., Pilaar, W. F. H. & Reinhardt, B. M.Geology of the Oman Mountains, Verhandelingen Koninklijke Nederland Geologisch Mijnbouwkundig Genootschap,31 (1974).

Glennie, K. W., Hughes Clarke, M. W., Boeuf, M. G. A., Pilaar, W. F. H. & Reinhardt, B. B. ‘Inter-relationship ofMakran-Oman Mountains belts of convergence’in A. H. F.Robertson, M. P. Searle, & A. C. Reis (eds), The Geology& Tectonics of the Oman Region, Geological Society Special Publication 49 (1990) pp 773–86.

Goodall, T. M. The geology and geomorphology of the Sabkhat Matti region (United Arab Emirates): a modernanalogue for ancient desert sediments from north-west Europe, Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen (1995).

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& Désalmand (eds) Global Precipitation and Climate Change, NATO ASI Series Vol 126, Berlin, Springer-Verlag(1994) pp 3–26.

Robertson, A.F.H. & Searle, M.P. ‘The northern Oman Tethyan continental margin: stratigraphy, structure, conceptsand controversies’ in A.H.F. Robertson, M. P. Searle, & A. C. Ries (eds), The Geology & Tectonics of the OmanRegion. Geological Society Special Publication 49 (1990) pp 3–25.

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Shackleton, N. J. ‘Oxygen isotopes, ice volume and sea level’, Quaternary Science Review, 6 (1987) pp 183–190.Shinn, E. A. ‘Tidal Flat Environment’ in Scholle, P. A., Bebout, D. G. & Moore, C. H. (eds) 1983 Carbonate Deposi-

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Press (1981).Teller, J.T., Glennie, K.W., Lancaster, N. and Singhvi, A.K.. ‘Calcareous dunes of the United Arab Emirates and

Noah’s Flood: the postglacial reflooding of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf’. Quarternary International (2000) pp297–308

United Arab Emirates University, The National Atlas of the United Arab Emirates, Al Ain (1993).Vita Finzi, C. ‘Rates of Holocene folding in the coastal Zagros near Bandar Abbass, Iran’, Nature, 278 (1979) pp

632–4.Whybrow, P. J. & Hill, A. (eds) Fossil Vertebrates of Arabia, Yale University Press (1999).

EVOLUTION OF THE EMIRATES’ LAND SURFACE: AN INTRODUCTION

Before the Emirates:an Archaeological and Historical Accountof Developments in the Region c. 5000 BC to 676 AD

D.T. Potts

Introduction

In a little more than 40 years the territory of the former Trucial States and modern UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) has gone from being a blank on the archaeological map of WesternAsia to being one of the most intensively studied regions in the entire area. The present chapterseeks to synthesize the data currently available which shed light on the lifestyles, industriesand foreign relations of the earliest inhabitants of the UAE.

Climate and Environment

Within the confines of a relatively narrow area, the UAE straddles five different topographiczones. Moving from west to east, these are (1) the sandy Gulf coast and its intermittentsabkha; (2) the desert foreland; (3) the gravel plains of the interior; (4) the Hajar mountainrange; and (5) the eastern mountain piedmont and coastal plain which represents thenorthern extension of the Batinah of Oman. Each of these zones is characterized by a widerange of exploitable natural resources (Table 1) capable of sustaining human groupspractising a variety of different subsistence strategies, such as hunting, horticulture,agriculture and pastoralism. Tables 2–6 summarize the chronological distribution of thoseterrestrial faunal, avifaunal, floral, marine, and molluscan species which we know to havebeen exploited in antiquity, based on the study of faunal and botanical remains fromexcavated archaeological sites in the UAE. Unfortunately, at the time of writing the numberof sites from which the inventories of faunal and botanical remains have been publishedremains minimal. Many more archaeological excavations (Fig. 1) have taken place whichhave yielded biological remains that have not yet been published. Nevertheless, a rangeof sites with a published floral and faunal record already exists which extends from thelate prehistoric era of the fifth/fourth millennium BC to the first few centuries AD, andthese leave us in no doubt that the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the region exploited a verywide range of plants, animals, fish and shellfish. So far from being an inhospitable desert,the land and waters of the modern UAE presented its ancient inhabitants with an enormousvariety of exploitable, economically important resources.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Table 1. Environments and resources of significance in the past found in the UAE

Resource Category Gulf Coast Desert Interior Piedmont Mountains Eastern Piedmont

Faunal fish small mammals camel small mammals fishshellfish gazelle freshwater fish shellfishdugong camel marine turtlescormorant crabsmarine turtleswhales and dolphins

Floral mangrove fodder plants cultivars timber grazing plantsfodder plants fuel plants fodder plants cultivars timberfuel plants medicinal plants fuel plants fodder plants fodder plantsmedicinal plants timber fuel plants fuel plants

medicinal plants medicinal plants

Mineral sandstone sandstone well-drained soils limestone igneous rockbeach rock igneous rock limestonelime copper shellpearls ironshell soft-stones

Water brackish brackish abundant abundant abundant

Resource Utilization fishing pastoralism agriculture horticulture horticulturepearling oasis horticulture horticulture pastoralism pastoralismlimited gardening pastoralism hunting fishingpastoralism

Fig. 1. Map of the UAE, showing the approximate locations of the archaeological sites mentioned inthe text.

Dalma

Sir Bani Yas

Ra’s al-Aygh

Marawah

• Barqat Bu Hassa

• Habshan

• Abu Dhabi Airport

Ghanadha

Ghalilah

AwhalaHatta •Rafaq •

Wadi al-Qawr •al-Madam

W. Munay’i •Umm Safahal-ThuqaibahJ. Buhais

J. Emalah Kalba• al-Qusais• Bithna

QidfaMleiha •Muwailah Khor FakkanTel Abraq Bidiyah •

Sharm •• al-DurAsimahRamlah

Khatt Dibba

Nud ZibaW. Haqil

DhayahShimal

Jazirat al-HulaylaNadd al-Walid 1-2

GhallahAkab

al-Madaral-Hamriyah

MoweihatSharjah Tower

al-Qassimiyaal-Sufouh

• Qarn Bint Saud

• J. HuwayyahJ. Auha •

Hili •Rumeilah • Qattarah

• J. HafitMazyad

Balghelam

Umm al-Nar

• J. Barakah

Not to scale; locations approximate

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 3. Reptiles and birds attested on archaeological sites in the UAE

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

REPTILE (wild)green turtle (Chelonia mydas) Akab1 Tell Abraq2 Tell Abraq? Tell Abraq? al-Dur3

DalmaChelonidae indet. Dalma4

Mleiha5 Umm al-Narsnake indet. (Serpentes sp.) Mleiha

BIRD (wild)Socotra cormorant(Phalacrocorax nigrogularis) Dalma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Umm al-Nar6 Mleiha7

ostrich (Struthio camelus) Abu Dhabi airport7 Tell Abraq MleihaAbu Dhabi airport

snake bird (Anhinga rufa) Umm al-Narduck (Anas querquedula) Umm al-Narflamingo (Phoenicopterus aff. ruber) Umm al-Nargiant heron? (Ardea bennuides) Umm al-Narbird unident. Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

BIRD (domestic)chicken (Gallus gallus f. domestica) al-Dur

1 Prieur and Guerin 1991. 2 Stephan 1995. 3 Van Neer and Gautier 1993. 4 Beech 20005 Beech 1998. 6 Hoch 1979, 1995. 7P. Hellyer, pers. comm. 8Gautier 1992, Gautier and Van Neer 1999.

Table 2. Mammalian fauna attested on archaeological sites in the UAE

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

MAMMAL (wild) Rodentia Tell Abraq1 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha2

rat (Rattus rattus) al-Dur3

mouse (Mus musculus) al-Durmouse (Mus domesticus) MleihaRueppell’s fox (Vulpes rueppelis) al-DurArabian red fox (Vulpes vulpes) al-Dur

Mleihafox (Vulpes sp.) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleihagazelle (Gazella subgutturosa) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

Umm al-Nar4

gazelle indet. (Gazella gazella ssp.) Akab5 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-DurDalma6 Mleiha

bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus)dolphin indet. (Delphinus sp.) Dalma Umm al-Nar Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Durdugong (Dugong dugon) Akab Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Dalma Umm al-Nar?rorqual (Balaenoptera) Umm al-NarArabian oryx (Oryx leucoryx) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Umm al-Nar Mleihatahr (Hermitragus jayakari) Mleihacamel (Camelus dromedarius) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

Umm al-Nardeer (Dama mesopotamica) al-Dur

MAMMAL (domestic)Zebu (Bos indicus) Tell Abraq? Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

Umm al-Nartaurine cattle (Bos taurus) Tell Abraq? al-Dur

Mleihasheep (Ovis aries) Dalma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Umm al-Nar Mleihagoat (Capra hircus) Dalma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Umm al-Nar Mleihacanid indet. Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleihadog (Canis familiaris) Shimal al-Dur

Mleihadonkey (Equus sp.) Mleihaequid indet. Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Durdromedary camel (Camelus dromedarius) Tell Abraq al-Dur

MleihaBactrian camel (Camelus ferus f. bactriana) al-DurCamelus bactrianus x dromedarius Mleiha

1 Stephan 1995. 5 Prieur and Guerin 1991.2 Gautier 1992, Gautier and Van Neer 1999, Mashkour and Van Neer 1999. 6 Beech 2000.3 Van Neer and Gautier 1993. 7Uerpmann 1999.4 Hoch sp.1979, 1995.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Table 4. Fish attested on archaeological sites in the UAE

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

FISH (marine)Elasmobranchii Dalma1

Carcharhinidaerequiem shark (Carcharhinus sp.)

Sphyrnidae al-Dur2

hammerhead shark (Sphyrna sp.) al-Durshark indet. Umm al-Nar3

Pristidaesawfish (Pristis sp.) Umm al-Nar al-Dur

Dasyatidae (Trygonidae)stingray (Dasyatis?) Umm al-Nar al-Dur

Clupeidaeherring (Clupeidae indet.) al-Dur

Chanidaemilkfish (Chanos chanos) al-Dur

Ariidae Dalmasea catfish (Arius thalassinus) al-Dur

Belonidaeneedlefish (Tylosurus crocodilus) Dalma al-Dur

Platycephalidaeflathead (Platycephalus indicus) al-Dur

Serranidaesea bass/grouper (Epinephelus sp.) Dalma al-Dur

Carangidaejacks and pompanos Dalma al-Dur(Scomberoides sp.)(Seriola sp.)(Megalaspis cordyla)(Carangoides chrysophrys)(Carangoides sp.)(Caranx sp.)(Gnathodon speciosus)(Alectis indicus)(Ulua mentalis)Carangidae indet.

Lutjanidaesnapper (Lutjanus sp.) al-Dur

Gerreidaemojarra (Gerres sp.) al-Dur

Haemulidaegrunt (Pomadasys sp.) al-Dur

Lethrinidae Dalmaemperor (Lethrinus sp.) al-Madar? al-Dur

Sparidaeporgie Dalma al-Dur(Crenidens crenidens) al-Dur(Acanthopagrus berda) al-Dur(Acanthopagrus latus) al-Dur(Rhabdosargus sarba) al-Dur(Rhabdosargus sp.) Mleiha(Argyrops spinifer) al-DurSparidae indet. al-Madar? al-Dur

Ephippidaespadefish (Platax sp.) al-Dur

Mugilidaemullet (Mugilidae indet.) al-Dur

MleihaSphyraenidae Dalma

barracuda (Sphyraena sp.) al-DurScaridae Dalma

parrotfish (Scarus sp.) al-DurSiganidae

rabbitfish (Siganus sp.) al-DurScombridae Dalma al-Dur

bonito/tuna (Euthynnus affinus) Dalma al-DurMleiha

tuna (Thunnus sp.) al-DurMleiha

Tetraodontidaepuffer (Tetraodontidae indet.) al-Dur

fish indet. (still under study) Tell Abraq5 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

FISH (freshwater)Cyprinidae

barbel (Barbus sp.) al-Dur

Crustaceans crab et al. (still under study) al-Madar Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Dalma Mleiha

1 Beech 2000.2 Van Neer and Gautier 1993.3 Hoch 1979, 1995.4 Uerpmann and Uerpmann 1996.5 Stephan 1995.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Most, if not all, of the flora and fauna utilized by the pre-Islamic population of the region isstill to be found in the area. This is not an unequivocal indication that no climatic change hastaken place since the prehistoric past, but it is certainly an indication that the changes which havetaken place have been minor rather than major ones. At the height of the Flandrian Transgression,c. 4000 BC, sea level in the Arabian Gulf reached its peak around .5m higher than it is today(Lambeck 1996), and until c. 3000 BC a more humid environment prevailed, largely as a resultof wind systems which were weaker than those at present, ‘permitting convection-induced thunderstorms in coastal and mountainous areas’ (Glennie et al. 1994: p 3). After 3000 BC today’s aridregime set in and although there have been minor climatic adjustments since that time, it is safeto say that the basic pattern observable in the region today has prevailed for the past five millennia.

Table 5. Plants and cultivars attested on archaeological sites in the UAE

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

FLORA (wild)Apocynaceaeoleander (Nerium oleander) Mleiha1

AsclepiadaceaeSodom’s apple (Calotropis procera) Mleiha

al-DurAvenaceaeoat (Avena sp.) Hili 8

Avicenniaceaemangrove (Avicennia marina) Tell Abraq?white mangrove (Avicennia marina) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Chenopodiaceaegoosefoot (sp. indet.) Hili 82 Mleiha

Leguminosaeacacia indet. (Acacia sp.) Hili 83 Muwailah Mleihagum arabic (Acacia nilotica) Mleihasissoo (Dalbergia sissoo) Tell Abraq Mleiha4

al-Durprosopis (Prosopis cineraria) Muwailah Mleiha

Oleaceaeash (Fraxinus sp.) Mleiha

PinaceaeAleppo pine (Pinus halepensis) al-Dur

Platanaceaeoriental plane (Platanus orientalis) Mleiha

PolygonaceaeCalligonum sp. Hili 8

RhamnaceaeChrist’s thorn (Ziziphus spina-christi) Dalma5 Hili 86 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha7

Tell Abraq MuwailahRhizophoraceaeextinct mangrove Dalma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

al-DurSolanaceaedesert thorn (Lycium sp.) Mleiha

Tamaricaceaetamarisk (Tamarix sp.) Hili Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

Tell Abraq Muwailah

FLORA (domestic)wheat (Triticum sp.) Umm al-Nar8 Mleihaemmer wheat (Triticum dicoccum) Hili 8bread wheat (Triticum aestivum) Tell Abraq9 Tell Abraq

Hili 8barley (Hordeum sp.) Umm al-Nar Mleiha2-row hulled barley (H. distichon) Hili 86-row hulled barley (H vulgare) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq

Hili 86-row naked barley (H. vulgare var. nudum) Hili 8date palm (Phoenix dactylifera) Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

Dalma10

Hili 8 Muwailah11 al-Durmelon (Cucumis sp.) Hili 8

1 Tengberg and Potts 1999.2 Coubray 1988, Tengberg 1998.3 Tengberg 1998.4 Cleuziou and Costantini 1980, Cleuziou

1989, Potts 1994b, Tengberg 1998.

5 Tengberg 1998.6 Cleuziou and Costantini 1980, Cleuziou

1989, Potts 1994b.7 Coubray 1988.8 Willcox 1995.

9 Willcox and Tengberg 1995.10 Beech and Shepherd, in press11 Tengberg 1998.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Table 6. Molluscan fauna attested on archaeological sites in the UAE

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

Marine BivalvesAcar plicata MleihaAlectryonella plicatula Mleiha1

Amiantis umbonella Tell Abraq2 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq MleihaShimal3

Anadara sp. MleihaAnadara antiquata Shimal MleihaAnadara ehrenbergeri al-Madar4 Tell Abraq Mleiha

Awhala5

Anadara uropigimelana MleihaAnodontia edentula MleihaAsaphis deflorata Tell Abraq Tell Abraq MleihaAsaphis violascens Shimal MleihaBalanus sp. Tell Abraq MleihaBarbatia fusca Tell Abraq MleihaBarbatia helblingii Shimal MleihaBarbatia obliquata MleihaBarbatia tenella MleihaBarbatia sp. al-Madar al-Dur6

Callista erycina Akab7 Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq MleihaShimal Awhala

Callista sp. MleihaCardita bicolor MleihaCardita variegata MleihaCardita sp. al-DurCerthidea cingulata Tell Abraq al-DurChama pacifica MleihaChama sp. MleihaChlamys ruschenbergerii Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

ShimalCirce corrugata Shimal MleihaCirce sp. MleihaCircenita callipyga Dalma8 Shimal Tell Abraq MleihaCodakia tigerina MleihaDecatopecten plica MleihaDosinia alta MleihaDosinia ceylonica MleihaDosinia tumida MleihaGlycymeris sp. al-Dur

MleihaGlycymeris lividus Tell Abraq MleihaGlycymeris maskatensis Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

ShimalIsognomon legumen Shimal MleihaLaevicardium papyraceum MleihaLutraria sp. MleihaMactra lilacea MleihaMarcia sp. Shimal Awhala MleihaMarcia hiantina Akab Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

al-Madar Shimal Muwailah9 MleihaMarcia opima Tell Abraq MleihaModiolus phillipinarum Mleiha

al-DurPeriglypta puerpera MleihaPinctada sp. Tell Abraq? Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Awhala MleihaPinctada margaritifera Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Mleiha

Shimal MuwailahPinctada radiata Dalma Tell Abraq Muwailah al-Dur

al-Madar Shimal MleihaPinna sp. Tell Abraq MleihaPteria marmorata MleihaSaccostrea cucullata Akab Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Hamriyah10 Shimal Awhala Mleihaal-Madar Muwailah

Sanguinolaria cumingiana Tell Abraq MleihaSolen sp. MleihaSpondylus sp. Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

MleihaSpondylus ?exilis Shimal MleihaSpondylus gaederopus MleihaSunetta effosa MleihaTellina sp. MleihaTivela damaoïdes MleihaTivela ponderosa MleihaTivela sp. MleihaTrachycardium sp. MleihaTrachycardium lacunosum Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Shimal MleihaTuritella sp. al-DurVenus verrucosa Mleiha

Marine GastropodsAncilla castenea MleihaArchitectonia perspectiva Tell Abraq? MleihaBabylonia spirata MleihaBullia sp. MleihaBullia tranquebarica Tell Abraq MleihaBursa bardeyi MleihaBursa sp. MleihaBythinia sp. MleihaCerithium sp. MleihaCerithium caeruleum MleihaCerithidea cingulata Tell Abraq Shimal Tell Abraq Mleiha

al-DurCharonia sp.? MleihaClypeomorus bifasciatus MleihaConus betulinus MleihaConus cf. ebraeus MleihaConus cf. kermadecensis Mleiha

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 6. Molluscan fauna attested on archaeological sites in the UAE (continued)

Species Late Prehistoric Umm al-Nar Wadi Suq Iron Age Mleiha/al-Dur

Conus flavidus MleihaConus striatus MleihaConus tessulatus MleihaConus textile al-DurConus sp. Tell Abraq MleihaCronia konkanensis Shimal MleihaCuma lacera Tell Abraq? Tell Abraq? MleihaCymatium sp. MleihaCypraea sp. Tell Abraq al-Dur

MleihaCypraea arabica Tell Abraq MleihaCypraea clandestina Awhala MleihaCypraea caurica MleihaCypraea gracilis Mleiha

al-DurCypraea grayana Awhala MleihaCypraea aff. lentiginosa MleihaCypraea turdus Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Shimal MleihaEngina mendicaria Mleiha

al-DurEngina sp. MleihaFasciolaria trapezium MleihaFicus subintermedia Tell Abraq Tell Abraq? Tell Abraq Mleiha

Jebel al-Emalah11 Shimalal-Sufouh12

Fusinus arabicus Mleihaal-Dur

Lambis sp. MleihaLambis truncata sebae MleihaLunella coronatus Dalma Shimal MleihaMonilea obscura Shimal MleihaMorula granulata MleihaMurex (Hexaplex) kuesterianus Dalma, Akab Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Hamriyah Muwailah Mleihaal-Madar

Murex scolopax Tell Abraq MleihaNassarius arcularius plicatus Tell Abraq MleihaNassarius coronatus MleihaNassarius sp. Shimal MleihaNerita sp. MleihaNerita albicilla MleihaNeverita sp. MleihaNeverita didyma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq MleihaOliva bulbosa Tell Abraq Shimal Tell Abraq al-Dur

MleihaPatella exusta pica MleihaPatella sp. Mleiha

al-DurPhalium faurotis MleihaPhasianella solida Shimal MleihaPhasienella variegata MleihaPlanaxis sulcatus MleihaPolinices tumidus MleihaPolinices sp. Shimal MleihaRapana bulbosa MleihaSiratus kuesterianus Shimal MleihaStrombus decorus persicus Dalma Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Shimal MleihaStrombus gibberulus MleihaStrombus sp. MleihaTerebralia palustris Akab Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq al-Dur

Hamriyah Shimal Awhala Mleihaal-Madar Muwailah

Thais mutabilis MleihaThais savignyi Shimal MleihaThais sp. MleihaTonna sp. Shimal MleihaTonna dolium MleihaTonna luteostoma MleihaTrochus erythraeus Tell Abraq Tell Abraq? Mleiha

ShimalTurbo coronatus al-Madar Tell Abraq Tell Abraq Tell Abraq MleihaTurbo radiatus MleihaTurbo sp. MleihaTurritella sp. al-Dur

MleihaTurritella cochlea MleihaTurritella torulosa MleihaUmbonium vestiarium Shimal MleihaVermetes sulcatus Mleiha

al-DurVermetus sp. Mleiha

ScaphopodsDentalium octangulatum al-Sufouh Shimal Mleiha

Jebel al-EmalahDentalium sp. Mleiha

FRESHWATER MOLLUSCSMelanoides tuberculata Mleiha

al-Dur

1 Prieur 1999. 7 Prieur and Guerin 1991.2 Prieur 1990. 8 Beech and Elders 1999.3 Glover 1991. 9 E. Thompson, pers. comm.4 Uerpmann and Uerpmann 1996. 10 Jasim 1996.5 E. Thompson, pers. comm. 11 Benton and Potts, in press.6 Van Neer and Gautier 1993. 12 Benton 1996.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

The Arabian Bifacial Tradition (c. 5000–3100 BC)

During the last glacial maximum (from c. 68,000 to 8000 BC), winds were so strong in thedesert regions of the globe that they ‘probably blew at sand-transporting speeds for much ofeach glacial winter’ in eastern Arabia causing ‘severe dessication, even at reduced air temper-atures, producing conditions that were probably too severe for man to tolerate’ (Glennie etal. 1994: pp 2–3). This fact, perhaps more than any other, helps to explain the absence ofPleistocene hominid occupation and Middle and Upper Palaeolithic stone tool industries inthe UAE. The only exception to this yet identified may come from a site at Jebel Barakah inthe Western Province of Abu Dhabi where radial cores and the tip of a bifacial tool wererecovered which might date to the Middle Pleistocene (McBrearty 1993, 1999: pp 382–384).

The last glaciation collapsed around 10,000 years ago, and the slightly moister conditionswhich ensued from c. 8000 to 3000 BC have often been described as a Climatic Optimum(Glennie et al. 1994: p 3). It was during this period that the first securely dated humansettlements in the region appeared. Finely pressure-flaked, bifacial stone tools (Fig. 2) belongingto what has been called the ‘Arabian bifacial tradition’ have been found on a large number ofsites in a wide range of environmental zones throughout the Emirates. The most important ofthese are listed in Table 7. Tanged points, foliates, blades, knives, drills and other tools attestto the diversity of the tool-kit of the region’s first inhabitants. Affinities with material fromthe Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain (Spoor 1997) are obvious, suggestingthat the entire region may have formed a single cultural province at this time.

In other respects these areas also show shared traits. Painted pottery of Ubaid type, importedfrom Mesopotamia, has been found on many of the coastal sites in the UAE, eastern Saudi Arabia,Qatar, Bahrain and the islands of Kuwait, revealing the existence of contacts between these regionsand the peoples of southern Iraq in the fifth millennium BC. Petrographic analysis, moreover,has confirmed that some (and most probably all) of the pottery found on the Arabian bifacialsites in eastern Saudi Arabia was imported from Mesopotamia itself, and the likelihood that suchwas the case in respect to the material found on sites in the UAE is equally strong (Méry 1994:p 398; Méry 1996; Méry and Schneider 1996). Be that as it may, it is important to underscorethe fact that this introduction of pottery into the region did not lead immediately to the birth ofa local ceramic industry, something which did not appear until the third millennium BC.

b c

Fig. 2. Arabian bifacial tools from al-Madar(a-c) and Hamriyah (d). After Boucharlat et al.1991b: Fig. 1.1-3; Millet 1991: Fig. 1.4.

Contact with areas to the north may also help account for the introduction of domesticatessuch as sheep, goat and cattle, the wild forerunners of which were never at home in south-eastern Arabia (Uerpmann and Uerpmann 1996). All of these domesticates have been foundon Arabian bifacial sites in eastern Saudi Arabia and they are present at Ra's al-Hamra 6 inOman by the fifth millennium as well. Thus, it is likely that they were being herded on sitesin the UAE by this time. As the stone tool industry found throughout eastern Arabia whichprecedes the bifacial tradition – known as Qatar B (but absent in the UAE) – shows clearaffinities to the pre-pottery Neolithic industry of the Levant, it has been suggested that thismay have been the ultimate source of both the people and the herd animals which eventuallypopulated eastern Arabia during the earlier portion of the mid-Holocene Climatic Optimum,beginning c. 5000 BC.

The fact that the tool kit of the earliest inhabitants of the region contained numerous projectilepoints should not lead us to conclude prematurely that they were primarily hunters. Rather,Uerpmann and Uerpmann (1996) have stressed that herders will maximize their own flocks’secondary products – such as milk, fleece and hair – by preserving their animals and huntingto provide any meat desired. Thus, the Arabian bifacial sites may be those of herders whosupplemented their diet by hunting, rather than hunters who kept a few domestic animals.The fact that ostrich eggshell fragments (Aspinall 1998, Potts in press b) have been recoveredat sites with bifacial stone tools does not mean that these notoriously shy and elusive creatureswere hunted, merely that their eggs, so widely used in antiquity as containers for liquids, werealready being employed in this capacity at an early date.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 7. Principal late prehistoric sites in the UAELocation Site Literature

Jazirat al-Hamra Nadd al-Walid 1-2 Gebel 1988; Glover et al. 1990; Uerpmann 1992Ra’s al-Khaimah Wadi Haqil de Cardi 1985; Stocks 1996Khatt Kh 92, 117-119, 135 de Cardi et al. 1994Umm al-Qaiwain al-Madar Cauvin & Calley 1984; Boucharlat et al. 1991b; Haerinck 1994b;

Uerpmann & Uerpmann 1996Ramlah Uerpmann & Uerpmann 1996Akab Prieur & Guerin 1991; Boucharlat et al. 1991aTell Abraq Potts 1991a

Sharjah al-Hamriyah Cauvin & Calley 1984; Minzoni Déroche 1985a; Haerinck 1991a; Millet1991; Boucharlat et al. 1991a; Haerinck 1994b; Jasim 1996

al-Qassimiya Minzoni Déroche 1985a; Calley & Santoni 1986; Millet 1988; Boucharlatet al. 1991a

Sharjah Tower Millet 1988Mleiha/ P15, 18-19, Minzoni Déroche 1985b; Millet 1989Jebel Faiyah 21-22, 28 Jebel al-Emalah Charpentier 1996Jebel Buhais Jebel Buhais S. Jasim, H.-P. and M. Uerpmann, pers. comm.al-Madam al-Madam Gebel 1988Qarn Bint Saud Qarn Bint Saud Gebel 1988Al Ain Jebel Huwayyah Copeland & Bergne 1976; Gebel et al. 1989

Jebel Auha Gebel 1988Mazyad Gebel 1988; Gebel et al. 1989Hili 8 Inizan and Tisier 1980

Western Region Barqat Bu Hassa Gebel 1988Habshan Gebel 1988Jebel Barakah McBrearty 1993Shuwaihat McBrearty 1999Hamra McBrearty 1999Ra’s al-Aysh McBrearty 1999Bida al-Mitawaa Crombé 2000

Liwa oasis Yaw Sahhab Harris 1998Abu Dhabi Dalma Hellyer 1993, Flavin and Shepherd 1994islands Marawah King 1998, Hellyer 1998b-c

Abu Dhabi airport Hellyer 1998b

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Whether or not these groups were fully sedentary is unknown. A transhumant pattern ofoccupation along the coasts in the winter, when fishing (Desse 1995, Hellyer 1998a) andshellfish gathering would have been the main pursuits, and summer residence in the interior,when pastoralism and, eventually, horticulture, were practised, is entirely feasible and well-attested elsewhere in south-eastern Arabia (Lancaster and Lancaster 1992: p 345), if as yetunproven for the prehistoric UAE. Certainly this would account for the fact that coastal sites,which usually contain some areas of shell midden formation, are generally not very deep, andinterior sites generally have little if any stratification. It would also account for the uniformityin the tool-kit evidenced in both the coast and the interior of the UAE.

As yet we know little about the people who inhabited the territory of the UAE at this time.Burials in an Arabian bifacial site along the coast of the Umm al-Qaiwain lagoon have beenexcavated but not yet published (C.S. Phillips, pers. comm.). At al-Buhais 18, H.-P. and M.Uerpmann are excavating an important aceramic site with an extensive graveyard at the footof Jebel Buhais which dates to c. 4700 BC where the remains of domesticated sheep, goatand cattle, as well as a tool-kit of Arabian bifacial type, have been found (Uerpmann, Uerpmannand Jasim, in press; Kieswetter, Uerpmann and Jasim, in press).

The Late Fourth and Early Third Millennium (c. 3100–2500 BC)

At the end of the fourth millennium, c. 3100–3000 BC, a major suite of innovations appearedin the material culture inventory of the region. For the first time collective burials in the formof above-ground tombs (Fig. 3) built of unworked stone appear at two sites in the UAE, JebelHafit (including Mazyad) and Jebel al-Emalah. Named after the site where they were firstdiscovered, these ‘Hafit’-type tombs are completely without precedent in the local archaeo-logical sequence. What is more, a number of them have yielded small, biconical ceramicvessels, many so badly preserved as to have lost their original surfaces, but on some of whicha panel of painted, geometric decoration in black can still be seen (Potts 1986a). Not only arethese vessels (Fig. 3) superficially reminiscent of so-called ‘Jamdat Nasr’pottery from southernMesopotamia, but analyses of examples from both Jebel Hafit (Méry 1991: p 72; Méry andSchneider 1996) and Jebel al-Emalah (unpubl.) have confirmed that this material was imported,some of it from the type site Jamdat Nasr in south-central Iraq.

Because of the fact that most of the Hafit tombs in the UAE were robbed in antiquity littledata is available on their occupants (but cf. Højgaard 1985), and it is difficult to get a goodidea of just how many people were normally buried within them. More than one is probablyall that can be said at the moment, but, given the restricted size of their keyhole-like interiorchambers, it cannot have been greater than perhaps a dozen or so. Around the keyhole a largearea of mounded, unworked rock was heaped up, sometimes with a discernible ‘bench’encircling the exterior. Whereas the tombs at Jebel Hafit range in size from an estimated 7 to11 m in diameter (Frifelt 1971: p 377), the Jebel al-Emalah examples are approximately 11to 12 m across (Benton and Potts 1994). In addition to their pottery, other imported finds ofnote include a class of roughly square, bone or ivory beads with two diagonal perforations.These find identical parallels in Iran at Susa, Tepe Hissar and Tepe Yahya and in Mesopotamiaat Uruk, always in contexts dating to c. 3000 BC (Frifelt 1980: Pl. XVa; Potts 1993a: p 183for full refs.).

To date the settlements of the population buried in the Hafit tombs of south-eastern Arabia(examples are also found further south in Oman) have yet to be discovered. Although it hasbeen argued by S. Cleuziou that the occupation of the settlement at Hili 8 in Al Ain beganc. 3100 BC (Cleuziou 1996) there are good grounds for questioning this early date. Thus, itis striking that the two radiocarbon determinations on which this contention is based (MC–2266and 2267) are roughly 500 years earlier than the next earliest date from the site and, moreover,both of these early dates derive from samples of wood charcoal (Potts 1997a). As experiencehas shown at other sites, radiocarbon determinations run on charcoal are often anomalouslyearly because the wood in question was old by the time it was burned. Thus, for example, aship’s timber or architectural beam may have been used initially, re-cycled several times, andfinally burned as fuel hundreds of years after its initial employment, unlike dates, fruit pips,matting, and other organic materials which have a much more finite lifespan. If we discountHili 8 as a settlement which may have existed in tandem with the period in which the graveson the slopes of Jebel Hafit were built, we are left with no settlements with which to pair theseimportant funerary monuments.

The question naturally arises why and how the contact which transmitted the Jamdat Nasrvessels from Mesopotamia to the Oman peninsula was organized. In most discussions of thisphenomenon an economic motivation is ascribed to the Mesopotamian bearers of the JamdatNasr-type ceramics and beads which have appeared at Jebel Hafit and Jebel al-Emalah. Whatresources they may have been in search of is unknown, but it is generally admitted that copperfrom the Hajar Mountains is a likely candidate. Certainly small pins and awls of copper havebeen found in Hafit burials (Frifelt 1971), but it cannot always be assumed that these date tothe original period in which these tombs were used, and at both Jebel Hafit and Jebel al-Emalah we have ample evidence for the later re-use of the tombs during the third, second andfirst millennia BC and, at the latter site, as late as the fifth or sixth century AD (see below).

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

a b

c d e

Fig. 3. Selected examples of Jamdat Nasr-type pottery (a-d) from Hafit-type tombs at Jebel Hafit excavatedby the Danish expedition and a plan of one of the tombs (6.4 m. in diameter) excavated by the Frenchmission (e). After Frifelt 1971: Figs. 12A, 17A, 22B and 22A; and Cleuziou et al. 1978: Pl. 15.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

More relevant, perhaps, is the fact that the earliest proto-cuneiform texts from Uruk in southernMesopotamia which date to c. 3400–3000 BC – the so-called ‘Archaic Texts’ from Uruk –already contain references to ‘Dilmun’ copper. Dilmun was later identified with mainlandeastern Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but as there is no copper in either of these areas it hasusually been assumed that the copper in question must have come from further afield. Onanalogy with the situation in the late third and second millennia BC the copper source mostoften invoked is that which stretches from Fujairah in the north (Hassan and al-Sulaimi 1979)to lower Oman in the south. Thus, although there is no proof as yet, it has generally beenassumed that the motivation behind the Jamdat Nasr-period contact between the UAE andsouthern Mesopotamia was the incipient trade in copper.

The Mid to Late Third Millennium (c. 2500–2000 BC)

The agricultural settlement of south-eastern Arabia was predicated upon the domesticationof the date palm (Phoenix dactylifera). Without the date palm, the shade necessary for thegrowth of other, less hardy cultivars, including cereals, vegetables and fruits, was lacking.Once the bustan-type of garden came into existence, watered by wells which tapped the relativelyabundant and shallow lenses of sweet water found throughout much of the UAE, the basiswas laid for the development of the kind of oasis living (Cleuziou 1996) which is so charac-teristic of the wadi and piedmont settlements of the region. Herd animals, such as sheep, goatand cattle, of course played a part in the development of a full oasis economy, but no singlespecies was so critical in this process as the date palm.

The earliest villages of the UAE were thus agriculturally based, and perhaps, in order tosafeguard their investment in land, water and natural resources, the inhabitants of those villagesfelt compelled to construct imposing fortifications. These buildings appear for the first timein the middle of the third millennium and are an architectural leit-fossil of the so-called ‘Ummal-Nar’ (Umm an-Nar) period (c. 2500–2000 BC). Like their later descendants at sites such

as Nizwa in Oman, the fortress-towers ofsouth-eastern Arabia took the form of

raised, circular platforms consisting ofmassive crosswalls and interveninghollows filled with gravel, theentirety of which supported asurface raised up off the ground (byas much as 8 m) with a still higher,outer wall for defence. Undoubtedlysmall buildings stood upon theseraised platforms as well. Everyexample excavated to date is alsodistinguished by the presence of a

Fig. 4. The Umm al-Nar-periodfortress-tower of Hili 1, 24 m. indiameter. After Frifelt 1975: Fig. 3.

well in the centre of the building, and it may be justifiably asked whether or not the entirefortress is not a ‘lock’placed upon the precious water supply of the village in which the fortresswas located.

In the UAE, examples of such Umm al-Nar fortress-towers have been excavated at Hili 1(Fig. 4), Hili 8 (Cleuziou 1989, 1996), Bidiyah (Al Tikriti 1989), Tell Abraq (Potts 1990a,1991a, 1993b, 1995a, 2000 a-b) and Kalba (C.S. Phillips, pers. comm.). Whereas most ofthese range in size between 16 and 25 m in diameter, the tower at Tell Abraq, at 40 m indiameter, is by far the largest yet uncovered. The social and political implications of thesetowers are intriguing. There is no longer any doubt that, by the late third millennium BC, theOman peninsula was identified in Mesopotamian cuneiform sources as Magan (Sumerian)or Makkan (Akkadian). In addition to safeguarding the agricultural settlements in their environs,the towers of the Umm al-Nar periodmay also have been the power centresfor the ‘lords of Magan’ against whomseveral of the Old Akkadian emperors,including Manishtusu and Naram-Sin,campaigned in the twenty-third centuryBC (Potts 1986b,). Manishtusu’sallusion to campaigning against nofewer than 32 ‘lords of Magan’ impliesa decentralized political landscape atthe time, and one can well imagine asituation in which petty lords, each incontrol of a certain amount of territorycentred around a primary settlement(such as Tell Abraq, Bidiyah, Hili, etc.)dominated by a fortress-tower, bandedtogether to repulse the Akkadianinvasion of Magan. It should also benoted that unfortified settlements of amore ephemeral nature have also been discovered, particularly along the Gulf coast (e.g. atGhanadha, see Al Tikriti 1985; al-Sufouh, see Benton 1996; at al-Dur (ed-Dur), see Boucharlatet al. 1988: pp 2–3; Abu Dhabi airport, see de Cardi 1997; and Umm al-Nar, Frifelt 1991).

In general, the dead of the Umm al-Nar period were buried in circular, stone tombs facedwith finely-masoned ashlar blocks, although rectangular chambers, perhaps for secondaryreburial of bone from circular tombs which had become full, are also known (Haerinck 1990-91). Examples of Umm al-Nar circular tombs were first encountered by a Danish expeditionon the island of Umm al-Nar in Abu Dhabi in 1958 (Frifelt 1991). Thus it was that the islandgave its name to the period of which these tombs are characteristic. Umm al-Nar-type tombsrange in size from c. 4 m to 12 m in diameter. Internally, the structures have a variable config-uration of crosswalls which may either be free-standing, bounded on each end by a passageleading from one half of the tomb to the other, or joined to the external tomb wall, dividingthe interior of the tomb into two halves without access to each other. By 1995, examples ofUmm al-Nar tombs (Fig. 5) had been excavated in both coastal and inland Abu Dhabi (Umm

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 5. The Umm al-Nar-type tomb at al-Sufouh, 6 m indiameter. After Benton 1996.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

al-Nar island, Hili area), Dubai (al-Sufouh and Hatta), Ajman (Moweihat), Umm al-Qaiwain(Tell Abraq), and Ra’s al-Khaimah (Shimal, Wadi Munay’i). The better-preserved examplesshow that literally hundreds of individuals were buried in these tombs along with a wide rangeof grave furniture, including soft-stone bowls (David 1990, 1996); fine and domestic black-on-red ceramics (Fig. 6) of local manufacture (Frifelt 1990; Méry 1997); incised grey andpainted black-on-grey pottery (Fig. 6) from south-eastern Iran or Baluchistan (Cleuziou andVogt 1985; Benton 1996; Potts 2000, in press a); copper-bronze weaponry (daggers, spearheads;Potts 1998; Pedersen and Buchwald 1991; Weeks 1997, 1999, 2000, on Umm al-Nar-periodmetallurgy); personal items of jewellery such as bracelets and necklaces incorporating thousandsof beads, a significant proportion of which are Harappan paste micro-beads from the IndusValley (Benton 1996); and other exotic items such as ivory combs (Potts 1993d; Potts 2000a-b), gypsum lamps (Potts 1995a), and linen (Reade and Potts 1993).

Like their Hafit counterparts, many Umm al-Nar-period tombs were robbed in antiquity,but those excavated at Umm al-Nar, Hili North (Tomb A), Tell Abraq, Shimal, Moweihat andal-Sufouh have yielded substantial quantities of human skeletal remains which are beginningto provide important evidence on the diet and health of the late third millennium population

Fig. 6. A selection of Umm al-Nar-period pottery from the tomb at al-Sufouh, including black-on-grey(a-b), incised grey (c), fine tan with raised meandering ridge (d), and fine black-on-orange (e-g). AfterBenton 1996.

of the Oman peninsula (Blau 1996, 1998; Blau and Beech 1999). Furthermore, they revealthat all age grades, from foetal infants to elderly adults, were interred together in these tombs.One of the most intriguing questions concerns the relationship between the individuals buriedin the different chambers of a tomb. Recent analyses of the epigenetic traits on teeth (cf.Højgaard 1980) from three of the tombs excavated by the Danish expedition on Umm al-Narindeed supports the idea that the individuals buried within a single tomb were geneticallyrelated, probably representing members of closely inter-married families (Alt, Vach, Frifeltand Kunter 1995).

Palaeopathological inferences can also be drawn from an analysis of Umm al-Nar-periodskeletal remains. At Tell Abraq, for example, A. Goodman and D. Martin have studiedthousands of bones from a minimum of 394 individuals (Potts 2000b) interred in a tomb datingto c. 2100–2000 B.C. (Potts and Weeks 1999). Some of the preliminary conclusions of theirwork may be summarized as follows:

Periostitis and osteomyelitis, both of which result from non-specific infections such asstaph and strep, are found on roughly half of the tibia recovered. Signs of trauma inthe form of healed and unhealed lesions (mainly on the hands, ribs, and forearms) andosteochondritis dessicans (lesions which developin response to trauma to joint systems) weredetected on roughly 5% of all skeletal elements.Osteoarthritis was found in a significantproportion of the adult population. Fluorosis(exaggerated bone formation at muscle andligament attachments) and anemia of unknownorigin leading to perotic hyperostosis (thickeningof the cranium) were also found. Turning to thedental evidence, fluorosis is suggested by dentalmottling in a large portion of the dental finds.Attrition was extremely severe, as was caries incertain individuals, and enamel hypoplasisas(severe enamel growth disruption due toinfection) were common among children (Potts1993b: p 121).

Perhaps most surprising in the tomb at Tell Abraqwas the discovery, amongst otherwise disarticulatedbone, of a unique, fully articulated female aged c.20. ‘Abnormal upward curvature of the spine ofabout 30˚ beyond normal, early osteoarthritischanges in the right knee and ankle, a mild deformityof the left foot and mild changes in the right foot’suggest that ‘the female was sedentary, overusedher right leg and had a neuromuscular imbalance ofthe lower left leg. It further suggests the individualsuffered from a neurological disease of several years’

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 7. An Early Dynastic III-type,Mesopotamian storage jar fromGrave 1 (a) and a cylinder seal-impressed sherd (b) from thesettlement on Umm al-Nar. AfterFrifelt 1991: Fig. 86 and 1995:Fig. 255.

duration which led to partial crippling’(‘AtTell Abraq . . .’ 1994). After considerableconsul tat ion with a wide range ofspecialists, D. Martin has confirmed thatpoliomyelitis is the most likely diagnosis,making this the earliest recorded instanceof polio ever confirmed in the archaeo-logical record anywhere in the world.

Mention was made above of contactbetween late third millennium Magan andthe Old Akkadian empire. Not only arethese connections attested to in cuneiformsources, but complementary archaeologicalevidence exists in the form of large,buffware storage jars from Umm al-Narisland (Fig. 7), confirmed by analysis to beMesopotamian (Mynors 1983), and a seal-

impressed jar fragment of Syrian provenance (Amiet 1975, 1985). This material indicates thetransport of a liquid, perhaps oil, from Mesopotamia to Umm al-Nar island at this time. Contactswere also maintained in other directions as well. The incised grey and painted black-on-greywares from numerous Umm al-Nar tombs were manufactured in southern Iran and/orBaluchistan (Blackman et al. 1989) while painted brown-on-buff pottery of Kaftari type fromthe tombs at Tell Abraq and Shimal/Unar 2 indicate contacts with the Elamite region ofsouthwestern Iran (Potts 2000a: pp 116–117, in press a). Settlements such as Tell Abraq, Hili8, and Asimah (in Ra’s al-Khaimah) have yielded diagnostic examples of black-washed, finelylevigated, thick micaceous orange ware which comes from the Indus Valley (Cleuziou 1992:p 97; Potts 1994c: p 617 and Fig. 53.3). These certainly represent fragments of storage jars,suggesting that something was being exported from the Harappan world to the Gulf in bulk.It has recently been posited that a milk-product, perhaps a sort of cheese, was the commodityin question (Gouin 1990: pp 48–49). The presence of diagnostically Harappan etched carnelianbeads, as well as thousands of paste micro-beads, and cubical chert weights with identicalparallels at all of the major Harappan sites, and small objects of ivory, also implies contactwith the Indus Valley in the late third millennium. Finally, a unique ivory comb (Fig. 8) from thetomb at Tell Abraq can be reliably identified on the basis of its particular floral decoration as animport from Bactria (northern Afghanistan/southern Uzbekistan) (Potts 1993d, 2000a: p126).

Excavations at Asimah in the interior of Ra’s al-Khaimah have revealed the existence ofstone alignments consisting of raised platforms and subterranean graves which, on the basisof their associated finds, also date to the Umm al-Nar period (Vogt 1994a: pp 101ff; Görsdorfand Vogt, in press). These monuments, which have been compared with the triliths andalignments of southern and western Arabia, suggest that a degree of cultural diversity existedin late third millennium south-eastern Arabia which has yet to be adequately investigated.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Fig. 8. The ivory comb from the late Umm al-Nar-period tomb at Tell Abraq.

The Early and Middle Second Millennium (c. 2000–1200 BC)

For many years it was thought that a major discontinuity occurred in the archaeologicalsequence of the Oman peninsula at the end of the third millennium This was speculativelylinked to disruptions in the Indus Valley, where the Mature Harappan period came to an endand the Post-Harappan or Late Harappan era began. In the Indus Valley these changes werelong attributed to the Aryan invasion, but this explanation has fallen out of favour with mostscholars and remains purely conjectural. The absence of direct references to Magan inMesopotamian cuneiform sources after the Ur III period (2100–2000 BC) also led scholarsto speculate that the alleged Aryan invasion may have caused further disruptions, via a sortof cultural ‘ripple effect’, in south-eastern Arabia. The settlement record of the region seemedto evaporate, leaving very few sites occupied on anything like a full-time basis, and makingit difficult to find the habitations of the many individuals buried in the collective, secondmillennium tombs of the sort first found at Shimal, but known by the name ‘Wadi Suq’ aftera site in Oman first investigated by Karen Frifelt (Frifelt 1975: pp 377–378). Finally, thenotion that the camel (Camelus dromedarius) was domesticated sometime in the secondmillennium gave rise to theories of a reversion to full-time nomadism after the Umm al-Narperiod, leading some scholars to view the ‘Wadi Suq period’ (c. 2000–1300 BC) as a cultural‘dark age’ in the region (cf. the discussion in Potts 1993c: pp 427–435).

It remains true today that the absolute number of early second millennium settlements inthe UAE and Oman is not great, but on those which have been investigated, such as TellAbraq, Kalba 4 (Carter 1997), and from the surface indications at a site like Nud Ziba in Ra’sal-Khaimah (Kennet and Velde 1995), some population centres continued to be inhabited ona full-time basis and show no signs of a cultural ‘decline’. At Tell Abraq, for example, thelarge fortress-tower of the Umm al-Nar period continued in use down to the middle of thesecond millennium, with modifications to the outer walls and the construction of new buildingson the interior. Apart from these architectural modifications, there is a major change detectablein the diet of the site’s inhabitants, with marine resources (fish and shellfish) becoming moreimportant than they had been in the late third millennium and accounting for about 50 percent of all dietary requirements (Potts 1995a: p 96). A similar swing from the exploitation ofterrestrial fauna (sheep, goat, cattle) to marine resources has also been observed at Shimal asone moves from the earlier to the later second millennium (Grupe and Schutkowski 1989;Von den Driesch 1994; Glover 1998). However, domesticated camel is not attested until theIron Age and Wadi Suq camel ‘nomadism’cannot be invoked as an explanation for the changesin material culture – particularly in the ceramic repertoire – which characterize the period.Moreover, both Tell Abraq and Nud Ziba (Kennet and Velde 1995) provide examples of ceramicswhich are clearly transitional between Umm al-Nar and classic Wadi Suq types, suggestingthat the change from one period to the next was evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

The later Wadi Suq levels at Tell Abraq are paralleled by the occupation of the settlementat Shimal in Ra’s al-Khaimah, where an area of habitation at the base of the Hajar Mountains,and within sight of an ancient mangrove lagoon, was located (Vogt and Franke-Vogt 1987;Velde 1990, 1991, 1992). Shimal, and the nearby sites of Ghalilah and Dhayah are, however,better known for the many collective tombs of the Wadi Suq period located there (Vogt1998). These belong to a number of different formal types. All are constructed of unworked

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

boulders and wadi pebbles, often of massive size.Unlike their Umm al-Nar counterparts, whichwere round, the Wadi Suq tombs were generallyoval. The simplest ‘Shimal’ type is an elongatedoval enclosure which can be up to 30 m long androughly 2 m wide (e.g. in the case of Bidiyah 1;see Al Tikriti 1989: 102ff; for Sharm, see Rileyand Petrie 1999) with an entrance in one of thelong sides. The ‘Ghalilah’type is constructed likea broad oval with a central, freestanding wall inthe interior. This is used to support the capstones,the ends of which rest on the upper surface of theouter and inner walls. Finally, the ‘Khatt’ typeresembles a Shimal-type tomb with an entranceat one end which is enclosed by an outer wall,thus consisting of two burial spaces, the interiorchamber of the ‘Shimal’-type structure and acorridor running around its perimeter (Potts1990b/I: Fig. 28). At Asimah, in the interior ofRa’s al-Khaimah, a number of graves with secondmillennium finds (e.g. As 13) have been excavatedwhich represent a type previously unattested inthe region (Vogt 1994a: p 41). These are notableby virtue of their oval shape, marked by a stonewall on the surface, which encloses a subterraneanburial chamber, not unlike the original Wadi Suqgraves investigated by Frifelt in the 1970s. ManyWadi Suq-period tombs have also recently beenexcavated at Jebel Buhais, south of Mleiha in theinterior of Sharjah, and at Khor Fakkan, on theEast Coast of the country (S. Jasim, pers. comm.).

a b d ec

Fig. 9. Plans of the tombs at Dhayah 2 (a)and Bithna (b). After Kästner 1990: Abb. 4,and Corboud 1990: Fig. 4.Fig. 10. Socketed spearheads of the Wadi Suqperiod from Dhayah 2 (a-b), and cairn 2 atJebel Hafit (e). After Kästner 1990: Abb. 6;Vogt and Franke-Vogt 1987: Fig. 21.5-6;and Cleuziou et al. 1979: Pl. 16.1.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Subterranean, horse-shoe-shaped tombs in the Wadi al-Qawr of southern Ra’s al-Khaimah(Phillips 1987) and the Qidfa oasis of Fujairah (unpublished but on display in the FujairahMuseum) must also be dated to the Wadi Suq period. Although previously attributed to theIron Age (e.g. Potts 1990b/I: p 364), it is now clear from the finds made at Qidfa that theoriginal construction and use of these tombs dates to the second millennium, and that theclassic Iron Age material found within them represents the secondary reuse of these structuresat a much later date. Subterranean, T-shaped tombs (Fig. 9), such as those excavated at Dhayah(Kästner 1990, 1991) and Bithna (Corboud 1990; Corboud et al. 1996) also date to the WadiSuq period. Finally, individual inhumation graves dug into the sabkha at al-Qusais (Taha1982–1983), a suburb to the east of Dubai, include many of Wadi Suq date.

The Wadi Suq period is notable for the explosion in metallurgy witnessed at this time. Althoughoften robbed in antiquity, some Wadi Suq tombs, such as the horseshoe-shaped structure atQidfa, have yielded literally hundreds of weapons and vessels (Weeks 2000a-b). Where theUmm al-Nar period was characterized by daggers and spears, the Wadi Suq period witnessedthe introduction of the long sword, the bow and arrow (for incised Wadi Suq arrowheads, seeMagee 1998b), and a new, light type of socketed spearhead (Fig. 10). These innovations inweaponry are clearly significant for an understanding of Wadi Suq-period society (Potts1998a). The long swords of Qidfa, al-Qusais, Qarn Bint Saud Grave 3 (Lombard 1979: Pl.LI.1-4; Vogt 1985: Taf. 122.1-4) and Qattarah (Lombard 1979: Pl. LI.5-6) are double-edgedweapons with a raised, central midrib and a concave butt-end marked by rivet holes for theattachment of a separate hilt. The double cutting-edge implies that these were thrustingweapons, and the lack of a well-attached hilt means that they would have been poor devicesfor slashing. Judging by the light weight of Wadi Suq socketed spearheads, it can be suggestedthat they were to be used on throwing spears. Acomparison with the cuneiform evidence fromthird millennium Ebla, in Syria, shows that many of the Wadi Suq spearheads are within theweight range of the light throwing spears used there (63.2–79 g.), whereas none of them attainthe weight of the heavier points mounted on thrusting lances which were used by foot soldiersat Ebla and weighed approximately 237–474 g. each (Waetzoldt 1990: p 2). The appearanceof these weapons, along with hundreds of cast bronze, lanceolate arrowheads with a raised,flattened midrib, suggest an evolution in the technology of warfare during the second millenniumunprecedented in the earlier archaeological record of the region.

a b

cd e

In the late third millennium an industry arose in the manufacture of soft-stone vessels –generally bowls, beakers and compartmented boxes – decorated with dotted-circles madeusing a bow drill. During the Wadi Suq period the numbers of soft-stone vessels deposited intombs increased vastly and new shapes, along with the addition of incised diagonal andhorizontal lines in clusters (Fig. 11), allow us to easily separate the later soft-stone vesselsfrom their third millennium forerunners (Häser 1988, 1990a, 1990b).

Fig. 11. Wadi Suq-period soft-stone vessels from Shimaltomb 6 (a-e). After de Cardi 1988: Fig. 12.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

The continuities visible in settlement at a site like Tell Abraq – in metallurgical technology;in the manufacture of stone vessels, and in the ceramic industry – all point to the obviousconclusion that the Umm al-Nar/Wadi Suq divide, however real archaeologically, was not acomplete rupture. We have little evidence of the people themselves from this era, largelybecause of the poor state of preservation of most of the skeletal remains excavated to date,and the lack of publication of such important complexes as Qidfa and Qattarah. The skeletalmaterial from the tombs at Shimal was highly fragmentary (Wells 1984, 1985; Schutkowskiand Herrmann 1987) but studies of the teeth have shown that the population there showedlow rates of molar attrition, suggestive of a low ‘intake of dried fish, more efficient graingrinding or sieving, or less grain intake’ which may reflect a diet heavily dependent on freshfish and shellfish; low rates of caries, suggesting ‘that fermentable carbohydrates [e.g. dates]did not play a large role’ in the diet; high rates of calculus formation, associated with otherdental pathologies, such as caries-induced abscessing, which ‘most probably reflect differentdietary constituents, food preparation techniques, or levels of oral hygiene’ vis-à-vis otherpopulations in the region; and moderate to severe ante-mortem tooth loss, ‘possibly due toinflammation of the periodontium caused by extensive calculus’(Littleton and Frøhlich 1993:pp 440–444).

Some indication of an accumulation of wealth during the Wadi Suq period is provided byan interesting class of gold and electrum plaques in the form of two animals, standing back

a bc

Fig . 12 . WadiSuq-period goldand/or electrumanimal plaquesfrom Bidiyah (a)and Qattarah (b-d). After Al Tikriti1989: Pl. 74.

to back, often with their tails curled up in a spiral. Examples (Fig. 12) are now known fromDhayah (Kästner 1990: Taf. 40, 1991: Fig. 6a), Qattarah (Potts, 1990b/I: Pl. IX), and Bidiyah(Al Tikriti 1989: Pls. 74A, 95B). Some of that wealth may have been accumulated throughlong-distance trade in copper, a commodity for which Dilmun (modern Bahrain) becamefamous as a retailer to the southern Mesopotamian market city of Ur in the early secondmillennium. The discovery at Tell Abraq of over 600 sherds of Barbar red-ridged pottery,now shown to be compositionally identical to the pottery from the settlement at Saar onBahrain (Grave et al. 1996b) and on the island of Balghelam, Abu Dhabi (Hellyer, pers.comm.), points to the clear existence of contacts in that direction, as does the recovery ofBarbar pottery at Kalba on the East Coast (Méry, Phillips and Calvet 1998). Moreover, bothTell Abraq (Potts 1994c) andShimal (de Cardi 1988: Fig. 11)have Post-Harappan pottery inearly second millennium contextsw h i c h r e f l e c t t h e o n g o i n gexistence of contacts with theIndus Valley at this time.

From the Late Second tothe Late First Millennium(c. 1200–300 BC)

Two innovations occurred in thelate second millennium which wereto revolutionize the economies ofsouth-eastern Arabia. The domesti-cation of the camel, attested by theend of the second millennium at Tell Abraq (Stephan 1995), opened up new possibilities forland transport, while the discovery of the principles of using sub-surface water channels forthe transportation of water from aquifers to gardens – so-called falaj irrigation – made possiblethe extensive irrigation of gardens and agricultural plots which resulted in a veritable explosionof settlement across the Oman peninsula (Potts 1990b/I: pp 390–392).

In conformity with usage elsewhere in Western Asia, particularly Iran, the period from c. 1200to 300 BC has traditionally been referred to as the ‘Iron Age’. No term could be less appropriate,however, for in south-eastern Arabia iron was not widely used until the following period, exceptat Muwailah in the interior of Sharjah where iron weaponry has been found which, however, islikely to have been imported from Iran (Magee 1998c). Nevertheless, it is convenient to termthis era the Iron Age, particularly when referring to comparable sites and finds from other areas,such as Baluchistan, Iran, and Mesopotamia. Based on the evidence from Tell Abraq, the IronAge sequence in the UAE can be divided into three sub-periods, labelled Iron I (1200–1000BC), II (1000–600 BC) and III (600–300 BC) (Magee 1995, Magee 1997). With the exceptionof a tomb at Asimah (As 100) which contains Iron I material (Vogt 1994a: pp 81ff), all of theevidence for Early Iron Age occupation comes from Shimal, Tell Abraq and al-Hamriyah on

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 13. Half of a bivalve (Marcia) shell from an Early IronAge (Iron I) context at Tell Abraq containing atacamite, acuprous pigment widely used as eye-makeup in antiquity.

the Gulf coast, and Kalba on the East Coast. Fish and shellfish continued to be important in thediet of the Iron I inhabitants, although domesticated sheep, goat and cattle were kept, and gazelle,oryx, dugong, turtle and cormorant were exploited as well (Stephan 1995; Magee 1995: p 269).Domesticated wheat and barley were cultivated at this time (Willcox and Tengberg 1995; Davis1998), and the date palm remained as important as ever. The ceramics of the Iron I period showclear signs of continuity with the latest Wadi Suq material (Magee and Carter 1999; Magee etal. 1998), and are in general very coarse, grit-tempered, handmade wares, often in large, openbowl and vat-like shapes (Potts 1990a: pp 103–109). Half of a bivalve shell (Marcia hiantina)from an Iron I context at the site was found by x-ray powder diffraction analysis to containatacamite (Fig. 13), a cuprous pigment widely used in the ancient world as eye make-up (Thomasand Potts 1996). Similar pigment shells have also been found in the late Wadi Suq tomb at Sharmwhich was re-used during the Iron Age (Masia 2000).

The Iron II period is the ‘classic’Iron Age in the UAE and is attested at a number of extensivelyexcavated sites with substantial mudbrick architecture such as Rumeilah, Bint Saud, Hili 2,Hili 14 and Hili 17 in the Al Ain area (Boucharlat and Lombard 1985; Magee et al. 1998); al-Thuqaibah and Umm Safah on the al-Madam plain (Benoist, Cordoba and Mouton 1997); andMuwailah (Magee 1998a, 1998c, 1999a, 1999b; Müller 1999) in the sandy desertic area nearthe Sharjah International Airport. Many other sites, both graves and settlements, have beenlocated, and it is estimated that at least 150 sites of this period have been documented in theUAE and neighbouring Oman. The explosion in settlement at this time is generally attributedto the invention of falaj irrigation technology, and cultivation using the hoe may be inferredfrom the recovery of a bronze hoe-blade at Rumeilah (Boucharlat and Lombard 1985: Pl. 72.7;Weisgerber 1988: Pl. 161; Potts 1994a).

It is interesting to note that the Iron II period also witnessed the appearance of fortifiedstrongholds, such as Hili 14 in Al Ain (Boucharlat and Lombard 1989), Husn Madhab andHusn Awhala in Fujairah (Hellyer 1993b; Potts et al. 1996; Petrie 1998), Jebel Buhais northof al-Madam (Boucharlat 1992), and Rafaq in the Wadi al-Qawr (Phillips 1997). The purposeof these fortresses, it may be argued, was to safeguard the agricultural settlements associatedwith them, particularly their precious aflaj, and the concentration of power in such centres isan important social and political phenomenon. A cuneiform inscription from Nineveh inAssyria speaks of the existence of at least one ‘king’ in the Oman peninsula at this time, anindividual named Pade, king of Qade, who lived at Is-ki-e (modern Izki in Oman) and senttribute to the Assyrian emperor Assurbanipal in or around 640 BC (Potts 1990b/I: p 393).

Political and economic control by central bodies may also be implied by the appearance atthis time of a tradition of stamp seal manufacture (Lombard 1998), evidenced at a number ofsites including Rumeilah (Boucharlat and Lombard 1985: Pl. 66.5–9), Tell Abraq (Potts 1991a:Fig. 135) and Bint Saud (Stevens 1992). Contacts with foreign regions are suggested by asoft-stone pendant from Tell Abraq (Potts 1991a: Figs. 136–137) which shows a figurereminiscent of the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian depictions of the lamashtu demoness,an evil spirit who spread disease, and it is most probable that such pendants were worn toprotect their owners from sickness. The same figure appears in some of the petroglyphs foundpecked on rock in the mountains of Fujairah (Ziolkowski 1998; cf. Ceuninck 1998; Haerinck1998c). Some indication of how such foreign contacts were effected is given by another pendantfrom Tell Abraq which shows the only Iron Age depiction of a boat in the Oman peninsula

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

(Potts 1991a: Figs. 142–143). In this case the boat appears to be a square-sterned vessel with asharp bow and triangular sail (Potts 1995b: p 564). The sail is obviously similar to the Arab lateensail, otherwise unattested in the region until the Sasanian period and absent in the Mediterraneanuntil c. 900 AD. The Tell Abraq pendant is thus the earliest depiction of a lateen sail yet discovered.

A further link with Assyria (and western Iran) is provided by a class of decorated discs,sometimes described as buttons or buckles, which have been found in a number of Iron Ageinhumations in the region, e.g. at Dibba and Qarn Bint Saud (Frifelt 1971: Fig. 11) and Shimal(Vogt and Franke-Vogt 1987: Fig. 18.1-4) and which are strikingly similar to examples knownfrom the Assyrian capital of Nimrud in eighth to seventh century BC. Recently discoveredexamples in a re-used Wadi Suq tomb at Sharm (Hartnell and Barker 1999) have been shown,upon examination by a scanning electron microscope, to have the internal structure of dentine,corresponding not with a shell but with the lower incisor of a large mammal, such as a camel(Davis 1999a; Susino 1999).

The third and final sub-period of the Iron Age, Iron III, is not very well known, althoughoccupation is attested at half a dozen settlements including Tell Abraq, Shimal, Rumeilah, Hili17, Hili 2, Nud Ziba and al-Thuqaibah (Magee 1995: p 345), as well as graves in the Wadi al-Qawr (unpubl., in the Ra’s al-Khaimah Museum) and Dibba oasis (unpubl., in the FujairahMuseum). The appearance of previously unattested shapes in so-called ‘Burnished MaroonSlipped Ware’ is significant, for this material, almost certainly imported from Iran, finds closeparallels at a number of Iranian sites, including Baba Jan, Godin Tepe, Nad-i Ali, Dahan-iGulaiman, Tal-i Zohak, and Pasargadae, in contexts dating to between the sixth and fourthcenturies BC (Magee 1995: pp 182–183). When combined with the literary and epigraphicrecord of Achaemenid control over the satrapy of Maka (cf. Makkan, Magan), the conclusionbecomes inescapable that the sudden appearance in the UAE of ceramics paralleled in

Achaemenid contexts in Iran is a reflection of the fact that the area was at this timepart of the Persian satrapy of Maka (Potts 1990b/I: 394ff; de Blois 1989). In spite

of the fact that messengers from Maka, some of whom are referred to as ‘Arabs’,are attested in the Persepolis Fortification Texts (PF 1545, 2050; PFa 17, 29) inthe year 505/4 BC, as are rations for the satrap of Maka (PF 679–680) in the

a b c d e

Fig. 14. Examples of Iron Ageshort swords from al-Qusais (a-e) and a

depiction of a Mac̆iya, or native of Maka, fromthe base of the throne of Darius II on his grave relief at Persepolis.

After Lombard 1985: Fig. 107.374–378 and Potts 1985: Fig. 1a.

years 495/4 and 500/499 BC (Potts 1990b/I: pp 395–397), we still have no idea where thePersian capital of the satrapy may have been located. A contingent from Maka formed part ofXerxes’ army at Doriscus in 480 BC (Herodotus, Hist. 7.68), and we can get some impressionof how they looked from the depictions of Mac̆iya (inhabitants of Maka) on several Achaemenidmonuments, the clearest of which is found on the grave of Darius II at Persepolis (Potts 1985:Fig. 1a). There the Mac̆iya (Fig. 14) is shown wearing only a short kilt, with a sword slungover his shoulder by a strap. The crescentic pommel of the sword hilt is interesting, and recallsthe many Iron Age short swords found at sites in the UAE such as al-Qusais (Fig. 14), Qidfa,Jebel Buhais and Rumeilah (Lombard 1981; Weisgerber 1988).

The Mleiha (Late Pre-Islamic A-B) Period (c. 300–0 BC)

The dissolution of the Persian Empire must have impacted on south-eastern Arabia, for, withthe defeat and death of Darius III, Maka was no longer a Persian satrapy. On the other hand,Alexander the Great’s conquests never touched the Arabian side of the Gulf and, while heinherited much of what had formerly been the Achaemenid empire, the famous ‘last plans’of the Macedonian conqueror, which included an invasion of Arabia, never advanced beyondthe stage of initial reconnaissance (Potts, 1990b/II: pp 1–22). Thus, by the third century BCsouth-eastern Arabia was free of foreign political influence, and it is in this context that thedevelopments of the subsequent centuries must be viewed, for none of Alexander’s Seleucidsuccessors was able to establish any sort of Greek dominance in the region either.

How significant these trends were for the local population is difficult to assess. Certainlywe can see evidence of continuity as well as change in the local ceramic repertoire, enoughto be certain that the basic industry and the people who made and used the wares remainedthe same. But our evidence is severely restricted and, with the exception of Mleiha, a sprawlingsettlement on the gravel plain south of Dhaid in the interior of Sharjah which extends overan area several square kilometres in extent (Boucharlat 1987–1988, 1989; Boucharlat andMouton 1991, 1993; Mouton 1999), we have no other settlements which can be attributed tothis time horizon. On the basis of their excavations, French archaeologists working at Mleihahave divided the sequence into four sub-periods, viz. Mleiha I (Iron Age), II (300–150 BC),IIIA (150–0 BC), and IIIB (0–200 AD). For the purposes of this chapter we shall considerMleiha II and IIIA together, as these correspond to the interval between the end of the IronAge and the appearance of a different cultural phenomenon best represented further north atal-Dur on the coast of Umm al-Qaiwain (see below).

The occupation of Mleiha represented the continuation of human occupation, in an optimallywatered and well-drained area, which had begun in the late prehistoric era (cf. Table 7). Theearliest, post-Iron Age settlement probably consisted of barastis or ‘arish, palm-frond houses,eminently suited to the hot climate of south-eastern Arabia. Starch residues on groundstonetools (Davis 1999b) and macro-botanical remains of wheat (Triticum durum/aestivum), barley(Hordeum vulgare) and date (Phoenix dactylifera) attest to a successful agricultural regime(Peña-Chocarro and Barrón Lopez 1999). The dead, however, were buried in more substantialstructures, mudbrick cists surmounted by a solid tower of brick, capped by crenellated stoneornaments. These structures, which have no antecedents in the region, recall the funerary

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

towers of Palmyra, Qaryat al-Fau, and the early periods at Petra (Boucharlat and Mouton1993: p 281; Mouton 1997, 1999; Boucharlat and Mouton 1998).

Both settlement and graves have yielded quantities of ceramics, some of it of obviouslylocal manufacture, carrying on and modifying the norms established during the Iron Age, andsome of it foreign. This includes glazed pottery, perhaps produced in south-western Iran orsouthern Iraq; red and black wares readily identifiable as coming from the north-east Arabianmainland or adjacent islands such as Bahrain or Failaka; and even Greek pottery, importedfrom the Aegean or Mediterranean. In addition to Greek black-glazed sherds identical to findsfrom the Athenian Agora, more than half a dozen stamped Rhodian amphora handle fragments(Fig. 15) provide precious clues to the absolute chronology of Mleiha. The named and generallydatable Rhodian amphora manufacturers attested at Mleiha include Iasonos (early secondcentury BC), P(ana)mo(u) Ant(ig)onou (late third/early second century BC), and EpiAriotuvos/Theomoaori(os)/ou (200–175 BC) (Mouton 1992: p 48). Folded-flan coinage fromMleiha, modelled on Athenian ‘old style’tetradrachms of fourth century BC date, may representthe earliest indigenous coinage in the region (Haerinck 1998d; Huth 1998, 1999).

Engraved bronze bowls and beehive-shaped, alabaster vessels from Mleiha II contextsrecall examples from South Arabia (Potts 1990b/II: Fig. 18; Boucharlat and Mouton 1993:Fig. 6; Hassell 1997), a fact which is important in connection with the recovery of severalitems (stone stelae, bronze bowls) inscribed in South Arabian characters (Fig. 16). Bythemselves, these inscriptions do not necessarily imply contact with South Arabia, for thesimple fact that the South Arabian script was also used in north-eastern Arabia to write theso-called Hasaitic inscriptions (Potts 1990b/II: 69–85), many of which begin with the sameformula as the Mleiha funerary stele, nafs/wqbr, i.e. ‘memorial and tomb (of) . . .’ (cf. thediscussion in Müller 1978: p 150; Potts 1990b/II: p 268 n. 11; Mitchell 1990–92). Moreover,alabaster vessels like those found at Mleiha, although of undoubted South Arabian manufacture,have also been discovered at sites like Thaj in north-eastern Saudi Arabia. Several coinsfound on the surface of the site are, however, unequivocally South Arabian (Sedov 1995).The question of South Arabian contact and cultural influence is an important one, partic-ularly in view of the legend of the Azd migration out of Yemen and its contribution to thelater tribal configuration of Oman.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 15. Stamped Rhodian amphora handles from Mleiha. After Mouton 1992: Fig. 21. 1, 3.

One of the cultural innovations which characterizes the late pre-Islamic era is the appearanceof iron in large quantities for the first time in the archaeological record of south-eastern Arabia.Alongside utilitarian items such as nails, long swords and arrowheads (Mouton 1990) wereused. Whether or not they were manufactured locally is another matter, but in addition to theexistence of iron-bearing zones near Jebel Faiyah, Emalah and Buhais, south of Mleiha, thesite itself has surface scatters of iron slag (Ploquin and Orzechowski 1994: pp 26ff) suggestingthat secondary refining and casting were carried out there. Why iron was previously so rareis a mystery. Certainly the abundance of copper sources in the Hajar Mountains, and the ancienttradition of copper metallurgy may have been a factor contributing to a lack of interest in iron.It has also been suggested that the Seleucid political presence in the Gulf region acted as acatalyst by way of introducing new types of armour and weaponry, made of iron, to peoplespreviously accustomed to the use only of copper-bronze (Lombard 1989: p 37).

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Fig. 16. Examples of inscribed material in South Arabian (a), Aramaic (b-d) and Latin (e) from Mleiha(a-b) and al-Dur (c-e). After Mouton 1992: Fig. 148 and Teixidor 1992: Fig. 2.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

A R A B I AF E L I X

A R A B I AP E T R A E A

A R A B I AD E S E R T A

Prom prope Pharan

Myosermos

Philoterae portus

Petra NarlaAdra

Aramaya Ostama

MadiamaObraca

Thapaya

Artemita

Erupa

Modiana

Albus portus

ElanaCorgce

Thauba Dapha

Gaia opp.

Salma

ThaemaAchrua

EgraSoaca

Chersoneseprom.

SAKENITAE

OADITAESARACENI

THAMYDENI

NAPATAEIMNASAEMANE

UDENICATANITAE

SYDENIDARRAEBANUBARI

THEM

ITAE

Berenice

Bathys

Daemonam

Isias mons

Polybii ins. Baetii ostia

Accipitum

Mamala vic.

Baiba

MacharaAluara

Salma

Iathrippa

Curna

Macoraba

Iabri

Iambia vic.

Arga vic.

Zaaram regia

Thebae opp.

Badeo regia

Acme opp.

ARSAE

MALICHAE

CALAPENI

MANITAE

REGIO SMYRNOFERA INT.

MINAEI

Maranqu

CIN

LPITA

SSAN

ITAE

Thuris

Evangelorum portus

Deorum Tutorumportus

Ptolemais Epitheros

Socratis

Pudnu opp.

Cardamine ins.

Are ins.

MalichuSacacia vic

Muza emp.

Sosippi portus

Pseudocetus

Ocelis emp.

Arsinoe Deire opp.

Martaeth vic

Magu

Hapegus vic

Adulis

Antiochi Canalis

ACHCHITAE

ELESAR

Save

SaracaSapphar

MASONITAE

SAPPHARITAE

LachchereHyaila

Deva Bana

Agathoclis ins.

Arabiaemp.

M A R E R U B R U M

ATRAMITAE

Dioscoridis ins.

Kane emp.

Erothe opp

Climaxmons

Ibisamaopp.

Tralla portusH a d h r a m a u t

Tritus portus

ASCITAE

IOBARITAE

CHATRAMONITAE

SMYRNOFERA REGIOEXT.

HOMERITAE

Sanina opp

Dela

Are regia

MaccalaSachle

Koa

Thauane

Sarvon

Sabbatha metrop.

MarimathaVodonaARABANITAE

BATHENI

ABAEI

Thabba

Grada

Menambis regiaSylaion

ThumnaMariama

Emborium vic.Thialemath

Mardache opp

IODISITAE

ATENI

THANUITAE

THAEMAE

ATTAENAREITAE

DACHARENI

BIRIVAE

BLIULAEIROOSARENIMOCRITAE

Carman regia

Mara metrop.

Laththa

Thumala

Amara Iala

Accipitram vic.

Tiagar

Atia

Tharo

Ichara

Bilbana opp.

Atta vic.Cadara opp.

SarcoeCavana Cansina opp.

Domana

LabrisIrada

Nagara metrop.

Maocosmos metrop.

Laltha

OlaphiaInapha

GirathaBiavanna

Gorda

Marata

Mata opp.

Catara

Ithar opp.

Phigea

Gerra opp.

Sapha

Sora

Salma

Ammaca

LAEANITAE

ABUCAEI

BABYLONIA S U S I A N A

Aina

Arra vicDigemaLugana

Adara opp

SaphthaMallada opp

Lucanites sinus

tamus portus

ApphanaCoromanis opp

Idisara

Tigridis ostia

Sophta

Alexandri ins.

P E R S I S

Sagdana

Vorochta

AradusTylus

RHarmozon p

Asahon prom.Regama opp.Solis oracu

lum

Lar fl. o

stia

ICHTHYOPHAGI

MACAE

COTTABANI

LIBANOTOFERA

REGIO

SINUSSACHALITES

Omanum emp.

Chabuata

Omani fontes

Cryptus portus

Corodamum prom

Dianae oraculum

Ravana regia

Organa

Sarapid

Zenobii ins.

Neogilla navale

Astoa vic.

Ange vic.

Ausara vic.

Matacumvic.

Syagros prom.Moscha

portus

S I N U S P E R S I C U S

Fig. 17. South-eastern Arabia according to Cl. Ptolemy. After Groom 1994: 200.

The Al-Dur (Late Pre-Islamic C) Period (c. 0–200 AD)

By the first century AD we have reached a period for which considerably more literarydocumentation exists, albeit of a difficult nature to use. The Roman writer Pliny the Younger(23/24–79 AD) completed his Natural History in 77 AD and, to judge from his account of thepeoples and places of south-eastern Arabia (Nat. Hist. VI.32. pp 149–152), combined with thesecond century AD testimony of Cl. Ptolemy’s map of Arabia (Fig. 17), the area of the UAEwas full of settlements, tribes, and physical features, the names of which he recorded for posterity.Fixing the locations of these, and linking them with archaeological sites, has proven difficult,but it has been argued that ‘the town of Omana, which previous writers have made out to bea famous port of Carmania (Pliny, Nat. Hist. VI.32. pp 149) [Kerman province in Iran]’ maybe identified with the large, nearly 4 km sq. settlement of al-Dur in Umm al-Qaiwain (Potts1988, 1990b/II: pp 306ff; Groom 1994, 1995). The same site is, moreover, mentioned (§ 36)at about the same time in the anonymous Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, an important textwhich documents the maritime trade between Alexandria in Egypt and Barygaza in India.Certainly the archaeological remains of al-Dur leave us in no doubt that the site was the mostimportant coastal settlement so far identified in the lower Gulf during the first centuries AD.

Located opposite what is today a sheltered branch of the Umm al-Qaiwain lagoon, al-Durextends for well over 1 km in a north-east/south-west direction, and is in places up to 1 kmwide. Within this vast area is a dispersed collection of private houses, graves, a fort, and atemple, along with extensive sherd scatters without associated standing architecture whichprobably represents areas of former ‘arish (barasti) habitation. Originally investigated in theearly 1970s by an Iraqi expedition, al-Dur was the object of a collaborative expedition fromfour European universities between 1987 and 1994 (Boucharlat et al. 1988, 1989; Haerinck1991b, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994d; Haerinck et al. 1992, 1993; Haerinck 1996b).

Most of the architecture at the site is built of beach rock (Ar. farush), a calcareous concretionwhich forms offshore in shallow tidal areas and can be easily broken into slabs for use asbuilding material. Large houses, some with numerous rooms and round corner towers, havebeen excavated as well as small, one-room dwellings. The use of alabaster for windowpanesis important and marks the earliest archaeological attestation of alabaster for this purpose inthe Arabian Peninsula (Potts 1996). Graves may be either simple subterranean cists for individualinhumations, or large, semi-subterranean collective tombs consisting of a subterranean chamberreached via a stairway from the surface, surmounted by a barrel vault. In general terms themore elaborate graves resemble Parthian tombs at Assur in northern Mesopotamia.

The ceramics from the site are dominated by glazed wares,almost certainly of Parthian manufacture and imported either fromsouthern Mesopotamia or south-western Iran. Fine black-on-orange painted ‘Namord’ ware (Fig. 18), imported fromsouth-eastern Iran or Baluchistan, indicates contacts across theStraits of Hormuz (Potts 1998b; cf. Wiesehöfer 1998), whilerare sherds of Indian Red Polished Ware point to ties withthe Indian subcontinent. As the Periplus indicates, duringthe mid-first century AD Omana was the most important portin the lower Gulf, and was twinned with the port of Apologosat the head of the Gulf, a site perhaps located somewhere nearmodern Basra and one of the main maritime outlets for thekingdom of Characene (Potts 1988, 1997b). While traffic downthe Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean provided one means forthe Roman acquisition of exotica from India and the east, overlandcaravan traffic between Palmyra in Syria and the cities of Vologesias,Seleucia and Spasinou Charax in Iraq, followed by seaborne travel downthe ‘Characene corridor’to Omana and on to India provided an alternativeroute (Potts 1997b). The latter mechanism may well have been responsiblefor the diffusion of quantities of Roman glass to al-Dur (Fig. 19), most ofwhich dates to the first century AD (Whitehouse 1998, 2000); at least onewestern Roman amphora (Papadopoulos 1994); and a handful ofCharacene coins dating to the reigns of Attambelos II (44/45 AD),Attambelos IV (58/59 AD) and Attambelos VI (104/105 AD) (Potts1988: pp 141–142). The single Roman coin from al-Dur, an undatedPONTIF MAXIM issue of Tiberius (Howgego and Potts 1992) mayhave reached the site in the same manner.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

Fig. 18. Examples ofearly (a) and late (b)Namord ware fromal-Dur. After Potts1998b.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 19. A selection of Roman glass from al-Dur. After Potts 1997c.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

The concentration of political powerwhich one may presume to have existed inan emporium like al-Dur was undoubtedlycentred on the fort (Fig. 20) excavated in

1973 by the Iraqi expedition. Measuring roughly 20 m on a side, and with four circular cornertowers each 4 m in diameter, the fort is built of beach rock and shows affinities to contem-porary Parthian fortifications in Mesopotamia. South of the fort is an important temple(Haerinck, Vrydaghs and Doutrelepont 1998), excavated by the Belgian expedition, whichwas a simple, one-room, square structure, roughly 8 m on a side, of beach rock faced withfinely worked gypsum plaster imitating ashlar masonry. An incense burner from the temple,inscribed in Aramaic with the name Shams, suggests that this was a shrine dedicated to thepan-Semitic solar deity.

While al-Dur was the prime settlement of this period on the Gulf coast, other minor siteshave been identified on the islands of Abu Dhabi as well (Hellyer and King 1999; King and

Fig. 20. The Area F building complex (a) andthe fort (b) at al-Dur. After Mouton 1992: Figs.150 and 55.

grave

camelgrave 1

concentrationsof food refuse

grave

camelgrave 2

burnt deposits(offerings?)

0 10 m

a b

Fig. 21. A coin mouldfrom Mleiha. AfterB o u c h a r l a t a n dDrieux 1991: Fig. 2.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 22. A silver tetradrachm of Abi’el (Class S2)from Mleiha; weight 14.68 g., diameter 2.70 cm.After Potts 1994d: 45, no. 183.

Fig. 23. A silver tetradrachm of Abi’el (ClassXLVI) from Mleiha; weight 16.02 g., diameter 2.20cm. After Potts 1994d: 66, no. 338.

Tonghini 1998). In the interior, Mleiha was certainly the leading centre, apart from whichonly a few graves have been identified (de Cardi 1996; Petrie 2000). Mleiha has producedremarkable evidence dating to this period of a cemetery in which both horses and camels wereburied. In addition, one of the most important discoveries made in recent excavations at thesite was a square fort with square corner towers in Area CW, the main outer wall of whichwas 55 m long, attributable to Mleiha IIIB (0–200 AD) (Benoist et al. 1994: p 12). Associatedwith the fort, moreover, was a stone mould (Fig. 21) for the production of coins (Boucharlatand Drieux 1991), and as the right to strike coinage was generally a royal prerogative in theancient world, it is likely that the Mleiha fort represents the power centre of the polity centredon the site. The coins minted at Mleiha – hundreds of which have been discovered at both al-Dur and Mleiha (Potts 1991b, 1994d; Haerinck 1994c; Grave et al. 1996a; Haerinck 1996a,1998a, 1998b, 1998e, 1999) – were modelled on the coinage of Alexander. They show a debasedhead of Heracles wearing the pelt of the Nemean lion on the obverse, and a seated figure,based on that of Zeus, on the reverse. Whereas the original Greek models had the nameALEXANDER clearly written in Greek on the reverse, the Mleiha/al-Dur coins (Figs. 22–23)bear a legend in angular, lapidary-style Aramaic which can be read as ‘Abi’el, son/daughterof bgln/tmyln/tlmyl/tym..’ (Potts 1994d: p 43). However the patronymic should be read(Maraqten 1996), the name Abi’el is always clear, and as this must be the monarch who originallyminted coins of this type, we can safely conclude that Abi’el was an important ruler in thewider region during the late pre-Islamic era.

The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that variant, prototypical issues with thename Abi’el have been found in a hoard on Bahrain datable to the second century BC. Thus,the later Mleiha issues from the first century AD may have repeated the name of an importantpolitical figure in the region long after that individual had died, just as the many Asiatic issueswhich were based on those of Alexander repeated the name of the Macedonian king over andover again, even centuries after his lifetime. Until this issue can be resolved it is wisest notto assume that the fort at Mleiha represents the stronghold of the eponymous Abi’el. ThatAramaic was the language of the populations of Mleiha and al-Dur at this time is, however,confirmed not only by its use on coinage, but also by the discovery of other inscribed objects,such as a unique bronze plaque from Mleiha (Teixidor 1992) and several short lapidaryinscriptions at al-Dur (Haerinck et al. 1991: p 36).

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

The End of the Pre-Islamic Era (c. 240–635 AD)

Although the extent of the political influence of the Parthians in south-eastern Arabia has longbeen debated, there is little doubt that their Sasanian successors swiftly imposed their will onthe inhabitants of the region shortly after coming to power. According to the Karnamak-iArtachsher-i Papakan, the ‘Book of Deeds’ recounting the exploits of Ardashir (224–240),founder of the Sasanian state, mcvnyg’n or natives of Mazun (the name given to Maka inMiddle Iranian, Syriac, Armenian and Arabic sources; see de Blois 1989) fought against Ardashirearly in his career. Later Arab sources, such as al-Dinawari (c. 895) and the anonymousNihayatu’l-irab fi ahbari’l-furs wa’l-’arab (c. 1000–1050), contend that Ardashir campaignedin Oman. Certainly the great Ka’aba of Zoroaster inscription at Naqsh-i Rustam near Persepolislists MZWN, i.e. Mazun, as the twenty-seventh land in the empire of Shapur I (240–270 AD),Ardashir’s son (Gignoux 1971: p 92–93; Potts 1990b/II: p 329; Huyse 1999/I;p 24).

Archaeologically, however, there is little concrete evidence of a Sasanian presence in theUAE. The few coins recovered on the Gulf coast include a pair of badly preserved bronzesof Ardashir and Shapur II (309–379) from Ghallah, an island in the lagoon of Umm al-Qaiwain, as well as a silver coin of the latter king from Tell Abraq (Potts and Cribb 1995: pp129–130). In Fujairah, a small hoard of 18 silver coins was discovered which included issuesof two late Sasanian monarchs, Hormizd IV(579–590) and Khusrau II (590–628) (Hellyer 1995).

The absence of Sasanian material should not be interpreted as a sign that there was no settlementin the region at this time. The latest occupation at Tell Abraq can be dated to this period by theShapur II coin found in 1993 in a context close to the surface (Potts and Cribb 1995: p 130).Area F at al-Dur, a large, multi-roomed house with corner towers, represents the most extensivelyexcavated complex of this date found so far (Lecomte 1993). It is well-dated by the numerousexamples of Sasanian glass found there, all of which find close parallels at sites in Mesopotamia.Further up the coast, at Jazirat al-Hulayla, late pre-Islamic ceramics and structures have alsobeen found (Kennet 1994: Figs. 9–11), while excavations at the substantial mound of Kush,near Shimal, demonstrate that settlements with occupation of Sasanian date do exist in the region(Kennet 1997, 1998). In the interior, several intrusive burials with iron weaponry (spear, sword,pike) dug into the prehistoric tombs at Jebel al-Emalah can be attributed to the very end of thepre-Islamic period. A fragmentary individual buried with an iron sword in Tomb I has produceda corrected radiocarbon date of 455–583 AD, while a fully articulated individual buried with aniron-tipped spear from Tomb III has been dated to 513–624 AD (Potts 1997c).

A third burial at Jebel al-Emalah with iron accoutrements was that of a camel in its own, ovalgrave ringed by stones. Camel burials are a phenomenon well-attested in the late pre-Islamicera throughout the Arabian Peninsula (Vogt 1994b), and elsewhere in the UAE they are knownat both al-Dur (Lecomte 1993) and Mleiha (Mashkour 1997; Jasim 1999; Uerpmann 1999).Yet it would be wrong to suggest that the religious climate of the era was dominated either byArab paganism (viz. camel burial) or Zoroastrianism (viz. Sasanian influence). NestorianChristianity was a decidedly important component of the religious milieu at this time as well.

In 424 Yohannon, bishop of Mazun, attended an important synod at Markabta de Tayyaein Iraq, where the Nestorian church proclaimed its independence from Antioch (Potts 1990b/II:p 333). This is the first concrete evidence of Nestorian Christianity in south-eastern Arabia,although the Vita Ionae, an account of the life of a monk named Jonah who lived in the time

(

of the catholicus Barb’ashmin(343–346), says that Jonah built amonastery ‘on the borders of theblack island’, a locale which someNestorian scholars have soughtamongst the islands between Qatarand Oman. In this connection it isobvious to consider the islands offthe coast of Abu Dhabi as a likelysite for Jonah’s monastery. Therecent discovery on the island of SirBani Yas (Hellyer 1993a; King andHellyer 1994; King 1997) of amonastery and/or church, completewith carved stucco ornamentationincluding several crosses (Fig. 24), is of enormous interest in this respect, as is the identifi-cation of another probable monastery on the island of Marawah (P. Hellyer, pers. comm.).

The literary testimony of Nestorian Christianity in the region does not resume until 544,perhaps due to a temporary loss of control over the area by the Sasanians and their Lakhmidvassals at the hands of the Kinda of central Arabia (Potts 1990b/II: pp 334–335). Be that asit may, in 544 David, bishop of Mazun, attended the Nestorian synod of Mar Aba I, and in576 Samuel attended the synod of Mar Ezechiel. Mazun is included in an important Armenianlist of the provinces of the Sasanian empire compiled late in the Sasanian period, and it iscertain that the region was under Sasanian control at the time of the Islamic conversion.

Two major towns of the period are mentioned in literary sources, Tuwwam and Dibba. Bothtowns were taxed by the Al Julanda, clients of the Sasanians who reported to the Persianmarzban (military governor) at al-Rustaq in Oman (Potts 1990b/II: p 337). Tuwwam, althoughidentifiable with the region of Al Ain/Buraimi (Wilkinson 1964: p 344), is invisible archaeo-logically, for no late pre-Islamic remains contemporary with the period of Sasanian governancehave been unearthed there. Dibba, of course, is still the name of a major port and oasissettlement on the East Coast of the UAE which is today divided between Oman, Fujairah andSharjah. Although the archaeology of Dibba in the late pre-Islamic era is known only fromchance finds, the literary record is more ample.

In his al-Muhabbar, Ibn Habib called Dibba ‘one of the two ports of the Arabs; merchantsfrom Sind, India, China, people of the East and West came to it’ (Shoufani 1972: 156). At thistime Dibba paid a tithe to Al Julanda b. Al Mustakbir on the occasion of a fair held each yearfor five nights beginning on the first day of Rajab. The commercial importance of Dibba atthis time explains why Jayfar, one of the Al Julanda addressed by the Prophet in a letter carriedby Abu Zaid and ‘Amr b. Al-‘As in the year 630 (AH 8), sent a messenger to Dibba exhortingits inhabitants to convert to Islam (Ross 1874: pp 118–119). Just a few years later, however,Dibba became the base of Laqit b. Malik, the leader of the al-Riddah or apostasizing movement,and the crushing of that movement by the armies of the Caliph Abu Bakr (Shoufani 1972:p 8) created one of the largest and most important historical sites in the UAE, a vast cemeterysaid to contain upwards of 10,000 slain rebels (Potts 1990b/II: p 345) on the outskirts of Dibba.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Fig. 24. A stucco fragment from a Nestorian building on SirBani Yas. After King and Hellyer 1994: 6.

Christianity in Mazun certainly survived some decades after the Muslim conversion, forStephen, bishop of Mazun, attended a synod in Mesopotamia in 676. The apostasy of theChristian community, however, was rife in this period, a fact amply documented by a seriesof letters sent by the Nestorian catholicos Isho’yahb III to Simeon of Rev-Ardashir in Iran,complaining about the conversions of ‘your people in Mazun’ (Potts 1990b/II: p 346). Thesubsequent absence of any more bishops from Mazun at the synods of the Nestorian churchis an indication that Christianity probably did not survive in south-eastern Arabia much beyondthe seventh century.

Conclusion

It is scarcely possible to draw a simple conclusion from the rich archaeological and historicalrecord of the pre-Islamic past of the UAE, but several observations suggest themselvesnonetheless. Quite clearly, archaeological research during the past decade has proceeded ata pace scarcely imaginable even 20 years ago, and there has been a veritable explosion ofknowledge as the bibliography appended here attests. Archaeological museums have appearedall over the country which display the impressive finds of numerous excavations. The moderninhabitants of the UAE have an archaeological and historical past which should make themthe envy of many of their neighbours, and dispel once and for all the notion that this regionwas peripheral in antiquity. Had it been peripheral, why would a series of Old Akkadian,Achaemenid, or Sasanian emperors have expended so much energy on campaigning in thearea? The lack of a local written record comparable to the cuneiform archives of Mesopotamiaor the hieroglyphs of Egypt must never blind us to the fact that, in antiquity, the region of theUAE was a strategic, well-resourced, important part of the cultural mosaic of ancient WesternAsia. With the continued goodwill of the rulers of the seven emirates, it is to be hoped thatarchaeological research in the UAE continues to make advances at the pace set by a committedbody of scholars from a variety of nations during the past 20 years. Let us hope, also, thattheir ranks are swelled by the addition of more indigenous scholars from the UAE itself.

Bibliography

AbbreviationsAAE Arabian Archaeology & EpigraphyAbiel II C.S. Phillips, D.T. Potts and S. Searight (eds), Arabia and its neighbours: Essays on prehistorical and

historical developments, Turnhout, Brepols [=Abiel II: New research on the Arabian peninsula] (1998).AUAE Archaeology in the United Arab EmiratesPSAS Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies

Alt, K.W., Vach, W., Frifelt, K. and Kunter, M. ‘Familienanalyse in kupferzeitlichen Kollektivgräbern aus Umm al-Nar; Abu Dhabi’, AAE, 6 (1995) pp 65–80.

Al Tikriti, W.Y. ‘The archaeological investigations on Ghanadha island 1982–1984: Further evidence for the coastalUmm al-Nar culture’, AUAE, 4 (1985) pp 9–19.

Al Tikriti, W.Y. ‘The excavations at Bidiyah, Fujairah: the 3rd and 2nd millennia BC culture’, AUAE, 5 (1989) pp101–114.

BEFORE THE EMIRATES

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Amiet, P. ‘A cylinder seal impression found at Umm an-Nar’, East and West, 25 (1975) pp 425–426.Amiet, P. ‘Quelques témoins des contacts de Suse avec les pays du Levant au IIIe et IIe millénaires’, in J.-M. Durand

and J.-R. Kupper (eds), Miscellanea Babylonica: Mélanges offerts à Maurice Birot, Paris, Editions Recherche surles Civilisations (1985) pp 9–12.

Aspinall, S. ‘New ostrich shell finds’, Tribulus 8/2 (1998) p 28.‘At Tell Abraq – the earliest recorded find of polio’, The University of Sydney – Research, Sydney, External Relations

Division (1994) p 20.Beech, M. ‘Preliminary report on the faunal remains from an ‘Ubaid-related settlement on Dalma Island, Abu Dhabi

Emirate, United Arab Emirates’, in M. Mashkour, A.M. Choyke, H. Buitenhuis and F. Poplin (eds), Archaeozoologyof the Near East IV, Vol.B, Groningen, ARC Publicatie 32, (2000) pp 67–78.

Beech, M. and Elders, J. ‘An Ubaid-related settlement on Dalma Island, Abu Dhabi Emirate, United Arab Emirates’,Bulletin of the Society for Arabian Studies, 4 (1999),pp 17–21.

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BEFORE THE EMIRATES

The Coming of Islamand the Islamic Period in the UAE

Geoffrey R. King

Introduction

Although the Islamic archaeology of the UAE has only been investigated in a sustainedmanner in very recent decades, the amount of information that it provides has been so greatthat, for the pre-modern period, it is now at least as important a source for the country’s pastas the rather sporadic and limited literary evidence. As a result of archaeological survey andexcavation, form has been given to periods in the UAE’s history that were hitherto invisible.The archaeological record now shows the nature of the UAE’s settlement patterns and usesof the landscape, its social and economic structure, and an architectural tradition, little ofwhich is apparent in the written sources. For the Islamic period, as for earlier times, archaeologyis in fact often the only means to retrieve the past of the UAE and new fieldwork on sitesrelated to the last 2000 years has brought the country into the historical framework of theNear East as a whole.

The Landscape, the Environment and the Islamic Geographers

The landscape has dictated the nature of habitation in the UAE just as much in the Islamicperiod as it did in more ancient times. Beginning in the far west, the coast of Abu Dhabi andthe interior is a harsh area with a band of salt flats (sabkha) between the sea and the gravelplains that precede the deep sands of the Empty Quarter desert. The coast is extremelyinhospitable and unattractive for any form of settlement, consisting as it does largely ofsabkha: after rain, this sabkha is virtually impassable for travellers. Furthermore, the sea justoffshore is often so shallow and befouled by shoals that it is difficult for boats under sail tonavigate. As a result, for both the pre-Islamic and the Islamic period, evidence of settlementon the coast of the mainland is rare west of Abu Dhabi up to the Qatar peninsula. By contrast,east of Abu Dhabi, at Dubai and Sharjah and in the northern emirates, ports are more frequent,although the shoreline is still encumbered by sabkha in many places.

There is a growing body of archaeological information to show that activity on the offshoreislands, whether seasonal or permanent, has extended over a very long period and down topre-modern times. On many of the islands there are numerous small stone-lined hearths for

the baking of fish: hitherto, these hearths have been associated with the later Islamic periodand, indeed, older UAE inhabitants still know how to use them. However, C14 dating of ashdeposits show that hearths on the island of Marawah, west of Abu Dhabi, belong to a seriesof dates ranging from ca 2281–1884 BC to ca 130–387 AD. Hearths of the same characterfrom the island of Balghelam to the east of Abu Dhabi city provide a similarly wide daterange, from ca 2269–1925 BC down to ca 764–395 BC, showing the longevity of this hearthcooking tradition. The coast of the UAE is, after all, the land of the Ichthyophagi of the Classicalauthors and, given the quality and quantity of the fish and shellfish in the waters of the Gulf,there is every reason for this hearth baking technique to have continued unchanged throughpre-Islamic and Islamic times. Related to this economy are fish traps of which large stone-built examples constructed across bays are encountered on the islands of Ghagha’ and Yasatal-cUlya, but these may be far older than the Islamic period in origin. The technology of reedfish traps, still encountered all along the coast, is also doubtless of great antiquity (Serjeant1968: pp 486–514).

Behind the coast, the hinterland of Abu Dhabi emirate is a sand desert, with mountainousaeolian sand dunes rising to more than 300 m above the underlying palaeofloor gravels thatpreceded the arrival of the sands. Camel herding in this desert area has been central to the lifeof the nomadic pastoralist population throughout the Islamic period as well as in very muchearlier times. The ancient river system of the Sabkha Matti in the west of the UAE has longsince ceased to flow out of the Empty Quarter sands: however, the inland oases at Liwa andat Al Ain have reliable water sources and they supported date plantations whose productshave provided a major element in the traditional local diet and economy since ancient times.Excavations at Dalma off the Abu Dhabi coast by ADIAS1 have shown the presence of date-stones, presumed to reflect dietary use, which C14 analysis has dated to ca 5280–4950 BC.This constitutes the earliest evidence of the use of the date in Arabia. There is probably a veryancient tradition of exporting dates from the oases of the UAE to the coast, while dried fishand salt-packed fresh fish seem to have come in the opposite direction. Members of sometribes in living memory would migrate seasonally between the desert oases and the islands,herding camels and cultivating dates in the interior and fishing and pearling on the islands.It seems likely that such a pattern reflects practice over a very long period of time.

In the east and north of the UAE, the sands and gravel plains give way to the high rockymountains of Jebel Hajar, part of the range that runs from Jebel Akhdar in the Sultanate ofOman through to Ru’us al-Jibal and Ra’s Musandam, the lofty promontory that overlooks theStraits of Hormuz. Rainfall is heavier here and this is reflected in the far greater fertility thatcharacterizes Ra’s al-Khaimah, Fujairah and the parts of the emirates of Sharjah and Dubaithat lie in this region. The terraced hillsides and mountain-top farmsteads are based oncultivation of grain and other crops, while sweet water retained in the gravels of the foothillsallows farming on quite a large scale. Livestock rearing is based on sheep, goats and cattle,rather than the camel-based economy of the desert areas to the west.

Although Dibba, Julfar and Tuwwam (Al Ain/Al Buraimi) are mentioned in the Arabicsources from the arrival of Islam in the area, it is not until the ninth century AD that additionalplaces names in the modern UAE begin to be recorded. Ibn Khurradadhbih (Ibn Khurradadhbih1967: p 111), a former official in the Abbasid Caliphate’s postal service, writing in ca 885–6,provides a series of itineraries that reflect the main routes through the Islamic world in his

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

day. He describes a coastal route from the Oman Peninsula2 to Mecca, mentioning Farak,ca*wkalan, Habat (?), and then al-Shihr, a port of the south coast of Yemen. It is unclear wherethe first three places were located although it seems that they should be sought along theBatinah coast of Fujairah and the Sultanate of Oman or in Dhofar and Mahra along the southcoast of Arabia.

Elsewhere, Ibn Khurradadhbih (Ibn Khurradadhbih 1967: p 113) mentions the towns ofBahrain. Bahrain to the medieval Arab geographers meant not only the island that now bearsthe name but the mainland opposite and its hinterland. Within this broad definition of Bahrain,Ibn Khurradadhbih refers to al-Khatt, al-Qatif, al-Aara and Hajar, all apparently in SaudiArabia today. The next place name he records is al-Faruq, and then Baynuna. The location ofal-Faruq is unclear but today Baynuna (Baynunah) is an area in the Western Region of AbuDhabi emirate. Mustawfi, writing before 740/1340, also mentions Baynuna in discussing Bahrainand other places in the Gulf (Mustawfî 1919: pp 135–6).

Ibn Khurradadhbih cites a verse by the eighth century poet of the Umayyad period, al-Nabigha, who refers to the wild cows of Baynuna. Given the nature of the desert landscapeof the modern Baynuna, it is hard to imagine cows there and it may be that al-Nabigharefers to the indigenous Arabian oryx that used to roam wild in the Empty Quarter untilthey were hunted to near extinction in the twentieth century. Alternatively, al-Nabigha’suse of the term Baynuna may be loose and may refer to a far broader area of the modernUAE. It is worth recalling that, in the more fertile northern emirates, there are still humpedback cows that are indigenous to the country. Furthermore, there is a tradition in Fujairahemirate of pitching bulls against each other (Hellyer 1990: pp 50–54). Although this customhas been associated with the Portuguese presence in the UAE, local sources suggest thatbull fighting is far more ancient. In this respect, it is worth recalling that the bull is acommon motif in the pre-Islamic religious art of southern Arabia. Thus, while identifyingthe Baynuna cows with the oryx may be a reasonable interpretation of al-Nabigha’s verse,there is a broad south-east and southern Arabian context into which his reference to wildcows could fit.

Al-Maqdisi in the tenth century AD describes the citadels (qasaba) of Oman, which includedSuhar, Nizwa, al-Sirr, Danak, Dibba, Salut or Salub, Julfar, Samad, and Lasya Milh (al-Maqdisi 1967: pp 70–71). Elsewhere, he mentions Khasab in Musandam. He then mentionsother eastern and central Arabian towns – al-Ahsa’ (al-Hasa’), Sabun, al-Zarqa’, al-Uwal, al-cUqayr, and al-Yamama (today, apparently, all in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain). His itinerary generallyruns from east to west and a number of the places he describes can still be recognized on amodern map: Suhar and Nizwa are now in the Sultanate of Oman; Dibba is in Fujairah andSharjah territory, and Julfar is in Ra’s al-Khaimah. There follows Lasya Milh and Samad, andthe next place al-Maqdisi mentions, al-Ahsa’, which is now in Saudi Arabia. Samad and LasyaMilh seem to be in the UAE but cannot be readily identified.

Abu’l-Faraj Qudama (Qudama 1967: pp 151–2), writing between 932 and 948 AD, givesan itinerary from Oman to al-Basra, via Qatar and al-cUqair, recording a place between themcalled al-Sabkha (‘The Salt-flats’). It was apparently in the UAE. al-Sabkha was also knownto al-Idrisi (al-Idrisi 1836/I: p 157; 1972/II: p 162), writing in 1154 in Sicily for the Normanking, Roger II. He refers to an itinerary from Suhar, to Damar, Muscat, al-Jabal and Julfar.Al-Jabal must refer to the Jebel Hajar mountain range. After Julfar, al-Idrisi says that the

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

traveller sailed to Bahrain via the port of (al-) Sabkha. Al-Sabkha remains unidentified butit could be identical with al-Maqdisi’s Lasya Milh, given the suggestion of salt in the latter’sname and the meaning of al-Sabkha as ‘salt flat’. However, the word sabkha itself is vagueand generalized and thus could be anywhere on the salt flats (sabkha) that run along the UAEcoast westwards from Umm al-Qaiwain to the far west of Abu Dhabi emirate and beyond toQatar. Both Lasya Milh and Sabkha are located west of Julfar in al-Idrisi’s itinerary, butwhether they were predecessors of Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, Sharjah, Dubai or Abu Dhabiseems impossible to determine at present. It has been suggested that Sharjah should beassociated with Ptolemy’s Sarkoepolis and Lasya Milh and/or al-Sabkha. An alternative couldbe al-Jumayra (Jumeirah) near Dubai which was apparently still settled in the ninth centuryAD, and which would be a persuasive Early Islamic candidate for a settlement associatedwith the harbour of al-Sabkha or Lasya Milh (Potts 1992/II: pp 319–320).

While al-Idrisi is quite specific in his reports about the UAE, he should be treated with somecaution as his work, produced in Palermo, was based on the reports of others, although thesereports seem to be based on direct observation. To be understood alongside his geographicaltext is his famous map which appears in various versions of his work and which is one of themost significant documents for Arabian geography since the second century AD map ofClaudius Ptolemy. Al-Idrisi’s mapping and his account of the coast of the UAE is not supersededuntil the Portuguese mapping of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Al-Idrisi knew the western waters of the UAE as the Sea of Qatar and described the islandsthere briefly but accurately as desert islands that were frequented only by sea birds and landbirds. The guano which these birds shed was collected and transported to al-Basra in Iraqwhere it fetched a high price for use on the farms and gardens to manure vines and dates atal-Basra itself and elsewhere. Al-Idrisi’s report is remarkable in its accuracy. The coloniesof seabirds on the offshore islands of western Abu Dhabi are sometimes vast, and islandsfavoured by them are indeed thick with their guano. The island of Kardal, off Ghagha’ inwestern Abu Dhabi, for example, lies deep in the guano deposits of the thousands of cormorantswhich inhabit it. There are many similar nesting sites. Guano was still being collected byboats for sale as fertilizer as recently as 40 years ago (Khalfan al-Rumaithi, Bab Field, ADCO,27.12.1998, pers. comm).

Al-Idrisi also mentions the pearl beds of the Gulf although he associates them with Suhar,Damar, Muscat, al-Jabal (i.e., Musandam) and Julfar. However, he says nothing of the farmore extensive group of pearl-beds that lie in the western waters of the UAE coast. This maybe because the informants of al-Idrisi were more aware of the harbours whose fleets fishedfor pearls than the location of the pearl-beds themselves.

Yaqut, writing in ca 1225, recorded an itinerary which ran from al-Bahrayn in al-Khatt, toal-Qatif, al-Ara, Hajar, Baynuna, al-Zara, Jawatha, al-Sabur and al-Ghaba (Yaqut 1866–69/I:p 507). This itinerary seems confused, displacing Baynuna from western Abu Dhabi off tothe north between Hajar and Jawatha, both in al-Hasa’ in Saudi Arabia. Elsewhere, Yaqutrefers to Baynuna as a place between Oman and al-Bahrayn, which is very vague (Yaqut1866–69/I: p 802). He mentions that Tuwwam (Al Ain) had its own citadel (qasaba) and hestates that the principal citadel of Oman was Suhar. Yaqut also refers to Julfar which he callsJullafar or Jurrafar, describing it as a town in Oman which had many sheep and which producedcheese and samn (ghee) (Yaqut 1866–69/II: p 104; II: p 63).

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

Gasparo Balbi, the state jeweller of Venice, made a visit in ca 1580 to the territory of theUAE to investigate the pearling industry. He is the first writer to record place names betweenal-Qatif and Oman that are still in use today (Slot, 1993, 36 ff.). Like al-Idrisi, he knows thewaters off the Abu Dhabi coast as the Sea of Qatar and mentions the following places now inUAE territory: Daas (Das), Emegorcenon (Qarnein), Anzevi (Arzanah), Zerecho (Zirkuh),Delmephialmas (Dalma), Sirbeniast (Sir Bani Yas), Aldane (Dhanna), Cherizan (identified asKhor Qirqishan, just off Abu Dhabi island), Dibei (Dubai), Sarba (Sharjah), Agimen (Ajman),Emegivien (Umm al-Qaiwain), Rasalchime (Ra’s al-Khaimah), Sircorcor (Khor al-Khuwair),Debe (Dibba), Chorf (Khor Fakkan) and Chelb (Kalba).

When the Portuguese under Albuquerque arrived in the area in the late fifteenth century, theynoted Julfar among the coastal towns as a place with a fleet, and Duarte Barbosa writing in thesixteenth century recorded that the people of Julfar were merchants and navigators. Pedro Teixeraspeaks of boats from Bahrain and Julfar going each summer to the pearl fisheries further upthe Gulf. He also mentions local pearl fisheries off Julfar. As the discovery of late Islamicceramic scatters suggests, there was activity in this period on many of the western Abu Dhabiislands near the pearl beds and pearl oyster middens are frequently found on the islands,although many oysters were probably opened while the pearling boats were still at sea.

The Eve of Islam (ca fourth – seventh centuries AD)

Immediately before the coming of Islam, the eastern coast of Arabia was under the rule of severalpowers. In the north-east of the peninsula, the authority of the Bani Lakhm Arab kings of al-Hira (now in Iraq) had only very recently faded (ca AD 611). One of the principal tribes ineastern Arabia was cAbd al-Qays while in the south-east, the tribe of Azd was beginning to dominatemuch of Oman, challenging the coastal foothold of the forces of the Sasanian Empire in Iran.

The Sasanian Empire and the Byzantine Empire constituted the two great international powersof the fourth to seventh centuries AD and their mutually destructive warfare forms thebackground to the rise of Islam, the new faith which was soon to overwhelm the Sasanianscompletely and greatly truncate the Byzantine state. The Sasanians had first establishedthemselves on the eastern Arabian coast in the fourth century AD and during their wars withthe Byzantines, they extended their authority as far as Yemen, where they appointed a governorat Sancâ’ in ca 570 AD. It was only with the coming of Islam in the seventh century AD thatSasanian power was swept from both Oman and Yemen.

Evidence of settlement in south-east Arabia during the emergence of Islam has only recentlybegun to surface as a result of archaeological fieldwork. Sasanian power in south-east Arabiawas based on fortified strongholds such at those at Rustaq and Demetsjerd at Suhar, both inthe Sultanate of Oman today (Kervran and Hiebert 1991: pp 337–343; Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens1988: pp 87–105; Kervran 1996). Excavations at the tell of Suhar indicate a date for the siteranging from the first century BC to the second century AD through to the Sasanian period,and then from the seventh century AD to the thirteenth century AD, followed by a later Islamicoccupation. A site associated with the Sasanian period is located at Jazirat al-Ghanam on theStraits of Hormuz, off the great headland of Musandam, now in the northern enclave of theSultanate of Oman. Here, remains of structures are attributed to the early fourth century AD

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

on the basis of ceramic evidence (de Cardi 1973: pp 305–310; de Cardi 1975: pp 24–26). It is interesting to note that ‘Hellenistic’ sites like al-Dur (Ed-Door) in Umm al-Qaiwain

emirate and al-Milayha (Mleiha) in Sharjah emirate seem not to have continued beyond thefourth century AD, and appear to have been abandoned in the centuries that immediatelyprecede the coming of Islam. Their relationship with the Sasanians has yet to be established.

To these fourth–seventh century AD sites must now be added the large tell at Kush in theShimal area of Ra’s al-Khaimah which is currently being excavated by Derek Kennet. Hedates its foundation to the Late Sasanian/Early Islamic period. Kush was built as a fortifiedcitadel with massive walls measuring on the east side 2.4 m in width and these still stand tosome 2 m at their highest point (Kennet, Farid, Beech and Parker 1999: pp 4–5, pp 20–21).The earliest period of occupation at Kush is dated to the sixth–seventh century AD. Findsinclude ceramics and glass and a Sasanian seal of carnelian, decorated with a griffin motif.This seal is set in a silver mount and is dated to the third–seventh centuries AD. Ceramicsimported from India were found in deposits from the early phases at the site and indicate tradebetween south-east Arabia and the Indian Ocean. Kush was to continue as a major site in theIslamic period, as the recent excavations have shown.

The presence of Indian pottery at Kush is important, fitting well with evidence fromelsewhere of Indian Ocean trade and communications with the Near East in Roman andSasanian times (Whitehouse and Williamson 1973: pp 29–49; Ball 1986: pp 106–110;Whitehouse 1991: pp 216–218).

Also from Ra’s al-Khaimah, there is evidence of settlement in the Sasanian/Early Islamicperiod at Jazirat al-Hulayla and Khatt. Al-Hulayla is a low sandy island opposite Rams witha protected anchorage provided by the Khawr al-Khuwair (Kennet and King 1994: pp 167–169).Ceramic scatters across the island date settlement at the al-Hulayla site from the third to theeighth centuries AD, especially from the ninth to the eleventh centuries AD and then againfrom the fourteenth century to late Islamic times.

Khatt lies inland in the foothills on the borders of the emirates of Ra’s al-Khaimah andFujairah. Several archaeological tells of great antiquity lie amidst farmland and groves oftrees, in an area with springs. Occupation of this fertile site goes back to the Late Stone Age,while ceramics indicating settlement in the first five centuries of the first millennium AD andin the Late Sasanian/Early Islamic period have also been retrieved (de Cardi, Kennet andStocks 1994: pp 54–58).

On the eastern side of the Jebel Hajar, but of far less certain dating, is a site in Fujairah emirate,a well-constructed falaj in the Wadi Safad north of Fujairah city. It is locally said to be Sasanian,but although it is probably ancient, its origin is unproven (King and Maren 1999: pp 10–18).

Extensive modern development means that it is probably no longer possible to assess thearchaeology of the towns of Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman, Sharjah and Dubai in the sixth/seventhcentury AD and in the Islamic period generally. However, just to the west of Dubai, the importantsite of al-Jumayra goes back to the Sasanian and the Umayyad periods according to its firstexcavator, Baramki, although recent excavations by Dubai Museum suggest that the chronologywill have to be revised in the light of new work at the site by Dr Husayn Qandil (Baramki1975; Hellyer 1998: p 130). By the rise of Islam, sites like al-Dur (Ed-Door) on the Ummal-Qaiwain coast and al-Muwailah and al-Milayha (Mleiha)3 had long since declined butwhere their successors as settlements are located, if anywhere, is unclear.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

A very curious discovery that relates to the transition between the pre-Islamic and theIslamic period is a camel sacrifice and burial at Jebel al-Buhais near al-Madam in Sharjah.The excavation involved a male skeleton, accompanied by iron arrowheads and a camel.It is dated by C14 analysis of the contents of the camel’s stomach to 640–680 AD with a2σ deviation. The arrowheads suggest that the individual was a warrior (Uerpmann andUerpmann 1999: p 456). The burial had taken place in a reused Bronze Age tomb: suchreuse practices have been encountered at several graves in the Oman peninsula includingat a grave at Jebel cImâla (Emalah) near to Jebel al-Buhais, at a date sometime betweenthe Hellenistic and the Sasanian period (Benton 1994: pp. 12-13). However, the Jebel al-Buhais burial is unusual inasmuch as it is both so late and it is a precisely dated camelburial belonging to the period when the region was apparently under Al Julanda and/orUmayyad rule. The Jebel al-Buhais human and camel burial appears to be a continuationof earlier burial practices and camel sacrifice in a period of transition as the countrygradually had its social practices transformed and the impact of Islam took grip. In thepre-Islamic period, camel sacrifice and burial rites have been well documented in recentyears at al-Milayha, dated to ca 300 BC to ca 200 AD (M. Mashkour 1997: pp. 725-736;Uerpmann and Uerpmann 1999: pp. 455–456; Uerpmann 1999: pp. 102–118) and in Yemen(B. Vogt 1994: pp. 279–290). To these should be added an extremely interesting camelsacrifice found at al-Rabadha on the Darb Zubayda, to the east of al-Madîna in centralSaudi Arabia, excavated in the mid-1980s but still unpublished. It involved a baby camelsacrificed and laid in the foundations of a doorway covered by the threshold stone of adoorway and in a firmly ninth or tenth century AD Abbasid context. Taken with the‘Umayyad-period’camel sacrifice at Jebel al-Buhais in Sharjah, these two camel sacrificesshow the long persistence of camel-related sacrifice rituals across a great expanse of theArabian landscape into a late period.

As in much earlier times, the plentiful water resources of Al Ain and Al Buraimi, theTuwwam of the Arab geographers and historians, must have made the great inland oasisan important place in the Islamic period. Its numerous falaj systems show the longevityand the extent of organized settlement and cultivation there. The oasis is mentioned in thecontext of events of the Early Islamic period, but published archaeological accounts forthe area on the eve of Islam or in the Islamic period generally are rare. A French teamworking in 1976 at Al Ain when the oasis was far less disturbed by modern developmentseems only to have found later Islamic material, dated to post-sixteenth century AD(Cleuziou 1976–1977: p 10).

A number of sites dating from the immediately pre-Islamic centuries have been recognizedthrough archaeological surveys of the Abu Dhabi coastal region since 1992 (King, Dunlop,Elders, Garfi, Stephenson and Tonghini 1995: pp 63–74; King and Tonghini 1999: pp 117–142;Hellyer and King 1999: pp 119–123). Until recently, it had been assumed that the firstsettlement at the site of Abu Dhabi city was to be dated to 1761, but sherds retrieved from anow lost archaeological site at al-Batîn (al-Bateen) boatyard in Abu Dhabi city have beenrecognized as belonging to ca third to fourth century AD, pushing back the history of settlementon the island on which the capital city of the UAE stands by a thousand years. Ceramics ofa similar date to those from al-Batîn have also been found at Ra’s Bilyaryar, a headland onthe mainland north-east of Abu Dhabi city.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Settlement of the same ca third to fourth century AD period is also proven on the offshoreisland of Yasat al-cUlya’, where there is also a small representation of Early Islamic ceramics.A significant site of similar date was found on the neighbouring island of Yasat al-Sufla’,with remains of buildings indicated by low mounds that represent the traces of collapsedarchitecture. Sites of the same date are located on the island of Ufzaiyya and on the al-Silac

mainland peninsula opposite. Yet another site of the same period and of some size wasfound on the island of Ghagha’, one of a small group of islands in the westernmost watersof the UAE, close to the Saudi Arabia sea-frontier. Later Islamic structures were built overthe site, although much remained to indicate the extent of the earlier occupation and itsimportance. Further out in the Gulf, ceramics of the centuries immediately preceding Islamhave also been found on the island of al-Qarnayn (Qarnein), at Marawah, Dalma and atRa’s Ghumays on the Silac peninsula.

A survey by a French team in 1979 on the island of Dalma, near the town of the samename, noted a major building which they attributed to a Sasanian/Early Islamic date, althoughit has since vanished (Cleuziou 1976–1977: pp 10–15). Ceramics of ca sixth century ADdate were recovered from a site on the outskirts of Dalma in 1992. Given the island’s plentifulwater supplies in the past, it seems very likely that it was a place of regional importancebefore the rise of Islam and also in the Islamic period itself, judging from Cleuziou’sobservations and our own.

One of the most remarkable discoveries on the Abu Dhabi islands for this period before thecoming of Islam has been made at al-Khawr (al-Khor) on the island of Sir Bani Yas, off thecoast at Jebel Dhanna. The landscape of the island has been changed by landfilling andextensive tree planting in recent years, but at al-Khawr, on the eastern side of the island and

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

Courtyard house north of the church at al-Khawr, Sir Bani Yas, Abu Dhabi emirate (1995).

in an undisturbed area, a group of sites was identified in 1992. These include several courtyardhouses and a large occupation mound, now recognized as a Nestorian monastery and church(King 1997: pp 221–235). Carbon 14 dating of burnt material retrieved from the monasteryindicates occupation to the mid-seventh century AD which matches the sixth to seventhcentury AD date of the pottery excavated at al-Khawr.

The structures so far exposed at al-Khawr were reduced to wall foundations, but theywere all remarkably well preserved, with a fine plaster finish on the internal wall surfacesand floors. The monastery consists of a rectangular enclosure with chambers surroundinga central courtyard and a church that stands in its centre at the highest point. In the courseof the excavation numerous pieces of fine decorative plaster were recovered, with reliefmotifs of grape leaves, grape clusters and Christian crosses of the same character as thedecoration of other Nestorian sites of similar date elsewhere in the Gulf, at Failaka’(Kuwait),al-Jubayl (Saudi Arabia), at the Bani Lakhm capital of al-Hira (Iraq), and at al-Kharg island(in Iran)4.

The al-Khawr church is on an east-west axis, measuring at least 14 m in length and it hasthree aisles. When abandoned, it eventually collapsed with the east wall falling on to its owndecorative plaster, thus protecting and preserving a large amount of the decoration that oncecovered the building on the exterior and possibly on the interior. The original design seemsto have consisted of string courses decorated with grape clusters, vine leaves and crosses thatran as bands across the building.

During excavations at the western end of the island of Marawah in 2000 season, yet anotherchurch was identified. Although only the apse at the east end of the building was exposed, itsdimensions and the quality of its undecorated internal plaster facing tied it stylistically to theal-Khawr church at Sir Bani Yas with which, at present, it is assumed to be comparable andcontemporaneous. Near to the newly found Marawah church is a complex water catchmentsystem that utilizes the natural configuration of the bedrock and man-made deflectors to guiderainwater run-off to make it pool. In the arid environment of the Abu Dhabi islands this skillin water management seems to have persisted from the Late Stone Age down to the LateIslamic period. While we hesitate to date the origins of this water deflector system on Marawahat present, it is tempting to associate its use with the nearby church. Certainly, if the watergathering system is as old as the sixth to seventh century AD, it is hard to imagine that thosewho used the church did not exploit this source of water. Other evidence, based on provisionalC14 dating from two lime kilns from the west end of the island point to use in ca 726 and ca826 respectively. It is thus increasingly apparent that there is a significant level of activity onwestern Marawah as well as at al-Khawr at Sir Bani Yas and at Dalma in the centuriesimmediately before Islam and in the Early Islamic period.

The presence of churches in eastern Arabia conforms to the Arabic textual accounts ofChristianity in the east of the peninsula at the time of the coming of Islam. The Bani LakhmArab kings of al-Hira in south-west Iraq were Nestorian Christians and their role was that ofa buffer state for the Sasanians in their conflicts with the Byzantines and their allies in thedeserts of Arabia and Syria. Other Arab tribes were also Christian, including Bani Taghlib innorth-east Arabia and the north Arabian and Syrian tribes of Ghassan, Kalb and Judham, whileChristianity was established in Yemen before Islam at Sancâ’, Najran and at Zafar as well asin the broader context of the Indian Ocean (Fiaccadori 1992).

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

The ecclesiastical arrangements of the Nestorian church in eastern Arabia are reasonablywell understood. The Nestorian province of Bet Qatraye included Bahrain and the coastopposite to it, the al-Hasa’ oasis and Qatar, and it was divided into a number of bishoprics.Further to the east was Bet Mazuniye, which encompassed the modern Sultanate of Omanand territory now in the UAE. The centre of Bet Mazuniye was Suhar on the Batinah and thenames of several of Bet Mazuniye’s bishops are known. As we have seen, for the Arabgeographers, all of south-east Arabia, including the territory of the UAE, was ‘Oman’, andthe Syriac term ‘Mazuniye’signifies this same broad geographical territory. It seems reasonableto assign much of the UAE to the territory of Bet Mazuniye rather than to Bet Qatraye. However,the location of the boundary between Bet Qatraye and Bet Mazuniye is unclear and Sir BaniYas with its monastery at al-Khawr and that at Marawah are very close to wherever this ecclesi-astical boundary must have been. It is therefore difficult at present to be sure to whichecclesiastical division the al-Khawr monastery belonged.

The Syriac sources speak of the foundation of monasteries in the Gulf as early as the fourthcentury AD and the presence of a church or monastery on at least one Gulf island is indicated.In 676 AD, bishops of the Nestorian church attended a council at Darin on the island of Tarut,off the Saudi Arabian coast, after visiting unspecified islands, presumably to meet other clergyresiding there. This sounds very much like a reference to Sir Bani Yas, Failaka’ or Kharg. Itis to this world of pre-Islamic Nestorian Christianity on the coasts and islands of the Gulf andwith contacts out into the Indian Ocean that the Sir Bani Yas monastery belongs.

Christianity persisted in eastern Arabia for several centuries after the coming of Islam buteventually it seems to have faded, supplanted by the dominant new faith. It appears to havesimply eroded away, perhaps because of conversion to Islam, and churches like that on SirBani Yas or Marawah would have been abandoned to deteriorate until they finally collapsed.

Little is known of the pre-Islamic history of the south-east Arabian tribes to whom manyof these post-third century AD archaeological sites must relate. The Azd, led by their Al Julandaprinces, had originated in Yemen and they seem to have been the principal tribal group inOman but there were non-Azd tribes as well, established in the present territory of the UAEand the Sultanate of Oman; the descendants of the non-Azd tribes were to be known as Nizarin later times.

The al-cAtik branch of Azd was found at Dibba on the Batinah coast of the UAE, whileanother branch, Huddan, resided along the modern UAE coast between Ra’s Musandam andQatar: yet another, Humaym, was at Nizwa. Elements of the Azd were also located on theislands of the Gulf, both on the Arabian and on the Iranian side, before the rise of Islam.

Of the little that is known of the pre-Islamic Azd, it is clear that they were seamen, merchantsand fishermen. Hisham ibn al-Kalbi says that, along with the northern Arabian tribes of Tayyi’and al-Qudaca, the Azd worshipped an idol called Bajir or Bajar before Islam (Ibn al-Kalbi1952: p 54), although this deity may have belonged to a branch of Azd who lived somewherein the north of the peninsula rather than in the south-east (Ibn al-Kalbi 1952: p 54). However,the excavations at Sir Bani Yas and elsewhere in eastern Arabia add to the growing body ofevidence of the presence of Christianity in the pre-Islamic Gulf, suggesting a religious picturemore complex than one confined to paganism alone. A local tradition, current in the UAE,holds that part of the Manasir were Christian before the coming of Islam. The archaeologicalevidence from pre-Islamic Nestorian church sites makes such a tradition seem plausible.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

The Advent of Islam (622–661 AD)

The sources for the history of the UAE in the Early Islamic period are either the Arabic historiansand geographers who wrote under the Abbasid Caliphate or the very much later compilationsbased on early but lost works. For the early years of Islam, such sources as we have areoccasionally informative, dealing with certain incidents in some detail. Such episodes as arerecorded touch on the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, the Rightly Guided Caliphs andtheir Umayyad and Abbasid successors. The events they describe either relate to the conversionof the country to Islam or to military matters. Yet, although the literary sources record certainepisodes, silence prevails for much of the Early Islamic period and it is only archaeologicalresearch in recent years that has broadened the scope of our understanding of the history ofthe UAE in the Islamic period as a whole.

Before the arrival of Islam to south-eastern Arabia, the Sasanians in Oman were already inconflict with the Azd tribe and their Al Julanda kings. The balance in this conflict swung in favourof the local Arabs when the Al Julanda were joined by Muslim forces sent by the ProphetMuhammad from al-Madîna, and in the resulting military campaigns the Sasanian citadels wereoverwhelmed and their forces expelled by 630 AD. The Sasanians had suffered a catastrophicdefeat in Iraq at the hands of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius over the previous two years andthe success of the Muslims and the Al Julanda in south-eastern Arabia presaged the subsequentMuslim victories over the Sasanians that were to lead to their total defeat and the disintegrationof their empire in Iran 20 years later.

At the time of the coming of Islam, the leadership of the Arabs of south-east Arabia was amatter of dispute. The Al Julanda ruling house of the tribe of Azd was led by two brothers,Jayfar and cAbd (or cAbbad), and they were centred on the Batina coast at Suhar. They werein conflict with the al-cAtik branch of the Azd who lived mainly in the interior of the country.The latter were led by Laqit b. Malik al-cAtiki, who seems to have lived at Dibba. Accordingto Ibn Habib, however, Dibba was also sometimes under the control of the Al Julanda, for onthe last day of the month of Rajab, they would administer an annual fair there, one of the greatmarkets of pre-Islamic Arabia (Potts 1992: p 339). Ibn Habib records that Dibba was one ofthe two ports used by the Arabs of south-east Arabia, Suhar being the other. Merchants wouldcame from Sind, India and China for this fair. If not an exaggeration, this provides furtherevidence of the breadth of Indian Ocean trade before Islam, although it seems unlikely thatmerchants from China arrived at this early date in Arabia and the most authoritative discussionof the pre-Islamic China trade, by G.F. Hourani, argues decisively against this possibility(Hourani 1995: pp 46–50). Although Dibba is mentioned in the Arabic sources as an importantplace, archaeological reports do not offer much evidence to indicate its character on the eveof Islam or in the Early Islamic period (de Cardi 1971: p 257). However, a graveyard associatedwith a major battle in the Early Islamic Ridda wars of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr is locatedclose to Dibba (Hellyer 1990: pp 48–49; Hellyer 1998: p 127).

The territory that now constitutes the UAE emerges into view in the context of the ProphetMuhammad’s invitation to the people of south-east Arabia to convert to the new faith of Islam.Knowledge of the Prophet’s message seems to have seeped into south-east Arabia, as well asto al-Hasa’ and Bahrain in eastern Arabia, before large-scale conversion and acquiescence to

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

the new faith occurred. The area also figures prominently in the events of the Ridda (Apostasy)wars of 632–634 AD.

As we have seen, about the time that the first contacts were made between south-east Arabiaand the Islamic community at al-Madîna, the Sasanian state was engaged in warfare with theByzantines which was to lead to the decline of both empires as international powers. In thissame period, the Azd appear to have been bringing pressure on the Sasanian outposts alongthe coast. In 630 AD, the Prophet Muhammad sent as a missionary to the Azd one of hisCompanions, Abu Zayd al-Ansari, from the Madînan tribe of Khazraj, who was known forgathering pages of the Qur’an during the Prophet’s lifetime. The Prophet then sent a newlyconverted member of Quraysh, cAmr b. al-cAs, the future founder of al-Fustât in Egypt.According to a late source, there had been contacts with Oman even earlier, with Mazin b.Ghadubah being the first individual from south-east Arabia to accept Islam when he went tothe Prophet at al-Madîna and converted there (Sirhan 1984: p 9).

Subsequently, cAmr b. al-cAs arrived bearing a letter from the Prophet, passing throughTuwwam (Al Ain/Al Buraimi) before continuing to the Batina coast to present the letter tothe Sasanian governor who rejected the Prophet’s message. cAmr, now joined with Abu Zayd,then went to the Al Julanda kings of the Azd, either at Demetsjerd, the citadel built by theSasanians at Suhar, or at Nizwa, and presented the Prophet’s letter to cAbd. cAbd recognizedthe importance of the matter and passed the letter to his brother Jayfar. They agreed on itssignificance and said that they needed to consider the matter at length. A council of the Azdwas called at which it was decided that they should convert to Islam. The Prophet’s messagewas accepted by all their kin, who agreed to pay the Qur’anic zakat tax. Jayfar then invitedall the people in Oman to submit to Islam. Among others places, he sent messages to Dibba,and to the furthest flung parts of Oman to the north, by which the territory of the UAE isprobably intended (Sirhan 1984: pp 9–10).

The conversion of the Al Julanda and the Azd to Islam now became tied to the existinghostility between the Azd and the Sasanian government. The Sasanians maintained theirrejection of Islam and, led by the Al Julanda princes, the Azd attacked them, killing Maskan,the Sasanian administrator of Oman, and besieging the rest of their forces in the citadel ofDamsetjerd where they finally surrendered in 630 AD. The defeated Sasanians agreed to evacuatethe country and to relinquish all their gold, silver and property.

With the Sasanians expelled, cAmr continued to administer Oman until the Prophet’s deathin 632 AD and the succession of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph. cAbd, the Julanda prince, went toal-Madîna where he was received with pleasure by the newly appointed Caliph who praised theconversion of the people and wrote to them to compliment them. The point at which this happenedis unclear, however, for at the death of the Prophet, the great uprising known as the Ridda (orApostasy) wars broke out against Islamic rule in much of Arabia. Central Arabia followed afalse prophet, Musaylima, while in the east and south, rebellions took place all the way fromBahrain to Oman, Mahra and Yemen. The famous Muslim general, Khalid b. al-Walid, wasdespatched to al-Yamama in central Arabia by the Caliph to put down Musaylima and whileKhalid suppressed this threat, other commanders were deployed in eastern Arabia. Al-cAla’ b.al-Hadrami was sent to reduce the apostates of Bahrain (the eastern coast of Arabia and theisland of the same name) while Hudhayfa b. Mihsan al-Ghalfani, of the Yemeni Himyarites,and Arfaja al-Bariqi, an Azdi, were sent to suppress apostates in south-east and southern Arabia.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

Abu Bakr ordered Hudhayfa to advance with all speed on Oman, where he was to be supportedby Arfaja. In Oman, they were to support the Muslims, reinforcing the Al Julanda princes, cAbdand Jayfar, against their opponents, the dissident Azd elements. The expedition was then tocontinue into Mahra on the southern coast, where Arfaja would command. They were reinforcedby cIkrima b. Abi Jahl, who had been engaged with Khalid b. al-Walid in the campaigns in centralArabia against Musaylima. After suppressing the apostates in Oman and Mahra, the Caliphordered that the Muslim forces should continue through the Hadramawt to Yemen, to join upthere with al-Muhajir b. Abi Umayya and his Muslim forces already operating in Yemen.

The Caliph’s plan of campaign responded to the nature of the topography of the south ofthe Arabian Peninsula, and the natural obstacle of the immense Empty Quarter sand sea. Thisforced the Muslim army to march from al-Madîna through central Arabia in a great circuitalong the north side of the sands and then to pass through territory that today lies in the UAE,to reach the Oman Peninsula. They then turned south-west and west towards southern Arabia,to Mahra’, Dhufar and to Yemen. Although there is evidence in later times of armies that musthave crossed the edge of the sands in the UAE to reach Julfar, the Batina and the interior ofOman, only this Early Islamic army from al-Madîna seems ever to have circled the whole ofthe Empty Quarter.

Any large force moving through the UAE from central or northern Arabia by land mustmarch between the deep sands of the eastern Empty Quarter and the sabkha salt-flats of thecoast, which are especially difficult when the weather is wet in winter and spring. For travellers,access to wells in the Baynuna, Liwa or Tuwwam (Al Ain/Al Buraimi) areas is vital until themore plentiful water sources of the Jebel Hajar and Jebel Akhdar are reached. The difficultyof finding wells when traversing this harsh desert area in south-east Saudi Arabia and in westernAbu Dhabi emirate is illustrated graphically by Wilfred Thesiger’s account of his journeyfrom Jabrin to Dhibi and the Liwa in 1948 (Thesiger 1971: pp 233–244). It was awarenessof the nature of the desert landscape and the location of the limited water resources that dictatedthe Caliph Abu Bakr’s plan of campaign and the route of his forces around the south-east ofthe Arabian Peninsula to Yemen. Like any traveller in the pre-modern period, dependent onwells, and travelling by camel, Abu Bakr, as a native of the distant Hijaz, or his commanders,must have sought the advice of local people from the tribes of south-east Arabia who wouldhave had the same detailed knowledge of the Empty Quarter that their descendants amongthe tribes of the area still retain today. It was as part of this process that Arfaja al-Bariqi, asan Azdi, and Hudhayfa b. Mihsan al-Ghalfani, as a Himyari of Yemen, were selected to leadthe expedition, not only because of the connections that their own tribal affiliations gave thempolitically in Oman and southern Arabia, but also because of the tribal contacts and access toguides that they would have had in the areas through which the Madinan Islamic force passedin its great march around the Empty Quarter.

In Oman, the leader of the apostasy was Laqit b. Malik al-Azdi, known as ‘the one with thecrown’ (Dhu’l-Taj), a figure of some importance in pre-Islamic times as a rival of the AlJulanda rulers of the country (al-Tabari, ed. Donner: pp 151–155; al-Baladhuri 1916: p 117).With the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Laqit rebelled and worsted the forces of the Julandaleaders and the Muslims in Oman. Al-Tabari says that, as a result of Laqit’s initial successes,cAbd and Jayfar were forced to seek refuge in the mountains and the islands off the coast,while Laqit dominated the rest of the country. The mountains must mean Jebel Hajar and

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Jebel Akhdar that form the great spine running from the Sultanate of Oman through thenorthern emirates of the UAE up to the Straits of Hormuz at Musandam. The islands mentionedare presumably those off the shore of the UAE and Oman and where Azd are known to havebeen present before Islam. In these more remote areas, the Al Julanda leadership awaitedreinforcements from al-Madîna.

The combined force of the Madinan army led by Hudhayfa and supported by Arfaja andcIkrima reached Riyam or Tuwwam, places which are recognized by Miles as being identicalwith Al Ain/Buraimi (Miles 1966: p 36). Using Al Ain as a base, the Madînan forces madecontact with cAbd and Jayfar who then met them at Suhar on the coast of the Batina in Oman.The Muslim forces, including those from south-east Arabia and from al-Madîna, now setabout fragmenting the apostates, writing to the chiefs of tribes that had supported Laqit b.Malik. The first to be approached was the leader of the Banu Judayd, who decided to abandonhim. When they felt that the apostates were weakened, the Muslim army advanced to meetLaqit at his base at Dibba which is described by al-Tabari as a great market and misr or town.As we have seen, Ibn Habib confirms the extent of Dibba’s trading network. Dibba wassometimes the capital of Oman and is said to have been garrisoned by the Sasanians beforeIslam (Donner in al-Tabari 1993: p 153, n 964).

A battle broke out between the two sides at Dibba, somewhere on the plain just inland fromthe present coastal town to judge by the location of the graves where those lost in the battleare buried. Laqit strengthened his followers’ intention to resist by placing their women andchildren behind his position so that their presence would encourage his men to fight to protecttheir families. Initially, Laqit was dominant, but the Muslims, reinforced by other tribes(including members of cAbd al-Qays and elements from Bani Najiya of the Qudaca, who hadsettled in Oman before Islam), finally prevailed and Laqit’s followers fled, leaving many dead.According to al-Tabari, 10,000 died although numbers are often exaggerated in the EarlyIslamic texts, and may merely indicate ‘a large number’.

The victorious Muslims proceeded to loot the market at Dibba. The captives seized weresent to Abu Bakr with one fifth of the booty, which included the enemy’s flocks. Hudhayfaremained in south-east Arabia where Abu Bakr appointed him governor, an office that he heldafter the death of the Caliph in 634. He calmed the situation with the tribes, and all of the Azdreturned to Islam while the rest of the Muslim forces from al-Madîna and from the people ofOman continued to pursue the apostates into Mahra in southern Arabia before marching toShihr in Yemen. Al-Tabari describes this army as including people from the seacoast and fromthe islands, as well as from the incense country and from Najd (al-Tabari 1881–5: pp 156–157).One must assume that the Gulf islands are indicated in this reference.

The Invasion of Iran

In ca 637 AD, according to al-Tabari, the governor of the province of al-Bahrayn, cUthmanb. Abi al-cAs, was ordered by cUmar b. al-Khattab, the second Caliph, to attempt to invadethe coast of Sasanian Iran. The Muslim forces were 3000 strong and consisted of men fromAzd, cAbd al-Qays, Najiya and Rasib. They set out by sea from Julfar and sailed across theGulf to the island of Ibn Kawan (Qays) where they encountered the Sasanian governor of the

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

island whom they defeated (al-Tabari 1881–5: p 2698). They then continued to invade thecoast of Fars and the Iranian interior. It is not clear exactly what Julfar was at this stage butit is evident enough that it had a port. Given that the archaeological site now known as Julfar,lying just north of Ra’s al-Khaimah city, is dated post-fourteenth century AD, Early IslamicJulfar and its harbour must have been elsewhere. It is possible that the name Julfar movedaround the coastal plain near Ra’s al-Khaimah over time and its harbour moved as anchorageschanged when its creeks silted and offshore sand-bars built up, making navigation difficult.A major result of geomorphological study at post-fourteenth-century Julfar has been todemonstrate the instability of the shore and the hinterland, and the rapid change of the coastin very recent centuries. These processes must have had their effect on settlement in verymuch earlier times.

The Umayyad and Abbasid Periods (661–1258 AD)

With the death of the third Caliph cUthman b. cAffan in 656 AD, the Muslim community fellinto contention between the fourth Caliph, cAli b. Abi Talib, and the Umayyad governor ofSyria, Mucawiya b. Abi Sufyan. The Umayyads came to power as Caliphs themselves in 661AD on the assassination of the Caliph cAli, but the people of Oman remained aloof, ruled bytheir Al Julanda princes. It was not until some time towards 705 AD that al-Hajjaj b. Yusufal-Thaqifi, the powerful governor of the eastern Islamic world under the Umayyad CaliphcAbd al-Malik, launched an attack on south-east Arabia to bring it under Umayyad control.

To end south-east Arabia’s autonomy, the Umayyads sent a fleet and army that marched byland to Oman (Sirhan 1984: pp 10–11; Salal b. Razik 1871: pp 2–5). The fleet landed at Julfarwhich served as a naval base for the expedition for the course of the campaign. The firstUmayyad forces were defeated by the Azd and the Umayyad general, Qasim b. Shicwa, waskilled. Faced with this reverse, al-Hajjaj despatched another army, 40,000 strong, to Omanunder Qasim’s brother, Mujaca. This force was divided so that the horses and camels travelledby land while the army went with a fleet by sea. The land force must have crossed the UAEto reach the rendezvous but there is no indication as to the route they followed. Given thedangers of the shallow coastal waters and the difficulties of the sabkha, it is impossible thatthe army and the fleet could have maintained visual contact with each other as they travelledthrough what is now the UAE.

The Umayyad land force was defeated by the Azd at a water source some days from a placecalled Bushir or Balqaca which has been identified by Badger with al-Falj (Falaj) and whichis mentioned by al-Idrisi (al-Idrisi 1972: p 153). He places it near to Julfar (Badger in Salalb. Raziq 1871: p 3, n 2). The Umayyad land force fled, but the fleet landed at a place calledal-Bunana, which could be synonymous with Baynuna in Abu Dhabi emirate. However,Baynuna as understood today is a district with wells that is far inland, and if the term wasused for a larger area in the eighth century AD, it would have had to include the coast for thisidentification with al-Bunana to be meaningful. Yet even if this is true, it would have been oflittle advantage for the Umayyad fleet to have landed as far west of Julfar as the coast of theWestern Region of Abu Dhabi and the areas of the coast north of modern Baynuna, since theyare not provided with good anchorages for a large fleet. It seems, therefore, that another source

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

(Salil b. Raziq 1871: p 4) is more accurate, recording that the Umayyad fleet’s landing placewas al-Yunaniya of Julfar. This seems to mean that al-Yunaniya was a part of the broad districtcalled Julfar, and thus should be located somewhere in the present emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah,in the north of the UAE.

When the Umayyad fleet reached Julfar, an individual from Tuwwam came to inform themthat a dispute had arisen among the Azd after their defeat of the Umayyad land army. TheUmayyad sea-borne forces that assembled at Julfar under Mujaca were superior to the Azdiforce that remained in the area under Sacid b. cAbbad, the brother of the Al Julanda leader,Sulayman. Faced with the superior Umayyad forces, Sacid retreated by night into the mountainswith the Umayyads in pursuit.

Meanwhile, the Umayyad fleet of 300 vessels sailed through the Straits of Hormuz to anchorat Muscat harbour. The Julanda leader, Sulayman, managed to burn more than 50 of the Umayyadboats, while the rest fled. Sulayman then attacked and put to flight the main Umayyad armyunder Mujaca. Mujaca retreated to his headquarters at Julfar with the remaining boats andwrote to al-Hajjaj in Iraq, requesting reinforcements. In response, al-Hajjaj sent Mujaca 5000cavalry from Syria who marched by land to Julfar. Thus strengthened, the Umayyads overcamethe resistance of the Julanda and the Azd and defeated them. In the aftermath of the victory,the Umayyads appointed Sayf b. al-Hani al-Hamdani as governor of Oman. The Julandaleadership fled to the land of the Zanj – east Africa – and only re-emerged as a power in south-east Arabia later in the Umayyad period. The south-east Arabian sea trade that must haveexisted in pre-Islamic times with other Indian Ocean littoral countries probably prompted thedestination of the Al Julanda flight, an episode which presages subsequent south-east Arabianconnections with east Africa in the Islamic period.

When the Abbasid Caliphs seized power from the Umayyads in 750 AD, they soon turnedtheir attention to Oman to put down a revival of the Julanda and Azdi independence whichappears to have re-emerged by the later Umayyad period. This seems to have affected notonly the mainland of south-east Arabia but the islands of the Gulf as well. The first AbbasidCaliph, al-Saffah, sent an army to Oman led by Shiban b. cAbd al-cAziz al-Yashkuri to ensurethe allegiance of Julanda b. Mascud, the Azdi leader. The Abbasid fleet sailed from al-Basrato Ibn Kawan island on the eastern side of the Gulf and then on to Oman, although the harbourthat they used is not mentioned. However, Shiban was killed in the fighting that ensued withthe Azd. Even before Shiban’s death, the Caliph had decided to send a new commander, Khazimb. Khuzayma, to help confront the Azd.

Khazim arrived after Shiban’s death. He sought the allegiance of the people of thecountry to the Abbasids, but they refused to support him. The Abbasid forces killed theleaders of Julanda and 10,000 of their supporters, according to al-Tabari. This final battletook place at Julfar.

According to al-Tabari, during the fighting, Khizam’s Abbasid forces burnt the houses ofthe Julanda followers, using naphtha to hasten the flames. When they saw their houses burning,the Al Julanda army fled from their prepared positions to protect their families and this allowedthe Abbasid army to fall upon them and slaughter them. There is a long tradition of usingwooden and reed housing in the Gulf and around the Arabian coast. As early as the Late StoneAge we find post-holes at an Ubaid period site at Dalma indicating the presence of huts andthe archaeological and literary evidence shows that similar huts were still in use as late as the

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries AD. These are usually called barasti by Europeansbut are more correctly known as carish. The episode of the burnt houses of the Julanda armysuggests that a substantial number of the houses of Julfar were carish in the early Abbasidperiod. This is the first textual information describing structures at Julfar that gives someimpression of the common housing of the UAE coast.

A far more destructive Abbasid intervention occurred when the Caliph al-Muctadid cameto the throne in 892 AD. As the Abbasid governor of Iraq and the Gulf, Muhammad b. Nurapproached the Caliph with a plan to support anti-Ibadhi forces (or anti-Julanda forces) insouth-east Arabia, in order to obliterate the Ibadhis and their Julanda leadership, bringingsouth-east Arabia back under the direct rule of the Caliphate (Miles 1966: pp 77–84; Salil b.Razik 1871: pp 22–25).

A large Abbasid force set out, including members of the north Arabian tribe of al-Tayyi’.The force consisted of 25,000 men and included 3500 armoured cavalry. Stores and equipmentwere sent by a fleet that was to land at Julfar, while the rest of the army under Muhammad b.Nur marched through eastern Arabia to secure Julfar by way of the interior. They would havefollowed a route through modern Abu Dhabi and Dubai to reach the northern emirates, justas the forces of the Caliph Abu Bakr and of the Umayyads had done in earlier times. Havingestablished his naval base at Julfar to ensure communications by sea with al-Basra at the headof the Gulf, Muhammad b. Nur marched inland to Tuwwam, before advancing on Nizwa. Thestrength of his army was such that the local people were overwhelmed. Nizwa, the main townof Oman and of the Azd, was seized by Muhammad b. Nur and the local forces were routed.Some fled to Shiraz and al-Basra, while others went to Hormuz across the Gulf. In the briefuprising which followed, Muhammad b. Nur was initially driven back and defeated at Dibbabut he recovered to unleash his army on the area. In the ensuing campaign of terror anddestruction, much of south-east Arabia was wrecked. Muhammad b. Nur’s army set aboutkilling and torturing the people and breaking up the infrastructure by filling the falaj irrigationsystem, on which the agricultural economy of so much of south-east Arabia depended. TheAbbasids also burnt books, which is probably the cause of the paucity of early sources onsouth-east Arabia’s Islamic history.

While Muhammad b. Nur was ravaging Oman and laying the country low for decades tofollow, an increasing level of disruption in many other parts of the Abbasid Caliphate wastaking place as Baghdad began to lose control of its more outlying provinces. By the end ofthe ninth century AD, the power of the Abbasids was greatly diminished, with the Caliphscontrolled by their Turkish military commanders and many provinces lost to the de factopower of their local governors. The Abbasids also lost parts of the Gulf during the great Zanjrebellion in southern Iraq, a revolt which though once represented as a slave uprising has alsobeen described as a conflict over the control of Gulf trade. The Zanj sacked al-Basra in 871AD and continued to represent a threat to the Abbasids. Not long after, the massively disruptiveQaramita state, based in al-Hasa’and Bahrain, arose in eastern and northern Arabia. The Qaramitasectarians raided over the whole of Arabia, destroying the security of the pilgrim road fromIraq to the Hijaz, and raiding Syria. They sacked al-Basra in 923 AD and made forays intoOman and Yemen. In 930 AD, with great sacrilege, they attacked Mecca during the pilgrimageseason and seized the Black Stone from the Kacba, bearing it off to eastern Arabia where itremained until 951 AD when the Qaramita returned it.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

On the opposite side of the Gulf, events in the course of the tenth century AD were alsograve for the great regional trading centre of Siraf on the coast of Iran. Siraf had flourishedsince the Sasanian period but it suffered an earthquake in 977 AD, after which it declined. Asthe town’s commercial dominance faded and other centres supplanted it, the Siraf merchantsscattered as far as the Red Sea and east Africa. Beneficiaries of the decline of Siraf seem tohave included Ibn Kawan (i.e., the island of Qays on the Iranian side of the Gulf), and Suharin Oman. Suhar’s heyday as a trading and agricultural centre appears to have occurred in thetenth century AD. The occupation of Kush and al-Hulayla in Ra’s al-Khaimah in the ninth toeleventh centuries and thereafter may suggest that they too were a part of the efflorescenceof south-east Arabia in this period.

After the withdrawal of the Qaramita from south-east Arabia in 965 AD, the BuwayhidAmir of Kirman, Mucizz al-Dawla, invaded Oman. He joined his son, cAdud al-Dawla, atSiraf before landing their combined force with a fleet at Julfar to bring the country undertheir control. When the Buwayhid position was subsequently threatened, they sent forcesagain in 972 AD and cAdud al-Dawla took south-east Arabia under his direct rule. TheBuwayhids remained a power in Arabia until some time before 1053 AD when their authoritywaned. In 1055 AD, the Buwayhid state in Iraq and Iran was overthrown by the SeljukTurkish Sultans.

The principal line of this Turkish regime, the Great Seljuk Sultans based at Isfahan, reinstatedthe power of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. They established the foundations of a SunniIslamic revival across much of the Islamic world in their westward advance from Central Asiaas far as Syria and Anatolia. In south-east Arabia, their presence is scantily recorded, but Ibnal-Mujawir mentions a Seljuk prince of Kirman who also held Oman and this connection mayhave sustained itself until the fall of the Seljuk dynasty in Iran in 1186 AD.

The Early Islamic Archaeology of the UAE

Until recently, there has been a great lack of archaeological information concerning the seventhto thirteenth century AD in the UAE but there is now a growing body of evidence from sitesassociated with the Umayyad and the Abbasid periods. This is especially the case in the northernemirates of the UAE.

One of the most important of these sites is Kush in Ra’s al-Khaimah whose sixth/seventhcentury AD citadel, already discussed above, seems to have been abandoned in the EarlyIslamic period. An Abbasid period re-occupation followed in the ninth to tenth centuries AD,peaking between the eleventh century and the mid-fourteenth century AD. Among importedfinds uncovered during the 1998 excavations at Kush were two eighth/ ninth century ADDusun potsherds from China, while Indian pottery, as noted above, was found from the earliestphases at the site. These reflect the Arabian sea-trade with the Far East via the Indian Oceanknown from literary sources to have flourished in the Early Islamic period (Hourani 1995:pp 61 ff). While there is plentiful evidence of Far Eastern ceramics at UAE archaeologicalsites from the fourteenth century AD onwards, this trade is not well testified in archaeologicalterms at an earlier date, hence the significance of the presence of the Indian and Far EasternDusun sherds found at Kush.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

Archaeobotanical finds retrieved from Kush also include coffee beans from thirteenthcentury AD levels. These are especially interesting as they provide the earliest dated indicationof the use of coffee so far found anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula (Anon. 1996).

As we have already seen, Jazirat al-Hulayla on the coast north of Ra’s al-Khaimah emiratewas settled in the Sasanian/Early Islamic period but it saw an efflorescence during the Abbasidperiod. Excavations at al-Hulayla by a Japanese team proving a ninth to tenth century periodoccupation match the earlier results of Kennet’s survey that had pointed to the peaking ofsettlement on the island in the ninth to eleventh century AD period (Kennet and King 1994:pp 167–169; Sasaki 1995: pp 1–23). Much of the archaeological evidence at al-Hulayla is inthe form of ceramic scatters, but the Japanese excavations have demonstrated more concretelythe Abbasid period occupation of the island.

Yet another site occupied during the same period is the inland fortress at Shimal, near Ra’sal-Khaimah, known variously as the Palace of Sheba, Zacba, or Zabba and also known as HusnShimal. The excavators suggest that the fortress reached its most elaborate development in thetenth and the thirteenth centuries AD. Although the site shows evidence of an early period ofoccupation, subsequent clearance and rebuilding has led to the loss of material information relatingto this earlier occupation. It is also suggested that a large flood deflector running across the WadiSur near the Palace of Sheba was first constructed in the ninth to twelfth centuries AD. Thisdeflector served to send flood water descending from the highlands away from the Wadi Surtowards the dense band of palm-groves and gardens that lie in the hinterland of modern Ra’sal-Khaimah city. Surveys associated with excavations at Wadi Haqil, also near Shimal and closeto Sheba’s Palace, have identified two sites tentatively interpreted as farms and occupied betweenthe Early Islamic period and the thirteenth/fourteenth century (Stocks 1996: pp 145–163).

Kush, al-Hulayla, the Palace of Sheba and the Wadi Haqil sites are all close to each otherand appear to be approximately contemporary, indicating a significant level of settlementactivity in the hinterland of Ra’s al-Khaimah city in the Early Islamic period. This period alsosees an efflorescence of settlement at Suhar, as we have seen, and in the interior on the easternside of the Oman peninsula mountains. Behind Suhar, there is also evidence that the falaj-irrigation supported agricultural regime reached its greatest extent in the fourth to tenthcenturies AD. This irrigation regime was associated with the Wadi ji*zzi that flows from thedirection of the highlands and Al Ain/Buraimi down towards the Batina behind Suhar.

There is further literary and archaeological evidence of settlement in the Early Islamiccenturies from elsewhere in the UAE. Al-Hamdani writing in the tenth century knew of agreat hisn or fortress of the Bani Riyam in Oman (al-Hamdani 1884/I: p 52) but he does notsay where it was located. The fortress is presumably the Riyam which Miles associates withTuwwam (Al Ain/Al Buraimi). Yaqut al-Hamawi in ca 1225 AD also speaks of a citadel orfortress (qasaba) at Tuwwam.

A significant but still little understood archaeological site for the earlier Islamic period isthat at Jumeirah, just west of Dubai. As we have seen already, the first excavator of the site,D. Baramki, suggested that it originated in the Sasanian period (Baramki 1975), but thepresence of classic Abbasid glazed wares implies that the site continued in use at least intothe ninth century AD. However, until the excavations at Jumeirah led by Dr Husain Al Qandilof Dubai Museum are published, it would be premature to estimate the origins and longevityof this important site.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

From Dalma, also in the west of the UAE and the principal source of sweet water in thearea, there is also evidence from a graveyard in the modern town of Early Islamic pottery.This is of great interest, for, so far, very little evidence has been found of activity in thewestern areas of the UAE in this period, apart from the monastery of al-Khawr at Sir BaniYas, and that, after the eighth century AD, seems to have been deserted or on the point ofabandonment.

Put into a broader context, this evidence of Abbasid period settlement from Ra’s al-Khaimahand other parts of the UAE corresponds to settlement activity all along the Gulf coast in thesame period. The best known site archaeologically for the Early Islamic centuries is Sirafon the Iranian side of the Gulf, but excavations and surveys now show Abbasid-period sitesto be widespread, being identified at Suhar and, as we have seen, in the UAE, at Murwabon the coast of Qatar, in Bahrain, at al-Qusur in Kuwait and at the well-recorded site of Susain south-west Iran.

Throughout this period, al-Basra in southern Iraq was the main town of the northern Gulf,the Early Islamic site now marked by al-Zubayr. Cumulatively, this information begins togive archaeological form to the Gulf as the major waterway of the Abbasid period when Baghdadwas the centre of the Caliphate. All of this should be seen in the context of conclusions byearlier scholars, who have suggested that the disorders in southern Iraq associated with theZanj, and the power of the Qaramita (Carmatians) in al-Hasâ and Bahrain led to a decline inGulf trade around 1000 AD, and the shift of commerce to the Red Sea and the new Fatimidstate based at Cairo5.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

Excavations at Julfar (1991). In the centre of the picture is the excavation of the five successive mosquescarried out by the British team. Beyond is the area excavated by the French team.

The Fourteenth Century AD to the Later Islamic Period

The entire complexion of the political framework of the Middle East was transformed with thevastly destructive Mongol invasions initiated by Genghiz Khan in the early thirteenth centuryAD. These invasions culminated in the sack of Baghdad in 1258 AD and the murder of theAbbasid Caliph, al-Mutacsim. The line of continuous successors to the Abbasid Caliphate wasbrought to an end for the first time since they had established their rule in 750 AD. In theaftermath of the Mongol invasions, a series of new regimes emerged, among them the TurkishKara Katayans of Kirman in central Iran who dominated the south-east of Arabia from 1224until 1364 AD. The local power henceforth was Hormuz which emerged after 1300 AD. Theprinces of Hormuz still ruled the lower Gulf when the Portuguese arrived on the scene in thelater fifteenth century and thereafter they continued as a regional power in conjunction withthe Portuguese until the Safavid Shah cAbbas brought their dominion to an end along with thatof the Portuguese in 1622 AD. The coinage struck by the Hormuz princes at Jarun (Old Hormuz)was in circulation in considerable quantities at Julfar in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuryAD period. Understanding of this little studied coin sequence will eventually provide importantknowledge about the rulers of the area (N. Lowick in Hansman 1985).

From the fourteenth century to the Late Islamic period and the eve of modern times, archae-ological evidence abounds throughout the UAE. While sites all along the coasts and in theinterior of the UAE bear witness (almost always based on ceramic evidence) to settlement inthis period, it is at the excavated Islamic port site at Julfar in Ra’s al-Khaimah that the LateIslamic period comes most clearly to light. Geomorphological studies and excavations haveshown that the site now recognized as Julfar, the immediate predecessor of the city of Ra’sal-Khaimah, dates from after the fourteenth century when a hut settlement was establishedon a sand bar which had only recently emerged from the sea.

The Julfar of the Early Islamic period appears to have shifted from its original site (whereverthat was) to develop on this new location. It is hinted by al-Idrisi that by the twelfth centuryAD, sand-bars or siltation were affecting navigation in the Julfar area and it may be that theharbour of the earlier Julfar became un-navigable and it was found necessary to move to thenew site. This new Julfar is that which is mentioned throughout the Portuguese period in theGulf when the town enjoyed great prosperity as a regional trading entrepôt. Its connectionwith the Indian Ocean commercial network is reflected in the quantities of Chinese, Vietnameseand Thai ceramics recovered in excavation, along with Indian glass bangles and Iranianpottery.

The Julfar of this later period had a trading prominence which made it the equivalent ofmodern Dubai. Duarte Barbosa in 1517 AD describes the local merchants as being wholesaledealers, persons of worth and great navigators (Barbosa 1918/I: pp 73–74). When the Portuguesearrived, Julfar was under the jurisdiction of the ruler of Hormuz who benefited from itscommerce and its pearling fleet (Dalboquerque 1875/I: p 246). In the early sixteenth centuryAD the Portuguese came to dominate the Indian Ocean trade with their string of forts fromHormuz to Goa, Malacca and Macao in China, and it is in this sixteenth to seventeenth centuryAD period that Julfar underwent a great expansion. The centre of the town was in the walledarea known as al-Mataf but it extended north and south, to al-Nudud, towards Ra’s al-Khaimah.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

During this expansion, Julfar was transformed from a hut settlement to a town of much largersand-brick houses. In the area excavated by the Japanese team of archaeologists working atthe site, a grid-like pattern of streets was found running between the brick houses. In the centralarea of al-Mataf, a small sand-brick mosque of fourteenth or fifteenth century AD date underwenta series of reconstructions, presumably as increases in the Muslim congregation necessitateda larger area of worship. As a result, a sequence of five mosques were built one above the other,all on the same site with ever-increasing dimensions and dating from ca fourteenth centuryAD through to the sixteenth or seventeenth century AD. Near the mosque the British teamexcavated a large courtyard house which had continued in use over a considerable period oftime, before the place declined and became once again the village of carish huts that it hadprobably been after the sand-bar first formed in the fourteenth century AD. It was as Julfardeclined that Ra’s al-Khaimah rose to prominence as the favoured centre of settlement.

The map of the coast of Arabia in the Atlas of Lazaro Luis, dated 1563 AD, shows a numberof fortresses built by the Portuguese, including one at Julfar. Apronounced inlet is also marked,probably a silted creek which once formed the harbour. The silting of the harbour may accountfor the decline of this Late Islamic Julfar and the rise of its southern neighbour, the moderncity of Ra’s al-Khaimah, some time after the expulsion of the Portuguese by the local Arabsin the mid-seventeenth century AD. Ra’s al-Khaimah is mentioned by Gasparo Balbi in ca1580 AD, by the local Arab navigator, Ibn Majid, in the latter half of the fifteenth century ADand by Duarte Barbosa in 1617 AD.

By the eighteenth century AD, Ra’s al-Khaimah was associated with the Al Qasimi sheikhswho still rule the emirate. The fortress of the town built by the Al Qasimi is now the NationalMuseum of Ra’s al-Khaimah. Sondages by J. Hansman suggested to him that the site of thefort had served as a camp during the military occupation of south-east Arabia by the AfsharidTurkmen ruler of Iran, Nadir Shah, between 1737 and 1749 AD. The fortress at Khatt, inlandfrom Ra’s al-Khaimah, also seems to have been used by Nadir Shah’s forces.

Further north along the coast from Ra’s al-Khaimah is the fortress at Dhayah, on the summitof a steep hill at the foot of the mountains, near to the harbour of Rams. Dhayah played a rolealong with Ra’s al-Khaimah city in the fighting with the British expeditionary forces of 1809and 1819. Inland, the Palace of Sheba (Qasr Zacba) still functioned in the later Islamic periodalthough, as previously seen, its origins are older.

Many Late Islamic towers occur throughout the UAE, the best recorded being those thatonce formed a defensive system around Ra’s al-Khaimah (Wacdad and al-Kharkhur 1992;Kennet 1995). The tradition of tower construction in the Oman peninsula may be of greatantiquity, with fortified towers, all of the third millennium BC, being recorded at Hili in AlAin, at Bidiyah in Fujairah and Tell Abraq. The Early Islamic sources, as we have seen, alsorefer to fortifications at Tuwwam or Riyam (Al Ain/Al Buraimi). It is possible that changesin military technology and the use of artillery, first introduced to south-east Arabia by thePortuguese in the late fifteenth century AD, affected the evolution of UAE and Omani fortifi-cation traditions, with the artillery fortresses of the Portuguese having an impact on somelocal fortifications (d’Errico 1983: pp 291–306).

There are a number of extant later Islamic fortresses scattered around the UAE, includingthose at Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Dubai, as well as that at Ra’s al-Khaimah. InAbu Dhabi emirate there are also forts in Abu Dhabi city itself, and inland in the Liwa and

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

the Al Ain oases (el-Mutwalli 1997). Remains of a fortress have been excavated inland atMantiqat al-Sirra by S. Garfi for ADIAS, near Madinat Zayed in the Western Region of AbuDhabi emirate (Czastka and Hellyer 1994: pp 9–12). This fortress has been associated tentativelywith the events of the year 1633 AD, when the leader of the Bani Hilal, Nasir b. Qatan, wasjoined by members of the Bani Yas at the fort of al-Dhafra ‘on the confines of Oman’. It ispossible that the fortress at Mantiqat al-Sirra is synonymous with the al-Dhafra fort. Thisepisode is also interesting inasmuch as, taken with Balbi’s reference of ca 1580 AD to theisland of Sir Bani Yas (Sirbeniast), it provides an indication of the length of time that the BaniYas rulers of Abu Dhabi have been present in the region.

Until recently, the fortifications of the Portuguese period in the UAE have been betterrecorded by early maps of individual fortresses around the south-east Arabian coast, than byarchaeology. However, an Australian team has now excavated the fort of Bidiyah in Fujairahwhich is identified with ‘Libedia’, a Portuguese fortress recorded by de Resende in his 1646AD map (de Resende, 1646; Ziolkowski 1999: pp 19–21). The walls of the Portuguese fortressof Bidiyah were largely built with masonry from a third millennium BC tower nearby. ThePortuguese fortress measures 60 m a side and C14 analyses from the foundation levelsconfirm a date of 1450–1670 AD for the building, matching the date of ceramics retrievedduring the excavations. These in turn are comparable to the ceramic sequence from Julfarand sites at Khashm Nadir, in Ra’s al-Khaimah. While the Bidiyah building is identified asa Portuguese fortress, archaeological material remains reflecting Portuguese presence at thefortress site are limited. This contrasts with Portuguese sites elsewhere in the Indian Ocean,where there is more evidence of items imported by the Portuguese from Europe (Kirkman1974: pp 119 ff and 297 ff).

Apart from fortifications, there is evidence all over the UAE of Late Islamic period settlement,often in areas where we have little or no archaeological material from Early Islamic times. Thishas provided a broader picture to counterbalance the importance that past archaeological studieshave tended to give to Julfar and which has afforded such a wealth of information for the LateIslamic period. At Wadi Safad in Fujairah, fieldwork has shown its efflorescence in the LateIslamic period, a pattern which is probably typical of settlement in the valleys of the mountainousnorth of the UAE. Agriculture in Wadi Safad, which was sustained in the past by water tappedfrom springs in the mountainsides, used falaj systems that irrigated terraces and plantations,although many of these have now fallen out of use. In the mountains above Wadi Safad arenumerous farms and many of these, too, are abandoned. Such farms occur all over the highlandsof the Jebel Hajar. Dostal has recorded the stone-built architecture of similar mountain farmsteadsin Ra’s al-Khaimah (Dostal 1983), while Paolo Costa has described farms and their architec-ture further north in Ru’us al-Jibal in the northern enclave of the Sultanate of Oman (Costa1991: pp 95–143). Such mountain farmsteads appear to be of Late Islamic date.

Not far to the north of Wadi Safad on the coast of Fujairah is the remarkable four domedmosque at Bidiyah whose design is unique in the UAE and which also belongs to the generalframework of the later Islamic period. However, while other older mosques are knownelsewhere in the UAE, at Julfar, al-Falayya, Jazirat al-Hamra’and Dalma, the mosque at Bidiyahbelongs to a very different architectural tradition. Although it hints at mosques in Yemen,especially on the Red Sea coast, it is of a different character to them as well (al-cAbudi 1992;Willems and Allaire 1994: pp 73–76). Other Late Islamic mosques are preserved in Ra’s al-

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Khaimah, and a group of mosques together with a pearl-merchant’s house of the same laterperiod is situated on the island of Dalma in Abu Dhabi emirate (King, at press). Avery tentativelyidentified mosque, cautiously dated to the nineteenth century AD, was excavated at al-Hamriyah in the city of Sharjah by a French team of archaeologists (Mouton 1989: p 23).

In Sharjah and at Dubai in the Bastakia area, there still survive a number of traditionalbuildings which include several wind tower-houses (Coles and Jackson 1975; Rustamani,n.d.; Azzawi, n.d.). Dr M. Azzawi has restored a number of these later Islamic monumentsin Sharjah and has published accounts of his work. Similar wind-tower buildings survivein Ra’s al-Khaimah, and they once existed in Abu Dhabi. These are all related to a broaderGulf building tradition that is also encountered in Qatar, in Bahrain and on the Iranianside of the Gulf. The extant traditional buildings still scattered around the UAE andelsewhere in the Gulf have an archaeological significance in that they may well preservethe appearance in elevation of buildings only now surviving at archaeological sites interms of wall footings, exposed in the course of excavations. These extant buildingstherefore provide a level of guidance to understanding the character of the architectureof the UAE coasts in earlier periods.

Little archaeology has been possible in the rapidly developing modern cities of the UAEalthough a certain amount of work has taken place in Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Abu Dhabiand Dalma. D. Kennet undertook excavations of Late Islamic structures in the city of Ra’sal-Khaimah, while at Sharghan in Sharjah city, opposite the Al Qasimi hospital, a large sitewas found which was assigned by the excavators to the nineteenth century (Mouton 1989:pp 23–25) and which is presumably related to Sharjah’s pre-modern existence. In Abu Dhabicity, only the Al Nahyan family graveyard now preserves the original landscape of AbuDhabi island before it was developed in modern times, with ceramics found on the surfacethat date from the Late Islamic period. In the course of restoration of the late mosques atDalma by Dr Azzawi, the wall foundations of Late Islamic structures were exposed nearthe al-Muraykhi mosque.

The islands off the UAE coast provide numerous and persistent indications of settlementin the later Islamic period, some of which suggest transient and seasonal habitation, associatedwith pearling and fishing. Such sites are often marked by shell middens and sometimes scattersof typical Julfar horizon Late Islamic ceramics. The shell middens tend to consist of bothpearl oysters and dietary shells and are frequently encountered on the more undisturbedislands, like the Yasats, Humr, Ufzaiyya, Ghagha’, Marawah, al-Aryam (Bu Khushaisha) andBalghelam, while there used to be the remains of an old fishing village called cAwafi on SirBani Yas, which had large middens. Late Islamic finds on Abu’l-Abyadh, al-Rufayq and al-Qusabi and other islands all indicate activity in this later Islamic period, almost alwaysassociated with pearling and fishing. Similar types of sites were noted by Boucharlat alongthe coastline of Sharjah on the mainland (Boucharlat 1989: pp 32–33).

The numbers of Islamic graves give some indication of the population in the later Islamicperiod on islands that are now largely deserted. There is every reason to suppose that archae-ological evidence of pearling and fishing activity, its extent masked by modern development,would have occurred on all the islands off the coast in the past.

On some islands, evidence of settlement more permanent than mere camps is found, inthe form of small villages, the basis of whose economy would also have been fishing and

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

pearling. Their Late Islamic date is indicated by the usual Julfar horizon range of ceramics.Although many of these smaller villages have vanished with modernization, traces of someof them have been recorded in the course of archaeological survey. They include the LateIslamic village of Dalma on the southern shore of the island of the same name (the walls ofwhich Azzawi exposed), the now-vanished villages of al-Thahir and cAwafî on Sir Bani Yas,and Bu Karwa on al-Aryam. Surviving villages on Marawah include Ghubba and Liffa whichappear to be the descendants of Late Islamic villages. As to the character of these islandsettlements, it seems that many of their structures consisted of carîsh reed huts and stockadeslike those that appear in old photographs of the UAE towns before the modernization of thecountry in recent decades.

While most of the island sites are from the later Islamic period, evidence of ca fourteenthcentury AD activity has been found at Dalma, al-Rufayq and Sir Bani Yas. At Sir Bani Yasand Dalma such dating is suggested by the presence of Far Eastern ceramics including celadonsin addition to the blue and white porcelains of sixteenth to seventeenth century AD date.

Stone outline mosques and water catchment systems are encountered on some of the islandsoff the coast of Abu Dhabi. The mosques are of a simple type found all over the ArabianPeninsula and desert areas of the Middle East. Those on the Abu Dhabi islands vary betweena simple outline of single stones serving as a place of prayer for a small number of individuals,perhaps no more than one or two, and those for a larger congregation.

The water deflectors exploiting the topography of the limestone surface formations to storewater are structures that characterize many of the islands. Places where rainwater tends togather are often amended by these man-made water deflectors which direct the water to placeswhere it can pool during the wet seasons. These water catchments are usually found withoutany dating material, but their prevalence and their association with other features such as stone-outlined mosques suggests that some, at least, should be linked to the Late Islamic period.

A unique coastal site associated with the later Islamic period is located at Jebel Dhanna, inthe Western Region of Abu Dhabi. Jebel Dhanna is a diapiric salt dome, one of several in theregion, and it has very pure sulphur deposits. Sulphur was traditionally used for curing camelsof diseases and for general medicinal purposes, but although exploitation of the sulphur maybe ancient, until the coming of the Portuguese its use would have been limited. After theirarrival and the introduction of guns and artillery, however, sulphur was demanded in quantityfor the manufacture of gun-powder. With its large-scale sulphur deposits, Jebel Dhannaunderwent extensive mining from ca sixteenth century AD onwards, leaving numerous pitsand trenching along with Late Islamic pottery and occasional pieces of pure yellow sulphurscattered all over the mountain.

In contrast to the coast and islands, a very different environment is represented by thedesert which characterizes much of the interior of the UAE, especially Abu Dhabi. Thisdesert constitutes the eastern edge of the vast Empty Quarter sand-sea that covers much ofthe southern half of the Arabian Peninsula. Since pre-Islamic times, the desert has been alandscape of nomadic camel herders, camping near the limited number of water sources,usually around the perimeters of the deep desert. Archaeological scatters in the sands, in allperiods, are very limited, usually reflecting the accidental loss of a lithic tool kit or the lossor breakage of a few ceramic vessels. These finds are mostly discovered on the interdunalgravel plains, the palaeofloors that represent the desert surface before the sands of the Empty

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Quarter overwhelmed this earlier gravel surface. In rare cases, at Sahil, for instance, northof Liwa, and at Tawi Baduwa Shwayba, there are denser scatters of Late Islamic pottery andother ceramic sites of this character may exist. They presumably mark litter from nomadiccampsites, but they also reflect the range of ceramics that penetrated these interior desertregions in the later Islamic period.

1 Abu Dhabi Islands Archaeological Survey (ADIAS) was established in 1992 on the instructions of HH PresidentSheikh Zayed b. Sultan Al Nahyan under the patronage of HH Lieut-General Sheikh Muhammad b. Zayed Al Nahyan.

2 The Arab geographers use the broad geographical term cUman to describe the territory encompassed by the UAEand the Sultanate of Oman.

3 Al-Dur was the subject of excavation by a series of international expeditions, and is best summarised by D.T.Potts, The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, Oxford (1992), ii.,‘. . . By the fourth century AD it seems to have fallen outof use’. Dr Peter McGee is currently excavating this Iron Age site, a walled town of remarkable extent. The siteof al-Milayha appears not to have remained settled beyond the fourth century AD (M. Mouton, La Peninsuled’Oman de la fin de l’age du fer au debut de la periode sassanide (250av.–350 ap.JC). unpublished doctoral thesis,Universite de Paris (1992).

4 To this list of Nestorian churches should be added a possible church at Siraf on the Iranian coast. The buildingconcerned is basilical and is now dated to the ninth century. AD, but although the excavators thought it could bea church, they express great caution about this (Whitehouse, 1974, pp 21–23).

5 For a discussion of this premise of a shift of commerce from the Gulf to the Red Sea, see B. Lewis, ‘The Fatimidsand the Route to India’, Revue de la Faculté de Sciences Economiques d’Istanbul (1953); see also C. Cahen,‘Buwayhids or Buyids’, Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.).

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Kervran, M. ‘Suhâr’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed.Kervran M., and Hiebert, F. ‘Sohar Pré-Islamique. Note stratigraphique’, Golf-Archaölogie. Mesopotamien, Iran,

Kuwait, Bahrain, Vereinigte Arabische Amirate und Oman, Internationale Archäologie 6 (1991) pp 337–343.King, G.R.D. ‘Excavations of the British team at Julfar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, United Arab Amirates: Interim Report on

the first season (1989)’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 20 (1990) pp 79–93. King, G.R.D. ‘Excavations of the British team at Julfar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, United Arab Amirates: Interim Report on

the second season (1990)’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 21 (1991) pp 123–134. King, G.R.D. ‘Excavations of the British team at Julfar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, United Arab Amirates: Interim Report on

the third season’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 22 (1992) pp 47–54.King, G.R.D. ‘Nizwa’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new ed. (EI2).

‘Musandam’, EI2

‘Ra’s al-Khayma’, EI2.‘Rubca. al-Khâlî’, EI2.

King, G.R.D. ‘The Architectural Tradition of Saudi Arabia and its Neighbours’, University Lectures in Islamic Studies,Al Tajir World of Islam Festival Trust (ed), A. Jones, vol.1 (1997) pp 85–107.

King, G.R.D. ‘A Nestorian Monastic settlement on the island of Sîr Banî Yâs, Abu Dhabi: a preliminary report’,Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies lx, part 2 (1997) pp 221–235.

King, G.R.D. ‘L’Aube de l’Islam aux Emirats Arabes Unis’, Archeologia no. 353, February (1999) pp 46–56.King, G.R.D. ‘The Islamic Architecture of Dalma, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates’, Garnet, London (at press).King, G.R.D. Dunlop, D., Elders, J., Garfi, S., Stephenson, A. and Tonghini, C. ‘A Report on the Abu Dhabi Islands

Archaeological Survey (1993–4)’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 25 (1995) pp 63–74.King, G.R.D. and Tonghini, C. ‘The Western Islands of Abu Dhabi Amirate: Notes on Ghagha’, Studies in Honour

of Beatrice de Cardi, London (1999) pp 117–142.King, G.R.D. and Maren, H. ‘A Preliminary Survey of the Archaeology of the Wâdî Safad, Fujairah, United Arab

Emirates, April, 1994’, Tribulus, Bulletin of the Emirates Natural History Group,9:2, 2000, pp 10–18.Kirkman, J. Fort Jesus. A Portuguese fort on the East African Coast, Oxford (1974).Larsen, C.E. Life and Land Use on the Bahrain Islands, Chicago (1983).Lowick, N.M. ‘Trade patterns on the Persian Gulf in the light of recent coin evidence’, in Kouymjian, D.K. (ed)

Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History. Studies in Honour of George C. Miles, Beirut(1974) pp 319–333.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Lowick, N.M. ‘Further unpublished Islamic coins of the Persian Gulf’, Studia Iranica 11 (1982) pp 247-261.Lorimer, J.G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman, and Central Arabia, Calcutta (1908). al-Maqdisi, Kitab Ahsan al-Taqasim fi macrifat al-iqlim (ed), de Goeje, M.J., Leyden (1967).Miles, S.B. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, London (1966).Morgan, P. 1991, ‘New Thoughts on Old Hormuz: Chinese Ceramics in the Hormuz Region in the Thirteenth and

Fourteenth Centuries’, Iran XXIX (1991) pp 67–83.Mouton, M. ‘The Historical Periods: The Soundings’, in Al-Abboudi, N.H. 2nd Archaeological Survey in the Sharjah

Emirate, 1985. A Preliminary Report, Sharjah (1989) pp 20–25.Mustawfi, Hamd Allah, The Geographical part of Nuzhat-al-Qulub, translated by G. Le Strange, Leyden and London

(1919).Mutwalli, R.T. Qasr al Husn, Abu Dhabi (1997).Piacentini, V. ‘Ardashir I Papakar and the wars against the Arabs. Working hypothesis on the Sasanian hold of the

Gulf,’ Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 15 (1985) pp 57–77.Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens, M. ‘La ceramique chinoise de Qalcat al-Suhar’, Arts Asiatiques XLIII (1988) pp 87–105.Potts, D.T. The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, 2 vols., Oxford (1992). al-Qasimi, Muhammad, HH Sultan, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, London (1986).Qudama, Abu’l-Faraj in Ibn Khurradadhbih, Kitab al-Masalik wa’l-Mamalik et excerpta e Kitab al-Kharadj, ed. and

trans. into French from the Arabic by de Goeje, M.J., Leyden (1967).Rustamani, A.H. Dubai and its architectural heritage, Dubai (n.d.).al-Sayigh, F. Al-Imarat al-carabiyya al-mutahidda min al-qabilat ila al-dawla, Dubai (1418/1998).Salil ibn Razik, History of the Imams and Seyyids of ‘Omân, translated from the Arabic and edited by Badger, G.P.,

London (1871).Sasaki, T. and Sasaki, H. ‘Japanese excavations at Julfar – 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 seasons’, Proceedings of the

Seminar for Arabian Studies, XXII (1992) pp 105–120.Sasaki, T. ‘1994 excavations at Jazirat al-Hulayla, Ra’s al-Khaimah’, Bulletin of Archaeology, University of Kanazawa,

Japan, 22 (1995) pp 1–23.Serjeant, R. B. ‘Fisherfolk and fish-traps in al-Bahrain’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies XXXI

(1968) pp 486–514.Simpson, St. J. Aspects of the archaeology of the Sasanian Period in Mesopotamia, D. Phil. thesis, Oxford (1992).Sirhan ibn Sacid ibn Sirhan, Annals of Oman: History of Oman from 1728 to 1883, Cambridge (1984).Slot, B.J. The Arabs of the Gulf 1602–1784, Leidschendam (1993).Stocks, R. ‘Wadi Haqil Survey, November, 1992’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies 26 (1996) pp

145–163. al-Tabari, Ta’rikh (ed), de Goeje, M.J., Leiden (1881–5).al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari, translated into English from the Arabic and annotated by Donner, F., x. ‘The

Conquest of Arabia’, NY (1993). Thesiger, W. Arabian Sands, London, (1959; 1971).Wacdad, J. and al-Kharkhur, A.H. Al-Abraj, turath wa ta’rikh, Ra’s al-Khaimah (1992).Whitehouse, D. ‘Excavations at Sîrâf. Sixth Interim Report’, Iran XII (1974) pp 1–30.Whitehouse, D. ‘Epilogue: Roman Trade in Perspective’, in Rome and India. the Ancient Sea Trade (eds), Begley

V. and de Puma, R.D. Wisconsin (1991) pp 216–218.Whitehouse, D. and Williamson, A. ‘Sasanian Maritime Trade’, Iran XI (1973) pp 29–49.Whitcomb, D.S. ‘The Archaeology of Oman: a preliminary discussion of the Islamic Periods’, Journal of Oman

Studies I (1975) pp 123–157.Williamson, A. Sohar and Omani Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd. Muscat

(1973).Wilkinson, J.C. ‘Arab–Persian land relationships in late Sasanid Oman’, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian

Studies 3 (1973) pp 40–51.Wilkinson, J.C. ‘The Julanda of Oman’, Journal of Oman Studies I (1975) pp 97–108.Willems D. and Allaire, S. ‘Bidiyah Mosque’, in Hardy-Guilbert, C. French Archaeological Mission at Julfar, United

Arab Emirates, Paris (1994) pp 73–76.Wilson, A.T. The Persian Gulf, London (1959) p 3. Yaqut, Mucjam al-Buldan (ed), Wuestenfeld, F., Leipzig (1866–69).Ziolkowski, M. [1999]. ‘Excavations at al-Bidiyya: new light on the Portuguese presence in the Emirates’, Tribulus

9:2 (Autumn/winter 1999) pp 19-21.

THE COMING OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC PERIOD

The Tribal Society of the UAEand its Traditional Economy

Frauke Heard-Bey

Introduction

Hundreds of millions of years ago a source of wealth was trapped several thousand metresunder the territory of the UAE. Before this oil and gas was discovered and exploited, therewas precious little to be found on the surface which could be called ‘natural wealth’. Yet, thescant resources were sufficient to sustain the inhabitants of this area throughout the centuries.They had developed the means to make all aspects of their seemingly inhospitable environmentwork for them. Management of these economic resources was harmonized with an age-oldsocial structure producing unique socio-economic responses to the rigours of life in the easterncorner of the Arabian Peninsula.

The local population of the present day UAE is tribal in origin. Does that mean that everyperson in the UAE who wears a white thob is descended from the bedouin of the Arabiandesert and would once have lived as a nomad? What does the word ‘tribal’ encompass? Toshed some light on such questions and to be able to understand why these concepts are centralto the structure of the traditional society of the UAE, it is necessary to know how this societysupported itself economically in the past.

The Tribe as Society’s Genealogical Building Block

Most national householders can quote a tribal name, which forms rightfully part of his ownname. This name could be a generic name (nisbah) such as ‘Ameri (plural ‘Awamir) used asthe last part of a name after his father’s name and possibly his paternal grandfather’s (e.g.Muhammad bin [=son of] Khalifah bin Muhammad Al ‘Ameri ). It could also be the name ofa forebear of countless generations back, who is considered the ‘patron’ or eponym of themany groups of families, which see themselves as his offspring.1 Such a tribal name is AlRashidi or Bani Yas or Ahl ‘Ali (family of ‘Ali). A link can be established with the two famousancestors of all the tribes of Arabia, Qahtan or Adnan2, through this jadd, whose historicalexistence need not always be verifiable with chronological precision. Thus, a person’s individualexistence is embedded in his group, which is committed to him because of their commondescent. The members of this group of common descent have a corporate responsibility to

provide support and protection. In practical terms a tribe is often too widely dispersed to beable to rally around one individual except in cases of general warfare, which might in earliertimes even have been the result of one man’s action leading to a blood feud.

Within the fold of the tribe, the individual head of the family (himself, wife and children)is traditionally bound by inescapable obligations of mutual assistance and a concept of joinedhonour to his immediate blood relatives – father, brothers, paternal uncles, cousins. Part ofthis particular relationship is the strong preference for marriages between the son and hispaternal uncle’s daughter (bint ‘amm). If this arrangement cannot be made because of agedifference or for other reasons, marriage with a first cousin on the mother’s side, or with amore distant cousin, is the norm in this society. Marriage outside the extended family is theexception, but does also occur, such as between families who are neighbours, or as a politicalmove, as when a sheikh marries the daughter of another tribal leader.

A woman’s place is clearly defined in this society. On marriage she keeps her father’s nameand remains emotionally most closely attached to her own family, to which she can return incase of a divorce. The bride moves into the house of her husband’s family, where separateaccommodation is prepared for the young couple and, if at all possible, for the families of allthe other sons. Because her own family is losing a worker, the groom must give compensationto that family in money or kind. At the time of the marriage contract he also has to give thebride the means to support herself in case he were to divorce her later. This mahr remains herown property and is managed separately from the rest of the household.

The woman’s role in the traditional economy was pivotal because, as will be seen later, theneed to alternate between various economic activities placed great responsibilities on the womenduring the long periods of time that men were obliged to be away from home. Her contri-bution earned her a high status in society, and a husband’s reputation and honour rested onthe conduct of his wife and daughters. Although it was permissible to have more than onewife, in practice few men could afford more than the one household; but because many womendied in childbirth, it was not uncommon for a man to have several wives in succession.

It may be noticed that not every man uses the name of his tribe (nisbah) as the last part ofhis name (e.g. Al Mansuri, Al Dhahiri, Al Za’abi). Considering the size of some of the tribes,this could lead to confusion, even if everyone were to include his grandfather’s name. Manyof the last names of local families in the UAE today are derived from one of the severalpossible sub-divisions of the tribe (qabilah). These horizontal divisions are kinship groups(‘ayal 3) and the sub-tribes (fakhdh pl. afkhadh), which are likewise perceived in genealogicalterms. In the graphical rendering of the tree-like relationship between a man and his tribaleponym, these divisions figure as the extension of the extended family.4 Thus, many membersof the Bani Yas tribe of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have family names like Al Mazrui, Al Qubaisior Al Hamili, referring to the sub-tribe to which they belong.

The Political Aspect of Tribal Cohesion

The boundaries between tribe and sub-tribe are not clear for several reasons. A tribe could bea confederation of tribes which have decided, for political or economic reasons, to follow theleadership of one of the constituent tribes’ sheikhs, as is the case with the Bani Yas, where

THE TRIBAL SOCIETY OF THE UAE AND ITS TRADITIONAL ECONOMY

Yas figures as a common eponym to signify the tribal cohesion. There could also be an alliancebetween two tribes to form one. In other cases a sub-tribe may assert itself over time or becomeremote from the main tribe, and its members may eventually adopt the name of the subdivisionas their tribal name – as is now the case with the Al Bu Shamis, whose relationship with theNa’im5 is well known in local understanding, but who were nevertheless listed separately inthe population census of Abu Dhabi of 1968. Whether a group deems it more useful to beidentified as the smallest unit (fakhdh) which often also lives together in the same locality, oras part of a bigger unit, may also vary from one community to another, and from one politicalsituation to another.6 Individuals may have different views on the matter, depending on theircurrent status and, if questioned, on the view of the inquirer. The relationship of tribes andtheir constituent parts is not static – it has always been the result of regional politics andremains a matter of tribal dynamics.

The Population of the Trucial States

Therefore neither the names and numbers of the tribes which make up the local society, northeir sizes, can be stated with precision. Considering the above mentioned tribal dynamics,assessments of numbers are bound to vary over time. The first such statements with regard tothe whole country, which was then called the Trucial States,7 were possible after a concertedeffort was made by J.G. Lorimer, the author of an official publication on behalf of the governmentof India. During a visit to Sharjah in 1904 he collected detailed information and also enlistedthe help of other government officials, who undertook several journeys to supplement thesefindings.8 At this time 44 tribes were listed, with some having main subdivisions and a numberof further subsections. Lorimer remarks that ‘indeed, the country is tribally one of the mostcomposite and perplexing’.9 The word ‘country’ is used here as a geographical term; thegovernment of India considered each emirate as a separate political entity, headed by a rulerwho attracted or commanded the loyalty of some or many of these tribes or tribal sections.

The political affiliations of these 44 tribes were listed by Lorimer as being divided betweenonly five ‘principalities’, whose territorial extent is, however, approximately that of the UAEof today. The tribes comprised an estimated 80,000 people.10 One tenth of them were thenconsidered bedouin and would not necessarily have spent all the year within the territory ofthe Trucial States. The Bani Qitab and the Bani Yas had the largest bedouin contingent; theirway of life will be discussed later. In 1968 the Trucial States Council organized the firstpopulation census for Dubai and the five northern emirates, and in Abu Dhabi the Departmentof Planning carried out a census simultaneously. The population of Dubai had reached 58,971,the five northern emirates were together 74,880, and that of Abu Dhabi was 46,375.11 Thenumber of people who gave the information that they belonged to one of the local tribes was44,668 for the five northern emirates and 17,750 for Abu Dhabi.12 In Abu Dhabi a further 2600were listed as nationals, but were not reported to belong to any particular tribe; they are mostlikely the descendants of people who came into the Trucial States at the height of the pearlingindustry’s boom. There seemed to have developed a fragmentation among the tribes as wellas a greater awareness of a tribesman’s own place in his society, because by 1968 the numberof separately listed tribes reached 67. Compared to the first decade of this century all the

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additional names are, however, not new names, but those which figured as names of sub-tribes in the past. For the people of this region – settled or bedouin – the tribe is the principalbuilding block for the structure of their society. For the individual, this tribal ‘belonging’ isfar more reassuring than the comforts of ‘home’and the sense of security, which is paramountfor people whose social structures are associated with the land they live on.

Origins of the Arab Tribes and their Dispersal throughout the Region

The ancestors of this tribal population have not always lived in the region. They took possessionof this land during successive waves of population movement, which brought Arab tribesfrom Yemen by way of Oman as well as by way of central and northern Arabia. They wouldhave found people already settled in the economically viable locations13 and there wereprobably some nomadic groups here as well, combining herding, hunting and fishing. Thedescendants of this original population were probably absorbed, although some were for along time identifiable as separate communities, particularly in the mountains of Oman. Comingfrom the tribally structured, highly organized culture of Yemen, where a sophisticated edificesuch as the Marib dam was built and maintained, the new arrivals retained their tribal structuresand their community-building genealogies and legends. Thus they also retained their strongkinship ties with the people elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula, and their sense of belongingto the Arab ummah. That sense of nationhood could be maintained throughout such a vastand inhospitable region because they all shared Arabic as their common language – a languagewhich was to become the language of their common religion.

Although there is evidence of linguistic links between northern Oman and the UAE and theOld South Arabian culture going back at least to the middle of the first millennium BC, largernumbers of Arab tribal groups started to arrive here in successive waves only since the secondcentury AD. They moved to areas such as Taw’am (Tuwwam), the old name for the twin oasesof Al Ain and Al Buraimi, and to other areas in the mountains, the mountain foreland andInner Oman, where people had lived since at least the sixth millennium BC.14 Those who camelater had to find other opportunities to make their living in the less well-watered parts of thecountry, which required them to adapt to a more rigorous environment. Over time theredeveloped a great diversity of economic pursuits, while the unity in the social structure wasretained, both of which were the hallmark of the traditional society of the UAE. The result ofa long process of adaptation to the rigours of a land with limited resources can be seen in thetraditional economy of the country, an economy which entered a new phase only 40 years ago.

Life in the Sandy Desert

A tribe’s quest for water

The general climatic conditions of the UAE are much the same throughout, with summertemperatures reaching close to 50°C and unpredictable, localized rains mostly in winter. Thelandscape of the UAE varies considerably and so, therefore, does the usage which peoplehave learnt to make of what the land can offer them. The availability of water dictates this

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usage and has been the key to the economic life and to much of the social structure of thiscountry’s past. The country can be broadly divided into three geographically, and thereforeeconomically, different regions: firstly, the coasts and islands, secondly, the Hajar mountainrange with its valleys (wadis) and adjacent gravel plains and, thirdly, the sandy desert.

On the face of it, the desert seems to offer the least resources. How could people live therethroughout the year, finding enough water to drink during the summer months? Yet the largesttribe of the UAE, the Bani Yas, has for several centuries inhabited the vast spaces of aeoliansands which cover most of the country’s territory, and almost all of the emirates of Abu Dhabiand Dubai.15 Other tribes, too, such as the Awamir, Manasir and others, have shared thischallenging habitat for countless generations. The sandy desert begins behind a stretch ofcoastal salt flats, called sabkha, with little white dune ripples rising as one goes south – eventuallyforming large orange-red dunes. Within this vast desert, which stretches to beyond Abu Dhabi’ssouthern border, some of the highest dunes in all of the Empty Quarter are found, about 100km distant from the coast. Some tower up to 200 m above the desert floor, catching some ofthe precipitation, fog and dew, which, although often heavy at the coast, diminishes consid-erably further inland in the desert.

In the distant past the ancestors of the bedouin, who made this region their home, discoveredthat they could find water in the dunes, which was adequately plentiful and often also relatively

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Aerial view of the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s Palace (March 1962).

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sweet. In many of the hollows between the dunes they created date gardens and built themselveshouses using the branches of the date palms, eventually forming about 40 settlements,16 someof which were inhabited all the year round. This half moon arc of villages called Liwa, spanningabout 70 km from east to west, has been the centre for the economic and social life of the BaniYas at least since the sixteenth century.17 Avarying number of subsections18 have acknowledgedthe leadership of the sheikh of one particular subtribe – the Al Bu Falah – for at least tenrecorded generations. Under their leadership their undisputed grazing area, their dar, includedthe Liwa, the intervening territory between it and the coast, called Al Dhafrah, the area calledKhatam stretching eastwards as far as the foreland of the Hajar Mountains and, in the west,the land known as Baynuna and the Sabkha Matti and the area up to the Qatar peninsula.19

Other tribes’ participation in the grazing was usually acceptable on the basis of mutuality. During the summer months many tribes retreated from the sandy desert to the savannah-

like outwash plains at the foot of the mountains, whereas the Bani Yas and their associatesadapted to the rigorous desert environment and made it their home. The patterns of their economicexploitation varied over time, but all the subtribes and clans were accustomed to wander greatdistances over long periods of time with their camels in search of grazing, moving as entirefamily units, seeking the precious gifts which the desert had to offer for those who knew howto make use of them. Almost all Bani Yas families, with the exception of fishing groups like theAl Rumaithat, returned to a home in one of the Liwa settlements at certain times of the year.

The thicker the sand cover or the higher the dunes, the better the chance there is of findinga good source of water. The seasonal rainfall and quite frequent heavy dew rapidly sinks intothe absorbing sand, which also acts as insulation against evaporation. The water which is thustrapped in the dunes frequently does not escape downwards, because there is a fairly level,impermeable rock formation below the dunes and the intervening depressions. However, thewater which rains down on the sand and is collected in shallow wells at the bottom of highdunes is not potable everywhere in this desert. Depending on the composition of the sand, thewater may dissolve chemicals during its passage through the dune and then be too brackishfor human consumption. It may even be unusable for animals or plants.20 The inhabitants ofthe Liwa developed the knowledge of where best to dig for good water and often did not haveto go down much more than 3 m to find some. Out in the sands some wells have beenestablished for centuries, and the right to draw water from one of those has been of the greatestsignificance in tribal politics.

The date palm – a wonder of the desert

Wherever it is found and whatever its quality, the water in the sandy desert never flows andextensive agriculture could not be developed there. But one tree, which combines manywonderful properties, is ideally suited to grow even at the foot of a huge sand dune in themiddle of the desert: Phoenix dactylifera, the date palm. It can tolerate very high salinity andthrives even in intense heat.21 As a cultivated fruit tree, the date palm is not propagated fromthe date stone, but from side shoots which grow at the foot of a mature tree. These are separatedand planted when they are already 100–150 cm high and have a good nest of roots. The newly-planted saplings need to be watered regularly. In the desert the water is carried from the well– one leather bagful at a time. After months, or even years, the young bushy plant’s roots willreach the water table and be self-sufficient. However, its rate of growth and eventual yield of

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dates is significantly influenced by the amount and quality of the water available.22 Care forthe date tree does not end when watering by hand ceases. The bushy plant grows branches atground level and thereby increases its volume; eventually the outer branches are trimmed andevery year as it grows these branches are cut higher up, and thus eventually the trunk is formed.The stumpy ends of the cut-off branches serve as footholds for the cultivator when he needsto climb into the crown of the tree. After three or more years, depending on the amount ofavailable water, the tree begins to flower in spring; then the caretaker must be there to pollinatewith the panicles from a male tree, of which only very few are planted. He has to climb everytree and carefully distribute the pollen to all the little waxen flowers. The harvest of the datestakes place during the hottest period of the year, between late June and early October, dependingon the type of date tree. The harvest involves climbing the tree and cutting the heavy bunches,which are either carried down or thrown to helpers below.

In this country people like to eat dates fresh when only half the fruit is soft and brown. Theharvested dates were essential for the survival of the inhabitants in the desert. The ripe dates arelightly boiled and compressed into a congealed substance called tamr which can be kept almostindefinitely, because the high sugar content kills germs which might settle on it. The dried palmfronds are plaited into containers, in which the nourishing, vitamin-rich staple diet can be takenon journeys through the desert, into the mountains, or out to sea. The date tree, which grows sowell in the desert where water is available, is like an anchor for the existence of the Arabs inthis environment. The yield from the small palm groves which were established in the sandydesert was, however, insufficient for entire families to live off throughout the year.

The camel – God’s gift to the bedouin

The bedouin like to say that God has been fair because He gave them the ideal tree for theirdesert, but that He has shown His bounty by giving them the camel as well. This animal isnot only as superbly suited to the desert environment as the date palm, but it also providesfor almost all the further needs of its owner. The camel gives the local tribesman his mobility.The camel is his mount as well as his beast of burden. He can ride it to war, to his date garden,to a distant market, to a port – or for fun, such as in the traditional races. He can load hiscamels and take them in a caravan across terrain where no other transport could pass. Oftencamel milk and the products derived from it were almost the only source of protein for theentire family for months on end; then one day there would be a feast to celebrate a weddingor the arrival of a guest and a he-camel would be slaughtered to provide the meat. Camel hidewas used to make bags and other useful utensils, while some of the finest mens’outer garments(bisht) were woven from the hair.

The camels bred in the desert of Eastern Arabia were renowned for their endurance andspeed. Throughout generations, to sell or barter them was the principal means of obtaininggoods, which could not otherwise be obtained from within the extended clan. The possessionof camels constituted great wealth and caring for them had a high priority. In the winter theirowners or caretakers would wander for weeks in an area where sufficient rain had made thedormant vegetation of the desert sprout. If there was no water well nearby, the milk from thecamels was enough for the people to drink. When the camels have good grazing, they do notneed any water themselves in the winter.23 But in the heat of the summer, when the grazingis dry, the camels are kept close to a well and they return daily by themselves. Each camel

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requires about 40–50 litres of water, which meant hauling maybe more than ten leather bagsof water up from the well and emptying them into the hawd, a leather trough slung over awooden frame. The camel owners were fortunate if there was enough summer grazing closeto where they owned date trees, because in this way they could participate in the harvest andmake use of the water wells which supplied the communities occupying their palm frondhomes (known as ‘arishah or khaimh) in the Liwa.

Life on the Coast of the Gulf

Fishing

The territory, which had over time become the exclusive dar of the Bani Yas tribes, is borderedby 600 km of coast. As can be expected, the inhabitants of the hinterland made every possibleuse of the resources which this area of beaches, sand banks, creeks and inshore islands offered.They also colonized the many more distant islands. The extensive tidal shallows, which arecharacteristic of most of this coast, are ideal for fishing with traps. These were intricatelyconstructed fences, placed to shape a letter V, where the fish were caught when the waterreceded. Another method involved stretching two nets at right angles to the tidal creek from

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Hunting falcon outside the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s palace, 1954.

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a central pole; the use of a small dugout and working in a team of two or three fishermen wasessential in some locations. But there were also methods by which one man alone could securea good catch as, for instance, by stalking a shoal of small fish in the shallow water and castingover it a circular net weighted with stones.24 Fish which was not consumed fresh was hungup in the sun to dry, or treated with salt, and taken to the inland settlements where thisadditional protein was very welcome. Some of the small fish was dried and used as camelfodder or as fertilizer for the gardens, but, as for the fresh fish, the fishermen on the coast ofAbu Dhabi were a long way from markets. There is archaeological evidence that on most ofAbu Dhabi’s numerous islands, tribespeople came to fish in the winter and even brought theircamels over in boats. They used rainwater, stored in cisterns, or caught in horizontally placedsails. But the coast between Dubai and Khaur al-Odaid, at the foot of the Qatar peninsula,was not suitable for the establishment of larger, permanent settlements, because of the lackof reliable supplies of drinking water.

This was to change dramatically after the end of the eighteenth century, when it was discoveredthat a dune belt at the northern end of Abu Dhabi island yielded some fresh water, (which,being lighter, floats in lenses above the salty water table). The water was drawn from shallowwells, which, when brackish water intruded, were abandoned and new ones were dug. In around1760, several of the Bani Yas tribal groups built themselves palm frond houses on the islandnear its northern shore. By the early 1790s, the town of Abu Dhabi had already become soimportant a centre of activity that the political leader of all the Bani Yas groups transferred hisresidence there from the Liwa. After 1793, Sheikh Shakhbut constructed the fort, which stillstands today near the centre of the city. Soon, the supply of such limited amounts of sweetwater did not suffice for the rapidly growing population; additional drinking water was broughtin bitumen-lined containers by boat from Dubai, Ra’s al-Khaimah or even Dalma Island.

Pearling

The reason for this increase in the population of Abu Dhabi was a resource which had playeda role for the Arabs of this area since antiquity: the lulu (locally called qamashah), the pearl.These timeless items of adornment, which grow inside some of the local oysters,25 haveprobably always been collected by wading fishermen, who would have kept their finds untilan opportunity arose to barter them. The oysters accumulate in larger quantities on oysterbeds (fasht) in water about 30–40 m deep, off the Arab shores of the Gulf. To bring enoughof them up to make a living from selling the pearls and mother-of-pearl required a bigcommunal effort, as well as sea-going vessels and people who could dive that deep. When,during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the market for pearls grew rapidly in prosperingIndia, pearling became an ever more important industry for the inhabitants of the Arabiancoast and the hinterland.

By the turn of the twentieth century about 1200 boats were based in ports on the TrucialCoast, manned by some 22,000 men, mostly tribesmen, but with extra hands brought in fromBaluchistan and elsewhere to augment the work force. The pearling industry had transformedthe traditional economy of the tribal population. Many families moved to live permanentlyin one of the coastal settlements, increasing, in particular, the size and importance of AbuDhabi and Dubai.26 Sharjah, Ra’s al-Khaimah and the intervening coastal villages were alreadylong-established as ports of the tribal Arabs and they, too, participated in this industry.

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During its modest beginnings, pearling constituted just another means of exploiting all theresources available to the tribal people. They cared for their camels and tended the date palms– often in locations which were many days’ travelling apart – and then, as pearling flourished,an increasing number of the able-bodied men participated in the dive (ghaus) during fourmonths in the summer. Many of the Liwa-based sub-tribes of the Bani Yas formed co-operatives, which jointly owned a boat27 and shared the proceeds of the sale of the pearlsaccording to an established arrangement, giving the biggest share to the captain, a larger shareto the divers than the haulers and leaving some money aside to finance the preparations forthe following year. It was due to pearling that, over several generations, some tribes becamemore specialized in one economic activity or another and became tied to particular locations.Thus, the Rumaithat and the Qubaisat favoured the maritime activities and became attachedto the coastal settlements and the islands, eventually giving up many of the date gardens theyhad in the Liwa. Other tribal groups such as the Mazari’ remained dedicated to the desert. TheManasir went pearling, but did not own any boats.

Social changes due to the pearling boom

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the pearling industry became increasingly thedomain of individual entrepreneurs in the now flourishing ports throughout the Gulf. Someof the merchants, who were involved in the trade in pearls or imported consumer goodsfrom India, accumulated enough capital to buy a boat, for which the wood had to be importedtoo, and to equip it with provisions for the 120 days of the diving season. In good years,the owner of a boat made a handsome profit by selling the pearls directly or through alocal merchant (tajir) to one of the Indian traders, who came seasonally from Bombay,chiefly to Bahrain or Dubai. But storms, epidemics or other adversities could mean thatthe season’s proceeds were insufficient to finance the next season and the owner would,in such circ*mstances, be forced to take an advance on the next year’s catch. Becauseneither the captain (nakhudah) nor the rest of the crew were paid a salary, but insteadobtained an agreed share of the profit, a bad year could spell disaster for years to comefor all those who were locked into a system of financial interdependence. The divers wereparticularly vulnerable. They were no longer part of the multi-faceted tribal economy, buthad settled in ports and lived from the money they earned during the third of the year theyworked on a pearling boat. They needed advances from the captain to pay for their families’upkeep during their absence at sea. If the season’s income was not as much as the advance,the debt was carried over into the next year and thus the diver became compelled to workfor a particular captain year after year. 28

Life in the Oases

The cash (resulting almost exclusively from the pearling industry) which flowed ever morefreely into the Trucial States, had a great impact on the entire society, and also broughtimportant changes to the hinterland. For the bedouin family, who had managed to wrest fromthe sandy desert the means to survive, a date garden watered by a flowing stream was theheight of luxury. Thus, when individual families had accumulated surplus wealth, they turned

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their attention to the villages in the Al Ain area, the nearest oasis, where several aflaj29 broughtunderground water from springs near the mountains to the fertile soil in the plain. This oasisis already mentioned by the name of Taw’am in the early days of Islam, and prehistoric findsfrom the area point to it having been a centre of settled civilization for at least five thousand years.

In the nineteenth century many of the Bani Yas bought date gardens in this area, andmembers of the ruling family also established new date gardens and associated settlementsthere. There was a resident labour force of descendants of earlier inhabitants which did notbelong to the tribal society, the bidar; they were accustomed to look after the gardens ofabsentee landlords and bedouin owners for reward in kind. The tribal population, which hadlived in and around the oasis for generations, resisted the inroads of the Bani Yas. Eventually,

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Water running through the irrigation channels of a luxuriant oasis where date palms and associatedplants flourish.

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however, the dominant tribe of Dhawahir and some of the Shawamis preferred an amicablecoexistence with, and the benefits of political protection by, the powerful Al Bu Falah leadersof the Bani Yas, who were much closer to home as compared to the distant overlordship ofthe Sultan of Muscat and Oman.

The availability of water made the nine villages of the Al Ain and Al Buraimi area a verydesirable place. The economy of all such oases in the region differs a great deal from that ofthe sandy desert. The Hajar Mountains, which run from the Musandam peninsula in the northat the entrance to the Gulf through the UAE and Oman, form the spine of the land dividingthe eastern coast areas from the desert region in the west. These mountains rise to just over1000 m in the UAE, but reach 2000 m near the Straits of Hormuz and 3000 m in the JebelAkhdhar region of Oman. Although the mountains consist of barren, friable rock devoid oftopsoil, in the valleys (wadis) and the outwash plains on either side, fertile soil can be foundin many places. The unpredictable, in some years prolific, winter rains run off the rocks quickly,but much of the water collects in the thick layers of gravel in the wadi beds and the plains.

The communal effort which is required to put these aquifers to good use is the hallmark ofthe tribes which live in and near the mountains.30

The most efficient system is the falaj (pl. aflaj), initially a tunnel reaching for several milesto where the ground water table is higher than the gardens to be watered. Between the sourceand the gardens there are vertical shafts at regular intervals, which were needed during thetime of construction and still now serve during maintenance for bringing out the spoil andadmitting air to the people working in the tunnel. There is usually a village near where thefalaj comes out of the tunnel to form an open stream. This is where the drinking water iscollected by the women; downstream is the off-take for watering the camels and, below that,the communal bathing houses – one for the men and one for the women with steps down intothe running water. Further down the stream again, there is a set of sluices to divert the waterinto various channels leading to the different gardens. Thus every date garden can get a meticu-lously measured time of water delivered by rivulets. A supervisor or arif is paid by thecommunity to give every garden owner his allotted or acquired share; he keeps time by thestars at night and by a sundial on the ground by day. In these favourable conditions other treesbesides palms can grow, such as figs, mangoes, oranges, pomegranates, grapes, bananas and,in particular, limes. Lucerne for animal fodder and a limited variety of vegetables, mostlysweet potatoes and onions, are grown inside these walled palm groves. Wheat, barley andmillet are grown outside on land watered by the winter rains. Usually there are also wells inthese oases to facilitate the drawing of drinking water near the houses, or to supplement thefalaj waters in the gardens.

A falaj always serves many date gardens and is the focal utility for an entire village or tribalsettlement area. The oldest aflaj in this region have been dated to around 1000 BC. Possessinga falaj signifies a dominant role for a tribe in the social web. However, most falaj-irrigatedoases are a melting pot for different sedentary tribal communities, of which some have olderrights or more property and therefore keep the upper hand in local politics. In addition to thetribal sections, each having their sheikh, the administration of such an economically importantplace was often entrusted to a wali, the representative of the distant ruler. The bedouin of theregion, often being absentee landlords, also greatly influenced life in an oasis, because theycould provide the fighting force in the event of a conflict.

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Life in the Mountains

The important oases, such as Masafi, or Manamah, are situated away from the confining wadiwalls, where good soil on level ground lends itself to agriculture. While they were usuallyshared between more than one tribe, there are countless small villages and hamlets in thewadis, which belong most frequently to just one clan or even a single family. There are falaj-like watercourses in use, which serve these smaller communities tucked away in the wadis.Some are even constructed by just one family for a terraced garden in the mountains: the wadiis dammed where surface water can be expected to run at least occasionally. The water ischannelled into an open runnel called ghayl, which follows the wadi at a gentle gradient – inplaces forming a gallery above the valley floor – until it arrives at the terraced field or dategarden. Terracing was known in these mountains since prehistoric times and this techniqueof increasing the potential for agriculture played an important role for these small tribalcommunities. They built retaining stone walls and levelled the ground above with topsoil toform small fields, which could be sown before the rains, or when the ghayl was prolific enough.The owners did not necessarily always live nearby, but visited several such favourable locationsto see to whatever needed to be done, hoping for a reasonable crop from at least some of theseterraces. A home – or, in times of strife, a hideout – could be constructed fairly easily withwalls of wadi stones and a roof of palm fronds or brushwood. Choosing which of thesetemporary abodes to use at any one time depended largely on the additional economic activitywhich played a role for a tribe of the mountain regions: the herding of sheep and goats. Thewadi beds and plains, and even the hills themselves, offer plenty of forage for these animalsduring the cooler part of the year.

Domestic animals, sheep, goats and some cows, were kept by the villagers mostly for theirmilk; donkeys were their preferred beast of burden, but camels and bulls were also keptnearby to help with drawing water. These animals did not need to be taken out for grazing,but were hand-fed with fodder grown in the gardens or, after rains had brought the vegetationto life again, with grass and herbs which the women collected daily. Some of the mountaintribal people, called shawawi, were semi-nomadic pastoralists, forming part of a villagecommunity, but wandering in the mountain region with their herds of sheep and goats. Theyalso offered their services to transport goods on their donkeys or, more rarely, on camelsthrough the mountains.

Life on the East Coast

On the eastern flank of the Hajar Mountains the plain along the Indian Ocean is only a fewkilometres wide and, in its northern part near the town of Dibba, some mountain spurs reachall the way to the sea. The communities which live on this coast have the opportunity tocombine, within easy distance from their settlements, all the different resources of theirenvironment: fishing, oasis agriculture and husbandry. The most profitable type of fish wastraditionally the anchovy (bariya). Side by side with modern craft, wooden boats with a straightstern manned by about 20 people are still used to place a weighted net of about 100 m length

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parallel to the beach. After several hours the ends of the net are pulled to the shore and thecontents spread on the beach. The dried catch is sold locally and abroad as fertilizer. For largefish such as tuna or shark heavier tangle nets are now used, as well as handlines.31 The meatis either eaten fresh or salted and dried on wooden racks. Sharks’ fins are sold to merchants,who export them to China. Individual fishermen used (and still use today) the local craft,which is typical for the entire eastern coast including the Batina in Oman. This boat, theshashah, is made entirely of palm sticks and filled with the buoyant cut-off lower ends of thepalm branches. The boatman is partly submerged, but he paddles the boat skillfully throughthe surf to lay out his net or line.

The villages along this coast, which until the middle of the twentieth century were underthe distant rule of Sharjah, and many of which now belong to the emirate of Fujairah, havealways been able to water their extensive date gardens from wells. The run-off water fromthe mountains sinks into deep layers of gravel before it reaches the sea. Once underground,this extensive wedge of ground water meets the saltwater, but does not mix. Sweet water isthus forced near to the surface at the beach, making it possible to plant date trees close tothe sea. When they are mature they reach the brackish water table. Further back from thebeach more date gardens were established with the help of many neighbouring water wells,some of which were operated by bulls lifting the waterbags with the help of a scaffold-mountedwheel. As in the falaj-irrigated oases, other fruit trees and some vegetables were also producedunder these favourable conditions.

The Advantageous Combination of Resources in Ra’s al-Khaimah

The hydrological conditions which obtain on the East Coast, are also found on the Ra’s al-Khaimah coast between the western slopes of the mountains and the Gulf. There, too, extensivedate cultivation and agriculture were traditionally combined with fishing; but while only afew people from the East Coast journeyed to Sharjah or Dubai to join the pearling season inthe summer, the pearling industry played a bigger role for people in and near Ra’s al-Khaimah,even though the main pearl banks are located offshore from Abu Dhabi and Dubai.32

Ra’s al-Khaimah in particular, but also some other settlements along the coast to the south-west, have been favourably located for trade with distant countries. The ports of medievalJulfar (near modern Ra’s al-Khaimah), Jazirat al-Hamrah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Hamriyah,Ajman, Sharjah as well as Dubai all benefit from being situated on a peninsula or a sand spitnear a lagoon (khaur), where the local ships could shelter behind a barrage of difficult tonavigate shallows and sand banks. Because the hinterland was sparsely populated and itssubsistence economy supported little in the way of export or import trade before the pearlingindustry flourished, shipping from these ports specialized in the carrying trade. Their shipssailed up and down the Gulf, to India, East Africa and most probably at some stage to the FarEast and China. Trade on that scale was much influenced by changes in the political climateof the region and beyond. During the latter half of the eighteenth century the Qawasim, theleading clan in the tribal grouping of the northern and eastern part of the country, dominatedthe maritime transportation and trade at the north of the Gulf. Due to the vicissitudes of history,they later lost this position to overseas competitors, not least to the steamships of British India.

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Life in the Musandam Peninsula

A survey of the influence of geography on the economy and, consequently, on the socialstructures of the population of this area is not complete without a description of the habitat ofthe Shihuh and their neighbours, the Dhahuriyin – even though the land of most members ofthese and associated tribes belongs to Oman. Many of these people now live in the UAE ordepend economically on her northern ports. The Musandam peninsula (locally called Ru’usal-Jibal) north and east of Ra’s al-Khaimah consists of precipitous limestone mountains reachingthe height of 2000 m within a distance of barely 20 km from the sea. In most places the wadiwalls are vertical cliffs, making communication between them and across the peninsula extremelydifficult, particularly since access from the fjord-like openings in the mountains at sea level isequally forbidding. Only a few of the wadis have filled up ancient bays to form an inshoredelta, where the run-off water collects in the gravel. In such locations sizable settlements couldbe established – the biggest one being Khasab in the north of the Sultanate of Oman. Theinhabitants of Musandam developed methods with which they could exploit the resources ofthe sea and the wadis to the full, and grow essential staple food in the mountains.

The economy of one of the two groups found in Musandam is based on the combination ofa*griculture and husbandry. They refer to themselves as badu.33 The other group has fishingadded as a third economic activity and is called sayyadin. This occupational differentiationcuts across the tribal divides. The agriculture consists of building, tending and sowing terracedfields in various locations, on the very top of the mountain, on a high slope, or just above thewadi bed. The crop is wheat (burr) or barley (sha’ir), which is sown after the winter rains andharvested in March or April. Fig trees are also grown on such terraces high up in the mountains.The rain which falls within the small area of the terrace would not be sufficient to sustain thecrops. A network of dams and stone-lined canals has long been in place, to collect water andmake it run through channels and openings in the field walls, or to cascade gently over theterraces. Thus a vast area of the rocky surrounding countryside contributes its rainwater.

Nearby are the houses of the owners. They have either a small stone-built house with a flatroof made from beams of the sidr tree and covered with brushwood and earth, or a bayt al qufl,a ‘house of the key’. This type of small house is often built against a rock, with walls madefrom very large fashioned stones and a floor no more than one metre below ground level. Insidewill be some earthenware storage vessels, which – being bigger than the low door – will havebeen placed there before the house was completed. The large and intricately carved lock onthe heavy door gives this type of house its name. This is where the mountain bedouin storetheir seed grains and any surplus harvested in readiness for a lean year of drought.

Besides crop-farming, the raising of small animals is of equal importance to the economyof the badu of Musandam. A family might have a herd (hawsh) of between 80 and 130 goatsand sheep, along with some donkeys.34 These animals are taken to locations (which may besome distance from the fields), but where the family has another house and a pen in which tokeep the animals at night. The same family may also own a date garden in a coastal oasis,such as Dibba on the East Coast or Khasab in the north, and move there for the date harvestin a group of about one to six families with their animals and few household goods. A housemade of palm fronds, situated on the fringe of the oasis, awaits the family in this location.

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Between visits, one member of the family may walk from the winter home in the mountainsto their date garden in order to pollinate or water the trees. Depending on the geography, thedifferent locations of their economic activities may only be half an hour’s walk apart, or theymay be separated by as much as a day’s climbing or hiking.

The sayyadin constitute the larger group of inhabitants of the Musandam peninsula. Fishingis their primary source of income and they live in palm frond houses in settlements by thesea. They own nets and other fishing gear and have at least a share in a batil, a local type ofseagoing boat. They spend between half and two thirds of the year fishing, but also move upinto the mountains to sow grain and tend their fields. In yet another location they own dategardens. Their sheep and goats move with them from place to place.35 Ra’s al-Khaimah andDibba were the nearest markets where the tribes of Musandam could sell surplus animals,dried fish, and occasionally rent out their donkeys or boats for the transport requirements ofthe local inhabitants. Therefore, some of the individual tribal groups became quite dependenton a good relationship with the rulers of neighbouring areas, particularly Ra’s al-Khaimah,and eventually put themselves under their leadership.

Nomadic Versus Settled Life

In the sandy desert, as well as in the mountains or in the coastal villages, people adapted indifferent ways to the geographical conditions and to the availability of some resources and thelack of others. In some instances a sedentary existence in one place was not at all possible becausethe small amount of available water was enough only for a short stay by a small group of peopleand for the survival of a limited number of date palms. Faced with these conditions, it wasessential to adopt a nomadic lifestyle in order to take maximum advantage of the meagreresources spread over a wide area. In other cases, as, for instance, with the fishing communitiesof Musandam or the owners of the marginal mini-oases in the wadis, mobility has always beenrequired to supplement the otherwise insufficient resources available at the principal abode. Inyet other situations, such as obtained for the population in the villages on the East Coast, in theRa’s al-Khaimah area and in the developing ports of the country, the possibilities to pursue avariety of occupations were all close at hand, and such people could lead a settled life.

In the original areas of population concentration, the large oases, various tribes often livedside by side and in many issues of economic or political importance this neighbourhood becamethe guiding factor in the society’s political life. In most villages they also mixed and mingledbecause one instance of inter-tribal marriage was usually the beginning of further marriagesbetween two groups. But there were also some long-established social differences relating tothe ownership of land in these oases – a kind of class distinction, where often the bedouinabsentee landlords were at the top of the social structure.

The Impact of Urbanization

The urbanization which set in with the accelerating pearling boom also brought a great mixof tribes into the coastal towns, where they lived in separate areas, forming tribally distinct

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quarters, as was already the custom in the large oases. In the nineteenth century it was generallypalm frond houses for every family – except for the rulers’ forts. During the first decades ofthe twentieth century an ever increasing number of families could afford to build themselveshouses made of coral stone, add an upper floor and even an ornate wind tower for comfortduring the hot summer months. The few Indian traders and some Persian-speakers who visitedseasonally, or moved to the coastal towns during the pearling boom, remained on the fringesof local society. Some local merchants, who made good money from pearls and from the bigincrease in general trade, began to seek political influence on the running of their city states.The bedouin in the hinterland were still considered to hold the balance of power by providinga fighting force to the ruler of their choice. There was growing social differentiation reflectedin the wealth of the individual families. When the pearling industry went into a steep declineduring the 1930s, due to the world economic recession and the introduction of cultured pearlsin Japan, the economic hardship hit many families so hard that they eventually decided toemigrate to seek employment in the neighbouring oil-producing countries.

Yet, whether people lived in the coastal towns, the oases, the mountains or in the desert,the families and groups were welded together by their tribal background, their commonreligious practices and their Arabic language; they wore the same clothes – even if some hadmore than one set– they ate the same food – though some had more of it than others – andthey all endured the rigours of the forbidding climate. Thus, before the advent of oil, the entirepopulation formed one hom*ogenous society.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, after more than three decades of immigrationby foreign experts and labourers have swelled the population figures, the UAE’s society as awhole is anything but hom*ogenous. However, for the nationals, the basic structure of theirtribal society has remained intact, even though for some families their changed economiccirc*mstances have dramatically revolutionized many aspects of their lives. For others, accessto modern housing, education and healthcare have made a great difference, but the basic patternof their lives has not yet changed. Belonging to a well respected local tribe or an influentialfamily is still of prime importance in today’s local society. In spite of the overwhelming majorityof expatriates around them, local families socialize almost exclusively amongst themselves.Thus it is not surprising that the traditional local customs are still very much part of daily life.The local people greet one another with the traditional nose kiss. They are instantly recognizableby their traditional clothes, which have remained the same in style even if the materials aremore varied and refined than in the past. The women in the family still have a special positionand are not expected to share the routine of the men, who have always congregated in themajlis, the publicly accessible part of any household. In the majlis of the sheikh as well as ofthe business man or of the fisherman on the coast, matters of state and matters of generalinterest are discussed, while the tiny cups of unsweetened light coffee with cardamom makethe round. Since the days of widespread illiteracy people have kept the memory of legends,stories and the much-loved local poetry called nabati, because the spoken word has alwaysbeen the superior art form of the tribal people, who lacked the raw materials used elsewherefor more tangible forms of artistic expression.

For the benefit of the generations who have not grown up with them, some traditions areupheld with official backing and encouragement, such as camel racing, traditional boatingand poetry competitions, while a variety of heritage villages and museums with ethnological

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collections are being established. Hunting the migratory bustard (hubara) with falcons, whichwere caught in early winter and released after the season, was practised by many bedouin inthe past. Now, this is a sport practised mostly by the members of the ruling families and otherswho can keep these rare falcons and travel abroad for the hunt. The local tribesman wouldnot begrudge their continuing this ‘sport of the kings’ as it was known in medieval Europe,because his tribal leader’s position should be manifestly different and be recognized as suchby the outsider. Among the tribal population an individual’s honour and pride is his selflesshospitality. It is an essential aspect of the egalitarian society of the Arab tribes that thehospitality afforded on behalf of the tribe in the sheikh’s tent or house should be impressiveand reflect the tribe’s standing in the eyes of the visitor. The nationals of the UAE of todaycan have great pride in their country.

1 See also for the following J.C. Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia. A Study of the Aflajof Oman, Oxford, Clarendon Press (1977) pp156ff.

2 See S.B. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, (2nd ed) London, Frank Cass (1966), (1st ed 1919)p 2: ‘The tribes that now dispersed and took possession of Arabia were composed of two main stocks, derivedfrom the fourth and fifth generation from Shem. One of the stocks was Kahtan, who identified with Joktan, sonof Eber, and colonized the Yemen, or the southern half of the peninsula, while the other, Adnan, who descendedfrom Ishmael, occupied the northern part . . . Under the one or the other of these great progenitors, Kahtan andAdnan, the whole Arabian race is comprised.’

3 See Wilkinson, op. cit., p 158. With the tribes of the Musandam peninsula the words batinah, ahliyah or usrahare also in use; see W. Zimmermann, Tradition und Integration mobiler Lebensformgruppen. Eine empirischeStudie über Beduinen und Fischer in Musandam/ Sultanat Oman, Göttingen (Dissertation 1981) p 36.

4 See the example of the tribe of Ma’awil in Fig. 28 in Wilkinson, op. cit., p 163.5 The Na’im are spread between Oman, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain. All members of this tribe belong to one or

the other of its big divisions, Al Bu Khuraiban or Al Bu Shamis, which have even adopted separate eponyms (jadd)called Khazraj and ‘Aus. These divisions are further divided into sections, one of which, the Khawatir livingmostly in Ra’s al-Khaimah territory, is itself now often considered as a tribe in its own right; see also J.G. Lorimer,Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, ‘Oman and Central Arabia, 2 vols., vol.I Historical, vol.II Geographical andStatistical, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing (1908–15) Geogr. pp 1301–6.

6 The members of the Za’ab tribe, half of which lived in Jazirah al-Hamrah in Ra’s al-Khaimah territory, but movedto Abu Dhabi in 1970, do not use sectional names, all preferring to be known as Al Za’abi.

7 The word ‘trucial’ refers to the fact that the rulers of the states on the southern coast of the Gulf had since 1820signed several treaties with the Government of India. In British documents the area is also refered to as ‘TrucialOman’. Its extent is approximately that of the UAE today.

8 See Lorimer, op. cit., pp 1425ff, where a detailed account is given of the written sources and the special investi-gations concerning the population and the geography of what he calls ‘Trucial Oman’.

9 Ibid., p 1431.10 The most populated ‘principality’ was Sharjah (at the time including Ra’s al-Khaimah and Fujairah) with 45,000,

then came Abu Dhabi with 11,000, Dubai with 10,000, Umm al-Qaiwain with 5000 and ‘Ajman with 750 settledpeople; see ibid., p 1437.

11 See K.G. Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates. An Economic and Social Survey, London, Longman (1973) p 126.12 See Trucial States Council, Development Office, Census 1968, mimeograph. For details of the way in which tribal

distribution and numbers developed between the first decade of the century and the 1968 census see Heard-Bey,F. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. A Society in Transition, London, Longman (1982) pp 72ff.

13 For the ample archaeological evidence of diverse economic activities including copper smelting see D.T. Potts,The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity 2 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press (1990) vol.I, particularly pp 119ff.

14 See Wilkinson, op. cit., pp 126ff and footnote 6.15 The size of the UAE is 83,600 sq.km, of which 86.7 per cent are Abu Dhabi territory, 5 per cent are Dubai; see

UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Abstract, (7th ed) (1992) p 3ff.16 The number given varies over time and in the different sources; see also Wilkinson, op. cit., p 54.17 The Bani Yas tribe is mentioned living in al-Dhafrah, of which the Liwa is a part, in the seventeenth century Omani

source by ibn Razik, Salil History of the Imams and Seyyids of ‘Oman from A.D. 661–1856, ed. and trans. intoEng. by G.B. Badger (1871) repr. London, Darf Publishers (1986) p70f. The island Sir Bani Yas figures in Balbi’slist of 1580.

18 See Heard-Bey, op. cit., pp 501f and 507–510.

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19 See Heard-Bey, ibid., map 4a p 30.20 The WHO recommends that people should not drink water which has more than 750ppm disolved minerals over

a long period of time. While date palms can tolerate salinity of over 6000 ppm, camels can drink water with 10,000ppm. Wilkinson, op. cit., p 58 ff and Heard-Bey, op. cit., p 408. Seawater has 35–40,000 ppm.

21 See F. Heard-Bey, ‘Development Anomalies in the Bedouin Oases of Al Liwa’, Asian Affairs, vol. 61, part III,1974, pp 272–286.

22 See Wilkinson, op. cit., p 59 and pp 71f. 23 Therefore they do not return by themselves to the well and to their minders, as they do in the summer; they have

to be hobbled to prevent them from wandering away too far.24 See for more detail Heard-Bey, op. cit., pp 172–175.25 Pearls and mother-of pearl are found in three types of molluscs; they are layers of nacre, which are formed around

an intrusion, such as a sandcorn.26 Dubai being more favourably placed for water, which comes from the precipitation in the mountains, has been

used by maritime communities for longer; a settlement in Jumairah dates back to the Umayyad period.27 Boats were made of imported wood; to pay for this and the season’s provisions required a big community effort.

See for further details Heard-Bey, op. cit., pp 182–190 and pp 200ff.28 Instances have been recorded where a captain exploited the fact that a particularly good diver could not read and

check the season’s financial records. See also M.G. Rumaihi, ‘The Mode of Production in the Arab Gulf Beforethe Discovery of Oil’ in T. Niblock (ed), Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, London, CroomHelm (1980) pp 49–60.

29 See below p 17.30 In this case they are too numerous to list here; the reader is refered to a map of the tribal distribution in the northern

area in Heard-Bey, op. cit., p 71.31 The Arabic, English and Latin names and valuable information about 200 fishes of the region are given in A. W.

White, and M.A. Barwani, Common Sea Fishes of the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, Dubai, Trucial StatesCouncil (1971).

32 See the sketch map in Wilkinson, op. cit., p 21.33 See also for the following Zimmermann, op. cit., pp 46ff; here in particular p 51f.34 See ibid., p 57.35 For the period of the date harvest in the summer both groups leave their animals unattended in the wadi where

they own land and a house.

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The Beginning of the Post-Imperial Era for the Trucial Statesfrom World War I to the 1960s

Frauke Heard-Bey

The UAE never was a colony, but its forerunner, the ‘Trucial States’,1 was increasingly absorbedinto the British orbit by a system of agreements which successive British governments, firstin Delhi and then in London, deemed necessary in order to best pursue their particularobjectives of the day.

The First World War was like lightning and thunder bursting forth from the storm cloudswhich European imperialist ambitions had fomented. This was not the time for letting theprivileged position, which Britain had acquired on the Arab side of the Gulf,2 slip from herhands. Rather, in order to consolidate her hold, it was necessary to be prepared to support thewar effort in the Middle East, regardless of whether or not the Gulf became a war zone. Duringthe period before the War, the German plan to nominate Kuwait as a terminus for the proposedBaghdad Railway was perceived as part of an increasing threat to the British position ofhegemony in the Gulf. This justified enhancing and elaborating the set of treaties, in whichthe rulers of the then six Trucial States – like other Arab rulers in the area – had agreed in1892 to ‘on no account enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power otherthan the British Government’.3

Another important objective was to prevent arms from reaching sensitive areas such asAfghanistan or Baluchistan on the fringe of the British Empire. The countries in the entireregion were all closely watched, and eventually treaties were made in November 1902 inwhich the rulers agreed to ‘absolutely prohibit the importation of arms for sale . . . or theexportation therefrom’.4 In 1911 it was agreed that concessions for pearling, sponge fishingand related economic activities should not be granted except with the permission of the BritishPolitical Resident for the Gulf in Bushire.5 This undertaking had the additional benefit for thelocal population that no outsiders were permitted to exploit the resources, which were asignificant part of their livelihood. Practical benefits for the far-flung Empire, such as way-leaves for telegraph lines or the demarcation of shipping lanes by buoys and lighthouses, weresecured as the need arose. Thus a cordon sanitaire was thrown around the Arab states of theGulf, which in the event meant, for the British at least, a well covered flank when Turkey,aided by Germany, engaged in hostilities in southern Iraq in 1916.

After the defeat of the main rivals within the Gulf region, Turkey, Germany and Russia, theprevious British political and strategic considerations of the nineteenth century – with thedesired effect of denying the littoral states of the Gulf contacts with other European powers

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– gave way to the pursuit of economic goals. During the War it had grown evident that accessto oil resources had become of prime importance. Finds in Persia and Iraq had already indicatedthat the entire region could be rich in oil. Therefore, Britain wanted to ensure that in the areaswhere she had already secured political influence, no other nation would pip her at the postif and when a race for oil concessions were to ensue. Between February and May of 1922 therulers of the Trucial States gave an undertaking that if the search for oil commenced in theirterritories they would not grant ‘any concession in this connection to any one except to theperson appointed by the High British Government’.6 Similar agreements had already beensigned in 1913/14 by Kuwait and Bahrain, although British diplomatic efforts never achievedthe same level of influence with Ibn Saud, the new ruler of Central Arabia.7

However, for more than a decade British oil companies were unable to take advantage ofthis privileged position in the Trucial States, because they were committing their capital andresources to the areas where oil had already been found, Persia and Iraq. Oil was then alsodiscovered in Bahrain in 1932, and there were good prospects for discovery in Kuwait andthe al-Hasa area – all in American-owned concessions. The London-based multinationalconsortium, which had been restructured after the First World War to exploit the knowndeposits in Iraq, the Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd (IPC),8 secured a concession in Qatar in1935 with the help of the British government. In the same year IPC formed a subsidiary calledPetroleum Concessions Ltd (PCL) in order to secure oil concessions on the Trucial Coast andin Oman and to exclude American companies from these areas.

PCL’s negotiations with the individual rulers proved to be tough and protracted and onnumerous occasions required intervention by the British Political Agent in Bahrain as the longarm of the British government. The first of these concessions was signed in 1937 by the rulerof Dubai; the last to sign was the newly independent ruler of Fujairah in 1952.9 The TrucialStates had so far been perceived by the British primarily as a string of settlements dominatedby the rulers of the coastal city states. From the early 1930s onwards, British policy towardsthe Trucial States became much more intrusive in preparation for the operations of oil companypersonnel in the uncharted hinterland. The way in which the rulers dealt with domestic matterswas now more closely monitored and, on occasions, severely censored, and the Britishauthorities took an interest in inter-tribal strife and the increasing number of territorial disputesin the hinterland. The frequency, not only of the letters, which were sent to the rulers via theResidency Agent in Sharjah, but also of the visits of one or another of the warships stationedin the Gulf increased, carrying the Political Agent from Bahrain or Kuwait or even the PoliticalResident from Bushire – depending on the urgency and importance of the matter. The SeniorNaval Officer in the Gulf, and even the captains of the ships, were also empowered to conductpolitical negotiations.

As communications between Britain and its Indian Empire developed to include air travel,and when landing facilities on the Iranian side of the Gulf were withdrawn, the Trucial Stateswere considered as essential staging posts first for military and, later, for civilian planes. TheBritish needed to be successful in negotiating agreements for runways, refuelling facilitiesand emergency landing strips for their seaplanes and aircraft.10 From 1932 there were overnightfacilities at a purpose-built fortress near a landing strip in Sharjah for the crew and passengersof (British) Imperial Airways. The strategically placed facilities for air communications, inparticular at Sharjah, played an important role during the Second World War, and were secured

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by constant monitoring of developments in the area through copious exchanges of letters andfrequent visits from the Agent in Sharjah, and the British personnel in Bahrain, Bushire, Indiaand London. The oil concessions remained dormant due to the shortage of men, money andsteel during the Second World War and for several years thereafter.11

In all matters of communication with the British government, the sole addressees in everystate were the rulers. Since the early nineteenth century the status of an incumbent ruler hadusually been much enhanced by the importance which the ‘High Government’ placed on a‘Trucial Ruler’ to the exclusion of a tribal sheikh in the interior.12 But from the end of thesecond decade of the twentieth century, when the decline of the pearling industry spelled greateconomic hardship for the region, the population in these states, led by the merchants, stronglyresented the fact that all the potentially lucrative arrangements and concessions, for whichthe British government or foreign companies made payments, were agreed exclusively withthe rulers. This further enhanced an already existing regional trend to xenophobia andencouraged alienation between the rulers and their people.

After the War the search for oil began in earnest in 1950, when the first drilling rig waserected on the coast of Abu Dhabi. But several dry holes were drilled in locations throughoutthe Trucial States and its adjacent sea bed, before oil was struck in commercial quantitiesoffshore from Abu Dhabi in 1959 and on-shore in the desert of the same state in 1960. Exportfacilities were built and shipments began in 1962 and 1963 respectively. The influx of foreignpersonnel working for the oil companies and, eventually, an ever increasing number of menwith the many construction and service companies, made it imperative that their safety wasguaranteed while they were working in remote locations. In response to these requirementsa British officered local force was established in 1951, the ‘Trucial Oman Scouts’. A host ofregulations were enacted to ensure their security, to define their legal status in the country aswell as to cover many other issues. The Political Agency, staffed by British officials since1949, was moved from Sharjah to Dubai in 1954, and a new Political Agency was opened forAbu Dhabi in 1957. Legal arrangements for British protected people were made in so-called‘Orders in Council’, decided upon in London. The British-made immigration rules wereimplemented by the Political Agencies. Thus, British involvement on a daily basis becamevery much more obvious, but, because it coincided with a period of perceptible economicimprovement, at least for those people who obtained employment with one of the companies,this was probably less resented than when the oil companies first arrived before the war.

As for the British government’s approach to this region within the slowly disintegratingempire, the changes which were sweeping the global political scene in the post-war era alsomade their mark here. The plight of people in developing countries was being discussed inthe United Nations. Britain, too, felt morally obliged to care for the population of this regionwhich was under her domination and from which she had over time benefited so much morethan she had been required to care for. Once the necessity to become active in the developmentof the Trucial States had become widely accepted, several efforts were initiated. The ForeignOffice profited from the fact that a number of its members, who came to serve in the Gulf,had already been involved in development in the Sudan Civil Service. They and others wereprepared to implement this new approach to the British imperial role – to help to improve theliving standards of the people, and to prepare the area of the Trucial States for the changeswhich were to be expected if oil was found there. The world economic recession of the 1930s,

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the decline of the pearling industry, and the impact of the Second World War had combinedto reduce the Trucial Coast to poverty. The finances which the British government was preparedto commit to this task were very limited, but a number of dedicated civil servants, engineers,military personnel and other specialists managed to have an impact in several fields and laidthe groundwork for the road to development

The rulers of the seven Trucial States were brought together in the ‘Trucial States Council’,which met regularly and decided upon the priorities for the ‘Trucial States Development Office’.13

Modest beginnings in health care, road building, agricultural extension work, vocationaltraining, statistics and surveys of water and soil resources were made in the 1950s. Such effortsaccelerated and brought visible results in the 1960s, when Abu Dhabi began to pay the lion’sshare for these development projects. This leading role taken by Abu Dhabi already pointedthe way forward to the foundation of the Federation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971, anindependent state which benefited from the oil wealth of its member states.

With this event the British Political Agency, which had been perceived by many in thecountry to be the hub of influence and power, was transformed into the British Embassy14 –one among a fast growing number of diplomatic missions in the country, thus symbolicallymarking the end of the imperial era in the Gulf.

1 This was the name given to the area (with the exception of Bahrain and Qatar) under the sovereignty of the rulerswho had signed the ‘General Treaty’ with the representative of the East India Company in 1820.

2 The supervision of developments on the Arab side of the Gulf was coordinated by the British Political Residentin Bushire; from 1823 a ‘Native Agent’ was sent to Sharjah to maintain a channel of communication with thisCoast.

3 C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries,Delhi, Government of India (1933) p 256.

4 Ibid., p 257.5 Ibid., p 263.6 Ibid., p 261.7 See G. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia. Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud, London, Frank Cass (1976)

pp 34ff.8 The shareholding at the time was: 23.75 per cent each BP, Shell, Companie Francaise des Petroles (later Total),

and Near East Development Corporation (half Mobil and half Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey) and 5 per cent Mr.Gulbenkian’s Participations and Explorations (Partex).

9 See for details F. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. A Society in Transition, London,Longman (1982) pp 296f.

10 See R.S. Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, New York, St. Martin’s Press (1978) pp 98ff.11 A team of geologists had visited some parts of the hinterland in 1936 and some seismic investigations had followed

in 1946. 12 For instance, the decision as to who should be the ruler in Kalba in the 1930s was entirely a British one, as was

the later decision to reincorporate Kalba into the state of Sharjah in 1951 after a series of struggles over succession. 13 See also for the following Heard-Bey, op. cit., pp 319ff.14 The Agent in Abu Dhabi became the Ambassador to the UAE, while the Agent in Dubai became a Consul General.

The Historical Background and Constitutional Basisto the Federation

Ibrahim Al Abed

Introduction

The United Arab Emirates achieved formal independence as a federal state on 2 December1971, as a result of two distinct, but related, events. One was the signature by the governmentof the United Kingdom and the rulers of the seven emirates (formerly known as the TrucialStates or Trucial Oman) of separate instruments bringing to an end the treaty relationship thathad existed between them since the early nineteenth century. The other was the agreementbetween rulers of six of the emirates, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwainand Fujairah, the previous July, to establish a federation to be known as the United ArabEmirates simultaneously with the ending of the treaty relationship with Britain. The seventhemirate, Ra’s al-Khaimah, formally acceded to the new federation on 10 February 1972.

The decision to establish the federation followed the gradual evolving of a consensus thattheir small population, their small size, (only Abu Dhabi being larger than 1500 square miles),and their poverty (only Abu Dhabi and Dubai being oil producers) did not permit the emiratesindependently, or in smaller groupings, to establish a viable, independent, political and consti-tutional entity. This is not to mention those objective factors, whether cultural, religious andsocial, which the various emirates hold in common.

In January 1968, the government of the United Kingdom had indicated its intention ofbringing to an end its treaty relations with the Trucial States, and with two other Gulf sheikhdoms,Bahrain and Qatar, by the end of 1971. During the nearly four years between that Britishdeclaration and the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, the ruling families in the sevenemirates, along with those of Bahrain and Qatar, together with their advisers, engaged in alengthy series of meetings and negotiations on the appropriate political and constitutional structureto be adopted upon British withdrawal. These negotiations were initially based upon a searchfor a nine state federation, including Bahrain and Qatar, and also involved the neighbouringindependent Arabian Gulf states of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who acted, individually and together,as conciliators and mediators, and, on occasion, as supporters of one or other of the nine intendingpartners in the federation. The government of the United Kingdom supported the efforts tocreate a federation and played an important role in the process that led to its eventual establishment.

The creation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 was the result of the consultations and negoti-ations in the period since January 1968. The concept of creating some form of constitutional

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structure linking together the emirates of the Arabian Gulf, while, at the same time, retainingkey elements of their individual and separate identities can, however, be traced back overseveral decades. An examination of that process is of relevance in analysing the dynamics ofthe politics of the federation.

The First Proposal for Inter-emirate Cooperation

The first proposal that can be traced for the creation of some kind of association between thesheikhdoms of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States, together with Kuwait, surfaced during1937, and was put forward by representatives of the colonial power, the United Kingdom. Itsubsequently created considerable local debate, both within and outwith the ruling families.

At that period, Britain was in treaty relations with all of the nine states as well as Kuwait,under the terms of which, inter alia, their rulers could not engage in independent relationswith foreign powers, and were obliged to accept the advice of Britain in certain defined areas.

The British presence was centred on the office of the Political Resident, Persian Gulf (PRPG)in Bahrain, although there were other officers and Political Agents in several other states.The PRPG reported to the government of India, then responsible for British interests on thewestern littoral of the Arabian Gulf, (with the exception of the recently emerged kingdomof Saudi Arabia), while the latter communicated with the Imperial Cabinet in London throughthe India Office.

The British proposal was presented to the rulers of the states during the course of 1937(Hamaidan 1967: pp 231–232). According to an interview in the magazine Al Bahrain in June1939 with a member of the ruling Al Maktoum family of Dubai, Sheikh Mana bin Hashar AlMaktoum, it included the following points:

• The establishment of a unified educational system, with a central administrative headquartersin Bahrain, and also a unified postal service.

• The creation of a common nationality, with the abolition of the necessity of passports fortravel between the member emirates.

• The unification of the judiciary and legislative systems.

The proposal was also said to include the unification of ground and naval forces under acentral command and administration. A federation council was proposed, with each emirate‘to send a representative according to an approved system’ while indirect taxation could belevied to raise money for federal expenses. According to Sheikh Mana ‘the advice andassistance of Great Britain is to be sought in implementing the project, due to its specialrelations with these parties, and for being the Arab’s ally in more than one part of the world.’

According to another report (Al Bahrain, 6.1939), the creation of an assembly was alsoproposed, with representatives from each emirate, either to be appointed by the ruler or to beelected by the population, having the power to propose financial regulations and to ratify draftlegislation put forward by the Federation Council.

The British proposal came at a time when the PRPG and other British officials were deeplyinvolved in negotiations designed to win oil exploration concessions in the Trucial States forthe British-controlled Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). These negotiations were by no means

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always smooth and easy and, as a result, relations between Britain and the rulers were notalways cordial. Indeed, some rulers were clearly opposed to any proposal which could lead toa greater degree of British involvement in their emirates. Perceived, by the British at least, asbeing one of the more difficult rulers was Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi.

By 1938, the government of the United Kingdom was pre-occupied with the looming SecondWorld War, which broke out in Europe the next year, and little energy was expended on promotionof the Gulf federation proposal. The contents of the proposal, however, became widely knownthroughout the states involved, and provoked considerable political discussion, some of whichwas reflected in local journals. Abdullah Al Zayed, owner of the magazine Al Bahrain, madeuse of his columns to promote the concept of greater integration. In June 1939, in the frontpage interview with Sheikh Mana Al Maktoum cited above, he commented: ‘We pray thatthe aspirations of Sheikh Mana (for a federation) are realized, so that we can see this plangoing beyond the area of thinking towards action’. He then added:

We are confident that Their Excellencies Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr (Al Qasimi), the Emirof Sharjah, and Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan (Al Nahyan), the Emir of Abu Dhabi, welcomethe plan. We also believe that His Excellency Sheikh Sultan bin Salem (Al Qasimi), theEmir of Ra’s al-Khaimah, does not see otherwise. There will be no need to seek theacceptance of His Excellency Sheikh Ahmed Al Jaber (Al Sabah, of Kuwait), who wasthe first to think about it (the concept of greater cooperation), and has spent much timeworking for its sake.

Although no action was taken, either by Britain or by the rulers, to implement the proposal,reports in Al Bahrain over the course of the next five years indicated that discussion of thetopic continued. On 22 August 1939, for example, the magazine reported: ‘We have learnedthat the Emirs of the Gulf have convened their Councils to discuss (the idea of a federation)and they are happy and keen on their endeavour.’

In the same issue, it published an article described as a summary of reports in other press,including Arab Association and Arab Newsletter. It reported that:

The general belief in the Arab Emirates overlooking the Gulf is one calling for the needfor its citizens to be brought closer together so that they may preserve their nationalidentity. These Emirates have carried out ‘national propaganda,’(contacts) in this respectthat is soon expected to bear fruit.The ruling Emirs have started to view closeness between the Emirates as a factor of(common strength), as long as each Emir maintains his own independence in his own state.

The report again summarized the outlines of the proposal, with more detail on some points.On the unification of posts and telegraphs, for example, it said that fees and salaries shouldalso be defined, and that a single administrative system should be created ‘on the basis of thepercentage of each emirate in the revenues’. On the creation of a joint military force, it saidthat the proposal suggested that:

Each military unit in each Emirate has its autonomous unit, but (should be) linked withthe units of the other Emirates in an alliance under one general command and staff.According to the rules of this alliance, the units can participate in defensive and offensive

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manoeuvres in any part within the border of the federation. Each Emirate will have tospend on its military units according to decisions by the General Command. The ruleswill apply to the ground, naval and air forces.

On the proposed Federal Assembly or Council, the magazine said that it was to be establishedwith representatives from each emirate, chosen ‘either by appointment or election, or both,taking into consideration the population of each Emirate’. It added that the Council ‘will haveto study all laws and regulations issued by the Judicial Council before endorsing them. EachEmirate has to show absolute subjugation, and is responsible for implementing these laws.’

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah were said to be involved in theplans. Al Bahrain, however, added ‘the Emirates which are expected to merge are over 20,and those which have been mentioned are only the larger among them’.

At the time, the British, through the PRPG, also recognized the separate identity of Ra’sal-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, as well as Kalba, which had been granted recognitionin the mid-1930s and was reintegrated into Sharjah in 1951. The emirate of Fujairah, officiallyrecognized in 1952, was also seeking a British acknowledgement of its separate status. Theother ‘emirates’ considered by the Al Bahrain editor were not identified, but may well haveincluded some of the near-autonomous inland tribes or small coastal villages like Hirah inSharjah, which had earlier unsuccessfully sought independent status. ‘Considering Britain’sposition towards this plan,’ the paper wrote, ‘it is obvious that it does not propose it, but hasnot opposed it or obstructed it, if it has been brought to its attention.’

In a subsequent issue of the magazine on 28 September 1939, Al Bahrain reproduced aletter it said had come from ‘a senior (official) on the Omani Coast (i.e. the Trucial States),who asked not to be named and who swore he was ready to exert his influence, and moneyand blood for the sake of the (federation of emirates) if need be.’ The letter, the identity ofwhose author has not been determined, said in part that the topic of a possible federationof emirates:

has become the main theme for discussions in councils (majalis) and clubs, and the focusof thinking among those interested in the future of the Arabs in this part of their nation.We do not know what share (of attention) it took in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, althoughthe newspapers which have dwelt on the subject have confirmed the great interest of theinhabitants there. The federation of the Emirates is beneficial not only for the Emirates. Its main benefit isfor the Emirs themselves, because in order to have such unity, there should be a FederationCouncil, and a constitution, that guarantees the status of the Emirs, and defines a wayof succession to the thrones, as well as preventing any aggression from one party againstanother, from within and from without, as well as against internal revolts. They (the Emirs)would be involved in building their countries for the prosperity of their peoples, and ineducation of their youth.

The correspondent from the Trucial States went on to refine further some of the suggestionsalready made on the powers and structure of the federation. These included a proposal thateach emirate should be ‘called to elect representatives, one to each 4000 inhabitants. Therepresentatives will be from the Emirs or from the people’. He added that he had no objection

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to either Kuwait or Bahrain as a base for the Council, but added that he personally preferredBahrain, because it was an island and in the geographical centre of the region:

Considering the fact that all the Emirates have special links with Britain, and that nopossible danger to the area’s Arabism and existence can arise from this relationship, theEmirates will have to seek assistance from this country (Britain) in a way that will ensurethe growth and steadfastness of the federation.

Finally, the correspondent said that the duties of the federation should include ‘the task ofworking towards cementing the links and alliances with neighbouring Arab countries, partic-ularly the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Iraq.’ ‘Now’, he concluded, ‘is it not time to takethe first step, and for the Emirs to call each other together for a preparatory meeting to discussthis subject?’

The emirs, however, made no attempt to do so, while the PRPG, with his masters in Bombayand London pre-occupied by the Second World War, took no initiatives on the subject. AbdullahAl Zayed, the campaigning editor of Al Bahrain, continued to promote the concept of greaterinter-emirate cooperation, and to suggest that there was a degree of support from membersof the ruling families. On 7 August 1941, the paper reported a statement by Sheikh Sultan binSaqr Al Qasimi of Sharjah, said to have been made during a visit to the paper, as follows:

I pray to God that the Arab Emirs in the Gulf succeed in uniting and in eliminating thecauses for differences and discord (between them). May He direct them towards forginga unity that brings them together, and puts away hatred.

On 11 September 1941, Abdullah Al Zayed reported a visit to his office by Sheikh Humaidbin Muhammad bin Salem Al Qasimi, nephew and son-in-law of the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah,and commented:

It is a delight to be able to mention that all the Emirs and dignitaries we have been ableto meet from the Coast of Oman (Trucial Oman) expect and support the idea that the ArabEmirates on the Gulf unite in an alliance that would make of them one country, as it isone nation, provided that each Emir maintains the right to run his own internal affairsas he does now.

Al Zayed’s continual campaigning and prompting, however, achieved little. Nearly threeyears later, on 23 March 1944, he wrote an editorial entitled ‘Will the Gulf be one state?’ Itsaid, in part:

Over and over again, we have written about this subject, which is of particular concernto us. The editor of this newspaper has personally ascertained the views of many Emirsand Sheikhs in the Gulf. He is also confident that Great Britain has no objection to thisproject, if the sheikhs of the Emirates should express their desire for a Federation. It iseven probable that it will take an initiative in giving assistance.We repeat here what we have often said, that the Federation of Arab Emirates in the Gulfdoes not mean that any Emir will cede his throne, or lose any of his influence or income.On the contrary, the wars between the Emirates will end, to be replaced by lasting peaceand stability.

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It is now our hope that the Emirs will convene a conference amongst themselves tocomplete discussion of the subject, as they have already (discussed it) individually.

The proposal during the 1930s for the creation of some form of greater inter-emiratecooperation in the Gulf came to naught, despite evidence that, at least as individuals, someof the emirs supported it. Moreover, the involvement of Britain in the Second World War pre-occupied the colonial power, while in the years immediately after the War, Britain was primarilyconcerned at a regional level with her impending withdrawal from India and, to a lesser extent,the impact that would have upon her interests in the Arabian Gulf.

The concept, however, was the first concrete formula to be put forward for a form of regionalcooperation between the emirates, and was, moreover, a formula that incorporated all of thebasic elements that were to compose the basic structure of succeeding plans and proposals.These included the concept that any viable federal structure should acknowledge the separateidentity and authority within his emirate of each sheikh, with particular relation to the armedforces and his authority over his own subjects, even if the latter were members of any FederalCouncil or Assembly. Also included was the concept that any such entity to be establishedshould have a form of collective leadership in which the individual sheikhs should all participate,as well as some form of popular representation, either through selection or election. Significantly,there was also a recognition that at least a tacit approval for any such structure should besought from the largest Arab states in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Indeed, some of theemirs were reported to have visited Riyadh to discuss the 1937 idea with the Saudi monarch,Abdul Aziz Al Saud, and to seek his blessings.

The Trucial States Council

The Political Resident, Persian Gulf (PRPG), and his political superiors, had taken no actionto promote the 1937 proposal, but in 1952, in the aftermath of her withdrawal from the Indiansub-continent, Britain took her own initiative, which was confined to the Trucial Coast.

At the time, there were seven states or emirates that were recognized as having independentidentities, all of which were in treaty relations with the United Kingdom. These were AbuDhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ajman and Fujairah. In the sameyear, Fujairah had at last succeeded in winning from Britain the recognition as a separate entityfor which it had been struggling intermittently for almost a century, while in the previous yearKalba, just south of Fujairah, had been re-absorbed into the emirate of Sharjah, following theextinction of the adult male line of the local branch of the ruling Al Qasimi family of Sharjah.

The British initiative took the form of the creation of the Trucial States Council, an informalbody composed of the sheikhs of the seven emirates and chaired by the British Political Agentin the Trucial States, resident in Dubai. The Council was designed primarily as an informalgathering, with no charter, written code or regulations, and its members were given tounderstand that it was to act as a consultative institution. Its intended purpose during its bi-annual meetings was to discuss matters of common concern and to prepare recommendationsfor the Political Agent (Fenelon 1973: p 39). Under the terms of the treaties regulating theBritish relationship with the emirates, the sheikhs were obliged in certain fields, moreover,

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to act upon the advice of the PRPG or the Political Agent. During the subsequent years, coveringnearly two decades, discussions in the Council centred upon matters of economic development,on services of general interest, such as education, health, traffic control and the control oflocusts and on other items, of concern also to the British, such as the total abolition of thesmuggling and sale of slaves, citizenship and travel documents (Hawley 1971: pp 25–27).

In 1958, six years after it was established, and in the wake of major changes in the Arabworld such as the republican revolution in Iraq and the tri-partite action by Britain, Franceand Israel against Egypt, the Council, at the prompting of the Political Agent, establishedthree sub-committees, for agriculture, education and public health. In 1964, another majorcommittee, entitled the Deliberative Committee, was established, with the tasks of undertakingpreliminary work on the agendas to be placed before the meetings of the Council itself, ofdeciding upon the priorities for projects and of drafting recommendations for the Council.The committee had two members from each of the Trucial States and met approximately everytwo months (Hawley 1971: p 25). In 1965, the British Political Agent vacated the chair of theCouncil, and the member sheikhs then elected a chairman from amongst their own number,to serve for a one year term. The first so to be elected was the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah, SheikhSaqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi (Al-Azminah Al-Arabiyyah no. 84, 15.10.1980: pp 6–7).

During the course of 1965, the administrative structure associated with the Council wasfurther developed, with the creation of the Development Office and the Development Fund.These were given the task of coordinating the modest development projects in the seven emiratesuntil the Fund was dissolved, after the formation of the Federation of the UAE, in early 1972.Its duties were then transferred to the institutions of the new state (ibid.). The activities of theFund were financed by the British, who in 1965 increased the budget for the Council’s FiveYear Plan from £350,000 to £1,000,000, and also made an annual appropriation of a further£200,000 for current development expenditure. Much to the delight of the British, who believedthat some of the oil revenues enjoyed by Abu Dhabi, which had begun production in 1962,should be spent in the poorer emirates, when Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan becameruler of Abu Dhabi on 6 August 1966 he immediately made a grant of a further £500,000 tothe Development Fund, with subsequent substantial grants in 1967 and 1968, by which timehe was the largest contributor. Other funds came from Kuwait, which was also providingassistance to the emerging educational sector (Fenelon 1973: pp 39–40).

The purpose of this chapter being to examine the gradual progress of the Trucial States towardsthe formation of the federation, the achievements of the Trucial States Council need not beanalysed in detail. It is apparent, however, that the Council was a joint venture that pointed theway towards a federation, and that its formation, and its acceptance by the rulers, implied arecognition of the essential unity, or at least common interest, of the seven Trucial States.

The Council served as a forum for discussion and exchange of views between the rulers,initially under the watchful eye of the British Political Agent. It also provided a frameworkfor cooperation and for the adoption of a certain degree of collective responsibility forcommon problems that permitted each individual ruler to operate at a level broader thanthat of his own individual tribe or sheikhdom. As a result, this first concrete experimentin inter-emirate collaboration played an important function in helping to reduce the degreeof competition between the rulers and, at the same time, giving them experience in collab-orating for mutual benefit.

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The Bi-partite Union

In January 1968, the British government informed the rulers of the Trucial States, and of Qatarand Bahrain, that they intended to bring the treaty relationship between them and Britain toan end by the close of 1971, as part of a process of British withdrawal from east of Suez. TheBritish decision meant, in effect, that the Trucial States were to be granted independence, adevelopment that not only took the rulers by surprise, since they had been informed only acouple of months before that such a withdrawal would not take place, but was also one thatwas by no means universally welcomed. Indeed, the first reaction of several was to ask theBritish to stay.

One of the immediate results of the British decision was the additional impetus given tothe already expanding cooperation between the rulers within the framework of the TrucialStates Council. Looking further ahead, however, Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi promptlyrecognized the need for discussion with his fellows on the nature of any future relationship.

On 18 February 1968, only a few weeks after the British had informed the rulers of theirdecision to withdraw, the rulers of the two largest and wealthiest emirates, Sheikh Zayed ofAbu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai, met at As-Sameeh, close totheir mutual border. The original purpose of the meeting was to discuss and to settle adisagreement over onshore and offshore borders, this being resolved quickly by a cession ofterritory by Abu Dhabi to Dubai, including the site of today’s Port of Jebel Ali. As both rulersmay have suspected, the offshore areas involved in the cession of territory were later discoveredto contain substantial oil reserves.

Although both rulers had not abandoned the hope of persuading the British to reverse theirdecision, they also discussed the likely prospects for the region should withdrawal take place.In order to prepare for such an eventuality, they agreed that they would create a two-emirateunion which others would be invited to join. The terms of the agreement provided for foreignaffairs, defence, security, immigration and social affairs to be union responsibilities, with eachemirate retaining responsibility for judicial and other internal affairs (Rozal Yousif 2.8.1971).Article 4 of the Abu Dhabi–Dubai Agreement invited the rulers of the other five Trucial Statesto discuss the agreement, and to adhere to it. The rulers of Qatar and Bahrain were also invitedto confer with the rulers of the Trucial States in order to discuss the future of the region as awhole, with a view to seeing whether a common stance could be adopted between the nineseparate political units (ibid.).

This agreement was short-lived, for the rulers of the other Trucial States, along with those ofQatar and Bahrain, signified their immediate acceptance of the offer to join the new union. On25 February 1968, the nine rulers met in Dubai, signing an agreement on 27 February to establishthe ‘Federation of the Arab Emirates’. This agreement was to come into effect on 30 March1968 (Al Rayyes 1973: p 75). The agreement stipulated that the purpose of the federation was:

to cement ties between them (the members) in all fields, to co-ordinate plans for theirdevelopment and prosperity, to reinforce the respect of each one of them for the independenceand sovereignty of the others, to unify their foreign policies and representation, and itshigher policy in international, political, defence, economic, cultural and other matters.

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It further stipulated that the highest body, the Supreme Council (comprising the nine rulers),‘shall be responsible for issuing the necessary federal laws and that it is the supreme authorityin deciding on issues of reference, and shall take its decisions by a unanimous vote.’ Thechairmanship of the Council was to be ‘rotated annually among its members,’with the chairmanrepresenting the federation ‘internally and before foreign states’.

Under the terms of the Dubai Agreement, executive authority was delegated to a FederalCouncil which was to act as an executive arm of the Supreme Council. Article 8 of theagreement, however, made it clear that the Federal Council:

would carry out its functions to strengthen the collective defence of their countries,with a view to safeguarding their security, safety and mutual interests in such mattersas to ensure the fulfilment of their aspirations and realize the hopes of the greaterArab homeland.

The second chapter of the Agreement defined the top federal, political and executiveauthorities and the financial structure of the federation, while the third dealt with defence,justice and the site of the capital of the federation. Ultimate political authority was vested inthe Supreme Council. This body was assigned the task of drawing up:

a permanent and comprehensive charter for the Federation, and the formulation of itsoverall policies on international, political, defence, economic, cultural and other affairsthat are in accordance with the aims of the Federation.

There was a notable lack of precision on matters of defence, justice and the capital.Article 12 provided that:

The contracting Emirates shall co-operate in strengthening their military capabilities inaccordance with the right of legitimate defence, both individual and collective, of theirexistence, and their common duty to repel any armed aggression to which any one of themmay be subjected. The Emirates shall also co-operate, according to their resources andneeds, in developing their individual or collective means of defence to meet their obligation.

Article 13, on justice, called for the establishment of a Supreme Court, and for its formation,organization and functions to be defined by law, while the relationship between the SupremeCouncil and the Federal Council was clarified by Article 10, which stated that ‘decisions ofthe Federal Council shall not be deemed final unless approved by the Supreme Council’. Thepermanent headquarters of the federation was left to be determined by the Supreme Councilat a later stage. Finances were covered, in general terms, in Article 6, which said that ‘thegeneral budget of the Federation shall be issued by a decision from the Supreme Council. Thelaw shall fix the budget revenues and the share to be paid by each member Emirate’.

The agreement also stated that local affairs were to remain within the jurisdiction of eachmember emirate, with precise details to be determined by the Supreme Council at a later date.

The agreement between the nine rulers to form the Federation of Arab Emirates was madeat speed, and, in consequence, the terms of the charter agreed upon were loosely worded inlegal terms and thus subject to differing interpretations. Although the Supreme Council wasto meet on four occasions over the subsequent 18 months, it was unable to reach lastingagreement on any point, except that the federation itself was not viable.

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The Failure of the Federation of Arab Emirates

A detailed examination of the various deliberations between leaders of the emirates and ofthe contacts that took place between them is outside the purview of this chapter. The underlyingobstacles that gave rise to the differences between the nine members are, however, of importancein understanding the reasons for its eventual collapse, effectively from the date of the lastmeeting of the Supreme Council, on 21 October 1969.

One obstacle of considerable importance was inherent in the Charter of the Federation itself.Although the new entity was named the ‘Federation of Arab Emirates,’ the Charter itselfstipulated that its purpose was, in part, ‘to reinforce the respect of each one of them for theindependence and sovereignty of the others’ (ibid.).

The agreement, as mentioned earlier, required the Supreme Council to take decisions onlyon the basis of unanimity, and single rulers could, and often did, prevent such unanimity beingreached. Moreover, the agreement was silent on questions relating to the organization andcomposition of the Federal Council, including the manner in which its members were to beselected. This again, according to one observer, ‘handicapped the process of implementationas the Supreme Council was not able to reach an agreement on these matters’ (Al-Azminah26. 11. 1980: pp 6–7). The agreement also lacked precision on questions such as the sourcesof federal revenues and the contribution to be made by each emirate to the federal budget,while an examination of the deliberations of Supreme Council meetings indicates that theCouncil also failed to reach agreement on these two points (ibid.). In addition, there was noclear indication in the agreement as to whether or not the member emirates had agreed to theestablishment of a joint defence force. As a result, some rulers supported the unification ofthe various military and para-military forces, while others insisted on maintaining their ownindependent armed units (ibid.).

Rivalry over the respective status of the rulers and their emirates was also clear during thelife of the Supreme Council, with competition for leadership and for positions. This was partic-ularly evident between Bahrain and Qatar, neither of which had participated in the work ofthe Trucial States Council that had brought the other seven emirates, and their rulers, closertogether in the previous decade and a half. Both eventually decided to withdraw from effortsto create a viable federation, and became separately independent, on 14 August 1971 and 1September 1971 respectively, although by that stage the Federation of Arab Emirates itselfhad long since ceased to exist.

The competition between the two emirates, however, permitted Abu Dhabi to emerge asa mediator. Though with a smaller population than Bahrain, and at a lower level ofdevelopment than either Dubai or Qatar, Abu Dhabi was largest of the nine emirates interms of size. It was also the wealthiest, with its rapidly expanding oil production faroutstripping not only that of Bahrain and Qatar, but also that of Dubai (which did notcommence exports until 1968), the only other oil producer in the Trucial States. This,coupled with the generosity of Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Zayed towards the other emirates,helped to make him the person most likely to be acceptable to his colleagues as leader ofthe federation of the seven Trucial States that was to emerge after the collapse of thefederation of nine.

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Qatar and Bahrain also disagreed over the site of the proposed federal capital. At the fourthand final Supreme Council meeting it was agreed that Abu Dhabi should be the temporarycapital, with a permanent site to be built later between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. When a yearlater the deputy rulers met in Abu Dhabi to attempt to revive the moribund federation, thequestion of the capital was again raised and Bahrain withdrew its previous acceptance,rendering the agreement on Abu Dhabi null and void.

Subsequently the federation of the Trucial States that became the United Arab Emiratesadopted the same compromise in its provisional Constitution in 1971, naming Abu Dhabi astemporary capital pending construction of a permanent capital, to be named Al-Karamah, onthe Abu Dhabi–Dubai border. Both Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaimah raised the question of apermanent capital on a number of occasions during the 1970s, demanding that it should bebuilt. The Abu Dhabi Ruler and UAE President, Sheikh Zayed, however, embarked on a processof turning Abu Dhabi into a de facto capital. Only financial considerations, plus the rapidcreation of established facts in terms of construction on the ground, led the two emirates todrop their demand after 1979. It was to take a further 17 years, until May 1996, before theSupreme Council of the UAE, adopting the provisional Constitution as permanent, finallyendorsed Abu Dhabi as the permanent capital.

Another major point of contention between members of the Supreme Council of theFederation of Arab Emirates was the method to be followed in determining the compositionof the proposed Federal Council or Parliament. Bahrain, with the largest population, proposeda ratio based on population. Qatar and the others, with much smaller populations, refused(Heard-Bey 1984: p 359). Subsequently, at the October 1969 Supreme Council meeting,Bahrain agreed to the principle of equal representation, with four members from each emirate.At the October 1970 meeting of deputy rulers, however, it retracted its previous agreement,and again demanded a form of proportional representation (Al-Azminah no. 95, 14. 1. 1981:pp 6–7). The opposition of the remaining eight deputy rulers led Bahrain’s representative toannounce his intention of refraining from taking any further part in subsequent discussions‘before ensuring that the Constitution ensures the rights of the people of the Union, partic-ularly in so far as the representation of the people in the Union Council is concerned.’ (ibid.)

A further unresolved point was the question of voting within the Supreme Council itself.The 1968 Dubai Agreement had originally called for unanimity. The draft constitutionsubsequently prepared stipulated that decisions on ‘substantial’ matters should be taken byunanimous vote, but that decisions on other, less important, matters should be taken on thebasis of a simple majority. Bahrain rejected this for reasons related to its opposition to otherrelated articles, while, when the subject was raised at the deputy rulers’meeting in Abu Dhabiin October 1970, there were several differing viewpoints (ibid.).

Following the collapse of the deputy rulers’ meeting in October 1970, it became clear byearly 1971 that Bahrain and Qatar had chosen to follow an independent course, and the rulersof the seven Trucial States were obliged to re-consider their plans to deal with the approachingBritish withdrawal, not least because any remaining hopes that the Conservative government,elected in June 1970, would reverse the decision to withdraw taken by its Labour predecessorhad finally been dashed. The British government, too, was eager to ensure that a viablestructure of government would exist upon its departure, not least because of the collapse in1967 of the superficially similar South Arabian Federation. The British government had

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sponsored the federation in the area that became independent as the People’s Republic ofSouthern Yemen, with a Marxist government that in 1971 was actively supporting subversionof the existing order both in Oman and in the Trucial States. Equally keen to have a satisfactoryagreement worked out, again partly because of the fear of a spread of the virus of revolutionfrom South Yemen, were the governments of the other Arabian Gulf states, Kuwait and SaudiArabia, both of whom had been actively engaged in promoting the federation of nine concept.

The Bahraini and Qatari decisions represented, at one level, a terminal blow to the embryofederal structure, because both emirates had a substantially higher level of education, and,hence, more qualified local personnel. At the same time, however, their departure, which leftAbu Dhabi and Dubai far outweighing their five colleagues in terms of area, population andwealth, made it easier for the Trucial States to move towards agreement amongst themselves.

On 10 July 1971, the seven Trucial States’ rulers met in Dubai. Eight days later, six ofthem announced the formation of the United Arab Emirates. Ra’s al-Khaimah declined tojoin, although not ruling out the possibility of doing so in the future.The discussions leadingto the creation of the Federation of the UAE, which centred, in part, on amendments beingproposed to the draft constitution for the Federation of Arab Emirates, indicated that substantialdifferences existed.

The rulers of the small five, excluding Abu Dhabi and Dubai, proposed three key amendments.As far as a federal capital was concerned, they suggested that the plan to build a new capitalbetween Abu Dhabi and Dubai should be abandoned and that, instead, a headquarters for thenew federal government should be built somewhere between Dubai and Sharjah, saying thatthe funds for a new capital would be better spent on development schemes in the emiratesthat were not oil producers. The five further stressed that there should be full equality betweenthe seven in all respects, including the composition of the national assembly and the votingprocess within the Supreme Council (Heard-Bey 1984: p 359). Neither Abu Dhabi nor Dubaiwere prepared to accept these points, the last of which, in particular, was in direct contra-diction to the powers they themselves sought.

On the second day of the meeting, four of the five withdrew their support for the proposalsthey had put forward the day before. Only Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, ruler ofRa’s al-Khaimah, continued to press them. In the subsequent days of talks, the remaining sixrulers agreed to adopt a revised version of the draft constitution for the defunct Federation ofArab Emirates, the key difference being that decisions by the Supreme Council of Rulers wereto be taken by a majority vote, but both Abu Dhabi and Dubai had to be part of the majority.Abu Dhabi was approved as provisional capital.

Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi was elected as the first President of the United Arab Emirates,while Sheikh Rashid of Dubai was elected Vice-President, both terms to run for five yearsfrom 2 December 1971, the date on which the treaties with Britain were to come to an end,and to be renewable.

The national assembly, which was given the name of Federal National Council, was to becomprised of 34 members, eight each from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, six from Sharjah, and foureach for the three smaller emirates of Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah. Six places wereto be allocated to Ra’s al-Khaimah, should it eventually decide to join the federation. It wasalso agreed that the Constitution should have a provisional status for five years, after whichit was to be replaced by a permanent Constitution.

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Examination of the provisional Constitution makes it clear that the views of Abu Dhabi andDubai carried the day, with the four smaller, and poorer, emirates feeling themselves obligedto accept the demands of their more powerful neighbours. They were encouraged to do so byscarcely veiled suggestions being made by advisers to the Abu Dhabi and Dubai rulers thatthe two had already reached agreement on a contingency plan to press ahead with a bi-partitefederation should the others fail to accede to their terms. The smaller emirates were alsoencouraged to join, however, by the pledge from Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi that his emirate’soil resources would be used for the benefit of all of the federation’s members. ‘Abu Dhabi’soil and all its resources and potential are at the service of all the Emirates,’(Heard-Bey 1984:p 349). The rulers already had the evidence of Sheikh Zayed’s generosity before them, AbuDhabi having been the largest single contributor to the Trucial States Development Fund since1968, as noted earlier.

In the discussions leading up to the agreement, as during the previous attempt to create theFederation of Arab Emirates, neighbouring states and the British played an important role.While Kuwait proffered advice and assistance as a mediator, Saudi Arabia made it clear thatit would not recognize any federation unless it obtained a satisfactory answer to its territorialclaims on Abu Dhabi. The Shah of Iran, for his part, having agreed in 1970 to drop his claimto Bahrain following the results of a test of opinion supervised by the United Nations, madeit clear that there could be no possibility of him accepting the formation of a federation amongthe Trucial States unless he obtained the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb, belonging toRa’s al-Khaimah, and Abu Musa, belonging to Sharjah.

The British were left with the sometimes difficult task of cajoling and encouraging therulers of the emirates to proceed to agreement. With the collapse of efforts to create theFederation of Arab Emirates, the rapid approach of the self-created deadline of December1971 for a final British withdrawal from the Gulf meant that British policy was, at times,a mixture both of carrot and stick. This was particularly true where the smaller emirateswere concerned, whose rulers continued to show a reluctance to accept the inevitabilityof a British departure until almost the date of the actual establishment of the United ArabEmirates.

When intransigence threatened to complicate future acceptance of the federation by Iran,British tactics echoed past imperial attitudes. Thus Sharjah’s ruler was informed that hemust make an agreement with Iran on sharing authority on Abu Musa, while the ruler ofRa’s al-Khaimah, who completely rejected the suggestion that he should cede the Tunbs,found simply that Iran was given to understand by Britain that it would not oppose a militaryseizure of the islands, particularly if this could take place just before Britain formallyrelinquished its authority.

At the end of November 1971, with the establishment of the UAE a matter of days away,Sharjah signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran on the sharing of authority overAbu Musa without either of the two parties relinquishing its claims of sovereignty. This wasfollowed by a night attack by Iranian forces on the Tunbs, during which a number of Ra’s al-Khaimah policemen were killed. The Iranian occupation has continued to complicate relationsbetween the UAE and Iran throughout the course of the subsequent 30 years.

Ra’s al-Khaimah’s application for membership of the Federation was accepted uncondi-tionally on 10 February 1972, without any changes in the provisional Constitution.

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The Federal System

The new state which came into existence on 2 December 1971 had its basis in the provisionalConstitution. Adopted by the rulers on behalf of their emirates, it represented a consensus onthe form of the state which they agreed to establish, and on the concessions that they agreedto make with relation to a surrender of part of their sovereign powers to the new federal bodies.(In July 1996 the Supreme Council of the Federation decided unanimously to drop the word‘Provisional’. The Constitution thus became permanent.) The Constitution represented,therefore, an expression of the political status quo at the end of the 1960s in the southernArabian Gulf, including Qatar and Bahrain, in the light of the impending British withdrawal.Both Qatar and Bahrain had taken part in the earlier negotiations that preceded the formationof the UAE, when the Federation of Arab Emirates, grouping all nine emirates, was underdiscussion. Indeed, one observer has suggested that, had they not been involved in the earlystages of the negotiations, ‘many compromises which now form part of the constitution wouldhave been settled very differently’. The relationship between Qatar and Bahrain was markedby strong rivalry and competition, encouraging both to introduce a variety of legal formulationsinto the draft of the Constitution which they believed would either safeguard their own position,or counter the position or influence of the other.

The preamble to the Constitution stipulates that the rulers of the emirates agreed to theConstitution for the sake of, among other matters:

Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the coming years on a sound basis,corresponding to the realities and the capacities of the Emirates at the present time, enablingthe Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, sustaining the identity of itsmembers providing that this is not inconsistent with those goals and preparing the peopleof the Union at the same time for a dignified and free constitutional life, and progressingby steps towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an Islamic andArab society free from fear and anxiety.

The Supreme Council

The Supreme Council of the Federation (FSC) is the federation’s highest authority, and iscomposed of the rulers or of those designated to represent them. According to the Constitution,the Supreme Council has exclusive executive powers, powers of ratification, and legislativepowers. The executive powers lie in the following spheres:

• Acceptance of a new member of the federation. Such acceptance should be unanimous(Article 1).

• Election of the President and the Vice-President from among its members.• Formulation of the general state policy, in all matters conferred by the Constitution upon

the federation, and consideration of all matters that could help to achieve the objectives ofthe federation, and the common interests of its members (Article 47, clause 1).

• Maintaining supreme control over the affairs of the federation (Article 47, clause 7).• Drafting its own Rules and Procedures Bill, in which the Council may define those matters

to be considered procedural (Article 48).

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The Supreme Council also enjoys limited, but decisive, powers of ratification in the following,on which initial decisions may be taken by the individual emirates, the President or the Councilof Ministers:

• Approval of any decision taken by two or more emirates on some form of merger.• Article 143 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘any emirate shall have the right to request

the assistance of the Armed Forces or the Security Forces of the Union in order to maintainsecurity and order within its territories whenever it is exposed to danger. Such a requestshall be submitted immediately to the Supreme Council of the Union for decision.’ (Whilethe President and the Council of Ministers may collectively take immediate action if theSupreme Council is not in session, they are obliged to call the Supreme Council intoimmediate session in order to sanction the move.)

• The Council has the power to endorse or reject any administrative agreements that may beconcluded between individual emirates and neighbouring countries.

• It approves the resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister, upon recommendation fromthe President.

• It endorses declaration of defensive war upon a proposal from the President.• It has the power to endorse any decrees from the Council of Ministers on the appointment,

resignation and dismissal of judges of the Supreme Court.• It endorses international treaties and agreements concluded by the Council of Ministers.• It approves any declaration of martial law by the President provided it has the approval of

the Council of Ministers.

The Supreme Council also has an absolute legislative prerogative, retaining the final sayon federal legislation. According to the Constitution, the Council of Ministers may proposelegislation, which, after discussion in the Federal National Council, is then submitted to theSupreme Council for approval or rejection. The Supreme Council may thus issue any law,with or without consent of the Council of Ministers and the Federal National Council. In viewof the dual roles of Supreme Council members as rulers as well as members of the highestfederal body, the Council may, according to the Constitution, delegate some of its powerswhile it is not in session to the President and the Council of Ministers jointly. However:

The ratification of international treaties and agreements, enforcement and lifting ofmartial law, declaration of war, and the appointment of the President and judges of theSupreme Court under no circ*mstances can be delegated. (Article 115)

An important aspect of the Supreme Council’s structure is the fact that, although each memberemirate has a single vote, the votes are not themselves of equal significance. On substantiveissues, such as those related to general policy, ratification of agreements, treaties and draftlaws, appointment of the Prime Minister, declaration of war, or the imposition of martial law,a majority decision may be taken, but the representatives on the Council of Abu Dhabi andDubai must be counted among the majority. The principle of a simple majority applies onlyto procedural matters.

The Supreme Council is, therefore, the supreme authority of the state holding the ultimatestrings of executive and legislative powers, whether exclusively or in nominal partnershipwith other federal organs. The fact that it is composed of the rulers of the emirates, or their

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delegated representatives, adds to its powers, since it was the rulers (or their predecessors)who agreed voluntarily to establish the state. The Council, therefore, reflects the independentstatus of each emirate, while each member derives his legitimacy from his status as a rulerrather than from being a Council member.

Constitutionally, the Supreme Council is a form of collective leadership. The special powersallocated to the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai give them additional weight in the Council,and hence in the federation as a whole, a recognition of the fact that they are the two largestemirates in terms of population, area and resources. This represents a force for a consensusamong Council members, since Abu Dhabi and Dubai can determine whether or not a decisionis taken on non-procedural matters.

The President

The President and Vice-President are elected by the Supreme Council for a term of five years,which may be renewed, under the terms of Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution. In the absenceof the President, the Vice-President assumes his responsibilities. The President is accorded awide range of legislative and executive powers under the terms of the Constitution, that canbe divided into three categories:

• Powers derived from his position as President, discharged by him alone.• Powers exercised either through the Supreme Council or through the Council of Ministers.• Powers exercised through the Council of Ministers.

As chief executive of the state, the President also enjoys other powers that include, interalia, the right to convene and preside over meetings of the Supreme Council. He may also,if the need arises, call a joint meeting of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministersin his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The stipulation in the Constitutionthat the President represents the Union externally and internally provides him with realauthority in the direction of foreign policy.

The President is also entrusted with signing laws, decrees and decisions sanctioned by theSupreme Council and with supervising implementation through the Council of Ministers,under the terms of Article 54, clause 4.8. Presidential powers include the ratification of treatiesand international agreements after approval by both the Supreme Council and the Council ofMinisters (Article 47, clause 4, 96, 115, 140, 146) and the declaration of defensive war andof martial law. The President also has the power to nominate the Prime Minister, accept hisresignation and terminate his appointment and to appoint the President and members of theFederal Supreme Court, although the latter two must be approved by the Supreme Council.

Under that category of power exercised through the Council of Ministers, the President isresponsible for supervising the execution of all federal laws, decrees and decisions, throughthe Council of Ministers as a whole, and through its members (Article 60). He also appointsall senior officials, both military and civilian, after such appointments are approved by theCouncil of Ministers.

The President has additional significant powers exercised together with the Supreme Counciland the Council of Ministers. He may overrule the rejection by the Federal National Councilof draft legislation, or may delete any amendments introduced into such legislation, and maythen promulgate it after its ratification by the Supreme Council (Article 110, clause 3 A).

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Together with the Council of Ministers, the President also has the power, should the needarise between meetings of the Supreme Council:

to promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force of law.Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council within a week. If they areapproved, they shall have the force of law, and the Federal National Council shall be notifiedat its next meeting. (Article 113)

Legislative powers of the President also include the authority to promulgate decrees, togetherwith the Council of Ministers, provided that these shall not pertain to ratification of interna-tional agreements or treaties, or to declaration or lifting of martial law, or to declaration of adefensive war, or to appointment of the President and judges of the Supreme Court (Article 115).

The Council of Ministers

The Constitution describes the Council of Ministers as ‘The Executive authority of the Union,’and states that it is responsible, under the control of the President and the Supreme Council,‘for carrying out all the internal and external affairs entrusted to the Union’ (Article 60).

The Council of Ministers is, in particular, charged with the following functions:

• Following up the implementation of the general policy of the Union, both internally andexternally.

• Initiating draft federal laws, and submitting them to the Federal National Council prior tosubmission to the President and the Supreme Council for ratification and promulgation.

• Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of federal legislation.• Supervising implementation of Union laws, decrees, decisions and regulations by all

concerned authorities whether in the Union as a whole, or in the individual emirates (Article60, clauses 1, 2, 5, 6).

It is not, however, entrusted with the task of formulating the general policy of the federation,but only with the responsibility of following up the implementation of policy laid down bythe Supreme Council.

Ministers are officially nominated by the Prime Minister. In practice, an unofficial quotadistributes the number of portfolios, and the portfolios themselves, among the individualemirates, rendering the Ministers partially dependent upon the ruler who nominates them.

The Federal National Council

The Federal National Council is essentially consultative, although it is a legislative organ interms of forms and procedures. It comprises 40 members, distributed according to a fixed pattern.Abu Dhabi and Dubai have eight seats each, Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah have six seats each,and Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Qaiwain have four seats each (Article 68). Members from eachemirate are chosen by their ruler who is free under the terms of the Constitution to choose howto select them and to renew their term, which lasts for two years. Since the inception of the UAE,members have been nominated. However, Article 77 of the Constitution states that a memberof the FNC represents the people of the federation as a whole, and not those of his emirate.

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The FNC has no ability to propose legislation, this falling within the jurisdiction of theCouncil of Ministers (Articles 60 and 100). It may only produce recommendations andobservations on draft legislation referred to it by the Council of Ministers. The FNC may,however, discuss the draft legislation, and approve, amend or reject it before the Council ofMinisters presents it to the President and the Supreme Council. If amendments are suggestedby the Federal National Council, the draft legislation, as amended, may be referred back tothe FNC by the President. If the Federal National Council continues to uphold such amendments,contrary to the wishes of the Supreme Council, the President may promulgate the legislationafter it has been ratified by the Supreme Council (Article 92).

The Federal National Council is empowered to ‘discuss any general subject pertaining tothe affairs of the Union, unless the Council of Ministers informs the FNC that such discussionis contrary to the highest interests of the Union’ (Article 92). The Federal National Councilmay question Ministers or the Prime Minister on matters within their jurisdiction (Article 93).It may not, however, call for a vote of confidence either in the Council of Ministers as a whole,or in any of its members, since they, individually and collectively, are responsible to the Presidentand the Supreme Council (Article 64).

The Federal Judiciary

A further component of the federal system is the judiciary, of which the highest authority isthe Supreme Court, which is entrusted with the following functions:

• It may adjudicate in disputes between member emirates, or between one or more emiratesand the federal government, ‘whenever such disputes are submitted to the Court upon therequest of any of the interested parties’ (Article 99, clause 1).

• It has the power to examine the constitutionality of federal laws, if contested by any emirate,and also the constitutionality of any legislation promulgated by one of the emirates.

• It may interpret the provisions of the Constitution upon request from the federal or an emirategovernment.

The Court’s interpretations or judgements are final and are binding upon all parties(Article 99).

Relationship between the legislature and the executive

The Constitution clearly favours the executive rather than the legislature.The executive, in the persons of the President and other individual members of the

Supreme Council, appoint the members of the legislature, the Federal National Council,while the President has the power both to postpone its meetings and to dissolve it. Eitherthe President or the Council of Ministers may initiate legislation, and may veto anyamendments put forward by the FNC. Furthermore, under Article 110, clause 4, theConstitution gives the executive power to issue legislation when the FNC is not in session,provided the FNC is notified when next in session. When the Supreme Council is in recess,the Constitution gives the President and the Council of Ministers the authority jointly toissue federal decrees equivalent to federal law, whenever urgent need arises. Thus powerultimately resides with the executive and the legislature participates in decision makingonly in a consultative capacity.

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The Basic Features of the Federation

The formation of the UAE represented a voluntary cession of powers by the rulers of theindividual emirates to the new state. This decision was clearly spelt out in the provisionalConstitution, adopted as a permanent Constitution in 1996, which stated, inter alia, their ‘desireto establish an independent and sovereign federal state’. Article 1 of the Constitution depictedthe UAE as a ‘federal state’. Article 6 emphasized that ‘the people of the Federation are onepeople’ and they therefore enjoy, according to Article 8, ‘one nationality’. To underline thesupremacy of the new state over the emirates, the Constitution granted to the federation exclusivejurisdiction over foreign affairs and the declaration of war, as explained above.

The five federal bodies, the Supreme Council of Rulers, the office of the President, theCabinet, the Federal National Council and the Federal Judiciary, began operating beforemature local authorities had been created. They had, furthermore, the constitutional power,under Articles 60 and 125 of the Constitution, to implement policies, and to exercise jurisdictiondirectly, without any interference from a local authority.

Paragraph 1 of Article 60 allotted to the Cabinet ‘the duty of following up the implemen-tation of the general policy of the federation, both internally and externally’. Paragraph 6 ofthe same Article stipulates that the Council of Ministers may ‘supervise the implementationof the laws, decrees, regulations, and decisions through all relevant parties in the Federationof the Emirates’.

Article 125 commits the governments of each emirate to take all necessary measures ‘toensure the implementation of the laws promulgated by the federation and the internationaltreaties and agreements it concludes, and to issue the necessary local laws, regulations,decisions, and orders to put this into effect’. The same Article bestows on the federal bodies‘the power to supervise the implementation by the local Governments of the federal laws,decisions, international agreements and treaties, and the federal justice verdicts’. The adminis-trative and judicial authorities in the individual emirates are also called upon ‘to offer allpossible assistance to the Federal authority in this respect’.

While the Constitution emphasizes the individual entity of each member emirate, makingthe Supreme Council more of a body for the emirates and their rulers than for the people ofthe federation, at another level it clearly lays down in Article 151 its supremacy, and that ofany federal law, decree or decision over those promulgated by individual emirates. Article 99also gives additional weight to federal legislation, stipulating that the Supreme Court mayexamine ‘the constitutionality of legislations promulgated by one of the emirates, if they arechallenged by one of the Emirates on the grounds of violation of the Constitution of the Unionor the Union laws’. However, the Constitution imposes no restriction upon any emirate thatmay wish to withdraw from the federation.

Although the Constitution enumerates the legislative and executive powers of the federation,it also stipulates that all residual powers fall within the jurisdiction of the individual emirates,thus recognizing their status with relation to the federal institutions. The separation of powersbetween the federation and its constituent emirates is, thus, of considerable importance.While Article 2 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘the Union shall exercise sovereignty inmatters assigned to it, in accordance with this Constitution, over all territory and territorial

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waters laying within the international boundaries of the individual Emirates’, Article 3emphasizes that ‘the member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over their own territoriesand territorial waters in all matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the Union asassigned in this Constitution’.

The Manifestations of Unity in the Constitution

The Constitution charges federal authorities with virtually all the functions of a unitary state.The Federal Government has thereby been given exclusive legislative and executive jurisdictionin foreign affairs, along with a virtual monopoly over the conclusion of treaties and implemen-tation of international agreements.

Two restrictions with relation to foreign affairs were specified. The first, in Article 124,said that:

Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agreement which may affect the statesof any of the Emirates, the competent Union authorities shall consult this Emirate inadvance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be referred to the Supreme Court fora ruling.

The second, in Article 123, stipulates that individual emirates:

may conclude limited agreements of a local and administrative nature with the neighbouringstates or regions, save that such agreements must not be inconsistent with the interestsof the Union, or with Union Laws, and provided that the Supreme Council of the Unionis informed in advance. If the Council objects to the conclusion of such agreements, itshall be obligatory to suspend the matter until the Union Court has ruled on that objectionas early as possible.

Such exceptions do not in themselves bestow an autonomous identity upon the emirates atan international level, since the prerogatives specified are also restricted in several ways,while they are within the rules of the Constitution, and are not absolute rights as with whollysovereign states.

Internally, the federation, according to the Constitution, was also to have exclusive legislativeand executive powers over a wide range of functions. Article 120 lists 19 subjects for whichthe federal authorities have the sole responsibility, both in legislation and in implementationof laws, regulations and orders pertaining to these matters. Some are directly linked to thenature of the federation, while others represent a surrendering of authority by individual emirates.

The first category includes matters related to the federal armed forces and to defence andsecurity of the federation against all threats, internal or external. The list also includes thefollowing: order in the federal capital; federal employees and the judiciary; federal finances,taxes, royalties and general loans; construction and maintenance of roads deemed to bemajor highways; federal property; the national census, nationality and immigration; andfederal information.

The second category of powers assigned to the federation includes matters that touch upon,and are related to, the sovereignty of each emirate, but which have been transferred by the

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rulers to the federal authorities. Two types of powers are incorporated in this category. Thefirst gives federal authorities exclusive legislative jurisdiction over communications, socialservices and economic matters. The second type allows the sharing of authority between federaland local authorities, whereby the first legislates, and the second uses, the powers under suchlegislation to issue the necessary regulations to ensure implementation. The areas covered areenumerated in Article 121 of the Constitution, and include labour relations and social security;estates ownership and expropriation for public interests; extradition of criminals; banks;insurance; the protection of animal and agricultural resources; major legislation; courts;protection of copyrights; publications; importation of weapons and ammunition unless for theuse of the armed and security forces of any emirate; other aviation matters not within the domainof the Union’s executive prerogatives; defining territorial waters and regulating navigation.

The third major formal aspect of unity is the existence of a federal executive authority,whose jurisdiction covers all emirates. This authority implements general policy of thefederation, executes federal laws and administers public utilities and services.

Even where individual emirates are assigned power to implement certain matters (Article121), the Council of Ministers is given authority to supervise implementation of federal laws,whether undertaken by federal or by local authorities.

The Constitution also incorporates other matters within the jurisdiction of the federation.These include the declaration of martial law (Article 146), the elimination of taxes and internaltariffs (Article 11), allocations from the federal budget to finance and implement projects inindividual emirates (Article 132), the formation of unified armed forces, and the right to formfederal security forces (Article 138).

The existence of a federal judicial authority, including the Federal Supreme Court, is afurther feature of the unifying powers incorporated in the Constitution. Article 125 obligesindividual member emirates to implement the rulings of the federal courts.

The Jurisdiction of the Individual Emirates

The Constitution states that ‘all matters not specifically stipulated as falling within federaljurisdiction are to be considered within the domain of the member Emirates’ (Article 116).Thus while the rulers of the emirates decided voluntarily to form a federation, and to surrenderto it some of their sovereign prerogatives, they retained, at the same time, aspects of sovereigntyon an emirate level. In effect, they kept authority sufficient to ensure that a ruler continues tobe the absolute authority within his emirate, and that the emirate itself maintains the essentialingredients of government. The Constitution states in Article 3 that ‘member Emirates shallexercise sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters in all matters that are notwithin the jurisdiction of the Union’. Residual sovereignty is further identified in Article 10,which states that the federation would seek to safeguard its own independence, sovereignty,security and stability, while taking into account the fact that each emirate should respect thesovereignty of the others in their own internal affairs, within the framework of the Constitution.

In foreign affairs, sovereignty of the individual emirates is more strictly limited. They may,according to Article 123, make ‘limited agreements of a purely local administrative nature’with neighbouring states, within the confines of the interests and laws of the federation,

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provided that the Supreme Council is given prior notice. The second clause of the article,however, gives each emirate the right ‘to retain their membership in the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, and the Organization of Arab Petroleum ExportingCountries, OAPEC, or to join them,’ whereby such emirates would have (albeit limited)independent international personae. No emirates have, in fact, chosen to exercise this option.The same article also recognized ‘treaties or agreements concluded by member emirates withstates or international organizations’ without specifying any such agreements or their nature.At the same time, Article 124 required federal authorities to consult in advance with anyindividual emirate ‘prior to the conclusion of any international agreement or treaty that mightaffect the status of such Emirate’. The article thus underlines the right of the member emiratesat least to be consulted.

Internally, the individual emirates have retained more authority. They, and their rulers, are theultimate sources of authority, while federal bodies enjoy specific powers granted by these sources.

At the time that the rulers of the emirates created the federation, in July 1971, they did notenjoy full political independence, then still being in treaty relations with the United Kingdom.Thus the powers granted to the federal bodies did not, in effect, diminish the powers theywere accustomed to practise and they preserved the bulk of the functions they consideredessential to maintain their own authority. Furthermore, the voluntary surrender of powers, orof part of their powers, by the rulers did not preclude their ability, collectively or individually,at any time, to reverse their previous decision.

The traditional status of each ruler within his emirate gave him the power to block the localimplementation of any federal law or decision considered to be unacceptable, or incompatiblewith his own interests. Each emirate may legislate on affairs within its own borders, providedthat such legislation is not in contradiction with the Constitution. Each emirate also specif-ically has the power to undertake the execution of federal law dealing with local matters.

Article 104 of the Constitution gives each emirate the authority to establish or maintain itsown judicial organs, to deal with matters outside the jurisdiction of the federal judicialauthorities. In addition, the Constitution also spells out other rights for member emirates thatunderline their retention of powers, the most important of which are related to the ownershipof natural resources and the right to establish special armed forces. Article 23 states ‘the naturalresources and wealth in each emirate shall be considered to be the public property of theemirate,’ and not the federation. Article 142 adds that the member emirates also ‘shall havethe right to set up local armed forces ready and equipped to join the defence machinery of theUnion, to defend the Union against any armed aggression if the need arises’.

Other indications of the independence of the member emirates can be found in Articles 5and 118 of the Constitution. Article 5 gives them the right to retain their own flags. Article118 stipulates that:

Two or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council,agglomerate in a political or administrative unit, or unify all or part of their public servicesor establish a single or joint administration to run any such service.

The Constitution lacks clarity on the funds to be made available for financing of the federalbudget. Article 127 says that member emirates ‘shall contribute a specified proportion of theirannual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of the Union’. The Constitution

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does not, however, settle jurisdiction over the collection of, or contribution of, such funds,leaving the financing of the federal budget to be decided on the basis of agreement betweenall or a number of member emirates. Thus the ability of federal authorities to perform thetasks allocated to them is affected by the budget contributions of individual emirates.

In summary, the power structure in the UAE favours the member emirates rather than thefederal authorities, for the following reasons. Firstly, the Constitution, while enumerating thematters within the jurisdiction of the federation itself, left those of the member emirates undefined,covering all matters not specifically assigned to the federal authorities. The emirates are thesource of authority, and the federation merely a means for the devolution of part of the authority.

Secondly, the legislative jurisdiction of federal authorities is restricted, in matters that arenot federal by nature, to a limited number of subjects, such as communications, education,health, currency and electricity supply. Moreover, the legislative prerogatives bestowed onthe federal authorities in accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution are not, in themselves,exclusive. Article 149 gives the member emirates a share of such authority:

As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this Constitution, the Emirate maypromulgate legislation necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the said Article,without violation of Article 151 of this Constitution.

Article 149, therefore, conflicts with Article 121, since it permits individual emirates topromulgate legislation even on matters specifically allocated to the federation. The reservationthus spelt out at the end of Article 149 can, however, operate as a balancing factor if the federalauthorities decide to challenge any moves by individual emirates that they consider contraryto the provisions of federal laws and decisions. There is a clear duplication of authority in someareas of powers allocated to the federation and to the emirates. In the words of one jurist:

Article 120 gives the Federation the exclusive legislative and executive authority onforeign affairs, while Article 121 gives it sole legislative jurisdiction, without executivepowers, on the definition of territorial waters and on navigation on the high seas.

Furthermore, within the federation all legislative powers reside ultimately in the SupremeCouncil and, hence, the rulers. No federal legislation can be promulgated without approvalby at least five of the seven rulers, including those of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. As a result, thelocal authorities of the emirates, and considerations related to them, are predominant in thesphere of legislation.

Thirdly, executive authority also resides ultimately in the Supreme Council. In addition, theexecutive powers of federal institutions are restricted to particular and specified matters. Thelocal authorities are entrusted not only with the execution of their own laws and regulations,but also with that of laws and regulations where jurisdiction is shared with the federal authorities,although the latter retain the formal right of supervision. The manner in which the Constitutionrefers to financing of the federal budget adds to the limitations on the extent of federal executiveauthority. No such limitations in financial affairs are placed upon individual emirates.

Fourthly, the judicial system laid down in the Constitution neither changes nor limits thestatus of local emirate judicial authorities. It simply adds a new level of courts, headed by theSupreme Court, which has specific functions. It also permits each emirate, if it so chooses,to merge its own system with the federal system.

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Conclusion

Looking back over nearly three decades, the federation is an established fact of life. It is evidentthat the country’s political elite has taken its time to ponder on the various approaches not onlyto form the federation but also on the way it should evolve. The ratification in May 1996 ofthe provisional Constitution, amended to include the designation of the city of Abu Dhabi asfederal capital as permanent, reflected an acceptance that it had proved its worth. At the sametime, it was accepted that further amendments could be made as and when the need for thembecame apparent, without questioning the fundamental basis of the federation itself. In late2000, however, there was little evidence of a desire for significant structural change.

If we look back over the years since the UAE was formally created in 1971, it is clear thatcertain steps have been taken to increase the jurisdiction of some of the federal agencies, inparticular in the judicial system and departments involved with immigration and security.At the same time, as member emirates have developed their administrative infrastructureand as the educational system has produced a more numerous and more qualified labourforce, so new local departments have been established, dealing with matters such as informationand tourism. It should be noted that this development is fully in conformity with theConstitution and represents the natural evolution of the administrative structure of the countryas a result of development.

The traditional pursuit of consensus, as reflected within the new political institutions, hasmeant that the dynamic of the political process has been able to respond to demands for changewithin the framework of a broadly accepted political legitimacy.

Bibliography

Ali Hamaidain, Lavenir Politique des Principantes Petrolieres du Golfe Persique, these, Paris (1967).Al Rayyes, R.N. The Conflict of Oasis and Oil: The Problems of Arabian Gulf, 1968-1971, (Arabic), Beirut, Al-

Nahar Press Services (1973).Al-Azmineh Al Arabiyyah.Anthony, J.K. Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum, Washington D.C., Middle East Institute

(1975).Fenelon, K.G. The United Arab Emirates; An Economic and Social Survey, London, Longman ( 1973).Hawley, D. The Trucial States, London, George Allen & Unwin (1971).Heard-Bey, F. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates : A Society in Transition, London, Longman (1984).

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Formation and Evolution of The Federationand its Institutions

Malcolm Peck*

Introduction

The Trucial States, which in 1971 became the Federation of the United Arab Emirates, did notstruggle for independence nor even seek it; it was thrust upon them. When the British governmentmade the decision to withdraw protection from these states it was done without warning,compelled by the then ruling Labour Party’s 1968 decision to relinquish the United Kingdom’ssecurity responsibilities east of Suez. Thus the rulers of these states, who had grown comfortablein their reliance on British political, diplomatic, and military power in an uncertain and dangerouspart of the world, were faced for the first time with the prospect of determining and securingtheir own destinies. Because this eventuality had not been seriously contemplated and becausethe British government had taken only a slight interest in the affairs of these states, apart fromtheir strategic importance along the imperial route of communications to India, and then onlyrecently, there had been little preparation for independence and its challenges.

The Confused Prologue to Federation

Despite a widespread perception that the United Arab Emirates and the other small Gulf Arabstates are artificial creations of the British, the UAE in fact reflects in its political form anddynamics a deliberate lack of British involvement in the Trucial States’ internal affairs untila late date, leaving tribal loyalties and structures largely unaffected. The effect of British interventionthrough the series of treaties implemented between 1820 and 1892 was to freeze the principalpower relationships of tribal groupings. Thus, the Al Qawasim and the Bani Yas tribal confed-erations which controlled what are now the northern emirates and the emirate of Abu Dhabi,respectively, were confirmed as the dominant elements within the Trucial States. The BaniYas eventually gained the upper hand in their rivalry with the Al Qawasim, largely becausethe latter’s naval power had been eclipsed by the British and because the Bani Yas were abroad, land-based confederation. The initial British military intervention in the southern Gulfhad the effect of altering the power relationship between the two rival groupings. Moreimportantly, by dealing with the Trucial States as a unit, the British gave some sense of natural

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coherence to the grouping of the several sheikhdoms signatory to the 1820 treaty and laterengagements. For a considerable period of time they were obliged to cooperate in variouscommon, if limited, treaty obligations.

Nevertheless, it is fair to describe the fundamental British attitude towards the Trucial Statesas one of ‘benign neglect,’ at least until very late in the long period of British protection.1

Only concern for control over oil exploration concessions, the development of imperial airroutes, the exigencies of the Second World War, and the threats posed by the Soviet Unionand Arab radicalism led to a significant upgrading of Britain’s own political representationin the Trucial States and to some significant involvement in their social, economic, andpolitical development. One manifestation of this was the creation of the Trucial States Councilin 1952 which brought together the rulers of the seven sheikhdoms for periodic meetings(usually twice a year) to discuss issues of common interest.2 This was done initially with theBritish Political Agent, the senior representative of the British government in the Trucial States,presiding. Later the chairmanship passed from one ruler to another on a rotating basis. Theprincipal benefit conferred by the Council was to provide a systematic means of regularcommunication amongst the rulers for the first time. The Council and the Trucial StatesDevelopment Office (which later carried out modest development projects) provided, duringtheir brief existence, the basis for core institutions of the future independent union. Nevertheless,when the Labour government reached its January 1968 decision to withdraw British protectionfrom the Trucial States, for domestic economic reasons having nothing to do with thesheikhdoms themselves, there had been little tutelary preparation for the new phase.

The time period allotted to the rulers of the Trucial States to prepare for the withdrawal ofprotection and federation was brief, and was imposed with no warning. Moreover, a lengthylist of other negative factors seemed to militate against the success of whatever state or statesmight emerge when British withdrawal was effected. Aconsideration of these factors and howthey were overcome is instructive in seeking an understanding both of how the UAE was bornand why it has endured.3 It is true that in 1971 the UAE adapted major governmental institutionsfrom the Trucial States Council (the model for the Supreme Council of Rulers), the TrucialStates Development Council (from which the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Developmentevolved), and the Trucial Oman Scouts (core of the federal armed forces). Moreover, one ofthe seven sheikhdoms, Dubai, had experienced a ‘reform movement’ as early as 1938, whenmembers of the merchant oligarchy and a branch of the Al Maktoum opposed to the ruler,forced on him administrative reforms, some of which endured.4 Nevertheless, virtually thewhole governing structure of the new federal state had to be devised and constructed in ashort time with few relevant precedents and traditions to draw upon.

Another essential item of independent statehood was largely lacking: settled borders. Thevery concept of exact territorial borders was alien to a tribal society where a sheikh’s dominionover people and control over various resources such as water and pasturage, as well as theextent of a tribe’s dar or range, which waxed and waned according to circ*mstances, werewhat mattered. It was not until petroleum exploration concessions were signed that the needfor precise territorial definitions of authority was seriously felt. The British made some effortsto promote agreements on boundary lines, notably those of the redoubtable diplomat JulianWalker whose careful research on relevant factors in the Trucial States helped obtain agreementto a significant amount of boundary-drawing. Nevertheless, when the decision to withdraw

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from the Gulf was made, all the Gulf Arab states had extensive borders in dispute. This wastrue of Bahrain and Qatar, which have engaged in territorial disputes since the latter threwoff Al Khalifa rule in the nineteenth century, and of the Trucial States, where boundarydefinition was only partial and deep-seated rivalries absorbed the individual sheikhdoms. Theseincluded, most significantly, the border dispute between Abu Dhabi and Dubai which haderupted into warfare in 1948, and the several border disputes of Sharjah and its neighbours.The Abu Dhabi – Dubai rivalry was of particular importance, because those two states woulddominate any federation among the Trucial States by virtue of their size and wealth. The successof that federation would presuppose their ability to work together.

Afurther, critical uncertainty was the fundamental question of which states would come togetheras a federation. This was generally posed as a matter of whether it would be the seven TrucialStates plus Bahrain and Qatar, or the former grouping alone. The uncertainty, however, extendedto the question of whether all of the seven would unite. This unsettled issue of who would bein or out continued to vex the process of reaching independence and federation until the Britishwithdrawal; in the case of one emirate, Ra’s al-Khaimah, it carried even beyond that point.

Yet another deeply troubling issue which these states faced on the eve of their independencewas the claims of powerful neighbours to some or all of their territory. Announcement of theBritish intention to withdraw from the Gulf brought renewed claims from the Shah’s governmentof Iran to the island of Bahrain. Iran also claimed the lower Gulf islands of Abu Musa andthe Tunbs, which belonged to two of the Trucial States, Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, respec-tively. The other major claimant was Saudi Arabia which had long asserted claims to a largepart of Abu Dhabi’s territory and saw in British withdrawal an opportunity to redress what itconsidered an injustice perpetrated and sustained by the British.

Iran and Saudi Arabia presented conventional threats of territorial claims. The new state ofSouth Yemen had emerged in 1967, when its leaders overthrew the Federation of South Arabiawhich the British had created on the eve of their withdrawal from Aden Colony and its hinterland.This state represented a new and different kind of threat when, in 1969, it came under radicalMarxist leadership. South Yemen was a radical revolutionary state whose goal was the overthrowof all the traditional regimes in the region. During the time established for British withdrawalfrom the Gulf, South Yemen had begun actively to assist a radical leftist organization alreadyin active rebellion against the Sultan’s government in Oman. Its name, Popular Front for theLiberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (in other permutations the organization was known asPopular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and Popular Front for the Liberationof Oman), suggested clearly its intent. While the circ*mstances of pre-independence Aden andthe Gulf sheikhdoms were very different in many respects, there was widespread fear thatsomething like what had occurred in South Arabia could occur in the Gulf.

Finally, the rapid evolution towards federation was complicated, if not jeopardized, by Britishvacillation after the decision to withdraw from the Gulf had been taken and announced. Indeed,there was considerable uncertainty in the Labour government of Harold Wilson even beforethe decision was taken. By May 1967 the government was seriously considering withdrawalfrom the Gulf; in the autumn of 1967 the devaluation of the British pound seem to confirmthat policy; then in November 1967, two months before Wilson announced withdrawal, theForeign Office issued an assurance that the British military presence would be maintained inthe Gulf region. Following the 16 January 1968 statement, withdrawal remained the policy

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until it was thrown in doubt by the election victory in June 1970 of the Conservatives. Thegovernment of Edward Heath temporized until 1 March 1971, nine months short of the dateprojected for withdrawal, before finally affirming that policy.5

The factors, then, that militated against the emergence of a successful federation of sevenor nine Gulf Arab states were considerable. Informed observers were doubtful of the chancesof any such grouping.6 Interestingly and perhaps decisively, several of these seemingly negativefactors had the paradoxical effect of working to the advantage of the future federation.

Britain’s unexpected decision to withdraw from the Gulf was a rude shock to rulers whohad contemplated development of their oil wealth under the continuing aegis of British-assured security. At the same time, it had the effect of concentrating their attention on thecreation of a federation more forcefully than if they had enjoyed a more leisurely approachto those issues. The anomaly of British-protected states in the Middle East would almostcertainly have come to an end soon, particularly after the termination of Kuwait’s similarprotected status in 1961 and the recent withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia. Moreover,further insulation from the challenges of an unprotected existence would arguably have madethe eventual transition more complicated and difficult.

In the minds of many observers, a federation of nine was preferable to one of seven, sinceall the states involved were mini-states with tiny populations and few significant natural resourcesother than oil and gas. Indeed, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia urged this fully inclusive approachto federation. That it failed, however, was almost certainly an advantage for the Trucial States.The lower Gulf states had reason to fear that Bahrain would try to dominate such a federation,drawing on its much more advanced state administration, greater political sophistication, anda population then larger than that of the other states of the lower Gulf. Further, such a federationwould have been riven by the long-standing enmity of Bahrain and Qatar, especially as thosetwo states were closely aligned with Abu Dhabi and Dubai, respectively. The natural ties andhabits of community were generally stronger amongst and between the seven Trucial Statesthan in the larger grouping, reinforcing the case for the smaller federation on the basis ofgeographic contiguity. (Bahrain as an island is physically separated from all its neighbours,though attached now to Saudi Arabia by a causeway. Abu Dhabi’s territory at the time adjoinedthat of Qatar but their population centres were separated by several hundred miles of roadlessdesert and Saudi Arabia had already strongly indicated its determination to alter its borderswith Abu Dhabi to include establishing a Saudi corridor to the Gulf south and east of theQatari peninsula, an arrangement which was in fact negotiated in 1974.)

At the same time, the meetings of rulers and other representatives from Bahrain and Qatar aswell as from the Trucial States between 1968 and 1970 to discuss the possibility of federationwere useful in fully exploring the issues that had to be faced. These meetings were, in effect, akind of intense, practical seminar whose utility was enhanced by the inclusion of the additionalinterlocutors. Moreover, as one astute scholar has observed, the UAE reaped a very specific andenduring benefit from this exercise. In adopting, with suitable modifications, the constitutionwhich had been drawn up for the projected federation of nine, it gained for its own use a documentwhich had been carefully crafted to accommodate the concerns and interests of all the states inthe anticipated wider grouping. Thus the Constitution of the UAE was from the outset an effectivesource of flexibility and creative ambiguity in coping with the challenges of a federal union.7

The collapse of the Federation of South Arabia and the subsequent emergence of a radical

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leftist government in Aden, whose goal of overthrowing the Arabian Peninsula’s traditionalregimes seemed within reach as the rebellion which it was assisting gained ground in Oman,appeared to be a negative and distinctly threatening development affecting the birth of theUAE. In fact it served a highly useful purpose by offering a clear signal to the leaders of thenew state that economic and social issues had to be seriously addressed to avoid the possibilityof discontent and political radicalization in their own populations.

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the driving force behind creation of the UAE, hadbecome ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1966. From the start Zayed was motivated by the convictionthat it would be politically fatal not to use to its fullest advantage the extraordinary new sourceof wealth to promote the development of both Abu Dhabi and the poorer Trucial States. Theescalating rebellion in neighbouring Oman, in large part a consequence of the ruler SultanSaid’s parsimony and the leftward lurch of Marxist South Yemen, confirmed his belief thatan improved life for the people of the area was important in securing their continuing supportfor traditional, conservative, hereditary government. In the years just after he had becomeruler of Abu Dhabi, Zayed provided the great bulk of the funds dispensed by the Trucial StatesDevelopment Fund; after the establishment of the UAE and with the growth of oil revenueshe continued to do so on an increased scale.

Thus, early on, Zayed established with the whole Trucial States population the kind of compactthat the other Arabian Peninsula oil producers had reached with theirs, whereby rapid economicdevelopment and widespread sharing of the wealth would be exchanged for continuedacceptance of hereditary, patriarchal rule without political challenge. In the months just beforethe UAE became independent, he created the ‘Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab EconomicDevelopment’, later called ‘Abu Dhabi Fund for Development’ to provide aid to other Araband, eventually, non-Arab countries. This helped to dampen some regional threats as whenthe UAE and Kuwait used foreign aid to encourage South Yemen to end its aggression againstOman and enter into negotiations which eventually led, in September 1982, to a bordersettlement and the establishment of diplomatic relations between those two states.

Movement towards creation of a federation among the Trucial States was also acceleratedand reinforced by a pattern of various deficiencies among the seven which convinced themthat none could go it alone. Ajman, Fujairah, Ra’s al-Khaimah and Umm al-Qaiwain all hadtiny populations and lacked both significant hinterlands and wealth. Sharjah had prospects ofmoderate wealth but otherwise shared the deficiencies of the above. All these had dividedterritories, except for Umm al-Qaiwain, forming a confused patchwork of enclaves andexclaves, while all but Sharjah lacked the modern bureaucratic structures that would berequired to manage successfully a modernizing state, unitary or federated. Dubai had consid-erable wealth, both from its long mercantile career and incipient oil production, and possesseda lean but efficient state administration. It too, however, lacked territorial depth, while AbuDhabi possessed over 80 per cent of the territory and the lion’s share of the hydrocarbonwealth, but had only recently begun to develop the administrative structure which a wealthy,independent state would require. Although Ra’s al-Khaimah briefly delayed joining the UAE,it never seriously contemplated existence outside the federation. In a dangerous neighbourhoodall the Trucial States realized that if they did not remain together the chances were very highof their being toppled separately. Thus, whatever real differences and rivalries existed, theseven sheikhdoms were drawn together by the strong sense of a shared fate.

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A further very great advantage was that the rulers of the seven states could conduct all theirdiscussions and negotiations between 1968 and 1971 in comparative privacy and were ableto take action on fundamental issues with virtually no reference to the great majority of theirsubjects. The process was elite-driven, quintessentially top-down. So long as the rulersmaintained the support of their extended families, clans and tribes, they could act freely. Thus,it was possible for key decisions to be taken and implemented quickly without fear of domesticchallenge. Had the rulers not been able to move towards federation in this way, it is hard toimagine that the process could have been completed successfully in the brief time allotted tothem. This was particularly so as that interval (not quite four years) was further diminishedby the lengthy false start towards a federation of nine and by the confusion resulting from theBritish Conservative government’s vacillation on the question of withdrawal.

Formation of the United Arab Emirates

What was undoubtedly of greatest importance in ensuring the UAE’s birth and survival wasSheikh Zayed’s commitment of his state’s resources and his own leadership to the success ofthe enterprise. Like the Prussian-led German empire, which Otto von Bismarck had created 100years earlier, the UAE was built around a preponderant state whose leader had a forceful personalityand considerable leadership skills. Despite Abu Dhabi’s wealth and size, however, only intelligentand energetic exploitation of those assets could assure the birth and survival of the UAE.

It was Sheikh Zayed who began the process of moving towards a federation which wouldensure the Trucial States’ survival and security and when, at a late hour, the prospects forfederation were in serious jeopardy it was he who rescued them. Following Harold Wilson’s16 January 1968 announcement of British withdrawal from east of Suez, including the Gulf,Zayed went almost immediately to Dubai to discuss with that state’s ruler, Sheikh Rashid binSaid Al Maktoum, an appropriate reaction. On 18 February 1968 they concluded and announcedagreement on a federation between them, urged the other five Trucial States to join, and invitedBahrain and Qatar to discuss the future of the region with them. When, three and a half yearslater, no federation had emerged with British withdrawal close at hand, Zayed again seizedthe nettle and engaged Rashid and the other Trucial States rulers in the decisive discussionswhich determined the essential nature of the UAE.

The last phase of the period leading up to the creation of the UAE began on 1 March 1971when, following British envoy Sir William Luce’s third mission to the Gulf to help determinethe British course of action, the Conservative government finally determined on the withdrawalof military forces from the Gulf by the end of December 1971. As Bahrain and Qatarsubsequently moved towards independence on their own, Zayed felt the need to act with dispatch.On 1 July 1971 he established Abu Dhabi’s first cabinet as well as a consultative council toprovide, with the help of advisers and civil servants from other Arab countries, an institu-tional structure for that state should it be compelled to stand by itself after British withdrawal.Zayed took this action because he feared that the go-it-alone course of Qatar, to which Dubaiwas closely aligned, might lead the latter to reconsider becoming part of a federation.8 At thesame time he hoped that by dramatically taking the initiative he could induce Dubai and theother Trucial States to unite with Abu Dhabi. Thus, at his urging, the seven rulers met in Dubai

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on 10 July in their capacity as members of the Trucial States Council to consider the issue offederation and, on 18 July, formation of the UAE was announced. To achieve a workableunion, Zayed first had to come to terms with his powerful Trucial States rival, Sheikh Rashid.

Despite the dominant role of Zayed and Abu Dhabi, the parentage of the new federation wasdecidedly mixed, with the interaction of two contrasting personalities who represented verydifferent constituencies and interests shaping the birth and development of the UAE. The rivalrywas deep-seated, dating to the 1833 defection of the Al Bu Falasah subsection of the Bani Yasin Abu Dhabi to establish a separate sheikhdom in Dubai. The latter became a cosmopolitan,outward-looking mercantile city-state, while Abu Dhabi remained a traditional tribal federation.The personalities of the two rulers perfectly reflected the character of their sheikdoms. Zayedwas a forceful tribal leader who embodied the bedouin qualities of courage and magnanimity.He was strongly committed to a truly integrated union of the seven Trucial States and preparedto use his own state’s resources generously to secure that end. Rashid was a merchant princewhose pragmatic vision embraced almost exclusively his own state and its prosperity. He wasdisdainful of less sophisticated neighbours and chary of committing his own state’s resourcesto a larger enterprise. But his careful calculations persuaded him of the practical necessity ofcreating a political federation with the other sheikhdoms when British protection was withdrawn.

In their negotiations, Rashid’s shrewd bargaining skills and Zayed’s readiness to bemagnanimous to ensure the success of the new union led the latter to make numerousconcessions to the former, almost to the point of bestowing political parity on Dubai. Despitetheir pronounced disparity in size, wealth, and military power, Zayed agreed that Dubai wouldshare with Abu Dhabi the right of veto in the federation’s most important governing body,the Supreme Council; and that any substantive issue decided by the Federal Government musthave the support of Dubai as well as Abu Dhabi. Rashid insisted on an equal number of votesin the Federal National Council, the UAE’s federal advisory body, and secured senior positionsfor three of his sons in the Federal Government. He himself served as Vice-President. Withthese far-reaching concessions Zayed secured Rashid’s commitment to support the federation,though not his support for Zayed’s concept of a closely integrated union. For the rest of hislife Rashid consistently supported the Federal Government’s essential authority. He wouldnot, however, yield more autonomy than was absolutely necessary and the contention withZayed over the nature of the union continued long after 1971.

The Constitution and the Institutions of the Federal Government

The Constitution adopted on 18 July 1971 for the UAE was, as earlier observed, an adaptationof the document drafted for the projected union of nine. Its hallmark was its provisionalambiguity, designed to gain the approval of states and rulers with differing views of the federationinto which they were entering. (The Constitution was made permament only in 1996.) This,in part, explains its length (151 articles) and the seeming contradiction between some of itsstated principles and goals.

The language of the Constitution’s preamble suggests that it is meant to be seen as a documentcharting an evolutionary course towards a new kind of government. Thus, it commits the unionto progress ‘towards a complete representative democratic rule’ but precedes that with the

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observation that federal rule must be established ‘in harmony with the Amirates’ existingconditions and potential,’ clearly indicating that traditional social and cultural norms wouldshape the new state’s evolution. Another interesting juxtaposition of modern, secular valueswith traditional values occurs in the articles dealing with religion. Like the constitutions of mostother Arab countries, Islam is recognized as the official religion of the union (Article 7). At thesame time, the ‘freedom to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed . . . provided it doesnot disturb public peace or violate public morals’(Article 32), and discrimination between citizensor inequality before the law on the basis of religion is explicitly rejected (Article 25).

The Constitution combines both blueprints for Western, representative institutions andformulas for preserving political power as exercised by traditional, patriarchal, elites. Thus,the pattern of governmental authority that was established betrays a marked contrast of bothprovenance and stated goals. The Federal Supreme Council – sometimes referred to as theSupreme Council of the Union – represents the union’s highest political authority and hasboth executive and legislative powers. It sets the general policy of the UAE, elects the presidentand vice-president, ratifies federal laws and international treaties, and prepares the federalbudget. Each ruler has a single vote and procedural matters are determined by a simplemajority vote, but substantive issues require the concurrence of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai,reflecting the formula worked out between Zayed and Rashid, thus giving veto power to each.This explicit apportionment of political power represents a departure from traditional normswhich emphasize decision-making by consensus (ijma’).9 At the same time, membership inthe Supreme Council is established on the wholly traditional basis of leadership of the tribesor tribal federations that dominate each emirate, thus giving institutional form to paternalistic,authoritarian rule. The substantial role of the president also reflects something of the society’spatriarchal norms. He convenes and presides over the Supreme Council’s meetings, representsthe UAE in its foreign relations, oversees the implementation of federal laws and decrees,can commute judicially imposed sentences, and must approve the execution of any deathpenalty. With the Supreme Council’s approval, he appoints the prime minister and, in consul-tation with the latter, appoints federal ministers. With the concurrence of the federal cabinet,or Council of Ministers, he appoints senior government officials.

The Council of Ministers also combines executive and legislative functions, but may beregarded as the real seat of legislative authority. Most laws are initiated in the council and itestablishes regulations necessary for the implementation of federal laws. It also prepares thefederal budget and supervises implementation of federal laws and decrees, Supreme Courtdecisions, and international treaties. Currently the Council of Ministers comprises 21 members,of whom ten are from ruling families. The balance are chosen as much for their positions inthe emirates’ elites, typically from merchant families close to the rulers, as for their technicaland professional abilities. Thus, in the Council of Ministers, the most important governmentinstitution in which the politics of balance and inclusion are played out, that process is effectivelylimited to the members of ruling families, close commoner allies, and a handful of technocrats.

The Federal National Council (FNC) in its formal structure appears to approximate mostclosely a federal legislature. In spite of the fact that the Constitution devotes no fewer than 26articles to describing the structure, functions, and prerogatives of the council, its powers areonly advisory and it has, therefore, little capacity to affect the political process. Although theConstitution grants the council the power to approve, amend, or reject draft laws (Article 89),

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it makes clear that the Supreme Council can ratify and the president issue a law regardless ofthe FNC’s action (Article 110). The FNC has 40 members with its seats allotted according toa weighted formula which gives Abu Dhabi and Dubai eight each, Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah six apiece, and the remaining emirates of Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Qaiwainfour each. It meets for annual sessions of not less than six months and members serve two-year terms, indefinitely renewable. The FNC was viewed at its creation as a means forpromoting a stronger sense of community at the federal level and, presumably to that end,leaves open the possibility of popular election of its members. In practice, however, becauseeach ruler has continued to select trusted supporters from the various emirate elites, the bodydoes not represent the people of the UAE in a meaningful way.10 Its deliberations can producethoughtful critiques of draft legislation and it can and does raise issues of broad public concernthrough the questioning of ministers. Yet, in its essential nature, the FNC resembles moreclosely a traditional consultative diwan or majlis than a modern representative body.

The Constitution establishes a federal judiciary whose highest authority is the SupremeCourt (sometimes referred to as the Higher Federal Court) and which also includes Courts ofFirst Instance. The Supreme Court, whose president and member judges are appointed by theUAE President with the approval of the Federal Supreme Council, can rule on the constitu-tionality of federal laws, interpret the provisions of the Constitution, deal with inter-emiratedisputes or contentions between individual emirates and the Federal Government, and servesas the nation’s final court of appeal. The Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction overadministrative, commercial and civil disputes between individuals and the Federal Government,as well as criminal and civil cases occurring in the federal capital (Article 102). The way inwhich the federal judiciary is defined, as in the cases of the other institutions of the FederalGovernment, reflects an attempt to embody both modern, Western norms of justice in theUAE and those of traditional Arab–Islamic society. On the one hand the Constitution definesall citizens as equal before the law, explicitly forbidding discrimination on the basis of religionand social status (Article 25) and it establishes that those accused of breaking the law are tobe considered innocent until proven guilty (Article 28). On the other hand all judicial mattersnot delegated to the federal courts are left to local judicial bodies in the individual emirates(Article 104). This means that local justice is dispensed under the close supervision of thelocal ruler in traditional fashion. Moreover, a recent decree has given authority in nearly allcriminal cases to shari’a courts (Muslim religious courts) rather than to civil courts.11 At thefederal level, however, the judiciary is the one branch of government which, as one scholarhas noted, really represents the ideal of an integrated state.12

The Federation Secured

After an accelerated gestation period and anxious birth, the UAE’s federal authority facedseveral potentially serious challenges in its infancy. In February 1972 the ruler of Sharjah,Sheikh Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, was assassinated by a cousin who had previouslybeen removed by the British as ruler. This affirmed the primacy of federal authority over thatof the Al Qasimi tribe which traditionally would have selected the new ruler. The FederalGovernment intervened to thwart the coup attempt and installed as the new ruler Sheikh Sultan

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bin Muhammad, who had been UAE Minister of Education. Later in the same year Sharjahand Fujairah clashed with loss of life over a small disputed parcel of territory. Once again theFederal Government successfully intervened to assert its authority and impose order.

These and other successful assertions of federal power, combined with the 1974 AbuDhabi–Saudi Arabia border agreement and the crushing of the rebellion in Oman’s DhofarProvince in 1975, had removed doubts about the UAE’s ability to survive within the first fewyears of its existence. Moreover, in keeping with Sheikh Zayed’s concern for making tangiblebenefits available to the federation’s populations, the UAE launched major programmes ofphysical and social infrastructure. In a very short time, modern highways joined all thepopulation centres of the country (at independence, Abu Dhabi town and Dubai, separated byover 100 km of desert, were linked by dhow or four-wheel drive vehicles) and rapid constructionof large scale housing projects and schools proceeded throughout the UAE. These were allvisible and compelling evidence, most dramatic in the poorer emirates, of the benefits conferredby the Federal Government and helped to consolidate its legitimacy and support early on.

There remained, however, the question of whether the union would take the form of acentralized state, with the seven emirates closely integrated under the Federal Government,or would pursue a gradualist approach towards greater federal power with each emirateretaining its essential autonomy. Sheikh Zayed, as we have seen, embodied the former conceptof the federal role and Sheikh Rashid the latter. While Rashid did not hesitate to support Zayedin the assertion of federal authority to thwart the 1972 coup attempt in Sharjah, he was, fromthe beginning, steadfast in opposing any significant enhancement of federal power orcorresponding diminution in the exercise of emiral autonomy. The starkly opposed visions ofthe two leading political figures of the UAE on a fundamental issue of the nation’s politicalstructure and dynamics precipitated a series of what may be described as constitutional crises.

In 1976 Rashid and some other rulers, in opposition to Zayed, refused to accept a strengtheningof the Federal Government and Zayed threatened not to serve another term as UAE President.He was induced to reconsider when general agreement was reached on unification of defenceand security forces while the matter of adopting a permanent constitution (called for in thedocument itself after five years) was simply deferred. This compromise accord also left openthe important issues of whether oil resources should be owned and immigration policy determinedby the Federal Government. Twenty-five years later, moreover, the defence and security forceshave not been fully integrated at the federal level. The 1976 crisis established a pattern wherebyevery five years the president would be continued in office and the Constitution would remainprovisional while basic questions concerning federal and local powers were essentially deferred.It was in early 1979, however, that the most serious such crisis arose when, in part because ofthe threats to regional stability perceived in the Iranian revolution and the imminent Israeli-Egyptian treaty, the Federal National Council and the Council of Ministers urged the SupremeCouncil to adopt plans to make the UAE stronger and more cohesive.

Through the spring of 1979, the matter continued to be debated, and it was only when asenior member of the ruling family of Kuwait intervened that it was resolved. Rashid agreedto become Prime Minister (as well as Vice-President), implying greater support for federalauthority but, again, with no meaningful movement towards the more integrated union thatZayed desired. The ongoing dispute between the unionists (wahdawis) and the federalists(ittihadis) will continue, rooted in the deliberately ambiguous compromises of the Consti-

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tution and not susceptible of obvious solution because of the veto power which Zayed feltcompelled to yield to Dubai to win that emirate’s adherence to the union. While the Consti-tution is flexible in its interpretation of federal and local powers, it is inflexible in terms ofthe process by which it can be amended.13 This difficulty did not disappear with the death ofRashid in 1990, as Dubai and the other emirates continued to see their interests as best servedby a looser federal structure than that favoured by Zayed and Abu Dhabi.

Although the positions of the rulers on the Supreme Council would seem to preclude thecreation of a stronger union through amendment of the Constitution, there has been somestrengthening of federal authority. Shortly after the creation of the UAE, greater consolidationof federal powers was achieved when Abu Dhabi merged its cabinet with that of the FederalGovernment and Sharjah and Fujairah combined key departments of their governments withthe corresponding federal departments. In the area of external security, the 1976 agreementgave at least formal expression to a federal UAE defence force, though real progress towardsthe goal has been slow. Further, there has been a diminution in the tendency of individualemirates to exploit their constitutional rights to pursue limited, independent foreign policies.No emirate has exercised its right to separate membership in the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) or, with the exception, briefly, of Dubai, the Organization ofArab Oil Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Abu Dhabi has extended its OPEC membershipto the whole federation. While Dubai and Sharjah caused embarrassment to the FederalGovernment by following independent courses of action towards Iran during the Iran–IraqWar, the experience of the Gulf War and the continuing intractability of the UAE dispute withIran over Abu Musa and the Tunbs seems to have helped to forge a more unified positiontowards the region and its dangers. Finally, in the twenty-fifth anniversary year of the UAE,both the capital and the Constitution lost their provisional nature. The Constitution’s call forthe creation of a new capital midway between Abu Dhabi City and Dubai yielded to practicalreality, with Abu Dhabi now recognized as the permanent capital, and the Constitution at lastratified as a permanent document. This provided appropriate symbolism at the country’squarter century mark in its suggestion of the federation’s permanence.

While the wahdawi-ittihadi debate remains unresolved, there is much to suggest that theUAE will endure as the one really successful example of political union in the Arab world.(The Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, merged with the Peoples’ Democratic Republicof Yemen, or South Yemen, in 1990, but was maintained only by the North’s military defeatof the South’s attempt to secede in 1994.) The extent of the UAE’s oil wealth is such that ahigh standard of living can be sustained for a long time, acting as an effective emollient forany political disaffection. Despite Iranian occupation of the lower Gulf islands claimed bythe UAE, the country now enjoys much greater regional security than it did during its firsttwo decades of existence. Inter-emirate border disputes have been largely resolved and rivalries,particularly that of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have acquired a friendly character and appear unlikelyto provoke really dangerous disputes.

Key to the federation’s survival and stability has been the continued strength and vitalityof tradition, combined with continuity in the institutions of government. The federal institutionscreated by the Constitution, despite their modern form, have operated in accordance with wellestablished norms of traditional exercise of political authority. Both legislative and executivepowers remain firmly in the hands of a hereditary elite whose legitimacy derives from effective

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family and tribal leadership, reinforced by the wealth at its disposal. Equally important, thesystem as it has evolved has preserved key traditional institutions themselves. Thus, by well-established custom, rulers and other members of ruling families hold majlises or councilswhere subjects are invited to present petitions or raise issues. This mechanism and the inspectiontours that bring Zayed and other UAE leaders close to their subjects provide means of personalcommunications between ruled and rulers which, despite the rapid growth and urbanizationof the population, remain effective.

Moreover, together with the gradual consolidation and strengthening of federal authoritynoted above, there has been a noteworthy development of local government. Abu Dhabi hasretained and extended its own central governing authority, established before independence,the Executive Council, under Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince. Underthis council, an Eastern and Western Region operate to make government more manageablein the largest and most populous of the emirates, together with a Consultative Council, parallelto the Federal National Council, and appointed municipal governments in the two large citiesof Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. Roughly similar local governments, varying greatly in size andcomplexity with the size and wealth of the emirate in question, have been developed in eachemirate. They deal with a range of local issues such as water and electricity supply and publicworks, as well as with external affairs, such as trade, in which the Constitution permits themsignificant independence. Paralleling this has been the development of municipal authoritiesin the other emirates, all of which, except Fujairah, are overwhelmingly urban. With its twoenclaves on the east (Gulf of Oman) coast, Sharjah has devolved considerable authority tothe local government in Khor Fakkan and Kalba.

Without question the most important factor in sustaining the UAE for 30 years and endowingit with its present strength and stability has been Sheikh Zayed’s leadership, as notable for itslongevity as for its effectiveness. From 1946 to 1966, as the representative in Al Ain of hisbrother Shakhbut, Zayed displayed special talents for securing and maintaining the loyaltyof the tribes and gained a reputation, especially in his management of the local irrigationsystems, for dedicated stewardship of the state’s resources and their utilization for the people’sbenefit. As ruler of the whole emirate from 1966, Zayed combined these capabilities with themastery of genealogical politics, the key to successful governance of a patriarchal state, bycarefully distributing both incomes and positions of authority among the branches of the rulingAl Nahyan clan. Within the fairly narrow confines of the traditional system he has practisedthe politics of inclusion, ensuring the support of the ulema or religious scholars who applythe shari’a, as well as tribal elements and leading commoner families. Zayed naturally projectsthe bedouin qualities important to establishing legitimacy in the eyes of his followers. Thushe displays generosity in personal and official behaviour and, in stark contrast to the rulingfamily of neighbouring Saudi Arabia, evidences an almost austere lifestyle. A central factorin securing Zayed’s legitimacy as ruler of Abu Dhabi and the UAE is his solicitude for Islamiceducation and institutions and his own unostentatious but sincere Islamic piety. His view ofIslam emphasizes a flexible pragmatism which contrasts with the strident, confrontationalnature of views expressed elsewhere in the Arab world and has helped to prevent the developmentof Islamic extremism in the UAE.

What is perhaps most striking about Zayed is his ability to embody and help sustain asystem of traditional social, cultural, and political values while intuitively understanding and

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effectively dealing with the modern world which has thrust itself upon Abu Dhabi and theUAE. But if his leadership credentials have to do with flexibility and broadmindedness, theyderive equally from his ability and determination to champion the causes of those for whomhe bears responsibility. He has established his credentials as a nationalist, first in defendingand advancing the interests of Abu Dhabi, then those of the UAE. Whereas Rashid had beenconcerned with protecting his emirate from the consequences of the Saudi claim to AbuDhabi territory, Zayed has made the Iranian actions against the islands, long claimed bySharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, fully a UAE question. Indeed, at the international level he hasacquired something of the character of an Arab elder statesman, especially through his effortsto mediate the Iran–Iraq war, but also with regard to South Yemen and Oman and NorthAfrica as well. All this has added to his stature as a father figure enjoying great admirationand affection throughout the UAE. Seldom if ever has an individual been so identified withthe birth and development of a new country.

For so long as Zayed remains President of the UAE the country’s survival and stabilityseem assured. He is, however, over 80, though in good health, which gives some urgency tothe matter of what may happen after his passing.

What Lies Ahead?

Thirty years on, one could offer a compelling argument that the UAE can continue indefi-nitely on a secure and stable course without changing the institutions of government as theyare today. In an astonishingly brief time it has made the transition from one of the world’spoorest states to one of the wealthiest, securing the benefits of that wealth to all the population.There is no appreciable discontent or call for change and the people enjoy a considerabledegree of freedom, with none of the repression that is all too common elsewhere in the MiddleEast. A pragmatic balance has been struck in the authority wielded by federal and localinstitutions of government which might well be the envy of devolutionary Republicans inWashington, DC. A modern, or at least modernized, state has been established on a solidfoundation of traditional values and habits of governance.

It is interesting, in this regard, to reflect that even before the UAE and its sister GulfArab states had emerged from British protection, the conventional wisdom among mostscholars and other analysts had consigned them to an early demise as feeble anachronismswhile the secular, military-based, Arab socialist regimes of the day were hailed as themodels of the future. The traditional, tribal, patriarchal states have endured and prosperedwhile the careers of the bold new experiments of the 1950s and 1960s have fared less well.Moreover, in part due to Zayed’s astute foreign aid diplomacy, the region is far lessthreatening than before. Indeed, with the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War and the demise ofthe Soviet Union, the current regional and international environments are probably morefavourable than at any time since the birth of the UAE. What might cloud this picture andsuggest that the evolution of the federation’s governing institutions is not or should notbe considered complete?The 1999 Yearbook of the UAE Ministry of Information and Culture states that:

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Since the establishment of the Federation in 1971, the seven emirates comprising the UAEhave forged a distinct national identity through consolidation of their federal status, andnow enjoy an enviable degree of political stability. The UAE’s political system, which is aunique combination of the traditional and the modern, has underpinned this political success,enabling the country to develop a modern administrative structure while at the same timeensuring that the best of the traditions of the past are maintained, adapted and preserved.14

It is difficult, however, to believe that such a neat dichotomy can be maintained indefinitely.The forces of modernization and change cannot be easily segregated and contained and willundoubtedly exercise progressively an impact on the political institutions of the country.Although, as noted above, there is no significant popular call for political change, a growingsentiment for democracy, or at least for increased political participation, may be found amongthe elites of the UAE and other Arab states, given voice by intellectuals, businessmen, andothers.15 The international arena, following the Gulf war of 1991 and the collapse of the SovietUnion together with the unchallenged global role of the United States, appeared to favourstrongly the adoption of more democratic governments. Even if this impulse continues to waxand wane, it remains a force of consequence. Perhaps more important is that the educatedelite of the UAE, which favours greater political participation, is growing.16

At the same time, there are, as many scholars have noted, significant obstacles to theintroduction of democracy, not only in states with traditional, autocratic forms of government,but in the Arab world generally. In a country like the UAE, where most wealth has beengenerated through activities of the state, no strong middle class such as brought about the riseof democracy in the West has emerged. A civil society of associative linkages among citizensis only present in embryonic form. Even more fundamentally, it has been pointed out thatdemocracy is not something which political leaders can bestow. It must emerge from a politicalculture and, in that regard, one is led to ponder that in an Islam-based society the source oflegitimacy for political rule is God’s command, not the accountability of rulers to the ruled.17

The dilemma, then, is how to manage an evolution from what one wag called a ‘shu’ocracy’to democracy, however the latter may be defined. Without attempting an answer, it is certainlythe case that it will be hard to compensate for the loss of Zayed’s leadership when he departsthe scene, even though there is wide popular support for the existing institutions. It may bewondered if the UAE could have weathered the 1972 coup attempt in Sharjah had not leadersof Zayed’s and Rashid’s stature been present and used their prestige in asserting federalauthority. It could also be questioned whether the fall-out from the 1987 coup attempt inSharjah could have been contained without Zayed’s dominating presence. Certainly Zayed’scommanding personal authority was a key factor in seeing the country through a long periodof menacing external threat.

At the same time, the UAE and its institutions have now developed a maturity that did notexist in 1972 and was only partially apparent by 1987, the events of which helped in theprocess of its development. Stability and continuity are not only part of the political scene,but the pursuit of them is now a fundamental part of the political process. Thus while thepersonal style of the individual holding the office of President will, inevitably, change, thepolitical traditions that have been established should contribute towards an unambiguous transferof power. With the selection of the president in the hands of the seven rulers, the process is

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really an exercise in traditional shura (consultation) and ijma’ (consensus) among triballeaders. When the leader (who has until now dominated the UAE and been the only real choicefor president) has passed from the scene, there will be no obvious criteria, apart from AbuDhabi’s size and wealth, to determine the selection of his successor.

For many years, Zayed has effectively relinquished the majority of the domestic functionsof the ruler of Abu Dhabi to his Crown Prince, Sheikh Khalifa. At the same time somepresidential duties have also been progressively relinquished to Sheikh Khalifa, who will,thus, have had a considerable apprenticeship before his expected assumption of the presidentialmantle. Khalifa has been handling state affairs especially in the absences of the President,and sharing in the decision-making inner circle in all matters for the state for almost threedecades. He has also led the UAE delegation to Arab meetings, such as the summit in Cairoin 1996, marking the first time since becoming UAE president in 1971 that Zayed had notattended an Arab summit.18 Khalifa may prove to be a capable successor to his father as UAEPresident. What is certain is that, however able he and subsequent leaders of the country maybe, they cannot hope to enjoy anything like Zayed’s stature. It has been the country’s singulargood fortune to have had as its principal architect and sole leader in its first 30 years of existencesomeone who could personify the state and serve as a father figure to all its people. In part,however, that has also contributed to the difficulty of creating, or even seriously contem-plating the creation of strong, popularly based political institutions for the future.

The era in the lower Gulf which produced and shaped Zayed has passed. His like will notbe seen again in the UAE or elsewhere. In an uncertain future, without a dominant personalityto embody the nation and speak for its people, the old autocratic, tribal order, whatever itsvirtues, will not be able indefinitely to cope with future challenges.

*The author wishes to acknowledge the kindness of Dr John Duke Anthony and Dr F. Gregory Gause III who made

helpful suggestions in the preparation of this chapter.

1 This description is used in Peter J.Vine, et al., Yearbook of the United Arab Emirates 1995, London, Planet PublishingLtd, (1995) p 23.

2 British motivation in creating the council may have been a mix of highminded and more cynical impulses. For aninstance of the latter interpretation, viewing the council as a scheme to consolidate British rule by reliance onpolitical power indirectly wielded through the rulers, see A.O. Taryam, The Establishment of the United ArabEmirates 1950-85, London, Croom Helm (1987) p 16.

3 Good narratives of the events analysed below can be found in Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to UnitedArab Emirates: A Society in Transition, London and New York, Longman (1982) pp 336–69; Ali MohammedKhalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press and London,Croom Helm (1979) pp 19–35; and A.O. Taryam, op. cit., pp 64–196.

4 On the reform movement in Dubai see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates. A Politicaland Social History of the Trucial States, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd (1978) pp 150–61.

5 See Heard-Bey, op. cit., pp 336–7 and 360.6 See for example David Holden, Farewell to Arabia, New York, Walker and Company (1966) p 159.7 See Heard-Bey, op. cit., p 371.8 On this point see Heard-Bey op. cit., p 362..9 Khalifa, op. cit., pp 34–35.10 See Heard-Bey op. cit., p 375 and Muhammad Saleh Al Musfir, The United Arab Emirates: An Assessment of

Federalism in a Developing Polity, Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the State University of New York at Binghamton(1984) p 112.

11 Alfred B. Prados, with the assistance of Ross Kaplan, United Arab Emirates: Background and U.S. Relations,CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: The Library of Congress (19 June 1995) p 3

12 Al Musfir, op. cit., p 134.

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13 Al Musfir, op. cit., pp 104–5.14 Ibrahim Al Abed and Paula Vine, Yearbook of the United Arab Emirates, London, Trident Press (1999) p 58.15 For a thoughtful commentary on this phenomenon, especially in the UAE, see Jamal Al Suweidi, ‘Arab and Western

Conception of Democracy,’ in David Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds), Democracy, War, and Peace in the MiddleEast, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1995) pp 83–4.

16 See ibid., p 108 on the attitudes of students at the UAE National University at Al Ain.17 See ibid., pp 85 and 88.18 ‘Sheikh Zayed Will Not Attend the Summit and He Designates the Heir Apparent to Represent the Emirates,’ Al-

Hayat, 18 June 1996.

Bibliography

Al Abed, I. and Vine, P. Yearbook of the United Arab Emirates, London, Trident Press (1999) p 58.Anthony, J.D. The Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum, Washington, DC, The Middle East

Institute (1975).Fenelon, K.G. The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey, London, Longman (1973).Gause, F. G. III Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, New York, Council on

Foreign Relations Press (1994).Holden, D. Farewell to Arabia, New York, Walker & Company (1966) p 159.Hooglund, Eric and Toth Anthony ‘United Arab Emirates,’ in Helen Chapin Metz (ed), Persian Gulf States: Country

Studies, Washington, DC Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (1994) pp 199–249.Heard-Bey, Frauke From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, London and New York,

Longman (1982).Ibrahim, S. E. ‘Democratization in the Arab World,’ in Augustus Richard Norton (ed), Civil Society in the Middle

East, Leiden, New York, and Köln, E.J. Brill (1995).Khalifa, A. M. The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press and London,

Croom Helm (1979).Al Musfir, A. The United Arab Emirates: An Assessment of Federalism in a Developing Polity, PhD dissertation

submitted to the State University of New York at Binghamton (1984).Peck, M. C. The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press and London and

Sydney, Croom Helm (1986).Peck, M.C. ‘Rashid bin Said Al Maktum,’ in Bernard Reich (ed), Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East

and North Africa, New York, Westport, Connecticut and London, Greenwood Press (1990), pp 448–52.Peck, M.C. ‘Zayed bin Sultan Al Nuhayyan,’ in ibid., pp 515–22.Peterson, J.E. The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation, New York, Westport, Connecticut and

London, Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC (1988).Prados, A. B. with the assistance of Ross Kaplan, United Arab Emirates: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report

for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress (19 June 1995).Al Suweidi, J. ‘Arab and Western Conception of Democracy: Evidence from a UAE Opinion Survey,’ in David

Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds), Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East, Bloomington and Indianapolis,Indiana University Press (1995), pp 82–115.

Taryam, A.O. The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950–85, London, New York, and Sydney, CroomHelm (1987).

Vine, P. J., P. Hellyer, and I. Al Abed, Yearbook of the United Arab Emirates 1995, London, Planet Publishing Ltd(1995).

Zahlan, R.S. The Making of the Modern Gulf States, London, Boston, Sydney, and Wellington, Unwin Hyman (1989).Zahlan, R.S. The Origins of the United Arab Emirates. A Political and Social History of the Trucial States, London,

The Macmillan Press Ltd (1978).

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The Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy

Peter Hellyer*

Introduction

The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates has one fundamental goal: the enhancementthrough its dealings with foreign governments, individuals and organizations of the prosperity,stability, power and independence of the country and its citizens. In this general sense, UAEforeign policy is similar to that of other countries. There are, however, two factors thatdistinguish UAE foreign policy, both in conception and in execution. First, policy is affected,and to some extent restricted, by a unique set of objective circ*mstances: the size andcomposition of its population, its geographical location and its natural resources and wealth.Secondly, since the seven-member UAE federation was established in 1971, it has beenpresided over by the same leadership, permitting the bringing of an unusual – and admired –degree of both experience and consistency to bear in terms of its foreign policy.

Throughout the last three decades, the continuity and consistency of foreign policy hasreflected the perceptions held by the leadership of the world about them and of the best interestsof country and people. Choices made in the sphere of domestic policy have also had an impacton foreign policy. This can be seen, for example, in the competing claims for expenditure ofthe defence budget and economic and social development and in the adoption of the choicesof conciliation rather than confrontation as an approach to the resolution of disputes.

This chapter will examine the objective conditions within which the UAE leadership operatesand the choices that have been made, in order to show the fundamental characteristics of theUAE’s foreign policy.

Objective Conditions

There are several objective conditions which make the United Arab Emirates unique, andthese affect its foreign policy, in some ways providing it with options not open to other, lesswealthy states, but in other ways restricting its options.

First, the UAE is one of the world’s major producers of hydrocarbons. Its proven recoverableoil reserves are estimated at 98.8 billion barrels, the third largest in the world, and nearly three

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times those of the whole of North America, while its proven recoverable reserves of naturalgas are estimated at 6 trillion cubic metres, the world’s fourth largest.1

The production of over two million barrels of oil a day makes the country one of the key membersof the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), while it is also a major gas exporter.Although oil and gas now account for only 30–35 per cent of Gross Domestic Product, (thepercentage fluctuating in line with changes in the world oil price), the resulting revenue still givesthe UAE one of the highest per capita incomes. This wealth has a direct impact on the country’sforeign relations. Other countries both need its oil and gas and desire access to its petro-dollars,whether for inward investment or as payments for their goods and services.

Secondly, situated in the south-east of the Arabian Peninsula, with its northern coastline onthe Arabian Gulf and its eastern coast on the Gulf of Oman, the country strategically commandsthe Straits of Hormuz, through which the bulk of the world’s oil exports pass every day. Evenif the Straits themselves were closed by the actions of other powers, UAE territory could beused to provide entrance to and exit from the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Complementing thisfactor, the UAE is also ideally situated to provide a key transit point for the import and re-export of goods, not just within Arabia, but in the whole north-western arc of the Indian Oceanand, overland, into the emerging economies of Central Asia. In recent years, Dubai, the UAE’scommercial centre, has become the region’s leading entrepôt. Thus the accident of geographyhas made the UAE of significance well beyond its borders.

While the country is rich in reserves of oil and gas, however, it has few other naturalresources. Although, as a result of a cautious and successful policy of investing much of itsoil revenues, the UAE has foreign reserves unofficially estimated at well over US $150 billion,use of these to finance current expenditure is tightly restricted. In consequence, the country’sprosperity is heavily dependent on fluctuations in the international oil market, although it isbetter equipped to cope with a period of low oil prices than any other major producer.

Moreover, the UAE’s population is small in comparison with many of its neighbours, bothin the Arabian Gulf and in the broader area of the north-west Indian Ocean. Its wealth andsize are also important factors in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy.

UAE Interests and Priorities

The interests and priorities of the United Arab Emirates in foreign policy derive from theseconditions, but they also reflect the views of the country’s leadership.

First, the key priority, naturally, is that of seeking security and stability within the immediateregion of the Arabian Gulf, including both the states of the peninsula and the two other littoralstates, Iraq and Iran. Continued tension in the area over the last 30 years, including two majorarmed conflicts, has left the UAE with no choice but to focus on affairs close to home.

It has done so within the framework of its second key priority, which is the promotion ofclose ties with the other states of the peninsula, with whom it shares religion, history, language,culture and tribal and other affinities, as well as systems of government (with the exceptionof Yemen). The outcome of these affinities, sufficiently strong to override the real differencesthat do exist, has been the creation of the (Arab) Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This body,officially established at a summit held in the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi in 1981, represents

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to a very considerable degree the implementation by its members of a common approach tothe challenges posed by tensions emanating from elsewhere in the Gulf.

The Arab identity of the United Arab Emirates is also of importance. It is reflected in thecountry’s approach towards the rest of the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa,with whom the promotion of relations represents a third main foreign policy priority. Intimatelyrelated with this, of course, is the Israel–Palestine conflict, perceived as an issue of dispos-session, as well as one of territorial occupation and the violation of basic human rights.

A fourth strand in the country’s foreign policy derives from a feeling of identification withfellow Muslims around the world. This can be detected both in the country’s extensiveprogramme of development assistance and emergency aid and in the concern shown whenfellow Muslims are perceived as being ill-treated by others. This was demonstrated partic-ularly clearly in the cases of Afghanistan in the 1980s and Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.

These priorities, apart from the first one of simple self-defence, reflect the impact of thecommonly held beliefs and value systems of the leadership and the people of the UAE. Thesemay be briefly summarized as a sense of Arab identity, a belief in Islam, and, arising directlyfrom the latter, an underlying unselfish and humanitarian approach.

Beyond these, however, the UAE’s foreign policy interests also reflect its economic interests.The securing of stable long-term customers for its oil and gas exports, the identification ofsafe destinations for its foreign investments and the stimulation of trade in order to strengthenthe country’s position as a commercial entrepôt are all concerns that influence foreign policy.The logic of the international economy also dictates that the UAE’s major commercial partnersinclude countries which are not only themselves concerned to support the stability and securityof the Emirates, but are also able and willing to provide the means to this end, through defenceagreements and arms sales. Thus the development of relations with the Western industrializednations has long been a key component of UAE foreign policy. In recent years, emphasis hasalso been placed on the development of commercial and political links with Russia and othersuccessor states of the Soviet Union.

Finally, the formulation and practice of the UAE’s foreign policy reflects the recognitionthat the country’s size and location require it to work, wherever possible, in collaborationwith others. Both in the bi-polar world that existed until the collapse of the Soviet Union andin the uni-polar world that has since emerged, the UAE’s foreign policy has reflected its beliefin the necessity of supporting and working with and through international organizations, whetherregional, such as the League of Arab States, or global, like the United Nations and its specializedagencies. The pursuit of consensus, conciliation and cooperation is fundamental through thesphere of foreign policy, as, indeed, it is in the domestic sphere.

Continuity in Style and Substance

The federation of the United Arab Emirates was formally established on 2 December 1971,bringing together seven emirates which had previously been in treaty relations with the UnitedKingdom and were known as the Trucial States. The Constitution, initially provisional, butadopted as permanent in 1996, provides for the highest authority in the country to be theSupreme Council of Rulers of the emirates, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ra’s al-Khaimah,

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Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Fujairah. The Supreme Council is declared to be ultimatelyresponsible for foreign policy.

In practice, however, the rulers have agreed since 1971 that the formulation and executionof foreign policy should be undertaken by the President, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan,although their views and interests, and those of their emirates, are, of course, part of the overallequation. Also ruler since 1966 of Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s largest oil producer, Sheikh Zayedwas a key architect of the federation and was elected by his Supreme Council colleagues as itsfirst President, a post to which he has been re-elected at successive five-yearly intervals. Inconsequence, there has been a consistency in the determination and guidance of UAE foreignpolicy over a period of some three decades, something that is decidedly unusual in the volatileMiddle East. The wealth of experience gained by Sheikh Zayed over the period has been matchedby a steady growth in his own reputation as a statesman, and his views are widely sought after,such that the UAE’s own international status is enhanced by the reputation of its President.

President Sheikh Zayed has stamped his own distinctive style on the foreign policy of theUAE Government, as well as on its domestic policy. Instinctively a conciliator and a peace-maker, and with a long record of being prepared to utilize the resources at his disposal for thebenefit not only of the people of the Emirates, but also for those in need elsewhere, he is, atthe same time, a stout defender of the rights of those he feels to be disadvantaged or dispos-sessed. Charismatic and determined, with over half a century of experience in government,Sheikh Zayed derives his ultimate legitimacy as President and ruler from the respect andsupport he has won from his people.

It is important to note that, while the continuity in UAE foreign policy that has been evidentsince 1971 may be most immediately recognizable through the person of the President, itsmost visible exponent, it reflects an underlying broad national consensus. Both published andoral evidence suggests that foreign policy is not a topic of serious adversarial debate withinthe Emirates.

In the years since the UAE was established, a national ethos has emerged in both domesticand foreign policy that resembles closely the style and beliefs of the President himself. Insofaras foreign policy is concerned, this ethos has the following basic characteristics.

Firstly, the UAE seeks to avoid rushed or impulsive decisions. Issues and options arecarefully reviewed before action is taken. Moreover where inaction or silence are perceivedas being in the country’s best interests, such an approach is adopted even if the UAE’s friendsor allies might prefer a different approach. Action for the sake of being seen to act, or statementsfor the sake of mere public effect, is disdained.

In general, the UAE adopts a policy of promoting conciliation, cooperation and consensus,seeking, wherever possible, to defuse confrontation and conflict. Although most clearlyenunciated by the President, the basic elements of this approach, which is also visible in domesticpolicy, can be traced back to the nature of the country itself. Society in the Emirates isessentially tribal in nature, although in recent decades an overlay of modern development andadministrative structures has partially obscured this fact. Tribal society in the Arabian Peninsula,heavily influenced by Islam, is essentially communal, requiring consultation and consensusin order to be able to survive. The dictum crudely enunciated by former British Prime MinisterSir Winston Churchill that ‘Jaw-Jaw (talk-talk) is better than War-War’ is equally apt as adescription of UAE domestic and foreign policy.

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At the same time, however, the UAE has shown that it is quite prepared to act swiftly whenthe situation requires, and to stand alone on controversial issues if the country’s foreign policyestablishment believe that it is right to do so. In August 1990, following the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait, the UAE was among the first Arab states to support a swift international militaryresponse. Later in the decade, however, the UAE adopted an approach that was clearly distinctfrom that of its GCC colleagues on the issues of continued United Nations sanctions againstIraq and on opening the way for it to be accepted back into the broader Arab fold.

Thirdly, in line with its generally conciliatory philosophy, the UAE tends to be tolerant ofdifferent lifestyles and approaches as long as these do not threaten the basic values of thecountry and its people. Indeed, as President Sheikh Zayed has stated, Islam is a religion oftolerance, not of intolerance, where the holding of different views is recognized as a right.2

This is particularly visible in UAE domestic policy. As stated earlier, a majority of thepopulation of the country are not citizens, but temporarily resident expatriate workers. Manyare from countries whose social and political norms, values and customs and religious beliefsdiffer radically from those of the traditional and conservative Muslim society of the UAE.

Within the country, all may practice their customs and beliefs without hindrance, providedthat these do not conflict openly with prevailing national norms. Thus while Islam is the nationalreligion, Christian churches can be found in the major population centres, often built withgovernment assistance. Muslim dietary rules are not applied to non-Muslims. One basic, thoughunstated, pre-condition of this tolerance, however, is that expatriate communities must recognizethat disputes between their countries of origin will not be permitted to spill over into the UAE.The two largest communities are Indians and Pakistanis, but, despite the conflicts betweenthose states, it is rare that there is any evidence of tension between the communities residingin the Emirates. Such an approach in domestic policy has implications for foreign policy aswell. Thus India and Pakistan, two large and important neighbours with whom the UAEmaintains close and friendly relations, have also sought to ensure that their disputes are notechoed among their communities in the UAE.

At a more general level, the belief in tolerance, coupled with a firm opposition to extremism,particularly of a religious origin, can also be traced clearly in the UAE’s foreign policy. SheikhZayed has, for example, been one of the most active among Muslim leaders in calling for adialogue between Islam and Christianity as well as in condemning extremists using – or misusing– religion. The relevance of religion to UAE foreign policy is clearly indicated in its positionon the future of Jerusalem. Thus Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan binZayed Al Nahyan noted in mid-2000 that ‘Jerusalem is not only an issue for the Palestiniansand Arabs, but is a sacred place for all revealed religions’(i.e. Islam, Christianity and Judaism).3

Another factor that is of importance in the determination of the UAE’s foreign policy is itsstructure as a federal state. Under the terms of the Constitution, the conduct of foreign policyis the prerogative of the Federal Government. At the same time, however, the individual emiratesmay have interests of their own that impinge on foreign policy, and which are taken intoaccount in policy formation. These may include, for example, commercial relations or borderissues, while two of the emirates, Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, have a direct interest in along-running dispute with Iran over the latter’s occupation in 1971 of three UAE islands.

Finally, over the last three decades, the United Arab Emirates has become a major donorof development assistance and emergency relief aid. While there is no formal connection

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between the financial assistance and political issues, the reputation of the UAE as an importantdonor state does have a significant impact upon its standing in the international community.Much of the assistance is given on state-to-state level, or through support for the programmesof international agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to which theUAE is one of the leading donors.

The Conduct and Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy

The implementation of the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates takes place within theobjective conditions and interests described above. The way in which it is carried out is bestexamined on a geographical basis, beginning in the immediate region. It should, however, benoted that both the conduct of foreign policy and its geographical perspective have not beenstatic over the course of the last three decades. While this can, to a considerable extent, beascribed to the necessity to adapt to a changing global community, (such as in the aftermathof the collapse of the Soviet Union), it also reflects a growing confidence. By 1999, for example,the UAE was actively engaged – in a military as well as a political sense – in the conflict informer Yugoslavia, while relations with South Africa were surprisingly close, given its distancefrom the Emirates and the fact that the two states apparently had little in the way of commoninterests. Neither region was significant in terms of the UAE’s foreign policy initiatives evena decade earlier. UAE foreign policy has, therefore, not only responded to changes in theinternational environment, but has also been prepared to take new initiatives as a result of thegrowing organizational and political maturity of the state itself.

The origins of UAE foreign policy can be traced back to the period prior to the establishmentof the state in 1971. Under the terms of the various agreements between the seven states andBritain, in particular the so-called ‘Exclusive Agreement’ of 1892, the rulers of the emiratesassigned to Britain the right to represent them in their foreign relations. This, however, neverresulted in a severing of traditional relations with other states in the region, while, from the1950s onwards, following the British withdrawal from India and a consequent lessening ofthe UK’s direct involvement in the area, those states of the Gulf that were still in treaty relationswith Britain, including the emirates, began to revive their active involvement in foreign affairs.Thus, for example, Sheikh Zayed visited Jordan in 1968, on which occasion he met for thefirst time with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, while Abu Dhabi also developed relationswith Kuwait and, further afield, with Egypt.

The evolution of UAE foreign policy in the first years of the federation derived directlyfrom the foundations laid before 1971, and contributed, inter alia, to the early focus onregional affairs.

The Gulf Cooperation Council States

Relations with the five other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) havebeen a central feature of UAE foreign policy, pre-dating the formation of the Council itselfin 1981. The commonality of history, language, culture and other factors has already beenreferred to. As the UAE’s nearest neighbours, along with non-Arab Iran, these states are,naturally, of major importance to the Emirates.

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Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar all shared with the seven emirates a common history ofa close relationship with the United Kingdom. Indeed the agreements between Britain andQatar and Bahrain were virtually identical to those with the component emirates of the UAE.When, in February 1968, Britain announced its intention of leaving the Gulf by the end of1971, UAE President Sheikh Zayed, then only ruler of Abu Dhabi, and his colleague SheikhRashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai (and UAE Vice-President from 1971 to 1990),took the initiative in launching a campaign for a federation between the states of the lowerGulf. This initially included Qatar and Bahrain as well as the seven emirates, and it was notuntil the summer of 1971 that the former decided to opt for a separate international status.When they did so, Sheikh Zayed stated (and subsequently reiterated) that the door remainedopen for Qatar and Bahrain to join the federation if they wished to do so. Although they didnot, it is arguable that the way in which the UAE successfully established itself as a federationin the 1970s helped to pave the way for the formation of the larger, looser GCC in 1981.

Afocus on good relations with Oman also predated the formation of the federation. Abu Dhabiand Oman had collaborated during the 1950s in their response to a border claim from SaudiArabia (see below), while the first agreement on their mutual borders was signed before 1971.With Kuwait, further away, relations in the period immediately prior to federation were lessintimate, although Kuwait was a major contributor to the Trucial States Development Fund andfinanced many of the UAE’s first schools, while Kuwaiti leaders played an active and constructiverole in the negotiations between the emirates that led up to the establishment of the UAE.

Relations with Saudi Arabia in the pre-federation period were more complex. Unlike therest of the members of the GCC, Saudi Arabia had no special historical relationship withBritain. At the same time, Saudi Arabia claimed territory that was traditionally part of Omanand Abu Dhabi, in particular in the west and south of Abu Dhabi and in the oases of Al Ain,part of Abu Dhabi, and Buraimi, part of Oman. Efforts by Saudi Arabia to enforce its claimhad led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia in the 1950s.

While Saudi Arabia welcomed the British announcement of its plans to withdraw from theGulf, it declined initially to recognize the federation of the United Arab Emirates, pending aresolution of the territorial issue. An early foreign policy priority for President Sheikh Zayedwas, therefore, the ending of this border dispute. In 1974, following an exchange of visits, anagreement was initialled which involved, inter alia, the cession by Abu Dhabi of some territoryin the west of the country to Saudi Arabia. Diplomatic relations were established and in subsequentyears, while territorial issues have on occasion affected relations between the UAE and its twolandward neighbours, they have not prevented development of relations in other spheres. Bythe end of 1999, the country’s land borders had been effectively agreed and demarcated.

The immediate impetus for the formation of the GCC was the Iranian revolution of 1979and the subsequent outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq the next year. Relations with Iranhad already been adversely affected by the Iranian occupation, in 1971, of the UAE islandsof Greater and Lesser Tunb, part of Ra’s al-Khaimah, and by the imposition on Sharjah, bythreat of force, of an unequal Memorandum of Understanding that allowed an Iranian militarypresence on a third island, Abu Musa.

Statements issued at the time of the creation of the GCC specifically stressed that it wasnot a political or military alliance, but rather one concerned with economic issues, an approachthat was presumably designed, in part, by a simple desire for caution while a major military

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conflict was raging in the immediate neighbourhood. Over the two decades since it wasestablished, however, the GCC has made considerable progress in a wide range of fields. Inthe spheres of foreign policy and defence, this has taken place particularly since, and in responseto, the invasion of one of its members, Kuwait, by Iraq in 1990. Progress in the economicsphere has been slow but steady, with the UAE actively working for an improvement of linksbetween member states and for a lowering of the tariff barriers between them.

Despite the closeness of its relations with its GCC partners, the UAE has on occasion takena distinctively separate approach as a result of differing political and economic objectives.Thus at the December 1996 GCC summit meeting, the UAE declined to agree to proposalsbacked by other members for the introduction of a common tariff policy. This would havemeant an increase in tariffs, with a consequent adverse impact upon the country’s vitallyimportant import and re-export business. Not until late 1999 was an agreement finally reached,which was deemed by the UAE to offer a better protection of its interests.

On occasion, the adoption of a separate stance by the UAE has reflected the distinct moralprinciples of its leadership, rather than a calculation of political interests. Thus in the late1990s, the country took a lead in calling for a re-assessment of United Nations sanctionsagainst Iraq, despite opposition from its GCC partners, humanitarian concerns about the plightof the Iraqi people overriding more purely political considerations. Humanitarian concernsalso provided the fundamental impetus of the UAE’s approach to the crises in Bosnia andKosovo, caused by the impact upon local Muslims of Serb actions. Further details can befound below, in the sections dealing with these aspects of foreign policy.

Iraq

Since the establishment of the UAE in 1971, its policy towards Iraq has undergone significantchanges. From the outset, the UAE sought to establish cordial relations with Iraq, not only afellow member of the Arab League, but also the most powerful Arab state in the Gulf, as wellas being a fellow member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).Indeed, relations pre-dated the formation of the federation in the sphere of oil policy, sinceAbu Dhabi, the largest UAE producer, had joined OPEC several years earlier – an importantexample of the way in which activity in foreign affairs pre-dated the formation of the federation.Abu Dhabi later yielded its own membership in favour of the federation.

While ties were built up with Iraq, however, they never became as close as those with otherGulf Arab states, because of the radically different nature of the Iraqi political system. Indeed,in the early 1960s, Iraq had questioned Kuwait’s right to an independent existence followingtermination of the latter’s treaties with Britain, while in the late 1960s, opposition movementsin a number of other Gulf Arab states received covert support from Baghdad. At the sametime, however, the UAE, like other Gulf Arab states, saw Iraq as a counterweight to non-ArabIran, whose relations with the Emirates were adversely affected by its occupation of UAEislands immediately prior to the establishment of the federation.

When the Iran–Iraq war began in 1980, the UAE remained formally neutral, although politicalsupport was given to Iraq through the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The ‘tankerwar’ which flared up in 1983 between the two warring parties caused considerable alarm in theUAE because it threatened to harm the country’s oil exports, and did, in fact, spill over intosome damage to UAE offshore installations, helping to reinforce the UAE’s sympathy for Iraq.

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After that conflict ended, in 1988, ties with Iraq remained friendly until early in 1990, whenIraq’s President, Saddam Hussein, began a campaign of public criticism of both the UAE andKuwait over oil policy, in particular their adoption of a production strategy designed tomaintain stable prices. Baghdad perceived this, falsely, as being calculated to have an adverseimpact on attempts to rebuild its economy after the war with Iran.

As the criticism mounted, particularly against Kuwait, the UAE, unlike other states in theregion, as well as the major global powers, correctly interpreted Baghdad’s approach as athreat to regional stability.

Following the invasion of Kuwait on 3 August, the UAE demonstrated its commitment tothe GCC principles of collective security. It was among the first Arab states to recognizepublicly the necessity for a military response. It joined the United Nations-backed coalitionof countries, providing military units to the allied armies and also making its territory availablefor use by other participants in the coalition, including both Arab and Western countries. UAEground units were among the first Arab forces into Kuwait in early 1991, while the UAE airforce flew numerous sorties in the air war.

Subsequent to the defeat of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, the UAE stressed its continuedsupport for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. It remained, however, committedto the principle of collective security within the GCC states and when, in October 1994, Iraqitroops moved towards the Kuwaiti border, the UAE sent ground forces to Kuwait as a tangibleindication of its support.

Unhappy about the impact of sanctions on Iraq, because of the fact that their impact wasprimarily felt by the people of the country, the UAE acknowledged that the fundamental respon-sibility for their distress lay with the Iraqi leadership. During the 1990s, the UAE becameincreasingly uneasy about the continuation of sanctions, however. Four major factors playeda part in the emergence of this uneasiness.

First, on simple humanitarian grounds, the UAE was concerned about the suffering of theIraqi people. Secondly, in the UAE’s view, the sanctions themselves were obviously, andincreasingly, ineffective. Thirdly the UAE, with its traditional advocacy of conciliationwithin the Arab world, was concerned about Iraq’s continuing estrangement. Finally, theUAE recognized that, whatever current problems may exist, Iraq will remain a major playerin Gulf affairs, with a significant role to play and with whom the UAE must deal. On thatbasis alone, it is in the UAE’s interests to take steps to escape from the impasse that prevailedthroughout the 1990s.

To tackle the issue, President Sheikh Zayed suggested that an all-inclusive Arab summit beheld, prior to which ‘the Arabs must open their hearts to each other, and be frank with eachother about the rifts between them and about their wounds. They should then come to thesummit, to make the necessary corrections to their policies, to address the issues, to heal theirwounds, and to affirm that the destiny of the Arabs is one’.4

UAE foreign policy with relation to Iraq continued to diverge slowly from that of its GCCpartners during the late 1990s, despite implicit criticism from, in particular, Kuwait. Whilecontinuing to implement sanctions, the country took steps to provide humanitarian assistanceto Iraq, both through the UAE Red Crescent Society and through other means, such as theintroduction of a weekly ferry service between Dubai and Basra. In early 2000, the UAErestored diplomatic relations with Baghdad and embassies were re-opened in both capitals.

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In August 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan made a firstformal call by the UAE for the lifting of sanctions, telling a visiting American envoy: ‘Thesuffering of the Iraqi people has gone beyond the limits of human tolerance. It is high timefor the human conscience to move to alleviate the plight of the Iraqi people’.5

Iran

Relations between south-eastern Arabia, including the United Arab Emirates, and Iran havebeen of long standing, and commercial and political links, as well as ties between the twopeoples, can be traced back for thousands of years, with the waterway of the Arabian Gulfhaving facilitated interchange between the two peoples. During periods when Iran has beenadministered by a strong centralized government, it has tended to adopt an expansionist policyacross the Gulf, while when Iran has been weak, south-east Arabian states have extended theirinfluence to the northern side of the waterway.

As the Trucial States moved towards establishment of the United Arab Emirates in 1971,their northern neighbour was unquestionably the most powerful state in the Gulf, therecognition of this being an important factor in the determination of UAE policy.

UAE policy towards Iran has always sought the promotion of cordial ties, the impetusfor this not only being a matter of wishing to establish good relations with a powerful neighbourbut also being motivated by extensive commercial ties and links between the populationson each coast.

Early attempts to implement this policy, however, were adversely affected by the renewalof territorial claims by Iran to three of the UAE’s Gulf islands, Greater and Lesser Tunb andAbu Musa. While these claims had been muted and effectively abandoned for several decades,due in part to diplomatic support from Britain for the two emirates with whom it was intreaty relations, the announcement by Britain in 1968 that it was to leave the Gulf by the endof 1971 prompted Iran’s Shah not only to revive the claim, but also to make it clear that hewould secure his objectives by force, if necessary. Thus two months before the date set forthe British withdrawal, the Shah stated: ‘we need them (the islands); we shall have them; nopower on earth shall stop us’.6

At the end of November 1971, hours before the formal British withdrawal, Iran invadedthe Tunbs, killing a number of policemen and expelling the population of Greater Tunb,which fled to Ra’s al-Khaimah. In the case of Abu Musa, the ruler of Sharjah was persuadedby the threat of Iranian invasion to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), underwhich Sharjah and Iran instituted an administrative division of the island. Neither siderelinquished their claim to sovereignty, although the threat of coercion from Iran was incontravention of international law.

The Iranian move was stoutly protested by the newly formed UAE, which promptly arrangedto take the issue of the islands to the United Nations, where the Security Council debated andcondemned the Iranian action on 9 December 1971.

During the course of the 1970s, the UAE continued to assert its right to the three islands,although without progress in reaching a resolution, since Iran declined to concede that anyissue of sovereignty was at stake. Despite this, however, relations with Iran expanded, partic-ularly in the commercial field, while the strong alliance between the Shah of Iran and theUnited States at least provided some guarantees of regional stability.

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This process was interrupted by the success of the Islamic revolution against the Shah in1979, and, with its northern neighbour in turmoil, the UAE was concerned to insulate itselfa*gainst the possibility of insecurity in the Gulf. From 1980 to 1988, Iran was primarilyconcerned with the prosecution of its war with Iraq and fortified the three occupied UAEislands and used them as military bases, this use being in contravention of the Memorandumof Understanding on Abu Musa.

During the 1990–1991 crisis caused by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iran was openly criticalof the participation of the GCC states, including the UAE, in the Western-led alliance first tocontain Iraq and then to free Kuwait. In the post-war period, Iran stepped up the process ofrebuilding its military capabilities, not only obtaining weapons of mass destruction, butbecoming the first state in the Gulf to obtain submarines.

In mid-1992, however, the issue of the three occupied islands came unexpectedly to thefore. Iran, which controlled Abu Musa’s only useable port, introduced a new rule that anyonedisembarking on the island, even persons en route to the UAE side, required Iranian visas. Inparticular, UAE civil servants, such as teachers, were refused landing permission.

The step, which was clearly in contravention of the Memorandum of Understanding, wasviewed by the UAE as evidence of an Iranian intention to extend control over the whole island,particularly in view of a continuing programme by Iran of building military and adminis-trative installations on the island. Responding quickly, the UAE sought and obtained diplomaticsupport from the GCC and the League of Arab States and, after a short while, the Iraniansbacked down.

Subsequent years saw a significant change in UAE policy on the issue of the islands.Whereas prior to 1992, the Government of the Emirates was content to restate its right toownership of the three islands in international bodies, in order to ensure that the issue remainedon the world agenda, it now embarked upon a proactive approach, emphasizing its claim tosovereignty, and seeking support from other countries both multilaterally and through organi-zations such as the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the Organization of theIslamic Conference. By the end of the 1990s, the UAE had won overwhelming support fromthe international community for its desire that the issue be resolved.

The UAE has consistently emphasized that it will pursue its attempt to regain the islandsonly through peaceful means. While confident of the legitimacy of its claim, the UAE hasput forward two suggestions on ways to bring the dispute to an end. In late 2000, these hadyet to make any progress.

The first was that of direct bilateral negotiations with Iran on the issue of sovereignty, offeredwith no pre-conditions except that agreement should first be reached on a time limit for thediscussions. This approach foundered on the Iranian refusal even to acknowledge that an issueof sovereignty existed, despite the fact that its control of the islands was founded in the militaryoccupation of 1971.

The second option reflects in the eyes of the UAE Government both its respect for theprinciples of international law and its desire that the issue no longer be permitted to impingeon the development of its relations with Iran.

This option is that the issue of the ownership of the islands be judged either by internationalarbitration or by reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In making this proposal,the UAE declared that it would accept any ruling to emanate from this process as binding.

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Iran declined to accept this suggestion, although it had itself suggested this approach after theFirst World War, when the government in Tehran first began to claim all three islands. Interna-tional arbitration or reference to the ICJ can only be effective if both parties are in agreement.In consequence, in the UAE view, a resolution of the dispute can now be achieved only whenthere is a change of policy in Iran.

The election of President Khatami in Iran in 1998 was followed by attempts by Iran to improverelations with the GCC states. These attempts caused some concern in the UAE that the issueof the islands might be pushed aside. Following extensive diplomatic consultation with theother GCC states, however, there was a re-affirmation of the long-existing policy that animprovement of relations with Iran should await signs of progress in resolving the dispute. Atthe December 2000 GCC summit, the (GCC) Ministerial Council was assigned the responsi-bility of exploring all peaceful means to bring about the end of the occupation, thus makingthe issue one of relations between the GCC and Iran, rather than simply UAE and Iran.

Evidence of a change in policy was still lacking by late 2000, with Iran continuing to developits installations on Abu Musa and still declining even to concede that an issue of sovereigntyand occupation was involved. The UAE has continued to assert its desire for a peacefulsolution to the problem and to suggest either bilateral negotiations or international arbitrationor adjudication. There was, however, little sign of a concrete change in the Iranian approach,with the government in Tehran still declining to acknowledge the existence of any issue ofsovereignty and continuing to strengthen its physical presence on the islands themselves.

The Arab world and the Islamic world

Further afield than the Arabian Gulf, the maintenance of solidarity within the Arab world asa whole is an important tenet of UAE foreign policy. In the process of policy formulation, theUAE Government seeks wherever possible to take into account issues deemed as being ofsignificance for the whole of the Arab world, consulting with other Arab governments whereappropriate.

Thus while issues directly affecting the Gulf remain central to UAE policy, the broaderissue of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the future of the Palestinian people is also of majorsignificance. Links were established by Abu Dhabi with Jordan in the early 1960s, prior tothe formation of the UAE, which provided important support, including the seconding ofpersonnel for the establishment of the nucleus of the UAE’s armed forces; later in the decadelinks were also established with the Palestinians.

Although distant from the area of direct conflict, the UAE perceived the Israel–Palestineissue as a matter that directly impinged upon its interests, both its support for the broad conceptof Arab nationalism and its support for the principles of the defence and restoration of humanand civil rights. The occupation of the Arab land of Palestine was, of course, something ofparticular interest to the Emirates, which also had part of its territory occupied by a foreignpower.

Recognizing the paucity of its own human resources, the UAE did not participate withmilitary units in the most recent of the Arab–Israeli wars, in October 1973. It did, however,play an important economic and political role through its initiation of an embargo byArab oil-producing states on the supply of oil to countries perceived as being alignedduring that conflict with Israel. At the time, the rationale of the embargo was defined by

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President Sheikh Zayed as being intended to show that ‘Arab oil is not dearer than Arabblood,’ or that a loss of oil revenues was a small price to pay when other Arab countrieswere suffering heavy human losses.7 Although the initiative led directly to a major increasein oil prices and the emergence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) as the key determinant of prices, this was a by-product of the initiative, ratherthan its original objective.

The UAE also became a major contributor of financial aid to the Palestinians and to theArab front-line states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, the aid being disbursed both through theAbu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), later renamed the Abu DhabiFund for Development (ADFD), and through direct bilateral government channels.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UAE supported the Arab consensus on the Palestinianissue. Thus, despite its close ties with Egypt, it broke diplomatic relations with Cairo followingthe visit to Jerusalem by President Anwar Sadat and the subsequent peace agreement in 1979,although it was later to be among the first of the Arab states to call for a re-admission of Egyptinto the broad Arab fold.

Support for the Palestinians per se has also been a significant component of UAE policysince the establishment of the federation in 1971. Implementation of this policy has, of course,evolved in response to changing circ*mstances. Having initially supported the PalestinianLiberation Organization (PLO) in its confrontation with Israel, the UAE later extended itsbacking to the process of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and the Palestiniansthat commenced in Madrid in October 1991 and out of which later emerged the Oslo Accords.In so doing, the UAE made clear its support for the principle of ‘land for peace’ and for theimplementation of a solution in accordance with international legitimacy.

While many Arab states, including the UAE, had reservations about the concessions madeby the Palestinian leadership in the Madrid and Oslo agreements, the UAE noted that sincethe PLO was internationally acknowledged as the legitimate representative of the Palestinianpeople, it was for that leadership to determine its own course. This approach was to prevailthroughout the 1990s. Only on the issue of Jerusalem did the UAE elaborate its own view,emphasizing that the future of the city should take into account not only its territorial statusbut also its status as a city holy to Muslims and Christians.

On the wider question of the establishment of normal relations between Israel and theArab states, the UAE has adopted a clearly distinguishable approach. Both Jordan and thePalestinians reached agreements with Israel in the period 1991–1995, following Egypt inbringing to an end the state of hostilities. In association with this process, the United Statesexerted diplomatic pressure on other Arab states to normalize relations with Israel, and,in particular, to cease implementation of the Arab economic embargo on Israel and oncompanies dealing with it.

At a meeting in 1994, the GCC states, including the UAE, agreed to suspend the secondaryand tertiary aspects of the boycott, but declined to lift the primary boycott, that of a ban ondealings with Israel itself. Subsequently Qatar and Oman made steps towards a cessation ofthe primary boycott. The UAE, however, declined to do so, insisting that a full normalizationof relations must await the conclusion of a satisfactory overall peace agreement between Israeland all its neighbours, including a just and lasting resolution of issues relating to the Palestinians,including the right of return of the refugees and the establishment of an independent, sovereign

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Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Thus when, in 1998, Qatar hosted an interna-tional economic conference designed to promote links between the Arab states and Israel, theUAE Government openly opposed the conference, declined to participate and instructed UAEcommercial organizations not to attend.

More broadly, since 1971, UAE foreign policy towards the Arab world has focused, whereverpossible, on the resolution of inter-Arab differences and on working for a consensus approach.This reflects to a considerable extent the personal philosophy of President Sheikh Zayed whohas offered his own good offices as a conciliator and mediator on a number of occasions withsome success. This approach, it should be noted, does not imply a belief in an unattainableunanimity of policy. Thus Sheikh Zayed has openly called for amendment of the charter ofthe League of Arab States in order that majority decisions can be taken. Nor has the approachmeant that the UAE has overlooked actions by other Arab states which it believes to haveimpinged directly on its own national interests. The support perceived as being offered byJordan, Yemen and Sudan to Iraq at the time of the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict, for example,led to a freezing of relations for some time, although by the mid-1990s, they began once againto become warmer.

Finally, the UAE leadership has consistently offered support to fellow Arab leaders facedwith violence emanating from fundamentalist religious groups, although the UAE itself hasfortunately been spared from this phenomenon. Describing such groups as ‘terrorist’, SheikhZayed has noted: ‘These people have nothing whatsoever that connects them to Islam. Theyare apostates . . . We see them slaughtering children and the innocent. They kill people, spilltheir blood and destroy their property, and then claim to be Muslims’.8

UAE foreign policy has involved the recognition of a Muslim dimension to internationalaffairs beyond the Arab world, and the country has been an active participant in the Organi-zation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and its associated agencies. This began in the 1990sto become a significant factor in foreign policy formulation, although it should be noted, interalia, that President Sheikh Zayed has been more vocal than any other Muslim leader in callingfor a dialogue between Islam and Christianity. Thus UAE diplomacy became actively engagedin issues relating to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, (see below). It also actively demonstratedits concern for the suffering of fellow Muslims in Chechnya, during the conflict in the late1990s that resulted from the Chechen attempt to secede from the Russian Federation, dispatchinghumanitarian assistance to the Chechens.

The UAE’s involvement, in accordance with the humanitarian aspects of its foreign policy,was additionally stimulated by its belief that the international community was displaying doublestandards by failing to take action to alleviate the sufferings of the Bosnian and ChechenMuslims while condemnation swiftly followed upon any attack by Muslim Arabs andPalestinians against Israel.

Following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the UAE developed increasinglyclose relations with the Muslim states of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Tajikstan,Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. These relations included both thedevelopment of bilateral trade and UAE investment, both public and private. More generally,however, while displaying sympathy for fellow Muslims, by mid-2000 the Emirates’ foreignpolicy showed little sign of a specifically Muslim content.

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South Asia

South Asia, broadly defined as the countries of the Indian subcontinent and Afghanistan, hasa special place in UAE foreign policy, both for economic and political reasons, particularlywith relation to India and Pakistan. Moreover, from 1820 until 1947, British relations withthe Trucial States were administered through the imperial government of India.

Links between the Gulf and the subcontinent can be traced back for around 5000 years,with evidence of extensive trade between the Gulf coast and the Harappan civilization of theIndus Valley, while in the period prior to the discovery of oil, India and Pakistan were the keytrading partners of the emirates of the southern Gulf coast.

While seeking to maintain good relations with both states, the UAE has also recognizedthat relations between the two have the potential to cause insecurity within the north-westIndian Ocean, most recently in connection with the dispute over Kashmir and the detonationby both countries of nuclear devices in 1998.

The UAE Government has also paid close attention during the 1980s and 1990s to the situationin Afghanistan, although the conflicts in that country have prevented the development ofrelations. The UAE offered political support to the insurgency against the Soviet-backedCommunist regime, which collapsed in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Unionand was one of the few states to grant recognition to the Taliban administration that emergedout of the subsequent civil war, on the basis that it controlled around 90 per cent of the country’sterritory. The UAE was thus able to offer itself as a means of diplomatic communication withthe otherwise largely isolated Taliban.

Beyond the Region

Beyond the region, relations with Britain have played an important part in UAE foreign policy,because of the historical relationship between the two countries, and because of the involvementof Britain in negotiations leading to the creation of the federation. Indeed, as mentioned earlier,the terms of the 1892 Exclusive Agreement between Britain and the rulers of the individualemirates specifically stated that the former would be responsible for the foreign relations ofthe latter.

The establishment of the UAE in 1971 coincided with the withdrawal of Britain from ‘Eastof Suez’, the culmination of a gradual process that had begun with the independence of Indiaand Pakistan, and Britain’s privileged political, military and commercial position in the ArabianGulf faded as other major industrial powers, in particular the United States, France and Japan,expanded their involvement in the region.

This process was stimulated by two important factors. First, the explosion in world oil pricesthat followed the 1973 Arab–Israeli war prompted the UAE, and other Gulf states, to embarkon a major programme of economic development that offered considerable opportunities tofirms from the industrialized powers. At the same time, there was a recognition abroad of theincreasing importance of the OPEC group in the world economy, both as suppliers of crudeoil and as the owners of substantial reserves that were invested, and often managed, in thefinancial markets of the industrialized world.

Questions of regional security then came to the fore with the success of the Islamic revolutionin Iran which removed the monarchy in 1979. While, prior to that date, the United States had

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been content to rely upon Iran, its strongest ally in the region, the change prompted a morevisible military presence both from the United States and from its British and French allies.

During the Iraq–Iran War from 1980 to1988, the ‘tanker war’against commercial shipping,carried out by both parties, had a direct impact upon the interests of the UAE because of thereliance of its economy on maritime trade. Whereas during the 1970s, the UAE vocallyadvocated that the Gulf should be kept free of the presence of military forces from outsidethe region, during the 1980s the policy changed, reflecting recognition by the UAE of the roleplayed by Western navies in maintaining the freedom of passage for shipping both inside theGulf and through the strategic Straits of Hormuz.

The process of acceptance of a Western military umbrella as a guarantee for regional securitywas completed as a result of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, when not only did the UAE participatein the allied coalition that freed Kuwait, but also welcomed Western military forces onto UAEterritory. Following the war, defence cooperation agreements were concluded with the UnitedStates, Britain and France. All also played a part in the UAE’s extensive military procurementprogramme, with American and French manufacturers winning the largest share.

Relations with the United States, in particular, developed strongly during the latter part ofthe 1990s, a process facilitated by the gradual movement towards a settlement of the Arab–Israeliconflict. With its strong support for the Palestinians, the UAE continued, however, to criticizethe American government for what it perceived as its failure to adopt an even-handed approachon the issue.

While at the end of the 1990s, relations with the United States were probably closer thanwith any other country outside the Gulf region, the foreign policy establishment of the UAEremained aware that the perception by the United States of its own interests was a centralcomponent of this relationship, and that the perception itself might change. In particular, itrecognized that a coming to an end of the mutual hostility between Iran and the United Statesthat had commenced in 1979 could have a significant impact on US perceptions of its nationalinterests in the region.

Beyond its relations with individual countries, the United Arab Emirates has, throughoutit* existence, devoted considerable attention to structures designed to strengthen internationalcollective security, whether through established organizations or through temporary coalitions.In each case, humanitarian issues provided the essential motivation. This aspect of its foreignpolicy can be traced back to the 1970s, when the UAE provided a contingent for the short-lived Arab Deterrent Force stationed in Lebanon during that country’s civil war.

Although its role in international peacekeeping was initially confined to the Middle East,there was a marked change following the experience of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. In the early1990s, for example, the UAE responded to an invitation from the Secretary General of theUnited Nations to provide units for the UNISOM II peacekeeping operations in Somalia,which had already received development assistance from the Emirates. Although UAEpeacekeeping operations in Lebanon and Somalia were under different umbrellas, bothcountries were fellow-members of the League of Arab States. Following the disintegrationof the former Yugoslavia, the UAE extended its peacekeeping further afield.With only minimaleconomic ties with the Balkan states, the UAE had previously paid little attention to the region,although Yugoslavia did maintain an embassy in the UAE capital. Following the eruption of theconflict in Bosnia, however, the area rapidly became a focus of UAE foreign policy involvement.

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As with Lebanon and Somalia, humanitarian concerns were of major importance. In thecase of Bosnia, the perception by the UAE was also that the failure of the international community,in particular Western Europe and the United States, to intervene and the imposition of an armsembargo both on the Serbian government and on Bosnia was permitting the killing to continue.President Sheikh Zayed made impassioned appeals for an end to the killing:9

It is as if the United Nations has been turned into stone, with no feeling or compassionfor the agony of the Bosnian people. We call upon all people with a conscience, thosewho believe in justice and abhor aggression and unjust wars, to stand up against thehorrors being perpetrated against the innocent people of Bosnia–Herzegovina. The worldhas to move forcefully to put an end to this horrifying tragedy. Governments must movenow to enable the people of that besieged country to defend themselves. The right of self-defence is the most basic human and elementary right.

With no sign of prompt international intervention, the UAE openly announced its intentionof breaking the arms embargo, and began to assist the Bosnian government to replenish itsmilitary arsenal. This, in turn, contributed to a stabilization of the military situation and toBosnia’s eventual survival. The UAE then provided substantial financial and humanitarianassistance to help the country rebuild.

The UAE’s active interest in the Balkans was again stimulated by the conflict in Kosovo,whose autonomous status within Serbia had been abolished in 1989. Early in 1998, the Serbiangovernment launched major offensives against the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo,who, like the Bosnians, were also Muslims. While again calling for international intervention,the UAE, through its Red Crescent Society, commenced a major programme of humanitarianassistance. This was complemented by the establishment of relief centres in adjacent areas ofAlbania, where the UAE Armed Forces re-built an abandoned Second World War airstrip tofacilitate the flying in of relief supplies.

When in early 1999, forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commenceda campaign of aerial bombardment to persuade the Serbian government to cease its offensivedesigned at expelling the Albanian population of Kosovo, the UAE was among the first non-NATO states to express support for the operation.

Once the bombing campaign was over and Serbian forces had withdrawn, political responsi-bility for Kosovo was assumed by the United Nations, while peace-keeping operations wereundertaken by a special international force, KFOR. The UAE was the only Muslim state to offerto participate in KFOR, as well as being the only country outside NATO, apart from Russia. Thecommitment, made initially for a two year period, was the first operational deployment of UAEforces outside the Middle East region. Through it, the country demonstrated its willingness toextend its active participation in global issues well beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

Conclusion

A review of the foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates since its establishment in 1971demonstrates that certain issues and interests have remained central throughout the period. Notsurprisingly, several of these are related to the Arabian Gulf region, the preservation of whose

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political security and stability is an essential component of the security of the UAE itself. During that period, the UAE has succeeded in remaining relatively insulated from the

impact both of major political changes in the region and of two major armed conflicts.At the same time, changes in the global arena, in particular the disappearance of the Soviet

Union and the emergence of a uni-polar world have had a direct impact on the involvementof other, much larger, powers in the Gulf area.

In response to these changes, the way in which the UAE has pursued its foreign policyinterests within the region has itself changed. It is, however, possible to detect throughout thesame essential themes identified earlier as the major components of policy. That there hasbeen a broad consistency is attributable to the way in which the country has enjoyed a stableleadership since 1971.

When the UAE was established, its view of international affairs was fairly narrowly confinedto the Gulf and the broader Arab region. Gradually, however, its political horizons expanded,a process that markedly accelerated during the 1990s. As a result, by the year 2000, the countrywas projecting the pursuit of its political interests far further afield than would have beenanticipated a few years earlier.

It has been able to adopt this approach with some success, and has, in the process, been recognizedas a state with a real, albeit limited, role to play in international affairs, and one which, moreover,is prepared to take concrete action in support of its views. That, in turn, has been of considerablebenefit in winning widespread support for its own position on key regional issues.

It is now possible to distinguish a characteristic style in the way in which the UAE pursuesits foreign policy objectives. That style has been established by President Sheikh Zayed but nowtranscends personalities and has become a fundamental component of the nature of the state.

* The structure of this chapter draws to a considerable extent upon a review of UAE foreign policy by William A.Rugh, published, as ‘UAE Foreign Policy’, in Ghareeb, E. and I. Al Abed. (eds), Perspectives on the United ArabEmirates, London, Trident Press (1997) pp 159–175. The debt owed to him is gratefully acknowledged. The authoralso benefited from access to material prepared by Francis Matthew, Managing Editor, Gulf News, for the UAEMinistry of Information and Culture. The author is also grateful to Ibrahim Al Abed, Adviser, UAE Ministry ofInformation and Culture, for his comments on early drafts of this chapter. A colleague of the author for more than25 years, he has been invaluable in shedding light on the nuances and processes determining the evolution andimplementation of the country’s foreign policy.

1 BP Amoco, Statistical Annual Review of World Energy, June 2000.2 ‘Islam is the religion of tolerance and forgiveness, of advice and not of war, of dialogue and understanding . . . A

Moslem should know what are the true teachings of Christianity, and a Christian should know what are the trueteachings if Islam. Sincere people from both sides should enter into dialogue, and should not leave the floor tothe extremists who are there amongst both Christians and Moslems. A true dialogue between religions is the realdeterrent and a strong defence against fundamentalists and extremists.’ Emirates News, 17 October 1995, quotinga speech by Sheikh Zayed to foreign ambassadors presenting their credentials.

3 Statement by UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, cited by EmiratesNews Agency, WAM, 5 August 2000 (‘UAE extends full support to the Palestinian position’).

4 Interview given by Sheikh Zayed to the New York Times. Full text transmitted by Emirates News Agency, WAM,22 June 1998.

5 WAM, 13 August 2000.6 The Guardian, London, 28 September 1971. 7 Cited in Leadership: Collection of speeches . . . of HH Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the UAE,

1971–1987, Presidential Court, Abu Dhabi (1987) p 187.8 Cited in Al Abed, I and Vine, P. (eds), United Arab Emirates Yearbook 1999, London, Trident Press (2000) p 16.9 Cited in Al Abed, I and Vine, P. (eds), United Arab Emirates Yearbook 1999, London, Trident Press (2000) p 20.

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Dimensions of the UAE–Iran Disputeover Three Islands

Mohamed Abdullah Al Roken

Introduction

The current dispute between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran over the three islandsof Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa is a classic example of the perpetuity of historicaldisputes. Time may solve many problems, but not those related to the difficult issue ofsovereignty and title between states. Legal rights that have been wholly or partly usurped donot disappear with the mere passage of time.

The crisis concerning the three disputed islands is multidimensional. Politically, it reflectsthe hegemonic attitude of major regional powers (major in terms of population, area and wealth).Economically it highlights the strategic importance of the islands’ location as a toll booth tothe Straits of Hormuz, controlling the passage of a vital regional commodity, oil, and evenjeopardizing the very source of that commodity in a smaller state. Furthermore, the crisis hasa historical-legal dimension. Unfortunately, however, this third dimension has not beenadequately probed by those concerned with, or interested in, the crisis. This is probably dueto the difficulty of research into the quagmire of history and international law, and to thescarcity of references and literature dealing with the dispute. In this chapter I shall deal withdifferent axes indicating the historical dimension of the dispute which support the UAE’srightful title to the three islands and refute Iranian claims thereto. However, I must stress thatI am wholeheartedly in favour of a peaceful solution, as strongly advocated by the UAE. Theregion should be spared the horrors of a further war, and should avoid anything that mayunnecessarily drain its human and material resources and upset the regional balance of peace.

Historical Roots of the Dispute

The Arabian Gulf, all its waters, islands and coasts, became a purely Arab ‘lake’ with theIslamic conquests in the seventh century AD. Even in the periods following the decline of theearly Islamic Caliphate, local powers, especially in Oman, maintained control and sovereigntyover the region as a whole. The legal status of the islands was closely linked to the legal statusof the southern coast area until the presence of the European colonial powers early in thesixteenth century.

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The rise of the Qawasim state and apportionment of the Gulf islands

On the fall of the Ya’aruba state in Oman (1624–1741), a new Arab maritime power rose tofill the vacuum. The new power was the Qawasim state based in Ra’s al-Khaimah. By themiddle of the eighteenth century, the Qawasim fleet was the principal naval power in the Gulf.The Qawasim eventually extended their influence to several regions in the Indian subcon-tinent and the East African coast. However, their power was concentrated on the southerncoast of the Gulf, Ra’s al-Khaimah and Sharjah being their major cities. In 1750 a faction ofthe Qawasim moved northward where they settled down in the area of Lingeh. The settlerseventually established an independent state in that region and sought to extend their influenceto the islands and coastal areas of the Gulf.1

Historical references point to a sharing of the Gulf islands by the two Qawasim factions:the islands of Sirri and Hengam became the property of the Lingeh Qawasim, while AbuMusa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Sir Abu Nu’air came under the Qawasim of the southerncoast (Ra’s al-Khaimah and Sharjah). Such arrangements were already in being by 1835.2

Thus, the Qawasim of the coastal areas established and maintained unopposed legal andactual sovereignty over the islands. In 1864 their ruler sent an official message to the BritishResident informing him that the islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and SirAbu Nu’air had been ruled by his ancestors, and would, therefore, remain under his rule.This message was the first document asserting the UAE’s legal title to the islands. Sovereigntywas further demonstrated in various forms of protest against any intervention in the islandsor violation of the agreement by the Lingeh Qawasim or neighbouring emirates. As early asthe 1870s, Abu Musa island had become an agricultural centre and a resort for the Qawasimrulers of Sharjah.3

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GreaterTunb

LesserTunb

Abu MusaSirri

Gulf ofOman

T h e G u l f

Straitsof Hormuz

Abu Dhabi •

QATAR

BAHRAIN

I R A N

U N I T E D A R A B

I RA

This separation of the two Qawasim factions is further confirmed by the fact that in 1873the ruler of the Sharjah Qawasim, Sheikh Salem bin Sultan, dispatched 50 armed men toAbu Musa to drive away ships belonging to Lingeh Qawasim. Even earlier, in 1871, thesheikh of the Qawasim of Ra’s al-Khaimah had denied Lingeh Qawasim entry into the Tunbs.He sent a message to the Lingeh sheikh protesting against unauthorized visits to the islandsby his subjects. The Lingeh ruler replied confirming that the islands actually belonged to theQawasim of the southern coast.4

The attitude of the then dominant colonial power (Britain, through the British governmentof India) was to consider the title to the islands and division thereof between the twoQawasim factions to be a purely local issue in which it had no desire to interfere. However,the British Political Agent, Haji Abdulrahman, who had broad commercial interests withthe Lingeh Qawasim, tried to demonstrate, in his correspondence with the British governmentof India, that the islands belonged to the Lingeh Qawasim. He even ordered the ruler ofRa’s al-Khaimah’s Qawasim5 to quit them. However, the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah stressed,in a message sent in February 1873, that the three islands were under his jurisdiction, andalso indicated that Sirri island belonged to the Lingeh Qawasim. In a message from theirruler in 1877, the Lingeh Qawasim admitted that title to the Tunbs belonged to Ra’s al-Khaimah Qawasim.6

A further proof that the Qawasim of the southern Gulf had title to these islands is that theyexercised all aspects of sovereignty over them. In 1879, for example, the ruler of Sharjah,Sheikh Salem bin Sultan, exiled his political opponents to Abu Musa island. When he himselfwas overthrown by his nephew, Sheikh Saqr bin Khaled, in 1883, he chose to live on AbuMusa himself.7

In the late nineteenth century Imperial Iran began to spread its influence to the northern Gulfcoast. In 1887, Persian armies invaded Lingeh and expelled the Qawasim governors who hadruled it for over 125 years. The Persians continued their offensive, ultimately occupying theisland of Sirri. It is worth noting that in one of his reports, the Commander of the Iranian forcesstated that the Qawasim had settled down in Abu Musa, which he regarded as their base.8

When Iran occupied the island of Sirri, the Qawasim of the southern coast began to havefears vis-à-vis the territorial ambitions of their northern neighbour. Their fears proved well-grounded when Iran set forth a series of claims to other islands. The British government protestedmildly against Iran’s occupation of the island of Sirri, while the Qawasim continued to affirmtheir title to it.9

In a note dated 11 March 1888 Britain demanded an explanation for the hoisting of theIranian flag on the island. The note also asked for evidence of Iranian claims to the island,especially as it was being ruled by the Qawasim in their capacity as the ruling dynasty inLingeh, and not as Iranian officials. On the same day, the Iranian Foreign Ministry repliedsaying:

. . . It is to be stated that according to all laws of progressive countries, the strongestevidence of ownership (of places and territories) of a government is ‘occupation’ and‘possession’, and hence there is no need for presentation of any other evidence.10

In 1898, the ruler of Sharjah, by virtue of his sovereignty over the island,11 granted threeArab nationals the first concession to prospect for red oxide in Abu Musa.

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Iran claims Abu Musa

Territorial and political ambitions, combined with the economic interests of influential elementswithin the government, helped strengthen the first Iranian claim to the island of Abu Musa in1904. Iran began to challenge Sharjah’s sovereignty over the island, with its eyes on the island’sresources, particularly the red oxide. It thus dispatched a mission, headed by a Belgian officer,to hoist the Iranian flag on the island. The ruler of Sharjah protested against this action, andhis reaction was supported by the British Resident. The latter called upon Iran to submit evidencesupporting its title to the island. Three months later, Iran quietly withdrew from the conflict,having failed to produce any evidence supporting its claim.12

Throughout the period of the British presence in the Gulf, the British Resident kept sendingmessages to the rulers of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah stressing his country’s recognition oftheir title to the three islands. Moreover, the Political Agent to the Trucial States (as the UAEwas called before independence), Sir Donald Hawley, states in his book Trucial States thatfrom the beginning of its presence in the Gulf, ‘the British Government has regarded the twoislands as belonging to the states of Sharjah and RAK (Ra’s al-Khaimah) respectively’.13.

In 1912, Britain and the ruler of Sharjah agreed to establish a lighthouse on Greater Tunb,with the assurance that this would not entail any encroachment on the ruler’s sovereignty overthe island.14 In 1923, the ruler of Sharjah granted a five-year red oxide exploration concessionto a British national named Strick. Iran protested against the granting by the ruler of Sharjahof prospecting concessions in Abu Musa. This was followed by a lull in the dispute.

Anglo-Persian negotiations

On 24 August 1928 the British administration issued a memorandum on the status of the threeislands. In that memorandum it was stated that the islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs hadbelonged to Ra’s al-Khaimah since its emergence as an entity independent of Sharjah, whileAbu Musa belonged to Sharjah, whose ruler was entitled to the proceeds of exploiting the redoxide and had been for a long period of time.15 This memorandum was issued following averbal understanding between the British and Iranian governments in which it was concludedthat the three islands were Arab territories.16

The period 1929–1930 witnessed negotiations between Britain and Iran aimed at reachingan Anglo-Iranian treaty. During these negotiations, evidence emerged supporting the Qawasim’stitle to the three islands, and hence highlighting the weakness of the Iranian claims. In thedraft of the treaty it was decided to recognize Iran’s title to the island of Sirri, while the threeother islands (the Tunbs and Abu Musa) would remain Arab.

The negotiations were almost a tug-of-war exercise between the two parties. The IranianMinister of Court, Mr Taimurtash, expressed in August 1929 his country’s readiness towithdraw its claim to Abu Musa, in return for recognition of its title to the Tunbs. Iran thenoffered to buy the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. In May 1930, Britain referred the Iranian offerto the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah, in the presence of the ruler of Sharjah. The two rulers,however, strongly rejected the offer, and informed the British Political Resident, Mr Barret,that the two islands were not for sale, whatever the price.17

The attempt was repeated in October of the same year when Mr Taimurtash set forth a freshidea, namely that Iran might lease the two islands for a period of 50 years. This was but a bidto save face in the wake of Iran’s bitter failure to claim Bahrain. Britain welcomed the new

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idea, as it would have enabled it, in turn, to lease the islands from Iran at the entrance to theGulf once the lease was in effect. For several months, British officials exerted pressure onthe ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah to persuade him to accept the new offer. The ruler eventuallyagreed, on the strict conditions that the Qawasim flag should continue to be hoisted on thetwo islands; and that Iran should refrain from inspecting Arab ships and boats, or even fromissuing orders to them.18 In the end no agreement was reached and the islands were not leasedto Iran. Thus, all Iranian attempts at expropriating the three islands failed, and Sharjah andRa’s al-Khaimah continued to exercise sovereignty over them.

In 1935, the ruler of Sharjah signed an agreement with Golden Valley Ochre and Oxide CompanyLtd, to exploit red oxide in Abu Musa. That company continued to function until 1968.19 On 6February 1953, the same company was granted exploration concessions in the Tunbs.

The exercise of sovereignty is further evidenced by the fact that on 3 March 1964, the rulerof Ra’s al-Khaimah granted oil exploration concessions in the Tunbs to two companies: UnionOil Exploration and Production Company and The Southern Natural Gas Company. Meanwhile,Sharjah granted similar concessions in Abu Musa and its territorial waters extending 12nautical miles to Buttes Gas and Oil Company.20

Iran raises the stakes and occupies the islands

However, the situation was not uneventful throughout that period. Having failed to annex theisland of Bahrain, following a United Nations resolution which endorsed Bahrain’s independenceon the basis of a referendum that was conducted in 1970, asserting the island’s independenceand its Arabism, Iran began to claim the three islands again, even more emphatically. The Iranianwriter Pirouz Mooojtahed-Zadeh said: ‘The Iranians openly and vigorously asserted their claimsof Tunbs and Abu Musa islands immediately after the settlement of Bahrain issue’.21

The linking between the islands issue and Bahrain is confirmed by British and Iraniandocuments. The Minister of the Imperial Court, the closest aide to the Shah, Amir Assdollah,stated in his confidential diary on 23 March 1969 that:

The British Ambassador called. I told him we can reach no settlement in respect to Bahrainuntil we know the fate of Tunb and Abu Musa. In that case, he declared, we have all beenwasting our time. So be it, I said.22

The British held intensive talks with Iran and the emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimahin 1970–1971, through its representative, Sir William Luce, seeking to secure a toning downof Iran’s threats to occupy the three islands by force, Sir William Luce set forth severalcompromise proposals aimed at finding acceptable negotiation terms.23 The negotiations wereovershadowed by aggressive statements by the Shah of Iran, whose prestige had been harshlybruised by failure to obtain Bahrain. In an interview with The Guardianpublished on 28 September1971 he said, ‘We need them (the islands); we shall have them; no power on earth shall stop us.If Abu Musa and the Tunbs fell into the wrong hands, they could be of a great nuisance value’.24

By ‘wrong hands’ was meant at that time the communists and the leftist tide in the Arabianpeninsula and the Middle East. The then Iranian Foreign Minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, said in astatement to the press, ‘These islands have been ours, and they are going to be ours. There isno compromise. Look at the Chinese communities in Aden. If these islands go, all our interestswill be damaged.’25

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British Foreign Office documents for 1969 (released early in 2000) indicated that the rulersof Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah continued to refuse to hand over the three islands, in spiteof repeated British and Iranian pressures on them to accept an amicable settlement of theissue; one that would prevent direct military occupation by Iran depriving the two rulers oftheir sovereignty over the islands. Iran went as far as to send an envoy to the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah urging him to sign a letter declaring Iran’s sovereignty over the two Tunbs. Theruler, however, refused to do so in spite of all Iranian threats and deadlines. Britain had alsorepeatedly attempted to convince the two rulers to settle the dispute with Iran before itsscheduled withdrawal from the region by the end of 1971. Such attempts clearly show thatBritain wanted the two rulers to make significant concessions and to depart from the veryposition it had itself been supporting until 1969, namely the rejection of any bid to give upor to share sovereignty over the three islands. As the released documents indicate, Britain’saim was to prevent the Shah of Iran from seizing the three islands by force before its departurefrom the region, as such an occupation would involve it (Britain) in an Arab-Iranianconfrontation, and thus hamper its plans for an orderly and safe withdrawal.26 In the meantime,such arrangements would strengthen Britain’s ties with Iran at the expense of the Arabs’rightsto the islands.

British endeavours ultimately resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding which was signedby Iran and Sharjah on 30 November 1971. Under this agreement, Iranian troops could landon the northern part of Abu Musa. Ra’s al-Khaimah, however, maintained its position of rejectingany concessions with regard to its title to the Tunbs. Iran responded to this outright rejectionand refutation of its claims by forcibly occupying the two islands in an offensive that claimedthe lives of two servicemen and five other citizens from Greater Tunb. The offensive alsoresulted in the demolition of a police station and a primary school on that island, and theeviction of its citizens, who sought refuge in Ra’s al-Khaimah.

Basis of Iranian Claims and their Refutation

Initially it may be useful to refer to certain secondary claims cited by Iran. The first is that‘Tunb’ is a word of Persian origin meaning ‘hill’ and that it is derived from a local Persiandialect known as ‘Tangistani Persian’.27 Apart from the legal invalidity of this evidence,because linguistic derivation is not a criterion for territorial title or sovereignty, it is also linguis-tically incorrect. ‘Tunb’ is a purely Arab word meaning ‘a long rope used to erect a tent’,28

while the name ‘Abu Musa’ leaves no doubt as to its being Arabic.Secondly, Iran claims that the three islands had for a lengthy period of time before the eighteenth

century been under Persian occupation. Such a claim is disproved by historical fact. Moreover,the Persian occupation of the three islands lasted for a short while, and occurred as a result ofinternal conflicts and a subsequent period of weakness in the region. The Persians were soondriven out of the islands. The claim is also illogical in light of contemporary international relations.If such a short period of occupation were to be taken as the basis of proving a state’s title to anyparticular territory, it would result in the undermining of international peace and security.29

A third claim cited by Iran is based on geographical proximity. There is no factual basis forthis claim, especially with regard to Abu Musa and, in any case, international law (to avoid

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repercussions in the realm of international relations) does not recognize geographical proximityas valid evidence supporting territorial claims.30

The fourth claim is that the Qawasim had ruled Lingeh in their capacity as ‘Persian officials’,and hence the islands belonged to Iran.31 Historical facts refute this claim; the three islands hadnever been under the rule of Lingeh Qawasim. Throughout the years they had always beenruled by Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah Qawasim. Unfortunately, however, many British legaladvisers had laboured under such a misunderstanding, drafting legal memoranda for the Britishgovernment in which it was wrongly stated that the Lingeh Qawasim had exercised controlover Greater and Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa. In fact they only ruled the island of Sirri.

Iran’s claim to the three islands is based on three major arguments. The first argument isthat in terms of international law Iran says it has evidence supporting its claim of title to theislands. The second is that British maps refer to the islands as being under the sovereignty ofIran. The third is that Iran’s strategic interests dictate possession of the three islands, so thatIran may be able to safeguard its security in the Gulf.

Let us now consider each of the three arguments and refute them on historical and legal grounds.

Evidence supporting Iran’s claim to the islands

First of all, it should be stated that Iranian researchers proceed from a basic hypothesis thatthe three islands are under Iranian control by virtue of lengthy historical sovereignty. Theyallege that there was no sovereign state in the Gulf region other than Iran for 2500 years (itselfdemonstrably a historical fiction) and that Iranian public opinion sees the entire Gulf and itsislands as Iranian. Therefore, there is no need to produce evidence for Iranian ownership ofthe three islands, and whoever claims otherwise has to present contrary evidence.32

Furthermore, Iran claims that the three islands had been under its sovereignty until Britainoccupied them in the name of the sheikh of Sharjah, and handed them over to him early inthe twentieth century. Iranian writers differ as to the exact date of the alleged British occupation.Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh says it was June 1903, while Davoud Bavand states that it was April1903, and Hooshang Amirahmadi claims it was 1904!33

Astory has been fabricated to justify this supposed episode. It states that Britain was concernedover Russian infiltration into Iran, and their possible subsequent arrival in the Arabian Gulf.Thus, it persuaded the ruler of Sharjah (who was under its protection) to claim ownership ofAbu Musa island and hoist the Emirate’s flag thereupon as a sign of sovereignty over it. Irandid not recognize the resulting occupation of the island until April 1904. Protesting againstsuch a step, it hoisted its own flag on the island, but again lowered it.34

Davoud Bavand also constructs theories about what he called an ‘Anglo-Sharjah occupationof Abu Musa’. He describes how, in its bid to check Russian and Iranian influence alike, andin order to block Iranian customs from exercising their authority over Gulf islands, Britainordered the ruler of Sharjah to hoist his flag on the island, thus signifying an unjustifiedoccupation.35

The story, however, ignores several facts, the most important of which is the historicalcorrespondence concerning the Qawasim ownership of the islands that pre-dates 1904 by manyyears. It also ignores all aspects of sovereignty exercised by the Qawasim during the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries and the fact, admitted by Iranian researchers themselves, that Iran didnot exercise any real or legal sovereignty over these islands for a long time. The central authority

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in Iran had no sovereignty over the remote dependencies and provinces, let alone over islandsthat had never been under its rule. Thus, an Iranian researcher admits that:

. . . Ill-defined relationships between the centre and its autonomous peripheries (princi-palities and dependencies) . . . resulted in the loss of territories all around the country.Wherever it was asserted that these principalities and dependencies were independent ofIran, Tehran failed legally to and/or physically to disprove this’.36

International law scholars are at one as to the existence of five conventional methods forthe acquisition of, or claim to, sovereignty over a given territory. These are: occupation, accretion,conquest, acquisitive prescription, and cession.37 It should be noted, however, that thesemethods came into being as justification for imperial European ambitions in the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries. I shall attempt briefly to explain them, and to pinpoint the extent towhich each applies to the Iranian claims.

OccupationBy occupation is meant the capturing of ‘no-man’s land’ by a state, with a view to extendingits sovereignty over it. For occupation to be effected in this way, three conditions must be met:

• The territory to be thus occupied must be a res nullius.• Occupation should culminate in imposing sovereignty over the occupied territory.• A continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty.

The basis for occupation has changed in European legal thought with the historicaldevelopment of colonial expansion. Initially, it was based on a fifteenth century Papal decree;later, it was based on geographical exploration. Eventually, the basis of occupation becamethe actual acquisition of a territory, provided that other European powers were notified of thisacquisition, in accordance with the 1885 Berlin Convention.38

Let us now apply this concept to the three islands. Never have they been res nullius territory.They have been ruled by the Qawasim for over two and half centuries, as has been recognizedby Britain and by Iran itself. Moreover, the acquisition of territory through the occupation methodhas declined in the twentieth century due to the absence of ‘no-man’s land’that may be occupied.

AccretionAccretion means the acquisition by a state of new areas by virtue of natural factors or throughhuman efforts, as when new islands emerge in the state’s territorial waters as a result of volcanicactivity, or when a state converts part (or parts) of its territorial waters into land.

The geographic reality of the three islands does not qualify either party to claim them onthat basis. The three islands have existed in the Gulf since time immemorial, and have neverbeen within Iran’s maritime zone.

ConquestA common practice before the emergence of the new world order, conquest meant the useof force to eliminate the legal existence of a state, or the annexation of a part of it to theinvading state. Under contemporary international law, this method has become illegitimate,and therefore cannot be used as valid evidence supporting any claim to any territory.

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Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations explicitly states that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of forceagainst the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting inany other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Rejection of this method was practically demonstrated by the international community throughinternational decrees condemning conquest,39 such as Security Council Resolution No. 242(1967) which rendered illegal the acquisition of territories through war and invasion, andvarious Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

Iran, therefore, cannot establish its claim to the three islands on the basis of a conquest thatoccurred in 1971. It cannot legally justify its occupation of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and AbuMusa under international law as conquest, since such a claim to sovereignty will be deemednull and void ab initio.

Acquisitive prescription40

By acquisitive prescription is meant the laying of hands by a state upon a territory under thesovereignty of another, or the exercising of actual sovereignty over it publicly and uninter-ruptedly for a period of time without opposition or protest on the part of the latter.41 Iran,which has been occupying the three islands for over 25 years, may thus base its claim to themon acquisitive prescription. However, acquisitive prescription as defined by international lawsets forth certain conditions for a claim to a territory in this way:

• Laying hands upon a territory should be effected through the sovereign party by way ofexercising its authority over it. Thus, the leasing of a territory, or administration thereof bya party that recognizes the sovereignty of another over it should not be regarded as a situationgranting acquisitive prescription, whatever the duration of the lease or the administration.While administering part of Abu Musa, Iran admits that the issue of sovereignty over theisland has not been settled in any way.

• Peaceful acquisition is another condition for acquisitive prescription. Thus, acquisition byforce, as is the case with the Tunbs, does not support Iran’s claim to the two islands on thebasis of acquisitive prescription.

• Acquisition should be public, and uninterrupted over a long period of time. Legal scholarsdiffer as to the specific period needed for acquisitive prescription to occur. Some havesuggested 100 years, while others opt for 50. In the case of the Tunbs, longer historically-proven acquisition lies with the UAE, rather than with Iran.

• Submission by the party to which the territory belongs: i.e. lack of protest or opposition tolaying hands by another state on the territory. Diplomatic protests and legal action thusundermine acquisitive prescription. Iran cannot, therefore, claim that the UAE has succumbedto a de facto rule over the islands, or relinquished its established title to the three islands.From the first day of the Iranian occupation of the islands, the UAE sought to prove theirlegal title to them. A message was sent to the United Nations by the emirate of Ra’s al-Khaimah on 30 November 1971. Meanwhile, there was armed resistance on the Tunbs andthe conflict resulted in some casualties. The UAE continued to defend its rights in UnitedNations lobbies whenever the issue of the three islands was raised.42

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CessionBy cession is meant the relinquishing by a state of its sovereignty over some part of its territoryto another state through an agreement between both. The basis or mechanism of cession differson a case-by-case basis. Cession may take place through barter, as in an exchange of territoryor part of a territory. Cession may also occur in return for financial compensation, as happenedwith the acquisition by the US of Alaska from Russia in return for seven million dollars.Finally, cession may occur coercively as when a victor state exercises pressure on a defeatedone, eventually forcing it to cede a particular territory or territories.

For cession to hold, or to be regarded as an act transferring sovereignty, the followingconditions must be met:

• The ceding state must have actual legal sovereignty over the territory to be ceded. On sucha basis, Iran cannot claim that Britain had ceded the three islands to it before the terminationof its treaties with the UAE and subsequent withdrawal from the Gulf. Britain was unqualifiedto do so, simply because it did not enjoy sovereignty over the islands. Meanwhile, the emiratesof Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah have never ceded their sovereignty over them, notwith-standing the agreement concluded between Sharjah and Iran.

• Cession must occur peacefully and willingly. If effected under the threat of force, it shallhave no valid legal consequences and the ceding state shall not be bound by it.

• The object of cession must be sovereignty over the territory in question, not simply theadministering thereof.

British maps and their validity

The second consideration on which Iran bases its claim to the three islands is the presenceof a British military map presented by the Foreign Office to the Shah of Iran in 1886. Thismap figures the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the same colour as that givento Iranian territories. Thus, Iran claims, the three islands have been under its sovereigntysince that time.

Initially, it is necessary to discuss the status of geographical maps under Public Interna-tional Law, and the extent of their validity as evidence supporting sovereignty rights overterritories. Maps are of two kinds: official and private. Official maps are those annexed tointernational treaties or international arbitration verdicts. These have supplementary value,but do not by themselves create legal consequences. Private maps are those issued bygeographical and scientific associations, or by specialized companies, or even by individuals.These lack the testimonial value of official maps.43

Iran has pointed out that all the maps then issued by British authorities show the three islandsto be part of its territories and that this is shown particularly clearly in the 1886 military mappresented to the Shah by the British representative. Iran therefore argues that this map is avalid proof of its title to the islands.44

In fact, the said map had first appeared in 1870, in the Persian Gulf Pilot. It attaches thethree islands to Lingeh. However, it was but a private map, that was not formally part ofany border treaty or agreement between Iran and rulers of the Qawasim. It should be notedthat this type of map is not binding on the state in which it is issued, let alone on the statesconcerned. Moreover, this error was later corrected by British officials. Britain regarded

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the content of these maps as ‘unintended’. The errors, therefore, should not be interpretedas an official statement on the part of the British government concerning ownership of theisland. They were insignificant errors.45

On the other hand, an earlier map published in 1864 by a German cartographer indicates thatthe three islands belonged to the southern coast Qawasim.46 Meanwhile, international mapsproduced until 1870 referred to the Arab character of the islands. Many subsequent maps alsogave clear indications that they belonged to the emirates. Recent maps, including some producedin Iran, also indicate that the Tunbs and Abu Musa are under the sovereignty of the emirates.The most valuable recent example is the map produced in 1955 by a specialized Iraniancompany indicating that the three islands are not part of Iran, and that they are Arab territories.47

The said British map of 1886 cannot be taken as evidence supporting Iran’s claim to thethree islands. Firstly, that map might at best be interpreted as an implicit recognition of Iran’sclaim to the islands; but it is a recognition by a third party with neither right nor sovereigntyover the islands, nemo dat quod non habet. Secondly, Britain itself had, as indicated in ourintroduction, repeatedly and explicitly recognized in official correspondence the sovereigntyof Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah over the islands. An implicit recognition whose validity andlegal strength is doubtful cannot and should not supercede an explicit one to the contrary.

Iranian strategic interests

Iran recognizes the strategic importance of the three islands in the Gulf. They dominate itsentrance and the lanes through which the bulk of Iran’s oil exports and its vital imports pass.Therefore, maintaining control over the islands would safeguard Iran strategically and maintainits national security.

This view poses an important question: Does a state’s strategic interests justify violation ofinternational rules of law and define its territorial sovereignty? The answer must be in thenegative. Whatever the importance of strategic interests, they cannot constitute a valid supportfor sovereignty over a territory.

Moreover, some scholars see a contradiction between the alleged strategic importance of thethree islands and geographical reality; the location of the three islands cannot in any way becompared with the locations of the Iranian port of Bander Abbas and the island of Qishm, bothat the very entrance to the Straits of Hormuz. Furthermore, the island of Sirri is only a few milesaway from the three islands, especially from Abu Musa, and could thus provide the same strategicprotection which Iran holds as a pretext for maintaining its occupation of the three islands.48

The stated existence of Iranian strategic interests is a political rather than legal pretext. It reflectsthe hegemonic mentality that has been governing the Iranian political regime since the Shah’sera and up to the present. Some observers go so far as to suggest that the strategic claims aresimply a cover for the Iranian leadership’s economic and ideological ambitions. They argue thatIran is seeking sovereignty over the three islands because its proven oil reserves are about to beexhausted; and that by exercising sovereignty over the three islands it can extend its territorialwaters by an extra 12 miles. Such an act poses a threat to the Emirates’ offshore oil wells.49

Irrespective of details of the Iranian strategy, it is important to stress that Gulf security is theresponsibility of all Gulf states; it cannot and should not therefore be handled by a single state.Moreover, Gulf security can only be achieved through cooperation and neighbourliness, not byoccupation of others’ lands, nor by military hegemony.

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UAE’s Rightful Title to the Islands

The preceding analysis indicates that Iran cannot support its claim to the three islands by anyof the conventional methods referred to in Public International Law. Let us now consider theways and means whereby the UAE may establish title to the islands.

Initially it should be noted that rights of sovereignty and of negotiations related thereto weretransferred from the emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah to the new federal state of theUAE, which was proclaimed on 2 December 1971. In accordance with the Constitution ofthe UAE, the Federation exercises sovereignty over all the lands and waters encompassed bythe international borders of the member emirates.50

Scholars of international law assert that border treaties provide for succession, i.e. rightsand obligations pass from the predecessor state to the successor state, in accordance withArticle 4 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.51 Moreover, the SupremeCouncil of the United Arab Emirates, which is the highest federal authority in the state,comprising the rulers of the seven member emirates, itself declared that agreements concludedby individual emirates with neighbouring states shall be deemed as agreements between theUAE and the said states.52

The Emirates’ ownership of the islands is based on legal documents, historical events andthe actual exercise of territorial sovereignty. The legal documents include a collection ofcorrespondence between the two branches of the Qawasim, correspondence between theBritish government (in its capacity as the protector of the emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah in accordance with a series of treaties between them) and the Iranian government,and a third collection of correspondence between rulers of the two emirates and Britishauthorities in the Gulf. All such collections demonstrate:

• Clear-cut statements by the Qawasim rulers of Lingeh to the Qawasim of the UAE coastthat the latter was the ruler of the three islands.

• A clear British recognition of the affiliation of the three islands to the emirates of Sharjahand Ra’s al-Khaimah.

• Protestations by rulers of the two emirates to Britain against Iranian violations of theirsovereignty over the three islands.53

Adequate reference has been made in the first part of this study to historical events confirmingthe Emirates’ right to the three islands. It may be appropriate here to discuss some theoriesthat support the Emirates’ claim to sovereignty over the three islands.

Acquisitive prescriptionIn his book entitled The Issue of Gulf Islands and International Law Mohammed Aziz Shukriendorses the method of acquisitive prescription to support the Emirates’ title to the islands.54

However, I disagree with this point of view. While the majority of the conditions required foracquisitive prescription to hold exist, the last one raises doubts as to the very source and baseof the UAE’s title to the three islands. If applied in favour of the UAE, this condition may beseen as an implicit recognition of Iran’s original claim to them. Emphatically, this is not soand, therefore, the Emirates should not make us of this argument.

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Immemorial possessionHowever, the UAE may establish their title on the basis of immemorial possession of theislands. In such a case, the origin of the status quo remains unknown or doubtful. Since it isimpossible to establish whether the process leading to the establishment of this status quo islegitimate or otherwise, it becomes legitimate.55 The UAE has been holding the three islandsfor over two and half centuries. It is therefore impossible to prove whether or not this possessionwas legitimate at the time it occurred, namely the middle of the eighteenth century.

Historical consolidation of titleThe UAE may also establish their title to the islands on the basis of the ‘Historical Consoli-dation of Title’, a recent concept developed by Charles de Visscher, a judge and formerPresident of the International Court of Justice. The essence of this concept is that it attemptsto combine all sovereignty-conferring elements in a single process. It also concentrates onlengthy utilization of a territory as a claim-proving factor. The concept thus reflects a blendof inseparable connections and interests and is normally employed to settle conflicting claimsto territories where there is no clear former possessor state.

Some British legal experts (Bathurst, Ely & Chance) suggest that the basis of the UAE’ssovereignty over the three islands stems from the above rule. They argue that the islands hadnot been regularly ruled by any particular state until they came under the control of the Qawasimwho actually ruled them and in a peaceful manner. During their rule, the Qawasim exercised allaspects of sovereignty. Such an exercise was never accompanied by any change of intent on thepart of the ruling authority; nor was it met by any significant opposition by neighbouring parties.56

Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah exercised all aspects of sovereignty over the three islandsbefore the Iranian occupation. In addition to those aspects stated in the introduction to thisstudy, the following may be listed:

• The governments of the two emirates exercised the right to levy and collect taxes and dutiesfrom pearl fishers and shepherds using the islands.

• Inhabitants of the islands carried the nationality of the two emirates respectively.• Rulers of the two emirates were respectively represented on the three islands by governors.• Public utilities on the islands, such as security, education, customs, health and mosques,

were under the control of the two emirates.• The governments of the two emirates hoisted their respective flags on the three islands, and

applied their laws and regulations to their inhabitants.• The governments of the two emirates maintained the right to grant concessions and licences

to companies operating in the islands.57

The exercise of all such aspects of sovereignty is the ‘root of title’ supporting the UAE’stitle to the three islands. Iran, on the other hand, has never exercised any aspect of sovereigntyover them. Professor Jamsheed Mumtaz, an Iranian academic, admitted in an article that Iranhad at no time any tangible control over these islands; and was merely content to exerciseremote and relaxed control over them, refraining from installing any official agency on anyof the islands.58

Moreover, a memorandum prepared by the British legal expert Mr Lacelle stated that for184 years at least, Iran had never exercised any real authority on the islands.59 Significantly,

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that memorandum is dated 4 September 1934. Given the period that then elapsed prior to theIranian occupation of the three islands, we may correctly conclude that the total period of ruleby the emirates amounts to more than 220 years.

Recognition and acquiescence60

Other significant evidence supporting the UAE’s sovereignty over the islands relates torecognition and acquiescence. The UAE has been in possession of the islands for a long periodand this has been recognized by a third state, Britain. In its correspondence with the rulers ofQawasim, Britain has repeatedly made a unilateral, express declaration recognizing theQawasim’s title to the islands. Moreover, Iran failed to protest over a long period at UAEpossession of the islands.

Legal Characterization of the Status of the Three Islands,and the Memorandum of Understanding

What, then, is the legal status of the three islands at present? And what are the legal relationshipsresulting from the Iranian presence in them?

To begin with, it must be noted that the situation in the Greater and Lesser Tunbs is one ofoccupation by force as of 30 November 1971. The ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah had refused tosign a British-mediated Memorandum of Understanding with Iran. Consequently, the Shahordered troops to land on the two islands and to occupy them by force. Thus, the current statusof the two islands cannot be legally recognized, in accordance with the accepted legal principlewhich requires countries to refrain from the threat or use of force to gain acquisition of aterritory or territories. Occupation dictates upon the occupier certain legal commitments whichhave to be observed while administering the occupied territory.

Moreover, Iran’s occupation of the Tunbs constitutes the violation of another acceptedprinciple in international law related to border issues, namely the principle of finality andstability of boundaries. It also violates the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity ofstates, a cornerstone in international relations.

The status of the island of Abu Musa is governed by a Memorandum of Understanding whichdoes not, however, amount to a final agreement determining the status of the island. In spite ofthis bilateral agreement and understanding between the two parties, the Iranian government stillviews the Memorandum of Understanding as ‘a temporary measure which would only postponethe eventual restoration of Iran’s full sovereignty over the whole island.’61 Following mediationby Sir William Luce, as special British Envoy, Iran and Sharjah agreed upon the six articleMemorandum. It is evident from the text of the Memorandum that Sharjah did not cede itssovereignty over Abu Musa, and maintained its right to demand restoration of the island in full.

In the preamble of the Memorandum, it is stated that: ‘neither Iran nor Sharjah shall giveup their claims to the island, and neither shall heed the other’s demands.’62 Further scrutinyof the articles of the Memorandum would reveal a dual approach dealing with the presenceof the two parties, i.e. Iran and Sharjah, on the island. The Memorandum refers to ‘areasoccupied by Iranian troops’and that Iran ‘will occupy areas.’Meanwhile, it refers to the Emirate’speaceful presence saying, ‘Sharjah will have full jurisdiction over the remainder of the island’.

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It is thus clear that the island originally belongs to Sharjah, while the Iranian presence is butan occupation of the northern part of the island, a situation that came into being only recently.

It should be noted that Iran still recognizes the continuity and validity of the Memorandum ofUnderstanding, as was stated by its Foreign Minister during a visit to Kuwait on 19 April 1992,and by the head of its negotiating team, Ambassador Mustafa Haeri, in September the same year.Meanwhile, Sharjah has continued to exercise all aspects of sovereignty over the island, includingthe hoisting of its own as well as the the UAE federal flags and the administering of health andeducation utilities for Emirates’ citizens and Arab expatriates living on the island.

Quite apart from the political considerations that prevailed at the time of its signing, a purelylegal examination of the Memorandum of Understanding shows it to be null and void. Thisnullification stems from a defect of substance relating to a signatory party (Sharjah), whichsigned the Memorandum under duress, as will be indicated later.

Duress and its invalidating consequences are considered differently by conventional andcontemporary theories.63 The conventional theory in international law distinguishes betweentwo situations: duress exercised upon the representative of the state, and duress exercised onthe state itself, upon signing an international treaty. Duress, material or moral, exercised ona state representative (head of state, foreign minister, ambassador or negotiator) annuls thetreaty, and the state on whose representative duress was exercised is not bound by it. A verygood example of this situation is the summoning by Nazi leader Adolf Hitler of the Presidentof Czechoslovakia in 1939, whom he forced to sign a treaty under which the latter relinquishedterritories belonging to his country. Duress exercised upon the state itself, however, does notaffect the validity of the treaty. Advocates of this theory argue that the threat to use forceagainst a state is only a catalyst employed to urge it to sign a treaty. Legally speaking, themotive for contracting does not affect the validity of the contract. They also cite several examplesof international treaties that have been concluded in the wake of wars, in which the victorsimposed their will upon the defeated. They argue that any attempt to declare such treaties nulland void would destabilize the world.

Under the new world order that emerged after the Second World War, and rejection of theprinciple of the use of force to settle disputes between states, a new theory was developed.This theory holds that duress, whether on the representative of the state or on the state itself,nullifies a treaty. Thus a treaty, concluded under duress or threat of force, shall not result inlegal consequences to be complied with. An advocate of this theory, Hafez Ghanem, arguesthat the maintenance of unfair conditions resulting from treaties concluded under duress wouldnot help stabilize international relations. On the contrary, such conditions would be a sourceof tension and instability, as the affected states would, sooner or later, seek to restore their rightsthrough efforts to render such treaties null and void.64 The stability cited by advocates of theconventional theory is based on unjust conditions, and as such cannot be regarded as real stability,this approach argues.

The late Sheikh Khaled bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, then ruler of Sharjah, explained thecirc*mstances under which he found himself forced to sign the Memorandum of Understanding:

I had spent about two years collecting documents proving that the island is Arab territory,and that it belongs to Sharjah. I had asked a team of jurists to prepare legal documentsand papers. These were presented to the Iranian Government. However, the logic of forceand threat allowed no room for reason and legitimate proofs . . . Several factors contributed

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to the delicacy of the situation, combining to form significant pressure: Britain hadthreatened not to maintain the status quo on the island; Iran insisted that the island wasIranian, and that they would seize it by force; unfavourable economic conditions placedSharjah in an awkward situation and weakened its position, severely affecting its manoeu-vrability; other powers came to support Iran . . . Thus, after consultations with brothers,I deemed it appropriate to seek a formula that would freeze the problem politically, whiledealing with it economically. Hence came the said agreement.65

From the above statement, it can be seen that the ruler was not acting of his own free will,and that he signed the Memorandum under an Iranian threat to use force, and due to a lackof support by Britain and neighbouring forces. Under such threats, the Memorandum ofUnderstanding may be deemed abrogated as a contradiction of international law, on the basisof Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). As the Memorandumof Understanding is utterly null and void ab initio, military occupation can therefore bedeemed the legal characterization of the status of the island of Abu Musa, the same status asprevails in the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.

Stances of the United Arab Emirates and Iran after 1971

Following Iran’s occupation of the Tunbs, and the landing of its troops in Abu Musa inaccordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the newly emerging state, i.e. the UnitedArab Emirates, asked her sisterly Arab states to assist it in bringing the dispute before theUnited Nations. The Security Council convened on 9 December 1971. The Council President,citing Article 36 of the Charter of the United Nations, called for a resolution of the disputeby diplomatic means. It was thus decided to defer debate on the issue to give an opportunityto a third party to consider it and find an appropriate solution.

As of 30 November 1971, the UAE began its unceasing efforts to win support on twoissues: its title to the three islands and its desire to resolve the dispute in accordance withinternational customs and laws.

Regarding the first question, the UAE, on 17 July 1972, sent a note to the President of theSecurity Council in which it affirmed that the three islands were Arab territories. On 5 October1972, a statement was read out before the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly,in which the UAE reaffirmed its sovereignty over them. A similar statement was read outbefore the Security Council on 20 February 1974. A third statement was read out before theUN Special Political Committee on 19 November 1974. Other notes were sent to the UNSecretary General on 6 August 1980 and 1 December 1980, in which the UAE reaffirmed itsunchanging policy of affirming its sovereignty over the islands.

On the other side, Iran under the Shah, and later under the Islamic Republic, continued toignore its international commitments with regard to the Tunbs, and continually violated theMemorandum of Understanding governing the situation in Abu Musa. It looked upon thedispute as a mere territorial misunderstanding between the two parties.

During the Shah’s reign, Iran adopted an approach of imperial arrogance, paying no attentionto appeals by the UAE. This attitude continued, and took an even more emphatic tone after

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the Shah’s downfall. Since the early 1980s, Iran has been acting in ways constituting flagrantviolation of the Memorandum of Understanding and open intervention in the internal affairsof the UAE. Iranian actions have included the following:

• Encroachment upon territories belonging to the UAE, outside the assigned area for anIranian presence in Abu Musa, by constructing roads and an airport as well as other civilianand military installations.66

• Moving troops in 1987 to the southern side of Abu Musa, and occupation thereof followingan abortive coup in Sharjah.67

• The imposition, late in 1991, of restrictions on third party citizens wishing to enter the UAEzone of Abu Musa by requiring entry permits. As the UAE rejected this measure, Iran orderedall foreigners off the island in April 1992.68

• Preventing, late in August 1992, teachers working in Abu Musa, as well as some UAEnationals, from entering the island, and returning them to Sharjah harbours following threenights aboard ship.

• The launching, on 29 December 1994, of an air route linking Bandar Abbas and Abu Musa,an action that violates UAE sovereignty over the island.

• Conducting military manoeuvres in the UAE’s territorial waters around Abu Musa islandon 27 February 1999.69

• Construction of military and civilian establishments on Abu Musa island, and the deploymentof medium-range missiles therein in February 1999.70

• Establishment of a municapility in Abu Musa affiliated to Bandar Abbas province and holdingmunicipal elections therein.71

On 12 May 1993, Iran promulgated a law entitled ‘Act on the Marine Areas of Iran in thePersian Gulf and Oman Sea’. Articles 1 and 2 of the said law define its scope. Article 1 statesthat ‘sovereignty extends beyond its land territory, internal waters and its islands in the PersianGulf’. Article 2 confirms that the islands belong to Iran. The two articles refer to the islandseven more emphatically than Article 5 of a previous law promulgated in 1959, amending thelaw of 15 July 1934 on the territorial sea. These two articles together constitute a graveencroachment upon the sovereignty of the UAE over the three islands.72

Iran’s current position may be briefly stated as follows: the Tunbs are part of Iran whosesovereignty over them is not debatable. However, negotiations over Abu Musa may beconducted on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding in such as way as would ensureIran’s security, economic and strategic interests in the Gulf.

The second issue concerns the UAE desire to solve the dispute peacefully. In spite of being theparty affected by occupation, the UAE strongly advocates a peaceful solution. In an interview,the President of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, stressed the need to refer thedispute to the International Court of Justice.73 Likewise, in his address on the occasion of thetwenty-third anniversary of the proclamation of the UAE, he urged Iran to enter into an objectiveand constructive dialogue, or otherwise to resort to international arbitration to resolve the disputeover the islands.74 Along the same lines, the UAE Foreign Minister has, in speeches at successivesessions of the UN General Assembly, expressed the UAE readiness to start immediate, directand unconditional negotiations with Iran to terminate the latter’s military occupation of the threeislands.75 When Iran did not respond, he demanded that the dispute be referred to the InternationalCourt of Justice, this being the international agency entrusted with resolving border disputes.

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In contrast to this moderate stance, the Iranian government continues to be vehementlyopposed to the idea of referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. It insists onbilateral negotiations. It should be noted that Iran had, in 1929, proposed that the disputeover the three islands be referred to international arbitration. This occurred during negoti-ations with Britain on the conclusion of an Anglo-Persian treaty.76 It should also be recalledthat Iran itself has resorted to the International Court of Justice with regard to several issues.However, since the Shah’s era, Iran has been adamantly against referring the dispute either tointernational arbitration, or to the ICJ. Iranian President Hashimi Rafsanjani, for example,stated that ‘referring the issue to an international court would not be viable’.77

Bilateral negotiations, however, have failed. They were started following the escalation ofIranian measures on the three islands in 1992. In the first round of negotiations, which washeld in Abu Dhabi on 27–28 September 1992, the UAE delegation set forth several demands,the most important of which were: termination of the Iranian occupation of the Tunbs,reaffirmed commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding with regard to Abu Musa, non-intervention by Iran in any way in the UAE’s exercise of its complete jurisdiction over thezone assigned to it in Abu Musa, and the finding of a decisive solution to the question ofsovereignty over the island of Abu Musa. Iran, however, refused to debate the status of theTunbs. Nor would it agree to refer the case to the International Court of Justice.

Following mediation by Qatar, a second round of talks was held in the period from 18 to 23November 1995. The UAE delegation reiterated its previous demands. Unfortunately, however,no agreement was reached, even upon the agenda of the negotiations, due to Iran’s refusal todebate the status of the Tunbs, and its rejection of a proposal to refer the issue to the InternationalCourt of Justice should negotiations fail to reach a solution within a specific period of time.

In a last-ditch bid to settle the dispute, the Foreign Ministers of the member states of theGulf Cooperation Council announced on 3 July 1999 the formation of a tripartite committeethat would set up a mechanism to start direct negotiation for settling the issue of Iran’soccupation of the three island by peaceful means. The committee was made up of the foreignministers of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and the Secretary General of the Gulf CooperationCouncil. The Council’s Ministerial Body had stated that the settlement of this dispute wouldcertainly contribute to the betterment of relationships between GCC member states and theIslamic Republic of Iran. The United Arab Emirates welcomed the formation of the tripartitiecommittee. While voicing optimism, it emphasized that success of the committee woulddepend on how far Iran was prepared to respond to its good offices. Contacts between thecommittee and Iran have not produced any encouraging signs so far.

It is thus evident that the stance of the UAE regarding the dispute over the three islands isbased on the fact that although the Iranian occupation is de facto, the UAE cannot and will notrelinquish its sovereignty over the three islands. In this connection, Hassan Al Alkim says:78

The UAE sees the Iranians’ occupation as de facto and cannot do anything about it;however, it has not ceded its sovereignty over them (the islands). The UAE, as a smallstate, aware of the imbalance of power with Iran, and the absence of a deterring force,whether regional or international, has preferred to keep a low profile on the issue. It haspursued a policy of peaceful co-existence with Iran, hoping that the development of goodrelations will inevitably lead to the settlement of the contentious problems.

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Ways and Means of Settling the Dispute

In the contemporary world, states are required to resolve their border disputes by peacefulmeans. It is no longer acceptable that such disputes be resolved by force. Refraining from theuse of force has become a binding legal rule in international law. It is more effective thanresorting to force, which only deepens differences and further kindles conflicts betweenneighbouring countries from generation to generation.79

International law provides several ways and means of settling disputes between statespeacefully. These include diplomatic methods, such as negotiations, good offices, conciliationand mediation; political ways, such as resorting to regional and international organizations;and legal ways, such as referring the dispute to international arbitration or to the InternationalCourt of Justice.80 Judicial settlement is normally effected through a neutral panel on the basisof the law, and the resulting verdict is thus legally binding.

In dealing with the dispute over the three islands, the UAE has adopted a peaceful approachcompatible with its own capabilities, and with a respect for international law. Initially, itdispatched its Foreign Minister to Iran in April 1992 to discuss Iran’s arbitrary measures. InSeptember of the same year, it called for negotiations in Abu Dhabi to consider a diplomaticsettlement. The attitude of the UAE delegation to these negotiations was prudent and balanced.It did not set forth prior conditions, such as the abrogation of the Memorandum of Understanding.On the contrary, it demanded full respect for it, while calling for a framework to settle thesovereignty issue within a specific time limit.

As diplomatic channels failed to produce a result, the UAE resorted to political means byreferring the issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The UAE has indicated thatit adheres to its right to exercise sovereignty over the three islands, stressing its title to them.Meanwhile, the UAE has offered to resolve the issue legally through the International Courtof Justice in the Hague, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations andArticle 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. However Iran, because of theweakness of its legal position and the difficulty of supporting its claim to the three islands, hasrejected such an approach. Thus, the only remaining way is to submit the issue to the UNSecurity Council, which could pass a recommendation referring the dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice, this being the appropriate channel for resolving it peacefully.

On 2 January 1994, the United Nations Secretary General stated that the world organizationwas ready to play any role in resolving the dispute over the three islands within the contextof diplomacy, mediation and arbitration, should the two parties seek its mediation.81

1 Arabian Gulf Intelligence, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, Oleander Press, p 300. Alsosee for the early history of the Arab people of this region, based on sources of the Dutch East India Company, B.J.Slot, The Arabs of the Gulf 1602–1784, (Arabic Translation) Abu Dhabi, The Cultural Foundation (1993) Especiallychapters seven and nine.

2 M.E. Bathurst, E. Northcutt, and C. Chance, Sharjah’s Title to the Island of Abu Musa, unpublished report(September 1971) pp 2–4.

3 Ibid., pp 4–5. 4 Mohammed Mursi Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates and Its Neighbours, (Arabic) Kuwait, Darul Qalam (1981)

pp 323–4.

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5 The Qawasim of Ra’s al-Khaimah had separated themselves from Sharjah’s Qawasim and established an independentemirate in the period from 1869 to 1900. They re-united in 1900 only to separate again in 1920 and remain sountil today.

6 Ibid., pp 324–5.7 Ibid., p 132.8 Mohammed Hassan Al Aydaroos, Arab–Iranian Relations (1921–1971) (Arabic) Kuwait, Zatul Salasel (1985) pp

254–6. Also see Ibrahim, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, Pax Britanica in the Arabian Gulf: 1899–1974 (Arabic) Riyadh,Darul Marrikh (1981) pp 305–7.

9 See R. S. Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, The Macmillan Press Ltd, London (1978) p 80.10 Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa: An Iranian Argument in Search of Peace and Co-

operation in the Persian Gulf, University of London, SOAS, July 1995, p 36.11 Zahlan, op.cit. p 129. This contradicts a claim by Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Secretary of the London-based Society

for Contemporary Iranian Studies, that Lingeh rulers were the first to grant exploration concessions. This wasstated in his article entitled ‘The Issue of Abu Musa Island From An Iranian Point of View’ in The Dispute Overthe Gulf Islands, London, Arab Research Centre (1993) p 22.

12 See Waleed Hamdi Al Adhami, The Dispute Between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the Islands of AbuMusa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs in British Documents 1764–1971, (Arabic) London, Darul Hekma (1993) p 31.In their correspondences, British circles stress that the main reason behind this move by the Persian CustomsDirector, Mr Dambrain, was Russian instigation for Iran to rival British presence in the Gulf. See D. Hawley, TheTrucial States, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd (1970) p 162.

13 Ibid., p 162.14 Telegrams from The Political Resident to Sheikh of Sharjah, 28 September 1912, and 22 October 1912. See Al

Adhami, op. cit., p 32.15 FO 371/13010, India Office, Status of Islands of Tunb, Little Tunb, Abu Musa and Sirri, 24 August, 1928. See Al

Adhami, op. cit., pp 22–416 See Zahlan, op. cit., p 90.17 See Al Adhami, op. cit., pp 61–5. See also Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995) op.cit., p 49 and R.S. Zahlan, ‘The Dispute

over Arabic Islands in the Gulf 1928–1971’ (Arabic) in Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, KuwaitUniversity, vol. 6, April 1976, p 21.

18 Zahlan, op. cit., pp 126–7. Also see Ahmed Jalal Al Tadmori, The Three Arab Islands, A Documentary Study,(Arabic) Ra’s al-Khaimah National Printing Press (1994) pp 79–80.

19 Abdulwahhab Abdoul, The Three Arab Islands in the Gulf: Extent of the Validity of Regional Changes Resultingfrom the Use of Force, (Arabic) Ra’s al-Khaimah, Centre for Studies and Documents (1993) p 170.

20 Ibid., pp 279–8021 Zahlan, op. cit., p 24. Also see F. Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, (2nd ed) Longman

(1984) p 364.22 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995), op.cit., p 55.23 Ibid., p 365. For minutes of the meetings between the British Envoy and the Ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah , see Al

Tadmori, op. cit., pp 127–55.24 Heard-Bey, op. cit., note 105, p 47925 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995), op. cit., p 56.26 These documents were translated into Arabic and published in Al Khaleej newspaper during the period of 1–1 to

4–2–2000. See especially issues no. 7545, 7550 and 7565.27 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1993), op. cit., p 5628 Abdulwahhab Abdoul, ‘Crisis of the Three Arab Islands Between a Clear UAE Attitude and a Contradicting Iranian

Stance’ (Arabic), a paper submitted to Islands of Peace Seminar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, November 30 to December 1,1994, pp. 9–11.

29 Abdoul, (1993), op. cit., pp 118–930 Ibid., p 175.31 Zahlan, op. cit., p 80.32 Davoud H. Bavand, ‘The Legal Basis of Iran’s Sovereignty over Abu Musa Island’ in Hooshang Amirahmadi (ed.)

Small Islands, Big Politics, Macmillan Press Ltd (1996) p 78.33 Ibid. p 89, Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995) op. cit., p 39. Hooshang Amirahmadi, ‘Iran-Emirates Dispute: Political and

Colonial Aspects’ (Arabic) in Shoun Al Awsat, Beirut, vol. 44, Sept. 1995, p 32.34 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995) op. cit., p 40.35 Bavand, op. cit., pp 89–93.36 Such weakness in proving Iranian sovereignty and political disorder is not confined to the twentieth century. In

fact it goes back to the era of Safavids, then Nader Shah and on to Qajars. See Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995), op. cit.,pp 10–12.

37 For further details on these conventional methods see C. Rousseau, Public International Law (translated intoArabic) Beirut, Al Ahliyah for Publishing and Distributing (1987) pp 147–51; et al.; Hamed Sultan Public Interna-tional Law, (4th ed) (Arabic) Cairo, Darul Nahda Al Arabia (1987) pp 380–93; and Ahmed Sarhal, Law ofInternational Relations (Arabic), Beirut, Al Jamiyah for Studies, Publishing and Distributing (1990) pp 147–60.

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38 Faisal Abdulrahman Taha, International Law and Border Disputes, (Arabic) Abu Dhabi Printing and PublishingCompany (1982) pp 21–2.

39 Sarhal, op. cit., p 148.40 For forms and conditions of acquisitive prescription see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public Law, (4th ed) Oxford,

Clarendon Press (1990) pp 153–9.41 Taha, op. cit., p 2642 This conduct was explained by Ali Humaidan, the first UAE envoy to the UN, in a lecture entitled, ‘Emirates’

Islands: Legal and Security Rights’, given at the UAE University in Al Ain, 26 October 1992.43 Taha, op. cit., pp 135–42.44 Mumtaz, op. cit., p 59.45 Bathurst, Northcutt & Chance, op. cit., p 13. See also Abdoul (1993) op. cit., pp 131–2 and Mustafa A. Al Najjar,

‘Britain and Sovereignty over Arabian Gulf Islands’ in Journal of Arabian Gulf, University of Basra, vol. 8, 1977,p 31.

46 Bathurst, Northcutt & Chance, op. cit., p 13.47 Ibid., pp 11–4.48 Abdoul (1993) op. cit., pp 144–75.49 Hassan Al Alkim, ‘The United Arab Emirates Perspective On the Islands’ Question,’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf

Islands, London, Arab Research Centre (1993) p 31. He has noted that the Iranian oil reserve will not last morethan three decades.

50 Article 20 of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates.51 Ahmed Mohammed Rifaat, ‘Dispute over the Arabian Gulf Islands and the prerequisites for a settlement in

accordance to the rules of International Law’, (Arabic), a paper submitted to Ra’s al-Khaimah, Islands of PeaceSeminar, 30 November–1 December 1994, p 22.

52 The declaration was published in the Official Gazette, Issue no. 240, Year 22, July 199253 Abdulwahhab Abdoul, ‘Legal Bases Supporting UAE’s Sovereignty over the Three Islands’, (Arabic) in Arabic

History, Morocco, vol. 1, Nov.1996, pp 47–49.54 This was quoted by Al Aydaroos, op. cit., pp 437–8.55 Taha, op. cit., p 26.56 Bathurst, Northcutt & Chance, op. cit., pp 15–18.57 For further details, see Abdoul (1993), op. cit., pp 263–80.58 Mumtaz, Jamsheed ‘Legal Status of Some Gulf Islands: Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs’ in Shu’un al-

Awsat Journal (Arabic), Issue no. 47, December 1995 p 59.59 Abdullah, op. cit., p 366.60 See Brownlie, op.cit., pp 159–62.61 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1995), op. cit., p 56.62 Al Khaleej newspaper, Sharjah, published text of the Memorandum of Understanding in its issue no. 4865, 4

September 1992.63 For further details, see Esam Sadeq Ramadan, Unequal Treaties in the International Law, (Arabic) Cairo, Darul

Nahda Al Arabia (1978).64 This was quoted in ibid., p 350.65 Al Aydaroos, op. cit., pp 427–428. Also see Jamal Zakaria Qasem, ‘Old Emirates and a New State’ in United Arab

Emirates: A Comprehensive Survey, (Arabic) The Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization(1978) pp 68–71.

66 Al Tadmori, op. cit., p 290.67 R. Schofield, ‘Abu Musa and the Tunbs: the historical background’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands, London,

Arab Research Centre (1993) p 15.68 J. Moberly, ‘Renewed Tension in the Gulf over Abu Musa and the Tunbs’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands ,

London, Arab Research Centre (1993) p 16.69 An address by the United Arab Emirates foreign Minister before the seventieth session of the GCC foreign

ministers, Al-Khaleej newspaper, 15 March 1999.70 Interview with Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Al-Khaleej newspaper,

18 July 1999.71 Al-Khaleej newspaper 15 March 1999.72 For full text of the law, see: United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental

and Scientific Affairs; Limits in the seas: Iran’s Maritime Claims, No. 114, 16 March 1994.73 An interview with the London-based Al Hayat newspaper, 20 March 1994.74 Address by the President of the UAE, 2 December 1994.75 See for example, address by the UAE Foreign Minister before the 49th session, 5 October 1994 and his address

before the 50th session, 4 October 1995. Also see an interview with Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed, Minister of Statefor Foreign Affairs, in Al Ahram newspaper, Cairo, 3 June 1996.

76 Mojtahed-Zadeh (1993), op. cit., p 24.77 Abdoul (1994) op. cit., p 47, quoting the London-based Al Sharq Al Awsat newspaper, Issue no. 5671, 8 June 1994.78 Al Alkim, op. cit., pp 30–1.

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79 Rifaat, op. cit., p 17.80 On ways and means of resolving international disputes, see J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, London,

Sweet & Maxwell (1984); Mohammed Basheer Al Shafei, Public International Law in War and Peace, (Arabic)(4th ed) Cairo, Darul Fikr Al Arabi (1979) pp 603–40; Ahmed Abdulhamid Ashoushi & Omar Abubakr Bakhashab,Concise in Public International Law (Arabic) Alexandria, Shabab Al Jamiaa Establishment, (1990) pp 557–99;Mohammed Aziz Shukri, An Introduction to Public International Law in Peace Time, (Arabic) (4th ed) Damascus,Darul Fikr (1983) pp 423–38.

81 Al Khaleej newspaper, Sharjah, Issue no. 5349, 3 January 1994.

Bibliography

Abdoul, Abdulwahhab, ‘Crisis of the Three Arab Islands Between a Clear UAE Attitude and a Contradicting IranianStance’ (Arabic) a paper submitted to Islands of Peace Seminar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, 30 November–1 December1994.

Abdoul, Abdulwahhab, The Three Arab Islands in the Gulf: Extent of the Validity of Regional Changes Resultingfrom the Use of Force, (Arabic) Ra’s al-Khaimah, Centre for Studies and Documents (1993).

Abdoul, Abdulwahhab, ‘Legal Basis Supporting UAE’s Sovereignty over the Three Islands’(Arabic) in Arabic History,Morocco, vol. 1 Nov. (1996), pp 39–60.

Abdullah, Mohammed Mursi, The United Arab Emirates and Its Neighbors (Arabic) Kuwait, Darul Qalam (1981).Al Adhami, Waleed Hamdi, The Dispute Between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over the Islands of Abu Musa,

Greater and Lesser Tunbs in British Documents 1764–1971 (Arabic) London, Darul Hekma (1993).Al Alkim, Hassan, ‘The United Arab Emirates Perspective On the Islands’ Question’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf

Islands, London, Arab Research Centre (1993) pp 28–38.Al Aydaroos, Mohammed Hassan, Arab-Iranian Relations (1921–1971) (Arabic) Kuwait, Zatul Salasel (1985).Al Najjar, Mustafa A. ‘Britain and Sovereignty over Arabian Gulf Island’, in Journal of Arabian Gulf, University of

Basra, Vol.8 (1977) pp 27–34.Al Tadmori, Ahmed Jalal, The Three Arab Islands, A Documentary Study, (Arabic) Ra’s al-Khaimah, Ra’s al-Khaimah

National Printing Press (1994).Arabian Gulf Intelligence, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, Oleander Press. Ashoushi, Ahmed Abdulhamid & Omar Abubakr Bakhashab, Concise in Public International Law, (Arabic) Alexandria,

Shabab Al Jamiaa Establishment (1990).Basheer, Dr Al Shafei Mohammed, Public International Law in War and Peace, (4th ed) (Arabic) Cairo, Darul Fikr

Al Arabi (1979).Bathurst, M. E., Ely Northcutt, and Howard Chance, Sharjah’s Title to the Island of Abu Musa, unpublished report

(September 1971).Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public Law, (4the ed) Oxford, Clarendon Press (1990).Constitution of the United Arab Emirates.Hawley, Donald, The Trucial States, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd (1970) p 162.Heard-Bey, Frauke, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, (2nd ed) London, Longman (1984).Ibrahim, Abdulaziz Abdulghani, Pax Britanica in the Arabian Gulf: 1899–1974 (Arabic) Riyadh, Darul Marrikh

(1981).Limits in the seas: Iran’s Maritime Claims, United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs, no. 114 (16 March 1994).Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement, London, Sweet & Maxwell (1984).Moberly, John, ‘Renewed Tension in the Gulf over Abu Musa and the Tunbs’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands,

London, Arab Research Centre (1993) pp 16–20.Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz,’The Issue of Abu Musa Island From An Iranian Point of View’ in The Dispute Over the

Gulf Islands, London, Arab Research Centre (1993) pp 21–7.Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa: An Iranian Argument in Search of Peace and Co-

operation in the Persian Gulf, University of London, SOAS, July 1995, p 36.Mumtaz, Jamsheed, ‘Legal Status of Some Gulf Islands: Abu Musa, and Greater and Lesser Tunbs’ Shu’un al-Awsat

Journal (Arabic) 47, December (1995) pp 55–74.Qasem, Jamal Zakaria, ‘Old Emirates and a New State’ in United Arab Emirates: A Comprehensive Survey, (Arabic)

The Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (1978).Ramadan, Esam Sadeq, Unequal Treaties in the International Law, (Arabic) Cairo, Darul Nahda Al Arabia (1978).Rifaat, Ahmed Mohammed, ‘ Dispute over the Arabian Gulf Islands and the prerequisites for a settlement in accordance

to the rules of International Law’, (Arabic) a paper submitted to Islands of Peace Seminar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, 30November–1 December 1994.

Rousseau, Charles, Public International Law (Arabic translation) Beirut, Al Ahliyah for Publishing and Distributing(1987).

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Sarhal, Ahmed, Law of International Relations (Arabic) Beirut, Al Jamiyah for Studies, Publishing and Distributing(1990).

Schofield, Richard, ‘Abu Musa and the Tunbs: the historical background’ in The Dispute Over the Gulf Islands,London, Arab Research Centre (1993) pp 6–15.

Shukri, Mohammed Aziz, An Introduction to Public International Law in Peace Time, (4th ed) (Arabic) Damascus,Darul Fikr (1983).

Slot, B.J. The Arabs of the Gulf 1602–1784, (Arabic Translation) Abu Dhabi, The Cultural Foundation (1993).Sultan, Hamed (et al.), Public International Law, (4th ed) (Arabic) Cairo, Darul Nahda Al Arabia (1987).Taha, Faisal Abdulrahman International Law and Border Disputes, (Arabic) Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi Printing and

Publishing Company (1982).Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, London, Macmillan (1978)Zahlan, Rosemarie Said, ‘The Dispute over Arabic Islands in the Gulf 1928–1971’ (Arabic) in Journal of Gulf and

Arabian Peninsula Studies, Kuwait University, vol. 6, April 1976, p 80, 90.

NewspapersAl Hayat newspaper, London.Al Ahram newspaper, Cairo.Al Khaleej newspaper, Sharjah.

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Evolution and Performance of theUAE Economy 1972–1998

Ali Tawfik Al Sadik

Introduction

The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) economy has been transformed from a precarious base offishing and pearling, together with some local agriculture, to an oil-based, high-income economywith a high concentration of expatriate labour driving the engines and wheels of the differentsectors. The transformation of the economy brought with it challenges and opportunities thatinduced discussions on how best to confront the challenges and utilize the opportunities in anoptimal manner. The analysis of the evolution of the economy that will be presented indicatesthat the UAE Government has succeeded, to a great extent, on both counts. In section two anoverview of the economy in 1998 is presented, utilizing a production and demand structure.Section three traces, discusses and analyses the evolution of the economy over the period1972–1998, highlighting the oil boom challenges and opportunities, the sources of growth andinstability in incomes and prices. In section four the evolution of the consolidated budget, aneffective policy tool for economic and social development, is outlined and the achievements inthe social sphere are highlighted. Section five presents a brief discussion of the evolution of thetrade and current account balances in the balance of payments. Section six indicates briefly themonetary and credit policy in the UAE and this is followed by a short concluding section.

Overview of the Economy

The UAE, which was established on 2 December 1971, is a federation of the seven emirates:Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ra’s al-Khaimah and Fujairah. It hasa total area of approximately 84,000 sq. km with an estimated population of three millioninhabitants in 2000, of which non-nationals make up over three-quarters.1 The labour marketis dominated by expatriates who accounted for more than 91 per cent of total employment in1998.2 The UAE per capita income on the basis of the gross domestic product (GDP) amountedto US $16,700 in 1998 and is considered relatively high compared to the average per capitaincome of developing countries.3 Three emirates, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, account formore than 93 per cent and 84 per cent of the UAE GDP and population respectively. Thedistribution of GDP and population between the emirates in 1998 was as in Table 1 below.

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Table 1. Distribution of GDP and population between the emirates in 1998 GDP Population GDP per capita

% % dh US $Abu Dhabi 55.32 38.59 87,820 23,929Dubai 27.88 28.92 59,066 16,094Sharjah 9.88 16.77 36,105 9,838Ra’s al-Khaimah 2.81 5.80 29,638 8,076Ajman 1.28 5.23 22,964 6,047Fujairah 1.51 3.17 29,194 7,955Umm al-Qaiwain 0.64 1.49 26,256 7,154

Memorandum: 1998 UAE GDP = 170,066 mn dirhams; 46,340 mn US $; population = 2, 776,000Source: On the basis of Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report 1999, Tables 1 and 6.

The income distribution between the emirates is skewed in favour of Abu Dhabi, as itsincome share of 55.32 per cent is 143.35 per cent of its population share. This is reflected inthe differences between the per capita incomes of the emirates presented in Table 1. AbuDhabi’s 1998 per capita income at US $23,929 is the highest for the emirates and is aboutfour times the lowest per capita income, that of Ajman, which did not exceed US $6050. Infact, the per capita incomes of all the emirates, except Abu Dhabi, are lower than the UAEaverage per capita income of US $16,700

The cited income differences between the emirates are generated mainly by the variationsin their natural resource endowments. The most important resource the UAE possesses ishydrocarbons (oil and gas). UAE proven oil reserves are estimated at 98.10 billion barrels(bbl) and gas reserves were 6003 billion cubic metres (bcm) at the end of 1998. UAE crudeoil production was 2.278 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1998 and gas production was 48,860million cubic metres (mcm) per year in 1997. These UAE petroleum related amounts are splitbetween the emirates as shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Production and reserves of oil and gas(Oil: production in mb/d & reserves in bbl) (Gas: production in mcm per year & reserves in bcm)

Production Reserves Production* ReservesOil Gas

Abu Dhabi 1.990 92.2 14.30 6,003Dubai 0.230 5.9 1.7 121Sharjah. .058 – 0. 20 303Ra’s al-Khaimah. – – 0. 04 31Total 2.278 98.10 48,860 5779World 72.760 10,517.73 2,898,180 152,504

*1997Sources: 1. Petroleum Economist, September.

2. OAPEC, Secretary General Annual Report 1998, Tables 2-6 to 2-9, pp 95–101. 3. EIU, Country Profile United Arab Emirates 1998–1999.

The impact on their income shares of the distribution of the petroleum resource betweenthe emirates is reflected in its contribution to their GDPs. The shares of value added of theoil sector in the emirates’ GDPs in 1997 are shown in Table 3 below.

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Table 3. Contributions of the oil sector to emirates’ GDPs in 1997(per cent of the emirate’s GDP)

Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah Ra’s al-Khaimah UAE43.72 12.15 7.48 1.3 29.63

Source: calculated based on Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report 1999, Table 7

Structure of GDP: the demand side

Crude oil production contributed about 22 per cent to UAE GDP in 1998. However, the oilsector’s impact on UAE economic activities and evolution is more extensive. Oil exports arethe main source for foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, accounting for morethan 37 per cent and 60 per cent of their totals respectively in 1998 (total exports and re-exports = Dh 111.45 billion, of which Dh 42.2 billion from oil and gas, total public revenueDh 42.69 billion, of which Dh 25.50 billion from oil and gas).4

The impact and importance of such shares on the overall economic activity may be analysedand gauged through the structure of expenditure on GDP utilizing the income determinationequality, namely:

GDP = Cp + Ip + G + X – Z (1)where: Cp = private consumption expenditure

Ip = private investment expenditureG = government consumption and investment expenditureX = exports of goods and non-factor servicesZ = imports of goods and non-factor services

It is appropriate to mention that available national accounts data do not split investmentexpenditures between the private sector and the Government. However, government financialstatistics contain data on government investment expenditures (Ig) which may be used toobtain private investment expenditure (Ip) from the relation:

Ip = I – Igwhere I= total gross investment and Ig = government investment expenditure. In fact, total investment in the UAE is split three ways: government gross fixed capital

formation, public sector gross fixed capital formation, and private sector gross fixed capitalformation. Total gross investment includes change in stocks.

The shares of the variables on the right-hand side of the income determination equality havechanged significantly between 1995 and 1998 as reflected in the following data:

Table 4. Structure of aggregate demand (components of aggregate demand as per centof GDP) in 1995 and 1998Variable 1995 1998Cp/GDP 47.92 53.12Ip/GDP 20.76 22.14

G/GDP(( Cg+Ig)/GDP) 25.38(16.45+8.93) 24.72(16.78+7.94)X/GDP 68.96 67.4

Z/GDP(–) 63.02 67.38Total 100.00 100.00

Source: UAE, Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report, 1999, Tables 1 and 5

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These shares reveal that the UAE economy is highly dependent on the external sector asreflected by the trade ratio (export plus import shares) which exceeded 131 per cent and 134per cent in 1995 and 1998 respectively. Both export and import shares are relatively high andconsequently the external sector plays a major role in the performance and evolution of theUAE economy. In addition, the government sector, as reflected by its expenditure share(G/GDP), plays an important role in the economy. Private sector expenditures accounted formore than 68 per cent of GDP in 1995 and exceeded 75 per cent in 1998. Thus, domesticabsorption (A) (equal to the sum of private and government expenditures on consumptionand investment) accounted in 1995 for a little bit more than 94 per cent of GDP, indicating apositive net export of goods and non-factor services (X–Z). In contrast, domestic absorptionin 1998 accounted for approximately 100 per cent of GDP, which is reflected by approximateequality between exports and imports of goods and non-factor services. However, imports ofgoods and non-factor services (Z) accounted for approximately 67 per cent of A in both 1995and 1998. This is another measure of the dependence of the economy on the policies of anddevelopments in economies of its international trade partners.

Structure of GDP: the production side

The production side of the UAE economy is heavily dependent on expatriate labour. Aproduction theory framework may be utilized to understand the economic impact of expatriatelabour on the economy. At the aggregate level labour and capital, the traditional factors ofproduction, technology and organization (management) are combined to produce aggregateoutput Q. In mathematical terms, this relation takes the form:

Q = F (K, L, O) (2) where: Q = Output

K = Capital input L = Labour input O = Organization, Management F = Technology

The UAE has had no capital constraint since, thanks to the foreign exchange earnings fromoil and gas exports, it has been able to purchase from international markets the capital goodsand services needed for its production processes. But the size of indigenous population (nationals)and consequently the indigenous labour force was and still is a constraint, from quantitative andqualitative aspects. For example, the labour force in the UAE numbered 1,378,000 workers in1998 (about 49.64 per cent of the population) of which more than 91 per cent were expatriates.This labour force, together with the capital services, management and available technologies inthe different sectors of the economy, produced the equivalent of Dh 170,066 million (US $46,340million) of final goods and services (GDP at factor cost) in 1998. Compensation of employees(wages and salaries) accounted for only 30.46 per cent of the GDP, a share less than half of thetwo thirds’share estimated from Cobb-Douglas production functions for other economies (Table4 in the annex). The balance in the 1998 GDP is allocated to depreciation of fixed capital stockand operating surplus (owners of capital). This large divergence between labour share in theUAE GDP and in other economies can be comprehended by analysing the distribution of thelabour force between the economic sectors and their contribution to GDP. Table 5 in the annexpresents the said labour force distribution and the structure of GDP by origin.

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The information content in Table 5 is important for understanding the low share of wages inGDPand for labour policy discussions on the issue of national versus foreign labour involvementin the economy. It is clear that there are large differences between the productivity of labouremployed in the different sectors. The average labour productivity (GDP divided by numberof workers) is about Dh 123,000 in 1998. The maximum labour productivity is in crude oil(Dh 1,687,260) and the minimum is in domestic services of households (Dh 10,785) with astandard deviation of Dh 451,371.

Table 5. Some statistics on labour productivity in the UAE economy in 1998 (dirhams)Average 123,371Maximum 1,687,260Minimum 10,785Standard Deviation (St. d. ) 451,371

Source: based on Table 5 in the annex.

The crude oil subsector employed roughly 1.6 per cent of the labour force, but contributedabout 22 per cent of GDP in 1998. The next best labour productivities are in finance andinsurance (Dh 528,611) and real estate and business (Dh 513,826). These sectors (crude oil,finance and insurance, and real estate) employed less than 6 per cent of the labour force yetthey contributed about 39 per cent of GDP. In contrast, the three sectors, wholesale, governmentand domestic services of households, employed about 38 per cent of the labour force, butcontributed 24.5 per cent of GDP. Further, if the construction and agriculture sectors are addedthen the employment percentage increases to about 64 per cent, but their contribution to GDPincreases only to about 37 per cent.

The analysis of the employment shares and sectoral shares in the UAE GDP leads to theissue of optimal allocation of the labour resource. In theory, the allocation of a resource betweendifferent uses should be in accordance with the principle of equality of the marginal produc-tivities of the resource in the different uses, if one is to achieve optimal results. In the caseunder analysis, marginal productivities of labour in the different sectors are not available.However, as a proxy, the average labour productivities are presented in Table 5 in the annex.

These average productivities show wide variations and the oil sector is ahead of all sectorsby a very large margin. The wide and extensive variation between the labour productivitiesin the different sectors is to be expected on the basis of differences in the quality of labourand the nature of the sector.

The special nature of the oil sector

The oil sector is not like any other sector because oil reserves are non-financial assets andthese are part and parcel of national wealth (Kendrick 1972; Fisher 1965; Hicks 1978). Giventhis concept, then the contribution of the crude oil subsector of Dh 36,951 million in 1998 isnot value added. That is, it is not income generated from an asset. It is rather transforming anasset from one form (oil) to another (foreign exchange or financial asset). This way of lookingat the oil sector shows that the confusion between the concepts of wealth and income leadsto income illusion about the proceeds of petroleum exports. The income illusion manifestsitself in several economic variables, namely:5

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• Overestimation of national income level.• Overestimation of national saving.• Distortion of the current account position.• Underestimation of domestic absorption.• Overestimation of the accumulation of national wealth.• Distortions of the contributions of the different sectors to the national income.• Underestimation of foreign aid.

These are important issues that have been raised in the literature and have been addressedin the framework of the 1993 United Nations System of National Accounts.

The adjusted GDP (AGDP) and labour productivity

To remove some of the distortions of the contributions of the different sectors to GDP, thecontribution of crude oil is removed and an adjusted GDP is considered for 1998:

AGDP = GDP – crude oil = 170,066 – 36,951 = 133,115Table 6 in the annex presents sectoral employment and contributions to adjusted GDP(AGDP)

in 1998. Average labour productivity relative to AGDP is about Dh 98,000, with a maximum of

Dh 529,000 in the finance and insurance subsector and a minimum of about Dh 11,000 inthe domestic services of households and a standard deviation of Dh 171,200.

It is important to note that the domestic services sector employs more than 11 per cent ofthe labour force (excluding employment in the crude oil subsector) but contributes less than1.5 per cent of AGDP. Low contribution to value added, an outcome of low productivity, isa good and practical starting point for discussion on labour policy in the UAE. If this is granted,then a criterion to identify low labour productivity would be to compare the variable indicatorprod with one, prod being defined as:

prod =Sector’s share in GDP

Sector’s employment share

If prod for a sector is less than one, the sector should be a target for study, analysis andreform aiming to raise its labour productivity.

According to this indicator the five sectors, agriculture, construction, wholesale, other servicesand domestic services of households, are low productivity sectors. These sectors employed about62 per cent of the labour force, excluding the oil sector, yet their contribution was less than 39per cent of AGDP in 1998. Agriculture, other services and domestic services are especially lowproductivity sectors and should be targeted for study and reform (Table 6 in the annex).

To conclude this section, it is appropriate to mention that the UAE economy is market based,open with a relatively high trade ratio, and has liberal trade policy and exchange rate convert-ibility for current and capital transactions. The lifeline of the economy is petroleum and it isheavily dependent on expatriate labour. The UAE economy has made important strides in itsdevelopment despite the violent fluctuations of its income during the last three decades, thanksto the persistent efforts of the UAE President, HH Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, andthe rulers of the emirates.

In the following sections, the evolution of the economy during the period 1972–1998 ispresented, analysed and evaluated.

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Evolution of the Economy

The UAE economy has witnessed several phases of growth and development. Up to the endof the 1950s, the economy was characterized by limited natural and human resources.Economic activities were centred mainly on agriculture (date cultivation, locally consumedvegetables and fruits), fishing, the raising of livestock, mostly camels, traditional manufac-turing (tents, rugs and carpets, gowns, daggers and swords and some dried foods) andpearling.6 The UAE population is estimated to have been 72,000 and 86,000 inhabitants in1950 and 1958 respectively.7

Oil boom challenges and opportunities

Foreign trade activity entered a new phase with the production and export of oil in the emirates:Abu Dhabi in 1962, Dubai in 1969 and Sharjah in 1970.8 The oil activity started to shape theevolution and development of the UAE economy in the 1970s as a result of the huge increasein oil production and exports and government revenues. Oil production increased from 253mn b in 1970 to about 619 mn b in 1975; exports increased from 253 mn b to about 606mnb and oil revenues jumped from US $233 million to US $6000 million. The huge growth inoil revenues during the period 1970–1975 (about 2475 per cent) is an outcome of the increasein production and the adjustment in government take.9

The unprecedented affluence the UAE started experiencing from the early 1970s, thanksto the structural changes in the international oil industry, brought challenges and opportu-nities to its leadership. The challenges were tri-dimensional: political, social and economic.As mentioned earlier, the UAE was established in December 1971 as a federation of sevenemirates with limited natural resources in addition to petroleum, which was mainly concen-trated in Abu Dhabi. Thus, Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser degree, Dubai received the oil revenues.Given this situation, the first challenge facing the Government was how to utilize the revenuesfor strengthening and cementing the federation, improving and expanding the social servicesto raise the standard of living and develop the non-oil productive base of the economy. In theevent, the UAE President, HH Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, supported and promoteddevelopment through planning and action as a single unified country. His paradigm was atrade off between Abu Dhabi’s oil wealth and the rulers’ release of personal authority to theFederal Government. This paradigm helped to cement and strengthen the federation politically,socially and economically. One of the early achievements of the UAE Government was themonetary integration of the emirates which culminated in May 1973 with the establishmentof the UAE Monetary Agency and the issue of the UAE national currency, the dirham, whichreplaced both the Qatari/Dubai riyal circulating in the northern emirates and the Bahrainidinar circulating in Abu Dhabi.10 In 1980 the Monetary Agency was replaced by the UAECentral Bank, which was charged with the responsibilities usually assigned to a central bank.

In June 1974 the UAE Council of Ministers defined and outlined the main themes anddirections for development.11 Thus, in the economic sphere, development should aim to:

• Change the productive structure of the economy, optimize its capacity, diversify its activitiesand maximize export revenues.

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• Concentrate on the expansion and exploitation of natural resources, promote and supportmanufacturing and lower the pressure on the growth of imports.

• Adopt capital-intensive projects so as to lower the demand for labour. • Develop the infrastructure in a compatible way with the requirements of production of goods

and services without barriers or bottlenecks. Development in the social sphere should proceed on the basis that:

• The ultimate objective of any development plan is the human being.The different socialservices are therefore a basic right for him/her. These services include health care, education(with a view to supplying the country’s labour demand for the different skills and special-izations, along with its cultural and information aspects), the care of the environment,achieving the country’s security and safeguarding the foundations of society, its morale,holy beliefs and shrines.

• With this foundation, the aim should be to supply the country with a trained and skillednational labour force to manage the economy and prepare and implement development plans.

Given these economic and social development objectives, it is appropriate to mention thatthe UAE Government in general, and the UAE President in particular, has always stressedthat the fundamental objective of development is the welfare of society and ensuring itscontinuity for the present and future generations. The human being has always been at thecentre of development in the UAE, which indicates the importance the Government placedon human development long before the publication of the first report, Human DevelopmentReport 1990, by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).12

The opportunities and challenges brought with affluence could be outlined as follows:

• No budget constraint as a result of a large increase in oil revenues and high saving rate.13

• A need for regulations and institutions in the public and private sectors. • Shortage of data banks and research centres to support decision-making. • Need to rationalize the answers to the basic economic questions of what, how and for whom

to produce.

In light of the above, it is appropriate to study and evaluate the evolution of the main economicindicators.

Evolution of income and prices

The size of the UAE economy, measured by the nominal GDP, has grown by more than 26fold during the period 1972–1998: nominal GDP increased from Dh 6450 million in 1972(US $1471 million) to Dh 170,066 million (US $46,340 million). However, the UAE realGDP in 1998 was only about 4.161 times its level in 1972 due to the erosion of purchasingpower as a result of the increase in inflation index by about 6.34 times (Table 1 in the annex).

The expansion of the economy has not been smooth. In fact, it suffered violent instabilitiesas reflected in the large expansions and contractions during the period 1972–1998 (Figs. 1and 2). Using the sign of GDP growth rate as a criterion, the UAE economy witnessed 15positive and 11 negative growth rates during the period: the maximum growth rate was 56.03per cent in 1973 and the minimum was negative 18.8 per cent in 1986 with an average growthrate of 6.5 per cent and 14.85 per cent standard deviation.

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9420.000

40.000

60.000

80.000

100.000

120.000

140.000

96 98-40

-20

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98

Fig. 1. UAE real GDP in mn dirhams

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9420.000

40.000

60.000

80.000

100.000

120.000

140.000

96 98

Fig. 3. UAE per capita real GDP (dirhams)

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

20.000

40.000

60.000

80.000

100.000

120.000

140.000

500.000

1.000.000

1.500.000

2.000.000

2.500.000

3.000.000

072 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 9896 98

Fig. 4. UAE real GDP (mn. dh) and population (number)

Fig. 2. UAE real GDP growth rates(per cent per annum)

The volatility of GDP during the period under study imparted volatility to per capita income(Fig. 3). The overall trend of per capita GDP is on the down side since the early eightiesdespite the rebounds in the oil market. This may be explained by the continued increase inthe UAE population coupled with the slowdown in the economy (Fig. 4).

Sources of growth and instability

The sources of growth and instability in the evolution of the UAE economy might be tracedto the development of the crude oil subsector. In fact, it is the lifeline of the UAE becauseeconomic activities, directly or indirectly, are linked with it. The direct impact of the oil subsectormay be investigated through the evolution of its value added.

A. Crude Oil Value Added The value added of the crude oil subsector fluctuated violently between 1972 and 1998. Theaverage value added is estimated at Dh 41,705 million. Its maximum and minimum reachedDh 70,532 million and Dh 4099 million in 1980 and 1972 respectively, with a standarddeviation of Dh 16,066 million. These variations are reflected in some statistics for the annualgrowth rates of the value added of crude oil from 1972 to1998:

• Maximum rate = 218.53 % in 1974• Average rate = 15.79 %• Minimum rate = – 41.46 % in 1986• Standard deviation = 50.14 %

Figures 5 and 6 clearly show that the value added of crude oil was unstable between 1972and 1998. The trend of value added was increasing in the sub-periods 1972–1980 and1987–1990, and it was decreasing during the periods 1981–1986 and 1991–1998. In fact,growth rates of crude oil value added were positive in 13 years and negative in 13 years duringthe whole period.

Fluctuations in the value added of crude oil are exogenous to the economic policy makingof the UAE. They are an outcome of international oil market development. The internationaloil market witnessed major changes and experienced violent fluctuations during the period1971–1998. Crude oil prices fluctuated between US $2 and US $33 per barrel and the oilmarket shifted from a seller’s market up to 1981 to a buyer’s market for the rest of the period.14

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 940

20.000

40.000

60.000

80.000

96 98

Fig. 5. Evolution of UAE value added in the crude oil sub sector (mn.dh)

Adjusting the GDP for crude oil contributions shows less volatility in the non-oil GDP.

B. Non-oil GDPNon-oil GDP, christened adjusted gross domestic product (AGDP) and defined as: AGDP =GDP–Crude Oil Value Added, has grown by more than 56 fold during the period 1972–1998:from Dh 2351 million to Dh 113,115 million (Table 9 in the annex). AGDP experienced lessvolatility than GDP. Only during the period 1984–86 did it experience negative growth rates(Fig. 7). The average, maximum and minimum growth rates and standard deviations forAGDP and NGDP are presented in Table 6 below.

Table 6. Growth rates and standard deviations:for AGDP and NGDP (1972 1998) (per cent)

Average Max Min St.d.AGDP 19.17 116.36 –2.68 27.28NGDP 17.25 173.20 –19.97 37.28

Source: based on Table 9 in the annex.

These variables indicate clearly that AGDP achieved a higher average growth rate with lessvolatility, as measured by the standard deviations, than nominal GDP (Fig. 7).

The AGDP also experienced an increasing share of GDP while that of crude oil declinedfrom 1972 to 1998. The paths of the two shares crossed each other in 1982 (Fig. 8).

Thus, the share of non-oil GDP increased from less than 37 per cent in 1972 to more than78 per cent in 1998 with a local peak of about 67 per cent in 1986.15

Table 7. Some statistics for the shares of AGDP and crude oil (per cent)Average Max Min

AGDP share 52.74 78.27 19.45Crude Oil share 47.26 80.55 21.73

Source: based on Table 9 in the annex.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

-100

100

200

300

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9472 96 98

Fig. 6. UAE growth rates of value added of crude oil sector (per cent per annum)

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

40.000

80.000

120.000

160.000

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9472

NGDP

AGDP

Crude Oil

96 98

200.000

Fig. 7. UAE NGDP, crude oil value added and adjusted GDP (mn.dh)

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9472

100

AGDP-SH

Oil-SH

96 98

Fig. 8. UAE shares of AGDP and crude oil value added in GDP (per cent)

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 9472

100

CG SHARE

X SHARE

I SHARE

CP SHAREZ SHARE

96 98

Fig. 9. UAE shares of aggregate demand components in GDP (per cent)

C. Evolution of Aggregate Demand Another source of growth and volatility in the UAE economic activity is the evolution ofa*ggregate demand. Aggregate demand is expenditure on GDP and may be represented as (seeequation 1 and the subsequent discussion):

GDP = Cp + Cg + I + X – Z (3)

Aggregate demand is made up of two parts: domestic absorption A and net exports (X–Z).

a. shares of components of aggregate demandFigure 9 presents the paths for the shares of private consumption (Cp), government consumption(Cg), investment (I), exports (X) and imports (Z) in GDPfrom 1972 to 1998. Private consumptionturns out to have experienced the largest volatility compared to the other variable componentsof aggregate demand.

In contrast, the share of government consumption in GDP experienced the least volatility.Both exports and imports showed relatively high volatility. Table 8 presents some statisticsfor the evolution of the different shares in GDP.

Table 8. Some statistics for the shares of aggregate demand (1972–1998) (per cent)Average Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation

Cp 31.40 53.31 6.91 13.94Z 43.39 70.08 25.63 13.43X 68.30 94.64 47.63 10.03I 27.89 39.03 15.50 4.9Cg 15.80 22.10 8.26 3.94

Source: based on Table 2 in the annex.

All the shares of the components except that of exports were higher in 1998 than in 1972.The Cp share was less than 15 per cent in 1972 and exceeded 53 per cent in 1998. Thisincrease in the share of private consumption is to be expected on the basis of the increase inpopulation from 309,243 persons in 1972 to 2,776,000 in 1998 and in per capita income (onthe basis of nominal GDP) from Dh 20,857 to Dh 61,263 in the same years.16 Also the Cgshare was about 13 per cent in 1972 and reached a minimum of about 8 per cent in 1975. Itincreased to about 17 per cent in 1998 with a maximum of about 22 per cent in 1986. Thissurge in the government share in 1986 was not policy induced, but rather a result of thedecline in GDP following the turmoil in the international oil market which led to the crashof oil prices to below US $13 per barrel. In contrast, the X share declined in 1986, reachinga minimum of about 48 per cent because of the negative impact of the oil market on the UAEexports which are mainly oil related.

b. growth rates of aggregate demandOn the basis of growth rates, exports (X) experienced the highest volatility, followed by privateconsumption, investments, government consumption and imports (Fig. 10). Table 9 presentssome statistics for the growth rates of the different components of aggregate demand.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 9. Growth rates of the components of aggregate demand and GDP 1972–1998 (per cent)Average Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation

X 17.91 212 –34.28 45.61I 17.26 150 –15.47 33.77Cp 23.13 189 –2.63 37.94Cg 17.17 108 –19.56 28.55Z 18. 113 –12.45 25.35A 18.71 123 –4.39 28.62GDP 17.25 173 –20. 37.29

Source: based on Table 2 in the annex.

The contributions of the components of aggregate demand to the growth rates of GDP maybe estimated from the relation:

Growth rate of GDP =(growth rate of Cp)(share of Cp)+(growth of Cg)(share ofCg)+(growth of I)(share of I)+(growth of X)(share of X)-(Growth of Z)(share of Z).

Thus, the contributions to the average growth rate of GDPfrom 1972 to 1998 may be calculatedas follows:17

(grth Cp)(share Cp) = (23.13)(31.2) = 7.22 %(grth Cg)(share Cg) = (17.17)(15.74) = 2.7 %(grth I)(share I) = (17.26)(27.81) = 4.8 %(grth X)(share X) = (17.91)(68.28) = 12.22 %(grthZ)(share Z) = (18.)(–43.39) = –7.81 %

The contributions of the components to the average growth rate of GDP are:

Cp: 37.72 % X: 63.93 %Cg: 14.10 % Z: –40.08 %I: 25.08 %

Exports have contributed about 64 per cent to the average growth rate of GDP from 1972to 1998. Such a high contribution renders exports the most effective factor in shaping GDP.The export concentration index for the UAE economy is relatively high at 0.691 in 1992,although it has declined from 0.801 in 1984.18

Given the high contribution of X, the high export concentration index makes GDPextremelysensitive to international developments in general and to the oil market in particular. Next inimportance is the import contribution to GDP growth which averaged about –40 per cent.Thus, the external sector is the mover of the UAE economy.19

Private consumption contributed about 38 per cent of average GDPgrowth while governmentconsumption contributed about 14 per cent. This relatively low government contribution tothe growth of GDPshould not be interpreted as limited or implying a small government impacton overall economic activity in the UAE. In fact, the Government receives the oil revenuesand spends on investments, transfers and subsidies, all activities which influence the behaviourof the private sector in its consumption and investment activities. Investment, both privateand government, contributed about 25 per cent to the average growth of GDP. But the

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

216

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

-80

-40

120

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94

160

96 98

200

240

Fig. 10. UAE growth rates of GDP and components of aggregate demand (per cent)

GDP Growth

Cg Growth

X Growth

Cp Growth

I Growth

Z Growth

incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) (investment divided by the increase in GDP betweentwo dates) on the basis of real GDP is about 4.25.

ICOR =I

•GDP

= (investment ratio x reciprocal of growth rate:

∆GDP GDP ∆GDP 27.81 x 1/6.55 = 4.25)

This is a rough measure of the productivity of investments; the lower the number the betteris the productivity. The ICOR for some groups are:20

• Low-income economies: 4.84• Upper-income economies: 7.35• High-income economies: 13.53

d. Structure of the UAE economy: productionThe UAE economy, as mentioned earlier, has expanded in size by more than 264 per centbetween 1972 and 1998 (Table 1 in the annex). At the beginning of the period, value addedin the crude oil subsector dominated production with more than 63 per cent of total GDP.However, the UAE Government aimed, through its economic policy, to lower the country’sdependence on the oil sector. Thus, when oil prices were adjusted upward in 1979/1980 forthe second time, and oil revenues surged by more than 100 per cent (from Dh 24,018 millionin 1978 to Dh 52,727 million in 1980), the Ministry of Planning prepared a five year plan forthe period 1981–1985. The plan centred on three major issues, namely:21

• Optimal size and structure of population. • Improvement in the standard of living in all regions of the UAE and development of the

skills and capabilities of the citizens.• Expansion of the productive base by increasing growth in the non-oil sectors in order to

lower the dependence on the oil sector and develop non-oil sources of income.

The funding of the plan assumed constant oil revenues and about 70 per cent of the fundswere to be provided by the Federal Government. However, oil revenues were down to lessthan Dh 35,000 million in 1982 and Dh 27,000 million in 1983. Oil market developments inthe first half of the 1980s discouraged the adoption of the development plan and it was shelved.This led to uncoordinated investments in the emirates that produced over-capacity andduplication in several activities in the economy. As a result, the non-oil economy did notimprove as much as was expected, though the share of non-oil GDP improved from about 50per cent in 1982 to about 55 per cent in 1985.22

The agricultural sector expanded, but because of the climate of the UAE, it contributed lessthan 3 per cent in 1998 (Table 5 in the annex).

The manufacturing sector has expanded from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1972 to about 12 percent in 1998. Government services also increased its share of GDP from 4.48 per cent to 11.54per cent in 1972 and 1998 respectively. The increase in government share is associated withthe population increase (from 309,243 to 2,776,000) and the improvement in living standards.Also associated with the growth of population is the expansion in construction activity, thedistributive sectors and the other service sectors.

The tremendous evolution and development that has taken place from 1972 to 1998 may notbe easily quantified, evaluated and recorded. However, it may be appreciated and comprehended

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

through the simple, but clear and deep understanding of what the priorities of developmentwere to the UAE President, HH Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan:23

The first fundamental change, and the most important is the availability of drinking water.In the past, we had no drinking water here in Abu Dhabi, and we had to bring brackishwater by tanker. The bringing of water was the most important. I remember telling mybrother (then Ruler) that had we not got water, we would all of us have had to have movedsomewhere, and to look for a place with sweet water. After that, everything started changing.Housing became available when there was none before, then infrastructure and everythingelse. Our policy was first to concentrate all our efforts to develop this country, and to developits citizens. When I look around at what has been achieved, I realize I could not have imaginedbefore that it could all have happened. It is like a dream. I had dreams, but would neverhave believed that it would all have been possible in such a short space of time.

The development to which Sheikh Zayed refers can be seen and experienced through themodern cities that have been built with modern facilities, the highways, the airports, the ports,the schools and colleges, the hospitals and clinics and the afforestation of the desert, in additionto other infrastructures that support further expansion and development in the future. Aquanti-tative assessment of this growth may be made by studying the evolution of the consolidatedbudget of the UAE, which is the subject of the next section.

Evolution of the Consolidated Budget

Revenues increased from Dh 2423 million in 1972 to Dh 42,690 million in 1998, an increaseof more than 17 fold (1762 per cent), while total expenditures increased from Dh 1257 millionto Dh 71,640 million, an increase of about 57 fold. Revenues have been shaped to a greatextent by oil revenues (Table 3 annex and Fig. 11). The share of total expenditure in GDPincreased from less than 20 per cent in 1972 to more than 42 per cent in 1998. The averageshare over the period is about 37 per cent with a maximum share of 47 per cent, a minimumshare of 16 per cent and a standard deviation of 7.24 per cent.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 940

10.000

20.000

30.000

40.000

50.000

60.000

96 98

Fig. 11. UAE total and oil revenues in the consolidated govt. budget (mn.dh)

Oil

Total

The expansion of the government role in overall economic activities has been the result ofa huge increase in government revenues and population during the period, stemming fromthe Government’s commitment to improving the standard of living for all residents, nationalsand non-nationals.

Expenditure on social services (education, health, social security, welfare, housing andcommunity amenities) increased from 23.6 per cent in 1980 to nearly 30 per cent of totalexpenditure in 1996.24 The counterpart of the financial expenditure may be appreciated throughthe expansion in the services of education, health and housing presented in the following Tables.

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

Table 10. Evolution of education in the UAE1974/1975 1984/1985 1994/1995

1.Students 60,254 229,759 480,973Govt.(G) 52,790 167,320 291,143Privt.(P) 7,464 62,439 189,830Male 33,233 121,813 NAFemale 27,021 107,946 NA

2.Teachers 3,681 14,088 37,425G. 3,380 10,597 24,766P. 301 3,491 12,659

3.Schools 198 551 951G 171 394 586P 27 157 365

4.University Ed.Faculty 76 469 1,137Students 520 5374 20,570

* 1989/1990Sources: UAE Ministry of Planning (1987). Tables (11-15) p 314, (11-17) p 316, (11-18) p 317.

UAE Ministry of Planning (1998). Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1990–1995, Tables 57 and64, pp 128 and 136.

Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat. Economic Bulletin, No. 10 (1995), Tables 2-4, p 224. 10-4, p 232.

Table 11. Percentage of the age group enrolled in education (per cent)Primary Secondary Tertiary

1980 1993 1980 1993 1980 1993F 88 108 49 94M 90 112 55 84Total 74 94 71 80 3 11Adult illiteracy rate (%) in 1995 F 20 M 21

Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1996, Table 7, p 200, and World Development Report 1998/1999, Table 2, p 193.

The indicators on education and health services presented in these tables reflect the implicationof the proverb ‘action speaks louder than words’and translate the President’s motto ‘educationis like a lantern which lights your way in a dark alley’.25 The improvement in the status ofwomen in the UAE is highly commendable and owes much to Her Highness Sheikha Fatimabint Mubarak, wife of the President, who emphasizes the importance of education to girls:

‘education is the real wealth which we should preserve and care for. A girl has the legal rightto a proper education’.26

The continued expansion in the budget, despite the fall in oil revenues in the early 1980s,has resulted in an overall deficit position since 1982. The continued budget deficit has, once

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 12. Health services in the UAE 1975 1990 1995

Hospitals 19 41 51G 15 33 36P 4 8 15

Beds 1745 6232 6412G 1525 5869 6074 P 220 363 338

Doctors 751 3085 4415G 671 1929 2742P 80 4456 1673

Dentists 65 400 646G 58 146 231P 7 254 415

No. of people perDoctor 617 597 538Bed 320 295 370Nurse 258 356 274

Source: Ministry of Planning (1987). Table 11-20, p 319 (1993) Table 62, p 137.Ministry of Planning (1998). Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates, Tables 65 and 67, p 139.

Table 13. Percentage of total UAE population with access to:Health Care Safe Water Sanitation

1980 96 100 751993 90 100 95

Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births)1980 1994

UAE 55 16Low income countries 87 58Middle income countries 63 40High income countries 12 7World 81 53

Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1996, Table 6, p 198.

Table 14. Evolution of housing services in the UAE (housing units)1975 1980 1985 1990

94,380 209,077 272,791 305,920Source: Ministry of Planning (1987) and (1990)

again, brought the issue of dependence on the oil sector to the forefront. Charging forgovernment services on the basis of cost recovery is being applied partially, and privatizationof some utilities, water and electricity has occurred, in part, since 1998. In fact, the privatesector has been encouraged to shoulder more and more economic activities. Total investmentduring the period 1975–1998 is estimated at Dh 721,112 million, of which Dh 203,164 millionis the Government’s share, the remainder being that of the private sector. The budgetaryexpansion, coupled with the fall in oil revenues, had a negative impact on the external sectoras can be seen from its evolution between 1972 and 1998.

The External Sector

It has been mentioned before that the UAE economy has a high trade ratio and adopts aliberal trade policy. In fact, the UAE economy experienced substantial trade surpluses basedon oil exports and prices. But the dependence of the economy, and especially the externalsector, on development in the international oil market means that the balance fluctuates withits evolution. Trade balance fluctuated between US $1.0 billion and US $10.1 billion. Thecurrent account balance fluctuated between US $1.0 billion and US $9.20 billion during theperiod 1972–1998 (Fig.12).

Fig. 12. UAE trade and current account balances (bn.US dollars)

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

The 1980s witnessed a decline in the surplus of both the trade and current account balances.However, during the period 1990–1998, trade surplus declined from $11.14 billion in 1990to US $5.62 billion in 1998, while the current account surplus of US $8.17 billion in 1990declined to US $1.78 billion in 1998. Transfers, private and public, continued to realize deficitsthroughout the period. This result is due to two factors: one is the development assistancethe UAE Government extends to Arab and other developing countries through the Abu DhabiFund for Development,27 and the other is the presence of expatriates to the extent of 91 percent of the labour force. Despite the decline of current account surplus, UAE foreign reserveswere estimated at nearly US $8.12 billion in 1997 and US $8.8 billion at the end of 1998.Other assets, unofficially estimated to be much larger, are managed by the Abu DhabiInvestment Authority.28

72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 940

96 98 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 940

96 98

Trade balance Current account

Notwithstanding these foreign assets, the UAE foreign debt was estimated at US $10.88billion at the end of 1996. Most of this (86 per cent) is in the form of short-term trade anddevelopment-related debt. Less than 3 per cent of the debt is owed to official creditors andthe balance is to commercial creditors. The debt service ratio continued to decline from a peakof 13 per cent in 1984 to about 3.1 per cent by the end of 1996.29

Despite the fall in the current account in the balance of payments, the monetary authoritieshave continued to provide the economy with the liquidity it needs as reflected in the evolutionof monetary and credit policy in the UAE.

Monetary and Credit Policy

The UAE Central Bank was established in 1980 to succeed the UAE Currency Board (set upin 1973) in managing the country’s monetary and credit policy. It issues currency, advises theGovernment on monetary and financial matters, manages the country’s foreign reserves andsupervises the banking sector. The Central Bank overcame numerous problems to applyuniform federal laws throughout the emirates. The oil boom attracted many commercial banksto the UAE. At the end of 1998 there were 47 commercial banks, 20 of them locally incorporatedwith 284 branches and exchange offices and 27 foreign banks with 110 branches. In addition,there are specialized banks and investment institutions and foreign exchange offices.30 Since1993 all banks have had to conform to a risk weighted capital adequacy ratio of 10 per cent(two points higher than the minimum ratio of 8 per cent recommended by the Basle Committee).The Central Bank has maintained the dirham’s exchange rate fixed at Dh 3.671 equal to oneUS dollar since 1981. From 1972 to 1980, the exchange rate appreciated from Dh 4.386 tothe US dollar to Dh 3.707 to the US dollar (Table 15 in the annex). The UAE MonetaryAuthorities (the Board and the Central Bank) have provided the economy with the liquidityit needed. In fact, if the velocity equation paradigm is utilized:

MV = P¥RGDP = NGDP, where M = money supply, V = velocity of the circulation, P =price level, RGDP = real gross domestic product and NGDP = nominal GDP, then growthrate of M + growth rate of V = growth rate of NGDP. The following growth rates are calculated:

Table 15. Some statistics for the growth rates of GDP, M1 and M2 (per cent)NGDP M1 M2

Average 17.25 16 19.88Maximum 173.2 81.92 167.25Minimum –19.96 –6.36 –8.23Standard Deviation 37.29 21.85 36.56

Source: based on Tables 1 and 15.

Growth rate of narrow money (M1 = Currency outside the banks and demand deposits) isclose to the nominal growth rate of GDP, which implies that V was stable. In fact, since 1986it was almost constant. This was associated with low or no inflation. In conclusion, one couldinfer that monetary policy was accommodating to economic activity.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Conclusion

Prior to December 1971, the United Arab Emirates was characterized politically as sevenseparate emirates under British protection, economically as separate and underdeveloped entitiesand socially as backward and lacking essential and basic needs in the areas of education,health and housing services. Today, by contrast, having made major strides politically, econom-ically and socially, it can boast of being in the company of high-income countries on both theHuman Development Index and by GDP Index criteria.31

Notwithstanding these achievements, the UAE continues to face at least two challenges. Firstis the issue of economic diversification and the development of non-oil income sources.Although the share of non-oil income (AGDP) has continued to increase and has, since 1982,surpassed the oil share, the linkages and dependence of the former on the latter is large. Thus,recession in the oil sector has a negative impact on the overall performance of the non-oil GDP.

The other challenge is the high percentage share of expatriates in the size of the populationand consequently in the labour force. Careful and prudent considerations are essential elementsfor any intelligent discussion on the issue. Concepts need to be defined and understood andhistorical and present experiences of other countries (USA, Canada, Australia and others)should be studied before taking decisions on this issue as it is not a social one only, but is firstand foremost an economic problem.

1 The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates non-nationals at 80 per cent, EIU, Country Profile, United ArabEmirates 1998–1999, p 7.

2 Dr Abdallah, Matar A. Disequilibrium in the United Arab Emirates Population Structure and Approaches to Correctit, Al Sharjah (1999) p 57.

3 In 1997 the weighted average of gross national product (GNP) per capita for the middle-income economies wasUS $1890 and that of the upper-middle income was US $4520. However, the weighted average of GNP per capitafor the high-income economies was US $25,700. The highest GNPper capita was that of Switzerland at US $44,320.Although the UAE is a member of the high-income economies according to the World Bank classification, its percapita GNP is less than 65 per cent of the group average and only about 38 per cent of that of Switzerland. SeeWorld Bank, World Development Report 1998/99, Table 1, p 190.

4 UAE Central Bank, Annual Report 1998, Table 2–15, p 37 and Table 2-7, p 26.5 Al Sadik (1985) p 86–7.6 Al Shamsi (1995) chapters 1–5.

Peck (1986) p 92.7 Al Shamsi, op. cit., p 55 and p 60.8 Ibid. Table 17, p 187.9 Average government take increased from US $0.89 per barrel in late 1970 to about US $9.79 per barrel in October

1975. See Al Sadik (1984), Table 2, p 20.10 UAE Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 31 December (1979) p 231.11 UAE Ministry of Planning, Main Aspects of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates

during 1972–1977, May (1978) pp 3–2.12 The President, Sheikh Zayed, is quoted as having said, ‘The federation has embodied the hopes and aspirations

of the UAE people for a good life, and represents the start of a great leap forward that will permit us to catch upwith civilization in the rest of the world.’ see UAE Yearbook 1995, p 19.

13 In the development literature, two constraints on development in the developing countries are the two gaps, theforeign exchange gap (insufficient foreign earnings) and the saving-investment gap (saving less than investment).

14 For a review of the changes in the international oil market see Seymour (1980).15 In 1986 the oil market witnessed the lowest prices since their adjustments in 1973/1974. The nominal average oil

price declined to less than US $13 per barrel, Table 14 in the annex.16 In theory real income should be considered assuming no income illusion. In fact per capita income (real GDP)

declined from Dh 92,332 in 1972 to Dh 42,808 in 1998 (Table 12 in the annex). On the real income basis the incomeeffect on the share of consumption is negative. However, the positive effect of the increase in population on Cpexceeded the negative effect of the decline in income on Cp.

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EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UAE ECONOMY 1972–1998

17 Numbers are taken from Tables 8 and 9 in the text. The sum of these contributions are not exactly equal to thegrowth rate of GDP reported in Table 9 due to rounding and not allowing for net indirect taxes.

18 Export concentration index measures the degree to which a country’s exports are concentrated in, or diversifiedamong SITIC (revision 2) three-digit level commodities. The index is calculated using Hirschman methodology: Ix = Â(Xi/X)^2, Xi/X is share of exports of commodity Xi in total exports X with a maximum concentration indexequal one. See World Bank (1996) pp 192 and 226.

19 The high degree of openness of the UAE economy to the international economies as measured by the trade ratiois a very good reason for the UAE Government to continue its oil policy aiming at stability in the internationaloil market.

20 On the basis of average growth rates of GDP over the period 1990–1994 and investment /GDP ratio in 1994, WorldBank (1996) Table 11 p 208 and Table 13 p 212.

21 Ministry of Planning (1987) p 175.22 Between 1981 and 1988, GDP was trending downward and in 1989 its level was less than in 1981, see Table 1 in

the annex.23 UAE Yearbook 1995, p 19.24 World Bank, World Development Report: Knowledge for Development, 1998/1999, p 217.25 UAE Yearbook, op. cit., p 99.26 Ibid. p 99.27 The Fund was established in July 1971, as The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, and in 1993

changed its name to Abu Dhabi Fund for Development to reflect the actual emphasis on extending aid throughoutthe developing countries.

28 The cumulative surpluses of the current account from 1980 to 1998 amounted to about Dh 307 billion (approxi-mately US $84 billion) in foreign assets before adding any derived interest or other income.

29 EIU. United Arab Emirates: Country Profile 1998–1999, p 34.30 UAE Central Bank. Annual Report, 1998, pp 47–48.31 United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1998, p 21.

Bibliography

Al Sadik, Ali Tawfik, ‘Managing The Petrodollar Bonanza: Avenues and Implications of Recycling Arab Capital’, ArabStudies Quarterly, vol. 6, nos.1and 2 (1984) pp 13–38.

Al Sadik, Ali Tawfik, ‘National Accounting and Income Illusion of Petroleum Exports: The Case of the Arab GulfCooperation Council (AGCCC)’, in Tim Niblock and Richard Lawless (eds), Prospects in the World Oil Industry, London,Croom Helm (1985) pp 86–115.

Al Shamsi, Najeeb Abdallah, The Economies Of The Emirates Before 1971, (1995).Fisher, Irving, The Nature of Capital and Income, New York, Augustus (1965).TheEconomist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, The United Arab Emirates, 1995–1996.The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: United Arab Emirates 1998–1999.The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Arab Emirates First Quarter 1996, (1996).Hicks, John, Value and Capital, (2nd ed.) Oxford, Oxford University Press (1978).Kendrick, John, Economic Accounts and Their Uses, New York, McGraw Hill (1972).OAPEC, Secretary General Annual Report, Kuwait (1996).OAPEC, Secretary General Annual Report, Kuwait (1998).Petroleum Economist, (February 1995).Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates: Adventure in Unity, Westview, Boulder, Colorado (1986).Seymour, Ian, OPEC Instrument of Change, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd (1980).UAE Central Bank, Annual Report 1996.UAE Central Bank, Annual Report 1998.UAE Ministry of Planning, Main Aspects of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates during 1972–1977,

Abu Dhabi (May 1978).UAE Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates: 1975–1985,Abu Dhabi (1987).UAE Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1985–1990, Abu Dhabi (1993).UAE Ministry of Planning, Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirate: 1990–1995,Abu Dhabi (1998).UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report, Abu Dhabi (1996).UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report, Abu Dhabi (1997).UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report, Abu Dhabi (1998).UAE Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 31 December (1979).UAE Yearbook 1995, London, Planet Publishing Ltd. (1995).UNDP, Human Development Report 1995.UNDP, Human Development Report 1998.World Bank, World Development Report 1996, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1996).World Bank, World Development Report 1998/1999, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1999).

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225

EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ECONOMY 1972–1998: ANNEX

Table 1. UAE nominal, real and GDP deflator (1987=100) Million dirhamsNGDP RGDP GDPDEF

1972 6450.2 28553.34 22.591973 11392.1 44552.6 25.571974 31122.7 51079.44 60.931975 39460 54427.59 72.51976 51033 63198.76 80.751977 63419 73932.15 85.781978 60669 72570.57 83.61979 79972 90671.2 88.21980 109833 114433.2 95.981981 121100 119486.9 101.351982 112433 109317.5 102.851983 102909 104085.2 98.871984 101843 108366.7 93.981985 99416 101331.2 98.111986 79566 82281.28 96.71987 87366 87366 1001988 87106 85322.75 102.091989 100781 96793.12 104.121990 125266 115708.5 108.261991 126264 109158.8 115.671992 131676 108384.2 121.491993 132116 104315.8 126.651994 135065 105105 128.50481995 156902 113565 138.16051996 175778 125368 140.20961997 180630 119996 150.531998 170066 118836 143.1098Sources: For GDP, UAE Ministry of Planning 1. Main Features of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1972-1977, May

1978. 2.Main Features of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1975-1980. 3.Main Features of Economic and SocialDevelopment in the United Arab Emirates 1990-1995, 1998. 4. Main Features of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1990-

1995, 1998. 5. Annual Economic Reports, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998.

Table 2. UAE Components of aggregate demand Million dirhamsCp Cg I X Z

1972 871.6 859.2 1747.7 5464.8 2493.11973 1535.5 1284.8 2880.6 9438.5 3747.31974 2150.4 2671.9 4824.7 29453.5 7977.71975 6215 3261 12059 29522 115971976 7695 4648 16585 36557 148021977 11557 7413 22966 41779 222961978 12501 8163 23679 40200 238741979 15245 9600 27643 57201 297171980 18968 11992 31155 85592 378741981 24946 21475 31801 83662 407841982 26846 22000 32063 71576 401521983 27467 17696 32193 60874 366651984 26744 19030 29496 60008 321011985 28317 19554 24933 57672 310601986 31640 17581 23872 37901 314281987 33852 17762 20956 48562 337661988 38605 18722 21770 46879 388701989 42510 19603 23526 59853 447111990 46717 20120 25314 81978 505901991 51376 21131 27210 84246 594441992 57921 22792 31435 92000 741481993 59849 23377 37259 96380 872981994 63314 24197 39324 101574 946561995 75303 25850 46655 108374 990381996 84880 27442 49584 123039 1087611997 86232 28100 50907 128613 1126731998 90662 28640 51334 115030 115000Sources: For GDP UAE Ministry of Planning. 1. Main Features of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates, 1972-1977, May

1978. 2. Economic and Social Development in the UAE, 1975-1985, 1987. 3.Economic and Social Development in the UAE, 1985-1990,1993Annual Economic Reports, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999.

Table 4. UAE number of employees and their compensationWorkers Wages Wage per workerNumber Mn. Dh. Dirhams per year

1972 144770 1256.7 8680.6661973 182850 2524.2 13804.761974 234380 5103.9 21776.181975 288414 5633 19530.951976 383983 8138 21193.651977 477301 11442 23972.291978 494485 12617 25515.441979 523240 14166 27073.621980 541033 16011 29593.391981 578810 21123 36493.841982 592530 23300 39322.91983 600418 24297 40466.811984 607682 24573 40437.271985 619429 24997 40354.911986 621822 24007 38607.511987 624746 24426 39097.491988 643669 25226 39190.951989 667246 26784 40141.121990 694201 28019 40361.511991 737690 29883 40508.891992 799427 31904 39908.581993 859717 34484 40110.871994 912929 36242 39698.61995 955100 38000 39786.411996 1274000 47889 37589.481997 1330000 50201 37745.111998 1378000 51804 37593.61

Sources: Ministry of Planning: 1. Main Features of Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates: 1972-1977 (1978), 1975-1985(1993), 1990-1995 (1998). 2. Annual Economic Reports: 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998.

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Table 3. UAE consolidated government fiscal accounts Million dirhamsTot. Rev. Cur. Exp. Cap. Exp. Tot. Exp. Oil Rev.

1972 2423.9 934.7 NA 1256.8 21941973 3699.1 1327.6 NA 2554.2 31661974 16466.3 2841.2 NA 5029.6 140411975 19033 4044 4075 13364 180251976 24766 5703 6761 18562 234841977 27347 7713 10332 24476 261161978 25489 8895 11391 26250 240181979 34653 10693 10154 29617 342651980 54550 16763 9593 39811 527271981 49617 24604 9207 46082 454801982 37729 25818 9756 42723 346431983 29539 24384 8096 38119 270051984 28800 24075 6817 33997 256311985 27762 24535 6534 34389 222471986 20397.8 23706.7 7400.8 34896.2 178551987 20683.4 31723.1 4492.6 37517 200421988 20793.5 31048.4 3596.2 36176.5 154251989 27367.5 32459.5 4229.7 38105.6 229341990 41277.9 34475.4 4758.1 53461.8 340341991 47833 33051 7171 59456 399151992 46154.9 39098.2 9269.6 52132.9 384121993 38517.2 38468.7 10910.4 54616.1 332431994 38664 38103 11737 54792 298941995 43654 43593 11945 61857 320331996 56350 58846 10193 73825 370071997 56192 48002 10842 64391 411401998 42690 50482 13903 71640 25501

Sources: 1.UAE Central Bank: Annual Reports (1993,1994, 1995, 1997, 1998) 2. Bulletin(1991) UAE Ministry of Planning: Main Features ofEconomic and Social Development 1972-1977, (1978).

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Table 5. UAE labour force distribution between sectors and GDP at factor cost by economic sectors in 1998Sector Labour GDP at Labour Sector’s

Number current share: % share: %prices of total of total

Mn. Dh. labour GDPAgriculture 101800 5834 7.38 3.43Mining

Crude Oil 21900 36951 1.59 21.73Others 3700 635 0.27 0.37

Manufacturing 173800 20190 12.61 11.87Electricity& Water 23935 4140 1.74 2.43Construction 255800 16243 18.56 9.55Whole Sale 234700 20490 17.03 12.05Transportation 98710 12310 7.16 7.24Finance, Insurance & Real Estate

Finance and Insurance 20866 11030 1.51 6.49Real Estate & Business Services 35440 18210 2.57 10.71

Other Services 116300 6690 8.44 3.93Government 153659 19700 11.15 11.58Domestic Services of households 137880 1487 10.00 0.87Less imputed bank services 3844Total 1378490 170066 100.00 100.00

Source: UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Report 1999, Tables 3 and 9.

Table 6. UAE oil revenues (mn.US $)1972 5511973 9001974 55361975 60001976 70001977 90301978 80001979 124001980 192001981 183061982 144651983 114411984 124001985 125001986 61001987 45601988 41411989 113001990 156001991 147651992 144901993 120861994 123001995 133501996 149801997 152701998 10260

Sources: 1970 1978 Bryan Cooper, (ed), Opec Oil ReportLondon. Petroleum Economist, 2nd Edition, 1978

1978 1982, Petroleum Economist, June 1981 and 19831983-1995. OAPEC,. Secretary General Annual Report, Various numbers.

Table 7. UAE oil production (mn.barrels)1972 440.21973 555.61974 611.61975 619.0771976 708.881977 729.511978 667.771979 667.51980 626.391981 548.81982 460.791983 451.581984 468.781985 477.81986 500.051987 542.0251988 571.231989 706.641990 774.891991 883.31992 835.851993 792.051994 788.41995 788.41996 788.41997 788.661998 831.47

Sources: Petroleum Economist, Various issues, OAPEC,Secretary General Annual Report, 1998.

Table 10. UAE population ( number)1972 3092431973 3641641974 4288391975 5050001976 5806691977 6676691978 7677081979 8827361980 10150001981 10791591982 11473751983 12199021984 12970141985 13790001986 14330011987 14891181988 15474321989 16080291990 16710001991 19088001992 20114001993 20831001994 22300001995 24110001996 24790001997 26240001998 2776000

Sources: UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Reports,Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1972-

1997, 1975-1985, 1990-1995.

Table 11. UAE per capita real GDP(dirhams per year)

1972 923331973 1223421974 1191111975 1077771976 1088381977 1107321978 945291979 1027161980 1127421981 1107221982 952761983 853231984 835511985 734821986 574191987 586701988 551381989 601941990 692451991 571871992 538851993 500771994 471321995 471031996 505721997 457301998 42808

Source: based on Tables 1 &10.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Table 8. UAE value addedin the crude oil sector (mn.dh.)

1972 40991973 78701974 250701975 263641976 322751977 355751978 326181979 478841980 705321981 698141982 559821983 461451984 466041985 447071986 261711987 324231988 296431989 387921990 576321991 542601992 537531993 473411994 451541995 479491996 571231997 533141998 36951Sources: UAE Ministry of Planning, Main Features of Economic and

Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1972-1977, 1978,1975-1985 (1987), 1985-1990 (1993), 1990-1995 (1998)). Annual

Economic Reports 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999.

Table 9. UAE GDP, Oil GDPand AGDP(mndh)AGDP OILGDP NGDP

1972 2351 4099 64501973 3522 7870 113921974 6053 25070 311231975 13096 26364 394601976 18758 32275 510331977 27844 35575 634191978 28051 32618 606691979 32088 47884 799721980 39301 70532 1098331981 51286 69814 1211001982 56451 55982 1124331983 56764 46145 1029091984 55239 46604 1018431985 54709 44707 994161986 53395 26171 795661987 54943 32423 873661988 57463 29643 871061989 61989 38792 1007811990 67634 57632 1252661991 72004 54260 1262641992 77923 53753 1316761993 84775 47341 1321161994 89911 45154 1350651995 108953 47949 1569021996 118655 57123 1757781997 127316 53314 1806301998 133115 36951 170066

Source: based on Tables 1 and 8 in the annex.

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Table 12. UAE GDP structure by origin (% of GDP)1972 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Agriculture 1.8 0.008 0.007 1.41 1.64 2.47Mining

Crude Oil 63.49 66.52 63.27 43.83 46.01 34.17Others 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003

Manufacturing 2.73 0.009 3.76 9.07 7.74 8.68Electricity& Water 1.3 0.005 1.16 2.1 1.96 2.23Construction 6.33 10.87 8.82 8.71 7.73 9.24Whole Sale 7.6 8.19 8.16 8.54 8.97 12.36Transportation 7.38 3.17 3.35 4.14 4.95 5.9Finance, Insurance & Real Estate

Finance and Insurance 0.007 1.58 1.9 5.05 4.09 4.96Real Estate & Bus. Ser. 3.72 4.02 3.59 5.08 5.48 8.13

Other Services 0.005 0.009 0.007 1.61 1.97 1.14Government 4.48 3.44 5.37 10.78 10.35 11.34Domestic Services 0 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.008Less imputed bank services 0 -1.39 -1.26 -1.01 -1.57 -1.77Total 6450 39635 111470 101990 125266 143970Non-Oil Sectors 2355 13271 40938 57283 67634 94770

% of total 36.51 44.57 36.24 56.17 53.99 65.83Sources: UAE Ministry of Planning, Annual Economic Reports, Economic and Social Development in the United Arab Emirates 1972-1997, 1975-1985,

1990-1995.

Table 13. UAE nominal and real oil prices US $ per barrelIndex 72 Index 95 Nominal Real 72 Real 95

1970 85.19 23 2.1 2.47 9.131971 92.59 25 2.57 2.78 10.281972 100.00 27 2.8 2.80 10.371973 122.22 33 3.14 2.57 9.521974 148.15 40 10.41 7.03 26.031975 166.67 45 10.43 6.26 23.181976 166.67 45 11.63 6.98 25.841977 181.48 49 12.6 6.94 25.711978 203.70 55 12.91 6.34 23.471979 233.33 63 29.19 12.51 46.331980 266.67 72 36.01 13.50 50.011981 255.56 69 34.17 13.37 49.521982 244.44 66 31.71 12.97 48.051983 240.74 65 30.05 12.48 46.231984 233.33 63 28.06 12.03 44.541985 229.63 62 27.52 11.98 44.391986 266.67 72 12.97 4.86 18.011987 296.30 80 17.73 5.98 22.161988 318.52 86 14.24 4.47 16.561989 318.52 86 17.31 5.43 20.131990 344.44 93 22.26 6.46 23.941991 344.44 93 18.62 5.41 20.021992 351.85 95 18.44 5.24 19.411993 333.33 90 16.33 4.90 18.141994 344.44 93 15.54 4.51 16.171995 370.37 100 16.86 4.55 16.861996 359.30 97 23.3 5.65 20.91997 329.70 89 18.7 5.67 211998 314.80 85 12.3 3.91 14.5

Sources: OAPEC. Secretary General Annual Report 1995, table1-18, p. 7. Secretary General Annual Report 1998, table1-16, p. 45.

Table 14. UAE dirham exchange rate(dirhams per US $)

1972 4.3861973 3.9961974 3.9591975 3.9611976 3.9531977 3.9031978 3.8711979 3.8161980 3.7071981 3.6711982 3.6711983 3.6711984 3.6711985 3.6711986 3.6711987 3.6711988 3.6711989 3.6711990 3.6711991 3.6711992 3.6711993 3.6711994 3.6711995 3.6711996 3.6711997 3.6711998 3.671

Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics, June 1999.

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Table 15. UAE narrow M1 and broad money M2 in mndh and their growth rates in per centGRTHM1 GRTHM2 M1 M2

1972 NA NA NA NA1973 NA NA 970.00 2,260.001974 58.76 167.26 1,540.00 6,040.001975 68.83 45.70 2,600.00 8,800.001976 81.92 90.91 4,730.00 16,800.001977 10.15 -7.74 5,210.00 15,500.001978 10.94 13.55 5,780.00 17,600.001979 8.48 3.41 6,270.00 18,200.001980 17.22 29.12 7,350.00 23,500.001981 22.04 23.83 8,970.00 29,100.001982 8.58 15.46 9,740.00 33,600.001983 -6.37 8.04 9,120.00 36,300.001984 -2.52 29.20 8,890.00 46,900.001985 6.97 6.40 9,510.00 49,900.001986 -3.26 4.41 9,200.00 52,100.001987 9.78 5.37 10,100.00 54,900.001988 6.93 6.01 10,800.00 58,200.001989 2.78 8.59 11,100.00 63,200.001990 -2.70 -8.23 10,800.00 58,000.001991 20.37 14.48 13,000.00 66,400.001992 15.38 4.67 15,000.00 69,500.001993 21.33 -1.58 18,200.00 68,400.001994 5.49 7.89 19,200.00 73,800.001995 8.33 10.30 20,800.00 81,400.001996 7.07 6.87 22,270.00 86,990.001997 13.92 9.05 25,370.00 94,860.001998 9.50 4.17 27,780.00 98,820.00

Sources: UAE Central Bank, Annual Reports, Various issues.

Oil and Gas in the UAE

Gerald Butt

Introduction

The prosperity of the United Arab Emirates and its rapid transformation from a backwarddesert region to one with a booming economy have been made possible by revenue from oilexports. The UAE possesses nearly 10 per cent of the world’s total reserves, and there is nodoubt that oil will continue to provide the income for both economic growth and the expansionof social services for several more decades at least. In the coming years, natural gas will playan increasingly important role in the UAE’s development – particularly as a fuel source for powergeneration, petrochemicals and manufacturing industry. The UAE has also taken the initiative indeveloping an intra-Gulf gas network that could eventually link up with the Indian subcontinent.

Early in 2000, the UAE marked the fiftieth anniversary of the drilling of the first oil wellat Ra’s Sadr, north-east of Abu Dhabi. It was an inauspicious start for the oil industry, becausethe well proved to be dry. Not for another decade were major discoveries made, although theTrucial States (the areas which became the UAE in 1971 after the British withdrew from theGulf) swiftly made up for lost time. In a matter of a few decades, Abu Dhabi, supported byDubai, turned the UAE into one of the major players in the international oil export industry.Proven recoverable oil reserves in 2000 were put at 98.8 billion barrels. At the same time,proven recoverable reserves of natural gas in the UAE were estimated in 2000 at 6 trillioncubic metres, or 4 per cent of the world total. This makes the UAE’s gas reserves the thirdlargest in the Middle East (after Iran and Qatar) and the fourth largest in the world (with Russiaholding the biggest reserve), although – as will be explained later in the chapter – gas productionin Abu Dhabi is never likely to be as economical as in some other Gulf states.

The Development of Abu Dhabi’s Oil Industry

By far the biggest deposits of oil in the Emirates have been found in Abu Dhabi. The emiratecontrols more than 85 per cent of the UAE’s oil output capacity and more than 90 per cent ofits reserves. As oil exports began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was still a largelyundeveloped desert emirate inhabited by nomads, pearl divers and fishermen. The ruler’s fortwas the only building of substance on Abu Dhabi island, the site of the city today. There were

231

no roads or basic amenities. Expatriate workers from Bahrain or Kuwait – where the petroleumindustry was much more advanced – were flown in on small aircraft which landed on runwaysof flattened sand mixed with oil. In 1966, when Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan becameruler, there were fewer than 20,000 people living in Abu Dhabi.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Abu Dhabi, with a population of around600,000, boasts a Manhattan-style skyline with high-rise buildings rising out of a city withtree-lined streets, and spacious parks and gardens. It is by far the cleanest and environmentallyfriendliest city in the region. Against the background of a carefully managed oil and gas industry,the UAE as a whole enjoys a high standard of living with public services and amenities asadvanced as any in the world.

While the Emirates were late starters in the oil export business, the idea that there mightbe oil under their deserts had taken root just before the outbreak of the Second World War in1939. This was a period of British domination of the Gulf region. Under treaties signed withmost of the sheikhdoms, including Abu Dhabi, the British government, through its PoliticalResident based in Bahrain, had the right to approve or reject the awarding of oil concessionsin the Gulf. This was part of Britain’s policy of protecting the route to India by making surethat no other foreign power could get a foothold in the region. It is no surprise, therefore, thatBritish companies played a leading role in the development of the oil industry in Abu Dhabiand other Gulf sheikhdoms. A 75-year concession for all the onshore oil rights in Abu Dhabiwas awarded to the Petroleum Development Company (Trucial Coast), a subsidiary of theIraq Petroleum Company (IPC), itself a joint venture of several oil majors, including BP,Shell, Total, Exxon and Mobil. During the Second World War, all exploration work in AbuDhabi, as in the rest of the Gulf, was put on hold, and after the war, efforts were focused moreon Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait than on Abu Dhabi. In 1953, the D’Arcy Oil Company acquiredAbu Dhabi’s offshore concession, passing it on two years later to Abu Dhabi Marine Areas(ADMA), owned initially by British Petroleum (BP) and Compagnie Française des Petrole(CFP – which became Total). In 1958, ADMA became the first company to discover oil incommercial quantities – at Umm Shaif close to Das Island. Aproduction and processing centreand an oil export terminal were built on the island. Crude began to be shipped from Das Islandin 1962 – the year when Abu Dhabi joined the family of oil exporters and the rapid transfor-mation of the emirate began.

Also in 1958, Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) discovered the onshore Bab oilfield,following up with the discovery of the Bu Hasa field in 1962. In that year the company changedits name to the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), agreeing at the same time to giveup parts of its concession every two years thereafter.

In its first year of oil production (1962), Abu Dhabi produced 14,200 barrels per day (b/d)of oil. The following year, production rose by a staggering 239.4 per cent to 48,200 b/d andby an even bigger jump (287.6 per cent) to 186,800 b/d in 1964.

ADMA’s success continued in 1965 with the discovery of the offshore Zakum oilfield. Exportsbegan two years later. Subsequently ADMA kept only part of the field (Lower Zakum), with theZakum Development Company (ZADCO) – owned by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company(ADNOC), 88 per cent and the Japan Oil Development Company (JADOC), 12 per cent – takingover the rest (Upper Zakum). In 1968, a third concessionary company, Abu Dhabi Oil Company(ADOC), was formed. Established by Maruzen Oil Company, Daikyo Oil Company and Nippon

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Mining Company, it was awarded a 45-year offshore concession for a 4416 sq. km tract relinquishedby ADMA. Oil was struck in September 1969 on the island of Mubarraz. ADOC brought thefield on stream in 1973. Today its shareholders are: Cosmo Oil, 51 per cent; Japan National OilCorporation, 17.8 per cent; other Japanese companies, 5.5 per cent.

After the ending of the Trucial States’ treaties with Britain and the creation of the UAE in1971, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was set up – to manage and operateall aspects of the emirate’s oil and gas industry. ADNOC acquired a 25 per cent stake in bothADPC and ADMA. In a further change, BP sold a 45 per cent stake in ADMA to a Japaneseconsortium, Japan Oil Development Company (JODCO). On 1 January 1973, ADNOCincreased its stake in ADPC and ADMA to 60 per cent. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi was the onlyGulf oil producer to retain foreign partners on a production-sharing basis, rather than havethe national oil company acquire 100 per cent control of oil operations. Today, oil companiesfrom Japan, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere own up to 40 percent of the energy sector in the emirate. The decision to limit state control of the companiesto 60 per cent was taken with a realization on the part of the emirate that its oil industry wouldbenefit from the advances in technology and the depth of expertise which international majorscould bring. The decision paid off – giving Abu Dhabi a technological edge over fellow-producers in the Gulf, some of which (notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) were realizing, asthe new century dawned, that their own industries needed outside expertise to help in developingoil and gas production and in incorporating the latest technology in their industries.

Back in the early 1970s, further adjustments were made to the structure and identity ofcompanies operating in Abu Dhabi followed the government’s decision that ADNOC shouldtake 60 per cent stakes in the two major ones. On 2 April 1977, ADMA was renamed the AbuDhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO) and designated as the emirate’s offshoreoperator. The shareholdings were unchanged: ADNOC (60 per cent); BP (14.66 per cent);Total (13.33 per cent); and JODCO (12 per cent). Offshore production continued steadily overthe next two decades, and in 1997, ADMA-OPCO awarded a gas injection project for theZakum field to enhance oil recovery. The field was already equipped with extensive waterinjection facilities for pressure maintenance purposes. A new compression platform andinjection network was built to deliver the gas to the injection wellheads. The compressionplatform incorporates three compression trains capable of handling a total of 300 million cubicfeet daily (mn cfd). A pipeline system delivers gas to five existing wellheads operated byADMA-OPCO and ZADCO. The existing wellheads were modified to accommodate therequired injection wells and pipeline tie-in facilities, serving both the Upper Zakum andLower Zakum oil reservoirs. In February 2000, the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC)and ADNOC signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in research and in raisingoil production capacity in the emirate. Abu Dhabi’s main offshore oilfields are Umm Shaif,Lower Zakum, Upper Zakum, al-Bunduq and Abu al-Bukhoosh.

On 20 September 1978 the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) wasestablished to take over onshore operations. The new company’s shareholders were: ADNOC(60 per cent); BP (9.5 per cent); Shell (9.5 per cent); Total (9.5 per cent); Exxon (4.75 percent); Mobil (4.75 per cent); Partex (2 per cent), these foreign companies being the shareholdersof ADPC. Abu Dhabi’s main onshore oilfields are the fields at Asab, Bab, Bu Hasa, Sahiland Shah. Other fields are under development at Dabb’iya and Rumaitha.

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While ADMA-OPCO and ADCO are the major companies on the Abu Dhabi oil scene(accounting for more than 90 per cent of production), some other companies –besides ADOC– also operate there. The Total Abu al-Bukhoosh Oil Company was formed in 1973 to developthe offshore Abu al-Bukhoosh oilfield, discovered in 1969, which came on stream in June 1974.The original owners of the company were Total (51 per cent), the US’s Charter Oil (24.5 percent), Canada’s Sunningdale Oil (12.25 per cent) and Amerada Hess of the US (12.25 per cent).In 1991, Charter Oil sold some of its stake to Total, leaving the latter with a 65.7 per cent stake,and later sold the rest the same way. Sunningdale Oil, meanwhile, sold its shares to AmeradaHess, giving it 25 per cent of the shares, with the remainder owned by Total. In 1996, AmeradaHess sold its shares to Japan Indonesia Petroleum. Production from Abu al-Bukhoosh peakedin 1976 at 81,000 b/d and is currently running between 40,000 b/d and 50,000 b/d.

The Bunduq offshore oilfield was discovered in 1965 in an area that straddles the offshoreborder between Abu Dhabi and Qatar. The two countries agreed to share equally productionfrom the field, and BP, Total and the United Petroleum Development Company of Japanestablished the Bunduq Oil Company. Production began in 1975 at 30,000 b/d, but becauseof reservoir pressure maintenance problems this fell to 10,000 b/d in the late 1970s, and, inOctober 1979, stopped. In 1981, a secondary recovery programme, costing around US $400million, was launched to reactivate the field. Production restarted at 4000 b/d at the end of1983 and is currently at around 15,000–20,000 b/d.

In 1973, Amerada Hess, leading a consortium of foreign companies (Marathon Oil, CanadianSuperior, Syracuse Oil, Wingate Enterprises, Bow Valley and Sunningdale), discovered anotheroffshore oilfield, Arzanah. But in 1993, with production having fallen from a peak of 20,000b/d in 1980 to around 6000 b/d, Amerada Hess relinquished its concession and operationswere taken over by ZADCO. Initially, plans to produce oil from two nearby undevelopedfields, Dalma and Hair Dalma, offered the possibility of maintaining the Arzanah field andthe production facilities on Arzanah island. However, further studies showed that this wouldnot be commercially viable, particularly because of the need for investment to reduce emissionsharmful to the environment, and so in November 1998, after nearly 20 years of production,a decision was taken to decommission the field.

Abu Dhabi’s oil is considered light, with gravities in the 34–40 degree API range (Murban39 degrees, Lower Zakum 40, Umm Shaif 37 and Upper Zakum 37). Murban, a blend fromthe onshore fields, is its major export crude, exported from the Jebel Dhanna terminal whichwas built in 1963 and expanded a decade later. Umm Shaif and Zakum crude is exported fromthe terminal on Das Island. Smaller amounts of oil are exported from Abu al-Bukhoosh,Mubarraz and Zirku Island. The quality of Abu Dhabi crude, the long-term evergreen contractswith the customers and the security of supply have combined to make the UAE a major supplierof crude oil to the Far East. Abu Dhabi is by far the biggest supplier of crude oil to Japan.

Oil Refining in Abu Dhabi

Since 1999, oil refining in Abu Dhabi has been carried out by a wholly-owned subsidiary ofADNOC, the Abu Dhabi Oil Refining Company (TAKREER). This was set up as part of a majorrestructuring of ADNOC (see below). The emirate’s first refinery – at Umm al-Nar – started up

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in 1976 with a capacity of 15,000 b/d. This was increased to 60,000 b/d in 1983 and 72,000 b/din 1988. In 1993 capacity was increased again to 85,000 b/d and currently stands at 90,000 b/d.A chlorine plant was started in 1981 with a capacity of 15,000 tons per annum (t/y).

The Ruwais refinery was commissioned in 1981, with a capacity of 120,000 b/d. Hydroc-racking facilities of 27,000 b/d were added in 1985. Because of its remote location, a generalutilities plant was also established at Ruwais, to produce 90 MW of electricity and 26,000 c*ms of clean water. In 1995, plans were announced for a US $1.2 billion expansion scheme toincrease crude distillation by 135,000 b/d, and install a new vacuum distillation facility, ahydrocracker and a delayed co*ker. Ayear later, following a thorough review, ADNOC decidedto delay by three to five years the implementation of the project. In June 1996, the export ofcondensates from Ruwais began at a new berth, following the commissioning of a major gasrecycling project targeting the Thamama C and F non-associated gas reservoirs underlyingthe onshore Bab oilfield. In June 1997, Snamprogetti of Italy was awarded contracts to buildtwo 140,000 b/d condensate distillation trains and related sweetening units at the Ruwaisrefinery. The two trains were commissioned in 2000 (the first in May, the second in July),thus tripling the refining capacity at Ruwais and eliminating the export of condensate.TAKREER’s total refining capacity in the middle of 2000 exceeded 500,000 b/d.

At the same time, the general utility plant at Ruwais was being expanded to produce 500MW of electricity and 8 mn gallons of water. ADNOC awarded a US $600 million contractto the international electrical engineering conglomerate, the ABB Group, to carry out theproject which was being completed in 2000. Expansion of the capacity of the sulphur handlingterminal (built in 1992), from 4200 t/y to 6200 t/y, was undertaken in the same year. Moltensulphur is shipped from Das Island and taken to Ruwais for processing. The Abu Dhabi NationalTanker Company (ADNATCO) has a vessel dedicated to this route.

The impact on the environment has become an integral design consideration for new projectsand plants. The demand for gasoline and gas oil in the UAE was forecast in 2000 to grow by3.5–4 per cent a year. According to the manager of TAKREER’s Process Technology & StudiesDepartment, ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Hammadi, in an address to the eighth Annual Middle EastPetroleum & Gas Conference in Abu Dhabi in March 2000, TAKREER’s ability:

to make unleaded gasoline at Ruwais has been demonstrated and some quantities aremanufactured as required. Similarly, sulphur in the gas oil has been voluntarily reducedfrom both the Ruwais and Umm al-Nar refineries. The decision to produce unleadedgasoline, to phase out leaded gasoline production and reduce the sulphur in gas oil inthe long-term has been taken in principle, and the optimum configuration is underevaluation. Facilities are expected to be commissioned in 2004.

In the shorter term, the company’s strategy is to increase the capacity of existing refineriesto achieve a high reformate octane level and lower benzene and sulphur content with theminimum investment. Back in 1997, ADNOC had released tender documents for what wascalled the unleaded gasoline package. This included the installation of a host of units relatedto the production of unleaded gasoline as well as naphtha, liquid petroleum gas, gas oil treatingand sulphur recovery. No contracts have been awarded as yet.

TAKREER is awaiting the results of a feasibility study being carried out by the US’s Bechtelbefore deciding whether to build a Dh 1.47 million (US $400 million) lube base oil refinery

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with a capacity of 300,000 t/y. If the project is approved, the refinery, integrated with theexisting one at Ruwais, will be scheduled for commissioning in 2004. In 1997, ADNOCannounced plans for a lube base oil refinery with output of 250,000 t/y, to come on stream in2001, but the project has been delayed.

The Structure of Abu Dhabi’s Oil Industry

Oil policy for Abu Dhabi is determined by the Supreme Petroleum Council that was set up inJune 1988. Its chairman is the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander ofthe UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and its Secretary-General is Yusifbin Omair Yusif, the Chief Executive Officer of ADNOC. Among the Supreme PetroleumCouncil’s responsibilities is management control of ADNOC. This company in turn owns a rangeof subsidiaries in the UAE and overseas which specialize in upstream and downstream oil andgas operations, as well as distribution, shipping and all other aspects of the hydrocarbons industry.

Aside from ADCO, ADMA-OPCO and ZADCO, the oil companies mentioned above,ADNOC owns or has a majority shareholding in: ADNOC for Distribution (ADNOC-FOD),Abu Dhabi Drilling Chemicals and Products (ADDCAP), Abu Dhabi Gas Industries Company(GASCO), Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS), Abu Dhabi National TankerCompany (ADNATCO), Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Operating Company (ADPPOC), theLiquefied Gas Shipping Company Ltd (LGSC), the National Drilling Company (NDC), theNational Marine Services Company (NMS), Natural Gas Shipping Company (NGSCO),National Petroleum Construction Company Ltd (NPCC), the Ruwais Fertilizers IndustriesLtd (FERTIL), the Abu Dhabi Polymers Company Ltd (Borouge), the Abu Dhabi Oil RefiningCompany (TAKREER) and the Abu Dhabi Gas Company (ATHEER).

In 1999, ADNOC underwent a major reorganization to improve internal efficiency andeffectiveness, reflecting the results of an internal study that had looked at all aspects of thecompany. Operational activities that had been supervised directly by ADNOC were convertedinto five autonomous business units to enhance accountability. One directorate is responsible forplanning, directing and guiding the company’s growing petrochemical interests. Another managesthe increasingly high-profile gas sector. Other directorates are responsible for exploration andproduction, marketing and refining, and shared services. In addition, a projects management policyrequires that project teams work under the direct supervision of the company or directorate whichis responsible for implementing the specific venture. Previously, all project work was carried outby ADNOC’s project directorate with little coordination among different areas of the organi-zation. Three other directorates – relating to finance, management support, and human resourcesand administration – provide the five business line directorates with support services. The headsof all eight directorates report to ADNOC’s Chief Executive Officer, Yusif Omair bin Yusif.

Abu Dhabi’s Involvement in Overseas Operations

Aside from developing its own oil industry, Abu Dhabi has investments in several overseasventures through the government-owned International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC).

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In 1997, the value of IPIC’s shareholding in the publicly listed OMV of Austria (in whichIPIC has a 19.56 per cent stake) and Compania Espanola de Petroleos (Cepsa – IPIC’s stake,9.54 per cent) of Spain was estimated at US $881.9 million. (Cepsa is a company engaged inoil refining and distribution, as well as crude production, in Algeria.) IPIC also has a 30 percent stake in the Pakistani company, Pak-Arab Refinery Ltd (Parco) and a 48 per cent stakein another Pakistani company, Pak-Arab Fertilizers Ltd (Pafco). Parco owns and operates an864 km product pipeline from Karachi to Multan in central Pakistan. IPIC and Pakistan signedan agreement late in 1997 to build a 100,000 b/d joint venture refinery in Multan. Pafco ownsand operates a fertilizer complex at Multan with a capacity of 850,000 t/y.

In October 1999, IPIC announced that it had reached an agreement with South Korea’sHyundai Group to acquire a 50 per cent controlling interest in the latter’s Korean oil refiningand marketing subsidiary, Hyundai Oil Refinery Company (HDO), with Hyundai affiliatesretaining the other 50 per cent. The 50 per cent acquisition was effected through the purchaseby IPIC of new HDO shares to the value of Won 612.7 billion (US $510 million). After itsacquisition of Hanwha’s Inchon Oil Refining Company, HDO had an effective refining capacityof 665,000 b/d–390,000 b/d at Hyundai’s Daesan refinery and 275,000 b/d at the Inchon plant.IPIC, as well as acquiring a controlling interest in HDO, effectively has control of management,appointing four out of seven directors on the board.

The Oil Industry in Dubai and the Other Emirates

Dubai is the next largest oil producer in the UAE after Abu Dhabi; but its output is decreasing.In the mid-1990s, production was running at around 230,000 b/d, but the Crown Prince ofDubai and UAE Defence Minister, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum, said in March2000 that production had dropped to 170,000 b/d in the previous year. Press reports indicatethat Dubai’s reserves would be exhausted within 20 years. The major player in Dubai oil isthe Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC) which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Conoco of theUS. It is the operator in a consortium comprising itself (32.5 per cent), Totalfina-Elf (27.5 percent), Repsol of Spain (25 per cent), RWE-DEA of Germany (10 per cent) and Wintershall(5 per cent). DPC discovered the four major offshore oilfields, Fateh, Southwest Fateh, Rashidand Falah between 1966 and 1976. Dubai’s oil production peaked in 1991 at 410,000 b/d andhas been steadily declining ever since. But production of condensate from the onshore Marghamfield is running at around 25,000 b/d. Margham, previously operated by Arco InternationalOil and Gas Company, is now run by the Dubai Margham Establishment, which is whollyowned by the Government of Dubai and chaired by Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum.

A condensate refinery began production at Jebel Ali in May 1999. In June 1997, the Dubaigovernment-owned Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) awarded a US $137 millioncontract to Technipetrol, the Italian subsidiary of France’s Technip, to carry out the first phaseof the project with a refining capacity of 60,000 b/d producing mainly jet fuel, diesel andnaphtha for local consumption. The plan was that in the second phase, output would beincreased to 100,000 b/d, but in January 1998, ENOC awarded Technipetrol a new contract,worth US $46 million, to double production at the refinery from 60,000 b/d to 120,000 b/d.This gives the refinery five Merox units to process condensates from the Gulf region into

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34,000 b/d of kerosene, 11,500 b/d of diesel, 5000 b/d of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and33,000 b/d of naphtha. The refinery is owned and operated by ENOC’s wholly-ownedsubsidiary, ENOC Processing Company.

Dubai has three terminals from which oil and LPG is exported: Jebel Ali, Port Rashid andFateh. On the domestic front, ENOC and Caltex announced in January 1997 that they had setup a joint company to produce and market engine oil and lubricants in the UAE. The newcompany – Emirates Petroleum Products Company (EPPCO) Lubricants – acquired a lubricatingoil plant in Dubai owned by Caltex. ENOC was established at the end of 1993 by the Dubaigovernment with a fully paid up capital of Dh 100 million (US $27 million) to promote jointventure petroleum projects inside and outside Dubai. It has a 60 per cent share in EPPCO,with Caltex holding the remaining 40 per cent. EPPCO markets petroleum products in thenorthern emirates of the UAE. Early in 2000, ENOC revealed that it, too, intended to moveinto the domestic petroleum retail market, setting up 30 gasoline stations in Dubai and otheremirates. Thus ENOC would not just face competition from EPPCO, but also from ADNOCfor Distribution (ADNOC-FOD) and Emarat, the UAE’s two other gasoline retailers.

Another wholly-owned subsidiary of ENOC, the Dubai Shipping Company, ordered twosmall tankers in 1998 from Daewoo of South Korea. The two double-hulled tankers were duefor delivery in the first half of 2000. The vessels were ordered to handle imported feedstockfor the Jebel Ali condensates refinery.

Dubai’s northern neighbour, Sharjah, is the third largest hydrocarbon producer in the UAE,with oil production centred on the offshore Mubarak field. This lies close to an area occupiedby Iran, and the northern part of the field lies in an Iranian concession area. As a result, whileSharjah has drilling and production rights, it shares production and revenue with Iran. At thesame time, 20 per cent of Sharjah’s remaining revenue is shared with the emirate of Umm al-Qaiwain and 10 per cent with Ajman. Sharjah’s hydrocarbon resources are confined largelyto natural gas (see later in this chapter) and condensates. Crescent Petroleum, through itswholly-owned subsidiary, Buttes Gas & Oil International, brought the Mubarak field onstream in 1974, with output of 60,000 b/d. By the mid-1980s, production had dropped to 5000b/d. At this stage the acreage was divided in the following way: Crescent (80 per cent),Finland’s Neste Oy (12.5 per cent), Bahrain-based Intoil (7.5 per cent). A ten-year fielddevelopment programme was started in 1986 to bring production up to 20,000 b/d. At the endof that period, Crescent’s partners pulled out, and a farm-in agreement was signed withEnterprise Oil of the UK. In May 1998, Crescent announced that it had started exploratorydrilling of the Khatir Number One well – with production to be hooked up to the Mubarakfield. The work was being carried out under the terms of an agreement between Crescent andEnterprise Oil to boost production from the Mubarak field. The agreement provided forEnterprise to spend around US $25 million on a 3-D seismic survey and the drilling of at leasttwo exploration wells in return for a 40 per cent share of the new wells. Early in 2000,production from the Mubarak field was estimated at 6000 b/d.

Despite the paucity of its oil prospects, the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin MuhammadAl Qasimi, issued an Amiri decree in October 1999 establishing the Sharjah Petroleum Council.This supersedes the Sharjah Department of Petroleum and Minerals which was set up in 1972.The Council’s task, among others, is to draw up the emirate’s policy regarding the productionand processing of oil, as well as all other matters related to oil.

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In mid-1999, a small refinery in the Sharjah free trade zone of al-Hamriyah began operations.It is run by the Sharjah Refining Company (SRC) – an affiliate of the Fal Group of the UAE.The refinery, which cost some US $250 million and was bought second-hand in Canada, wasput together in three phases. The first phase consisted of a 16,000 b/d crude distillation unitand a 7500 b/d reformer.

The search for oil in Ra’s al-Khaimah has been continuing since 1967, with the emirateestimated to have reserves of 400 million barrels of oil and condensate. Offshore productionfrom the Saleh field has fallen from an initial rate of 11,000–12,000 b/d and is now suspended.In June 1998, the Ra’s al-Khaimah Oil and Gas Company said that it had failed to find anyhydrocarbons at its offshore exploration well Aman-1 which had been spudded in Februarythat year. The well had been drilled to a depth of 17,580 ft.

Fujairah’s involvement in the oil industry is limited to refining – and that operation has notbeen without its difficulties. But in January 2000 prospects seemed brighter after anannouncement by the Department of Industry and Economy in Fujairah that the Bermuda-registered Metro Oil Corporation had reached agreement with its creditors to reopen itsrefinery in the emirate within three months. Operations there had stopped in March 1998 whenMetro Oil’s parent company, Athens-based Metro Trading International, filed for bankruptcy.It was declared bankrupt the following month by the First Instance Court of Athens. TheFujairah Department of Industry and Economy said that after reviewing technical and financialstudies conducted by the parties concerned in settling the Metro Oil affair, it had decided ‘thatthe reoperation of the Fujairah refinery in the present circ*mstances is feasible taking intoaccount the relative improvement in oil prices and increase in demand for oil products.’ Thestatement added that a license was being granted ‘to operate the refinery under the managementof an operator with an international reputation and to form the Fujairah Refinery Co Ltd toundertake the project.’

The new company is expected to expand production at the refinery from 75,000 b/d (itscapacity at the time of its closure) to 90,000 b/d and extend its range of products to includejet fuel and kerosene as well as the fuel oil and gasoline which were produced in the past.Before its collapse, Metro Trading was one of the main movers of long-haul fuel to theSingapore market for bunkers. Under the restart-up plans, new jetties will be built at Fujairahport, and dredging will be carried out to a depth of 15 metres to accommodate larger tankers.Texaco Inc and Swiss-based Glencore International were reported to have agreed to supplythe necessary crude to operate the refinery at full capacity. The main creditors, which includeCredit Lyonnais, Banque Nationale de Paris, Fujairah National Bank and Credit Agricole,along with Texaco and Glencore, will be repaid from revenue earned by the refinery. It wasfurther reported at the time that Vopak (formerly Van Ommeren) was holding talks onoperating the Fujairah refinery. Vopak and the Emirates National Oil Company were said tobe planning to connect the refinery with their adjacent storage terminal by means of twopipelines (one for crude and the other for products). Fujairah, situated on the eastern coastof the UAE close to the Straits of Hormuz, the gateway to the Gulf, has become a majorbunkering centre for the region. The emirate is continuing to expand its oil products storagecapabilities. A 20-tank storage farm, built at a cost of US $84 million and run by Vopak, wasopened early in 1999: towards the end of the year a contract was awarded for the constructionof six more tanks. The tank farm is used to distribute products to regional markets such asPakistan, India and East Africa.

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Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain remain the only three emirates where no oil depositshave been located, although exploration has been carried out in the all three, all of whichremain optimistic that commercial quantities may one day be discovered. In February 2000,the ruler of Ajman, Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid Al Nu’aimi, issued a decree setting up theAjman Petroleum Department to take over all aspects of the emirate’s oil and gas industry,onshore and offshore. The new government body was charged with supervising upstream anddownstream activities and advising on policy. The Supreme Chairman of the department isSheikh Ahmad bin Humaid Al Nu’aimi.

The UAE on the World Oil Stage

Abu Dhabi joined OPEC in the late 1960s; but since the formation of the union in 1971, represen-tation at the organization has been in the name of the UAE, with Abu Dhabi acting as the swingproducer, altering its production to conform with OPEC quota changes, thus leaving Dubai,with its much smaller output, unaffected. Within OPEC, the UAE – the sixth largest producer– is regarded as a moderate state, seeking a balance between production and price that willsatisfy producers and consumers alike. The UAE’s production was limited by OPEC quotasin 1999 to 2 mn b/d (a reduction of 157,000 b/d). This restricted output to approximately thefollowing amounts, which were subject to change from time to time: ADCO 900,000 b/d; ADMA-OPCO 380,000 b/d; ZADCO 450,000 b/d; other Abu Dhabi operators 70,000 b/d; and Dubai200,000 b/d. Abu Dhabi had around 500,000 b/d spare capacity in the first quarter of 2001.

Gas: The UAE’s Fuel for the Future

Oil has underpinned the development of the UAE thus far, but there are growing signs thatnatural gas will be playing an increasingly big role for the Emirates as a whole throughoutthe twenty-first century. Not only does the UAE own vast reserves of its own, but it is alsotaking the initiative in developing the Emirates as a hub from which to supply a network thatwill benefit the entire Gulf region – and possibly countries further afield at a later stage.

Once again, Abu Dhabi has been blessed with the biggest reserves – as much as 90 per centof reserves are within the territory or under the waters of that one emirate, although a lot ofthe gas is sour and relatively expensive to produce. Abu Dhabi can take the credit for beingone of the first states in the region to realize the value of gas – most of which was previouslyflared off in all the oil-producing states. As early as 1977, the Abu Dhabi Gas LiquefactionCompany (ADGAS) built an LNG plant on Das Island to process associated gas. Initially theplant had two trains, and a third was added in November 1994. As well as LNG, this plantproduces smaller amounts of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), pentane and sulphur. The plant’snameplate capacity is 5.5 mn tons per year (t/y), but production has frequently been in excessof that figure. Since 1992, gas has been produced from Abu Dhabi’s share of the vast Khuffreservoir – one of the largest in the world – under the Abu al-Bukhoosh and Umm Shaif oilfields.

The venture’s principal long-term customer is the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco)which signed a 20-year contract beginning in 1977 to buy 4.3 mn t/y of LNG, with an option

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of lifting additional quantities of up to 4.9 mn t/y, plus a much smaller quantity of LPG. Thecontract was extended by another 25 years in 1994. Tepco imports about 30 per cent of itsgas supply from ADGAS. In May 1997, ADGAS took delivery of its fourth LNG carrier fromKvaerner-Masa Yards of Finland to carry LNG to Tepco’s power plant in Japan. The NationalGas Shipping Company (NGSCO) operates the carriers. These replaced four other tankersthat had been on long-term charter. As well as the Tepco deal, ADGAS has signed a series ofshort-term supply contracts with another firm in Japan as well as customers in South Korea,Spain, Italy and Belgium.

ADGAS’s other major long-term contract, for the supply of LNG to India, was signed in1999. Under the deal, ADGAS will provide Enron’s Indian affiliate MetGas with 500,000 t/yof gas for a 20-year period beginning in 2001. The deal to supply gas for Enron’s Dabholpower plant in Maharashtra state had been due for signature at the end of 1998, but was delayedfor scheduling reasons. LNG from Abu Dhabi as well as larger volumes from nearby Omanwill be used to meet the fuel requirements of the 2450 MW power station.

The Indian company will need some 2.1 mn t/y of LNG to fuel Dabhol once the power plant’ssecond 1624 MW phase is commissioned in October 2001 and the first 826 MW naphtha-firedstage is converted over to gas. The Dabhol Power Company has been running the plant on acommercial basis since early this year after beginning testing operations at the end of 1998.While ADGAS has signed on to supply some 500,000 t/y of LNG, the sales and purchaseagreement with MetGas allows the buyer to exercise more downward flexibility in the initialperiod of the 20-year contract. This is required as a safeguard against operating difficulties orlower than anticipated running rates once the first phase of the power plant shifts to gas andthe second stage is started up. MetGas is providing the shipping capacity necessary to transportthe volumes to a 5 mn t/y receiving terminal it plans to build at Dabhol. Because the MetGasdeal did not start until 2001, ADGAS had spare capacity for short-term supply contracts in theintervening period.

As for the development of the Khuff gas zones in the Umm Shaif and Abu al-Bukhooshregions, the original plan was to drill five new wells at Abu al-Bukhoosh, which would beconnected to a new gas-processing platform. Gas would then be piped ashore via a 165-kilometresubsea pipeline to a treatment plant at Taweelah after which it would be used for power andindustrial projects in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The two emirates signed an agreement in February1998 under which Abu Dhabi would supply Dubai with 500,000 cubic feet/day (cfd) of naturalgas beginning in 2001. In March 1999, construction firms bidding for the offshore portion ofthe project were told that it had been cancelled. Instead, ADNOC decided to source the gasneeded to supply Dubai from ventures in Abu Dhabi’s onshore sector. A second gas supplyscheme known as the Onshore Gas Development Phase-2 (OGD-2) project is currently underconstruction at the Bab field. When it comes on stream in early 2001 it will add an incremental1 bn cfd of sales gas into the domestic network, although it could take some time beforeindustrial users in Abu Dhabi are able to absorb the additional supply from OGD-2. Analystsreckon that for several years after the project is brought on-line there will be somewhere inthe range of 400 mn to 500 mn cfd of spare capacity at Bab’s Habshan gas plant. This excesscould be used to supply Dubai as well as a planned second-phase expansion at the TaweelahA power and desalination complex. Contractors in 2000 were constructing a new pipelineconnection to the Maqta/Taweelah manifold as part of the ongoing OGD-2 project. The

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existing power plant at Taweelah is already linked into the domestic network through an overlandpipeline spur from Maqta.

At one time ADNOC suggested that it might fast-track OGD-3, a third onshore gasdevelopment project, to meet Dubai’s long-term needs, but the gas involved is extremelysour, with huge amounts of hydrogen sulphide and carbon dioxide. Moreover the cost ofdeveloping these reservoirs has been estimated at over US $2/mn BTU, double the US $1/mnBTU required to for OGD-2. Completion of OGD-2 – developing the Thamama C and Dgas reservoirs – was due by the end of 2000. It will provide an additional 1100 mn cfd ofraw gas, with 950 mn cfd being sold to meet the needs of the expanding power and desali-nation sector, industrial users and the condensate splitter at the Ruwais refinery. As part ofthe onshore development, the Asab Gas Development project – a new grassroots facility toprocess the natural gas from the Thamama F and G reservoirs in the Asab field – was alsodue for completion in 2000. This has the capacity to produce and gather 825 mn cfd of gas,produce 100,000 b/d of condensate, and reinject 825 mn cfd of sour gas into the variousreservoirs. A pipeline will transport condensate to the Ruwais refinery. With the commis-sioning of the two condensate splitters at Ruwais, exports of condensate from Thamama Cand D (100,000 b/d) were to stop. Instead, the condensate from there and a similar amountfrom Thamama F and G were to be piped to Ruwais for the production of naphtha. Thedecision to switch from the export of condensates to naphtha reflects the fact that the lattercommands a higher price on international markets.

Another major facility at Ruwais is the natural gas liquids processing plant operated by AbuDhabi Gas Industries Ltd (GASCO). This produces around 6 mn t/y of propane, butane andpentane. Output was increased after debottlenecking was carried out in 1996.

Gas for Abu Dhabi’s Power and Petrochemicals

The Chief Executive Officer of ADNOC, Yusif Omair bin Yusif, speaking towards the end of1999 outlined the emirate’s gas strategy: ‘Abu Dhabi’s main future gas policy is to developgas resources to meet growing domestic demand, giving priority to generating water andelectricity, supply of gas to new industries, petrochemical projects and any re-injection needs.’

Estimates of the gas supply needed to meet these requirements all point to a sharply risingdemand in the coming decade. Abu Dhabi’s gas supply in 2001 is projected at approximately5.7 bn cfd – consisting of 2.46 bn cfd from condensate gas, 1.62 bn cfd from the Khuff offshoreproduction and 1.62 bn cfd from associated gas. However, demand projections show thatpower generation and industrial consumption will increase from 1.78 bn cfd in 2001 to 2.1bn cfd in 2005, and that demand for reinjection will grow substantially from 2.57 bn cfd to4.25 bn cfd during the same period as Abu Dhabi’s oilfields continue to mature, while LNGdemand will remain constant at around 1.1 bn cfd. These demand estimates leave a shortfallof nearly 1 bn cfd by the year 2005, and the supply deficit is projected to widen ever furtherto more than 3 bn cfd by 2015.

Much of the focus in the development of gas-based industries in Abu Dhabi is on the developmentand expansion of power/water desalination plants, with the private sector playing a major role.The UAE as a whole is acknowledged by other Gulf states as the leader in this field of activity.

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Three major privatized power/desalination projects are under way in Abu Dhabi. The Abu DhabiWater and Electricity Authority (ADWEA), in mid-2000, was considering bids for the constructionof a US $408 million private power/water plant near Jebel Dhanna, 250 km west of Abu Dhabicity. Commercial operations of the first power units are expected to start before summer of 2003,with the whole plant becoming operational the following year. In the first phase, the plant willgenerate 1500 MW of electricity and produce 100 mn gallons/day (g/d) of fresh water. Outputwill later be expanded to 5000 MW and 200 mn g/d, making it the biggest project of its kind inthe UAE and enabling ADWEA to extend the power distribution grid to Al Ain.

Two other private power/water projects are under way in Abu Dhabi. In October 1998,CMS Energy Corporation of the US reached agreement with ADWEA on the construction,privatization and operation of the US $740 million Taweelah A-2 project. The consortium,Totalfina-Elf and Tractebel of Belgium, were the successful bidders for Taweelah A-1. Whenrefurbishment of al-Taweelah A-1 is complete, output will be around 1050 MW of electricityand 70 mn g/d of water.

Demand for power and water in Abu Dhabi is increasing by 8 per cent a year, according tothe Deputy Director of ADWEA, ‘Abd Allah Al Nu’aimi, speaking in the first quarter of 2000.At present the emirate is generating 3500 MW of electricity and producing 262 mn b/d of water.Output is expected to rise to 6964 MW/400 mn b/d by 2005 and 7536 MW/573 mn b/d by2010. Mr Nu’aimi said the privatization schemes were part of a new drive towards cost reduction.

Abu Dhabi is also taking steps to develop and expand its petrochemicals sector. Constructionof a 600,000 t/y ethylene plant in the Ruwais industrial area was under way in mid-2000. Theproject, which will also contain two 225,000 t/y polyethylene plants, is being carried out byBorouge, a joint venture owned 60 per cent by ADNOC and 40 per cent by Borealis. Borealisis 50 per cent owned by Norway’s Statoil and 25 per cent each by Austria’s OMV and AbuDhabi’s downstream investment arm, IPIC. The ethane-based cracker will supply feedstockto the two polyethylene plants and ADNOC’s planned dichloride plant. Borouge will beproducing high-density and linear low-density polyethylene. Borouge Singapore will handlemarketing of the products.

While Borouge is a newcomer, the Ruwais Fertilizers Industries Ltd (FERTIL), which isowned by ADNOC (63.75 per cent) and TotalFina Elf (33.25 per cent), began production ofammonia and urea in 1984. By 1994 the output of the two was 600,000 t/y.

Rising Gas Demand in Dubai

In the northern emirates, by far the largest market for gas is Dubai, the trading and commercialhub of the UAE and the Gulf region as a whole. The emirate produces limited amounts ofgas itself, and this is not nearly enough to meet the rising demand from its fast-expandingindustrial sector. At present, its major source of gas (up to 400 mn cfd) is its northernneighbour, Sharjah. Production from the onshore Saja’a field, situated to the west of theHajar Mountains, began in 1982 and from Moveyeid in 1992. Later the same year a majorgas and condensate discovery was made at Kahaif, to the south. In December 1992, BPAmoco Sharjah Oil Company announced it would be drilling two gas wells to increase naturalgas and condensate production. At the time, BP Amoco was producing more than 650 mn

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cfd from Saja’a, Moveyeid and Kahaif. Condensate from the three fields was almost 30,000b/d. The major customers for BP Amoco Sharjah gas are the Sharjah Electricity and WaterAuthority, the Dubai Supply Authority and the UAE Ministry of Electricity and Water. InSeptember 1999 another operator, Sharjah-based Crescent Petroleum and its partner AtlantisHolding Norway AS, announced that significant quantities of hydrocarbons had beendiscovered at the offshore Sharjah-2 well. This was the first well drilled by Crescent/Atlantisin the 1018 sq. km block, which runs from the Sharjah coastline to the Crescent-operatedProtocol Area where the Mubarak field is located.

Other customers for gas, apart from the Dubai Supply Authority, are the Dubai Electricityand Water Authority, several petrochemical and fertilizer plants located at Jebel Ali – as wellas the Dubai Aluminium Company (Dubal), which in March 2000 inaugurated its US $736million Condor expansion project, making Dubal the second largest smelter in the world andthe largest in the Middle East. The plant can generate 440 MW of electricity and produce148,000 t/y more aluminium with a negligible increase in natural gas consumption.

All these projects are swiftly pushing up the demand for gas in Dubai. In 1998, powergeneration and water desalination consumed around 380 mn cfd, with peak demand rising to500 mn cfd. Government forecasts project demand growth rates for these two sectors atbetween 8 per cent and 9 per cent annually through to the year 2010. Dubal in 2000 wasconsuming an estimated 240 mn cfd. Other industries in Dubai (existing or under construction)used 70 mn cfd in 1998 and this figure is set to rise to 90 mn cfd by 2005.

Abu Dhabi agreed in February 1998 to supply 500 mn cfd of gas to Dubai. Abu Dhabi firstconsidered supplying this gas from its offshore Khuff project. But, as described earlier, itdecided to source the gas initially from its OGD-2 development. In February 2000, workbegan on constructing a 112 km pipe from the al-Taweelah processing plant in Abu Dhabi’sMaqta’ district to the Jebel Ali industrial zone in Dubai. But the plan is that, at a later stage,gas from Qatar will reach Dubai via this pipeline.

The idea of the Qatar connection arose out of a realization on the part of the UAE leadershipin 1999 that the scope of the demand for natural gas in the Emirates and elsewhere in the Gulfwas rising so rapidly that new and much broader strategic thinking was required. This led tothe birth of the most ambitious gas distribution scheme ever attempted in the Middle East:the Dolphin initiative.

The Dolphin Initiative – Qatar’s Gas For UAE and Oman

The United Arab Emirates Offsets Group (UOG) is the body that handles the investmentswhich foreign companies making military sales are required to place in the Emirates. Earlyin 1999, UOG came up with the idea of bringing gas to the UAE market – and to Dubai inparticular. The logic is obvious. Qatar, in its offshore North field, has one of the biggest reservoirsof gas in the world. It needs to find a market, and Dubai needs to find a new source of supply.So the UOG suggested the building of an 800 km undersea pipeline from the North field toa landfall in Abu Dhabi. From there the gas would be piped overland, first to Jebel Ali andthen on to Oman, and at some much later date, the pipeline might be extended to the Indiansubcontinent. The scheme was named the Dolphin initiative.

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Throughout 1999 and in the early months of 2000, UOG began putting together a chain ofpreliminary agreements to prepare for the launch of Dolphin. In June 1999, UOG signed aMemorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Dubai Supply Authority for the delivery of200–700 mn cfd of gas from the Dolphin project. Furthermore, under a joint declaration byADNOC and Dolphin in November the same year, the latter agreed to supply the 500 mn cfdwhich Abu Dhabi had agreed (in February 1998) to supply to Dubai – depending on the latter’sapproval. By the first quarter of 2000, Dolphin still had not finalized with Dubai exclusivityover gas sales to the emirate, the volume requested and the price.

In June 1999, UOG signed two more MOUs with potential customers for Dolphin gas. Thefirst was with Oman for the supply of 300–600 mn cfd on a long-term basis. The second waswith Pakistan for the supply of up to 1.5 bn cfd. Then in July UOG and Mobil Oil Qatar signedan MOU to start negotiations on developing a long-term supply and purchase agreement forinitial gas supplies from the North field of 300–500 mn cfd. In the short term the Qatarigovernment has indicated that the gas will be supplied by existing concession holders. At alater stage UOG will be granted the right to develop gas reserves in the North field.

Then in March 2000 came an announcement from UOG that they had reached an agreementwith the US’s Enron and France’s Elf (a subsidiary of Totalfina) on a strategic partnershipto implement the Dolphin initiative. The formation of the partnership represented a majorstep forward for Dolphin and set the stage for detailed negotiations with potential customersfor the proposed gas network. UOG will hold a 51 per cent majority shareholding in the newpartnership, with the remainder split equally between Enron and Elf. (The Elf name has beenretained for the merged company’s Middle Eastern operations for legal reasons, and isexpected to remain in use for some time.) The Project Development Agreement (PDA)foresees the partnership lasting a minimum of 25 years, and its initial goal will be to developthe resource-base part of the project. Elf’s contribution will be to ensure that the upstreampart of Dolphin is completed as cost-effectively as possible, while Enron will oversee themidstream, particularly pipeline construction and operation, as well as raising and managingcapital for the venture.

President and CEO of Enron, Jo Sutton, said that the venture partners would focus in the nearterm on the construction of a pipeline from Qatar to Dubai via Abu Dhabi. He predicted thatwithin 12–18 months the group would begin construction of the first phase, with a view tocompletion in late 2002 or early 2003. Initial deliveries to Abu Dhabi are expected to reacharound 1.2 bn cfd of gas, expanding to 3 bn cfd over 2–3 years as the customer base grows. Ofthis amount, 80 per cent is earmarked for use in the UAE, and this will include the 500 mn cfdwhich Abu Dhabi has contracted to supply to Dubai. A decision on extending the supply line toOman ‘will depend on whether we want to supply more gas within the UAE or to sell to Oman.’

The cost of the production facilities and the pipeline from Qatar to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Omanis predicted to total about US $4 billion, of which US $2–3 billion is expected to be spent onproduction and processing and US $1–2 billion on the pipeline. The overall capital cost of takinggas to these markets and building the power projects and industrial plants linked to the gas streamis projected to be US $8–10 billion, much of which is to come from the customers. Besidespotential power schemes, UOG is hoping to line up energy supply contracts to LPG, petrochemical,fertilizer, ammonia and other industrial producers in the region. According to the former Chairmanof UOG, Dr Amin Badr el-Din, ‘lots of this gas demand is driven by the need for power generation

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in the region; also, many industrial developments are being held up by a lack of gas in the UAEand Qatar. It is the same in Dubai, too, where a number of projects are waiting to be sanctioned.’

With its decision to launch the Dolphin project, the UAE is taking the initiative in developingthe first links in an intra-Gulf gas network, a concept that has been much discussed. Beyond that,the UAE could become the hub for an even wider gas distribution system, with pipelines extendingto Pakistan at first, and possibly as far as India at a later stage. While sceptics cast doubt on thepossibility of a gas pipe being laid on the sea bed deep under the Indian Ocean, UAE officialssay they are determined to see if a way of overcoming current obstacles can be found.

UAE Oil and Gas – an Environmentally Sound Future

Having established itself as one of the major players in the international oil and gas industry andan innovator in intra-Gulf cooperation, the UAE is setting its sights on responsible, secure andenvironmentally safe development in the century ahead. Despite the fact that the role of gas isincreasing fast, the UAE does not believe that the oil era is over or that its demise is imminent.Nevertheless, leading figures in the UAE’s oil industry believe that further study is needed to seehow the continued expanded use of oil as a power source could be made to be compatible withthe growing awareness and concern around the world about preserving the environment. Thispoint was made by the Chairman of ADNOC, Yusif bin Umair Yusif, in a speech opening theeighth Middle East Oil & Gas Conference in Abu Dhabi in March 2000. Some commentators,he said, defined the Kyoto Protocol to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases as the beginningof the post-oil age. Research was being carried out into developing alternative automative fuels.‘But our concern,’ the ADNOC Chairman said, ‘is that resources should be effectively targetedand the full cost should be taken into account, both financially and to the environment.’Electricity,for example, still has to be generated from primary energy sources; and there is transmission lossin moving it and difficulty in storing it. ‘In the Middle East,’ Mr Yusif went on:

we are sitting on top of two thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves and they are relativelylow cost to develop. The gasoline and diesel fuels which are refined from these crude oilsare reliable, cheap and efficient, with a long successful track record. It would be beneficialfor us and the world if more research into the production of these hydrocarbon-basedtransportation fuels is undertaken, which will make them even more environmentally friendlyand will maintain and enhance their attraction for many more decades. We believe theseconventional transportation fuels will remain more economically viable than the alternativesand merit more intensive research than they are currently receiving.

The UAE which, from the earliest days of oil discoveries, has demonstrated its realization ofthe need for constant technological improvements in the oil industry to keep pace with the worldat large and the necessity to strive for an increasingly efficient and safe industry, is ideally suitedto act as a catalyst for the research needed to adapt oil products to the stringent environmentalregulations of the twenty-first century. Given the UAE’s determination to keep its place amongthose nations that are quick to realize the need of oil producers to adapt to changing circum-stances and consumer demands, it can look forward to many more decades in which its oil andgas industries will provide a secure and dynamic base for economic growth.

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UAE Oil and Gas Statistics

Table 1. Crude oil production 1978–1999 (thousand b/d)1978 1,830.51979 1,830.71980 1,701.91981 1,502.31982 1,248.81983 1,149.01984 1,069.01985 1,012.6*1986 1,146.0*r1987 1,281.1*r1988 1,359.4*r1989 1,641.3*1990 1,818.5*r1991 2,093.6*r1992 2,241.1*r1993 2,159.31994 2,166.51995 2,148.01996 2,161.31997 2,160.71998 2,255.3 1999 2,071.0

*– provisional or estimated figure. r – revised. Source: OPEC

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Table 2. Crude oil exports by destination 1994–1998 (thousand b/d)Destination 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998North America 23.6 – 1.4 – 2.5Latin America 10.0 – – – 7.5Eastern Europe – – – – –Western Europe 61.7 2.0 0.7 2.0 13.0

France 1.4 – 0.1 – 11.2Germany 0.6 – – 1.0 –Italy – – – – –Netherlands – – – 1.0 –UK – – – – 1.3

Africa 30.0 36.0 40.9 40.0 57.0Asia and Far East 1,751.6 1,828.9 1,843.6 1,846.9 1,924.1

Japan 1,212.9 1,215.0 1,195.1 1,213.4 1,205.0Oceania 78.1 58.1 56.6 60.1 34.9OECD 1,376.3 1,273.0 1,253.8 1,275.5 1,255.4Total World 1,955.0 1,925.0 1,943.2 1,949.0 2,039.0

Source: OPEC

Table 3. Main oil-producing fields in the UAEField Discovered Producing Wells API GravityAbu Dhabi:

Abu al-Bukhoosh 1969 42 32.0Asab 1965 106 41.0Bab 1958 100 44.0Bu Hasa 1962 201 39.0Bunduq 1964 23 40.0Mubarraz 1969 28 37.0Sahil 1967 22 39.7Satah 1975 10 39.8Umm al-Dalkh 1969 32 32.5Umm Shaif 1958 142 37.0Lower Zakum 1963 131 39.0Upper Zakum 1963 142 35.0Total 979

Dubai:Falah 1972 25.5Fateh 1966 31.8Rashid 1973 141 38.0Margham 1981 10 43.5Total 151

Ra’s al-Khaimah:Saleh 1983 7 50.0

Sharjah:Kahaif 1992 4 50.0Saja’a/Moyeid 1980 30 50.0Mubarak 1972 14 47.0Total 48

Source: IPE, MEES

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Table 4. Natural gas production 1994–1998 (million cubic metres)1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 98/97 % change

Gross Production 34,360 40,860 45,930 48,090 48,980 1.9Marketed Production 25,820 31,320 33,800 36,310 37,070 2.1Flaring 390 360 390 1,520 1,500 –1.3Reinjection 4,330 6,000 8,510 7,000 7,150 2.1Shrinkage 3,820 3,180 3,230 3,260 3,260 –

Source: OPEC

Economic Development in the UAE

Mohamed Shihab

Introduction

Thirty years ago the UAE was one of the least developed countries of the world. Today,it has achieved an income level comparable to that of the industrialized nations. The UAEdid not pass through the hypothetical development ‘stages’ that most developed countriesseem to have experienced. Rather, its large oil revenues have allowed her to leap thesestages to the stage of high mass consumption. Massive oil revenues have enabled the UAEto short-cut the usually difficult and lengthy process of saving and capital accumulationnecessary for economic development. Given an abundance of natural resource endowments(oil and gas), the UAE has embraced resource-based industries (RBI) as a developmentstrategy, an industrial strategy that is based on utilization of natural resources. There hasbeen a deployment of windfall income, largely directed at a ‘once-and-for-all’ boost tothe social and economic infrastructure, which enabled the UAE to achieve a significantdegree of economic development within the very brief timeframe of 1973 to 1982, a periodof relatively high oil prices.

This chapter takes account of the fact that development economics cannot be separatedfrom the institutional, social, cultural, economic and political context. It also takes into accountthe all-important human factor, both as a goal and a source of economic development.

Economic and Institutional Constraints

Before the discovery and export of oil, the economy of the Trucial States (which today formthe UAE) depended mainly on subsistence agriculture, nomadic animal husbandry, theextracting of pearls and the trade in pearls, fishing, and seafaring. The period before the discoveryof oil, therefore, reflected the country’s limited natural resources, and resulted in a simplesubsistence economy.

The epoch of economic development in the UAE (or the UAE’s First Development Decade)began in the early 1970s, the federation’s formation on 2 December 1971 (and the establishmentof its formal economic, social, and political institutions) coinciding with a massive increase inoil production and oil exports, followed by the explosive rise in oil prices in 1973.

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Political and Social Stability

Since its formation in 1971 the UAE has enjoyed a political stability. The existing politicalstructures appear to suit the tribal society of the UAE, and the distribution of huge oil revenuesin the form of social and economic infrastructure, high salaries, a high standard of social services,such as health and education, has raised the standard of living for UAE citizens and consid-erably reduced the likelihood of internal political and social unrest. It is worth mentioningthat the UAE Government has maintained a relatively good record on human rights since theformation of the state. This in turn has promoted political and social stability.

The UAE is an active member of many regional and international associations such as theArab League, the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab Gulf CooperationCouncil, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Relations with many countries ofthe world, particularly the Western democratic countries, have been traditionally warm.

Political and social stability has gone hand in hand with liberal trade policies and has pavedthe way for investment (domestic and international) in the industrial sector.

Oil and Mineral Resources

The UAE is endowed with vast reserves of oil, both offshore and onshore. Associated gasfrom crude oil production and non-associated gas is also produced. Since the early 1970s theUAE’s phenomenal growth has depended largely on the discovery and exploitation of oil.The oil and gas industries are well managed and the latest technology is continuously harnessedto increase productive efficiency.

According to the UAE Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, the UAE maximumsustainable daily capacity of oil production (maximum production rate that can be sustaineddaily for one year in present conditions of exploitation) is 2 million barrels a day. Its installedproduction capacity is over 3 million barrels per day. In 2000, proven oil reserves in theUAE were 98.8 billion barrels, the third largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia,and Iraq. The UAE’s proven oil reserves were estimated to be almost 10 per cent of theproven world oil reserves in June 2000. On the basis of current daily oil production of 2 .2million barrels per day, it is estimated that oil reserves in the UAE will last for more than122 years.

Proven gas reserves were estimated to be 6 trillion cubic metres in 2000. The UAE wasestimated to have natural gas reserves equivalent to over 4 per cent of the known world gas.The UAE holds the fourth largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Daily gas productionwas estimated in 1999 to be 2940 million cubic feet. Gas reserves are estimated to last formore than 60 years. The UAE possesses, therefore, huge reserves of oil and gas, capable ofsustaining long-term economic growth.

Other mineral resources in the UAE are divided into three categories: rocks, sands and soils,and metals. The exploitation of minerals is primarily restricted to rocks and sands. Rocks andgravel are used for construction. Limestone, sand, marl and gypsum are used to manufacturecement. There is also small-scale mining of the mineral chromite in Fujairah.

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Agricultural Resources

The total area of land under agriculture and forestry constitutes less than 1.5 per cent of thetotal land area of the UAE. Agriculture has made only a small contribution to GDP (3.8 percent in 1999). There has, however, been a consistent and substantial increase in the amount ofland devoted to agriculture and forestry over the past 30 years as the result of sustained effortsby the UAE Government to promote agricultural development using the following incentives:

• Agricultural plots are granted free to any UAE citizen.• Land is levelled and prepared mechanically for free.• Production inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides are provided at half cost.• Water wells are drilled for free.• There is provision of free technical services such as installation of water pumps.• An agricultural credit line was established in 1978 to grant farmers loans for water pumps,

fence wires, fishing boat engines, green houses, and drip irrigation systems. This agriculturalcredit attracts no interest.

• A market for produce is secured by government intervention. Small farmers are protectedfrom foreign competition by a policy of buying the farmers’ products at favourable prices.

The very limited agricultural potential of the UAE, with unsuitable land, water scarcity andharsh climate, has not been an obstacle to its economic development. Clark (1984) arguesthat although improvement in agricultural productivity is normally a necessary condition forsuccessful development, there are exceptions when a developing country (particularly richlyendowed with minerals) produces what he terms ‘food substitutes’– mineral or forest products,which can be exported to world markets, purchasing food imports which then partiallysubstitute for the productivity of the country’s own agriculture.

Population and Labour Force

The UAE population is essentially a small one. However, after the discovery of oil and itsexport in the last four decades, it has experienced very rapid growth, the result of a combinationof high natural rates of increase among the UAE’s indigenous population, and a massiveinward migration of expatriates who now comprise more than three quarters of the population.Thus, a small indigenous population, a large expatriate population, and immense wealth generatedby oil are the dominant socio-economic features of the UAE.

In addition to population size and age composition, social factors in the UAE have a greatimpact in determining the size of the UAE labour force. Female participation in the UAElabour force remains small, 16.3 per cent in 1999. However, incentives and legislation aimto change this situation. Greater female participation is seen as a way of increasing the UAEindigenous labour force and lessening the country’s dependence on foreign labour.

A two-tier labour market has emerged in the UAE. At the top is the indigenous labour force,which constitutes about 10 per cent of the total work force. Below this is an unlimited supply offoreign labour. The UAE has reaped benefits from foreign skilled and unskilled workers, whoinitiated its economic development in the early 1970s and subsequently have come to sustain it.

The employment pattern in the UAE does not reflect the structure of output. The oil sectoremploys only 1.6 per cent of the UAE labour force, reflecting the capital-intensive nature ofthe industry. Nearly 39 per cent of the labour force is engaged in community, social and personalservices. The unemployment rate in the UAE (0.5 per cent) is remarkably low, which meansthat the UAE economy is effectively at full employment.

The UAE is highly urbanized. This has been attributed to the cluster of public services,transportation and communications, financial markets and service-based industries in the cities.

Table 1. UAE’s main economic indicators 1990–1999Economic indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1999GDP at current prices (Dh billion) 125.3 126.0 128.4 131.7 135.0 143.9 181.5Real GDP growth (%) 11.9 –2.4 –0.9 –0.6 –2.4 –0.8 6.7Population (million) 1.84 1.91 2.01 2.09 2.23 2.37 2.93Total exports (fob), $ billion 21.25 22.15 23.37 23.31 21.78 23.44 32.28Imports (fob) $ billion 11.69 13.92 15.83 17.75 18.25 18.98 28.33Current account ($ billion) 5.09 1.53 3.00 0.18 –0.72 0.36 3.94Reserves excluding gold ($ billion) 4.58 5.37 5.71 6.10 .. .. ..Total external debt ($ billion) 11.05 10.20 10.80 11.07 .. .. ..Oil production mnb/d 2.12 2.42 2.29 2.22 2.17 2.22 2.28Oil price (average) $/barrel .. .. 18.5 16.4 14.3 15.5 18.2Crude oil exports ($ billion) .. .. 14.10 12.10 10.28 11.44 16.62Exchange rate Dh:US $ (average) 3.671 3.671 3.671 3.671 3.671 3.671 3.671Inflation (%) .. .. 5.5 3.2 5.0 5.5 3.1

Sources: MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Annual Economic Report 1999.CPC (Crown Prince Court, UAE), Development Indicators in the UAE (1999).

Structural Changes in the UAE’s Economy

Economic development can be perceived as change in the structure of the economy. Structuralchange refers to terms such as agricultural transformation, industrialization, demographictransition, urbanization, transformation of domestic demand and production, foreign trade,finance, and employment.

In considering structural changes in the UAE’s economy, this chapter intends to identifyand describe the pattern of the UAE’s economic growth and to determine its achieved levelof development. In taking this structural view of the economy, the chapter examines the distinctsectors of economic activity and how these sectors respond to changes in demand to whichthe development process subjects them. This partition of the economy into sectors permitsgreater understanding of the problems of development.

One clear pattern of the changing economic structure in the course of economic developmentis that the share of industry increases as gross output per capita rises. Following the SecondWorld War, rapid industrialization was viewed as a prerequisite for modernization and structuralchange. The difference in the output and the contribution to GDP of the industrial sector indeveloping countries as opposed to its place in developed countries was seen as the mainmanifestation of economic backwardness and dependence.

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While value added growth rate in the UAE oil sector was fluctuating during the period1975–1998, the manufacturing sector value added growth rate was steadily increasing. Themanufacturing value added increased considerably from Dh 472 million in 1975 to Dh 9443million in 1985, and to Dh 18,855 million in 1998 (at constant prices). Its contribution to GDPincreased significantly from 0.9 per cent in 1975 to 3.8 per cent in 1980, and to 12.4 per centin 1998. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the substantial increase in the manufacturing valueadded has made a modest contribution to the UAE’s total output growth.

Agricultural production increased more than fourfold from 1975 to 1998 at an average annualgrowth rate of 12.6 per cent. This consistent increase in the agricultural output is attributedto the sustained efforts of the UAE’s Government to promote agricultural development withgenerous agricultural incentives and subsidies. Changes in the contribution to GDP of thenon-oil sector (agriculture), however, increased at a moderate rate. In 1998, the agriculturalsector comprised about 3.6 per cent of GDP.

A conspicuous sectoral shift and contribution to GDP is evident in the service sector,commerce (wholesale and retail trade), restaurants, hotels, transport, storage, communications,finance, insurance, real estates and government services. The service sector contribution toGDP increased from 22.3 per cent in 1975 to 39.7 per cent in 1998.

Table 2. Relative importance of UAE’s main economic sectors 1975–1998(percentage of GDP)

Sector 1975 1980 1985 1995 1998Agriculture 0.7 0.9 1.5 2.0 3.6Crude oil 67.7 56.4 44.0 41.1 22.4Manufacturing 0.9 6.9 9.2 8.7 12.4Electricity and Water 0.5 1.3 2.2 2.1 1.8Construction 9.0 8.3 8.8 8.4 9.4Commerce, restaurants and hotels 9.3 9.0 8.8 10.1 13.7Transport, storage and communications 3.0 3.4 3.8 5.5 7.0Financing & insurance 1.6 3.5 5.1 4.3 6.7Real estate 2.5 3.8 4.9 6.2 10.5Government services 4.8 7.0 10.5 10.9 11.8

Sources: MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1975–1985, (1987).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1985–1990, (1993).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1990–1995, (1998).

MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Annual Economic Report 1999, (1999).

Structural Change in the UAE’s Employment Patterns

The service sector, which includes trade, restaurants, hotels, transport, storage, communi-cations, finance, insurance, real estate, business services, community, social and personalservices, ranks first in size of employment (58 per cent of the labour force), which reflectsits powerful dominance in the UAE. The share of employment in the service sector increasedfrom 51.91 per cent in 1975, to 56.97 per cent in 1980, and to 57.9 per cent in 1998,corresponding to the increase in the sector’s real output over the same period 1975–1998.

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The service sector value added comprised the second largest value added (after the oil sector)in the UAE’s GDP in 1998.

The agricultural sector employed 7.4 per cent of the UAE labour force in 1998, the fourthranking sector in labour force distribution. Its employment share increased from 4.55 per centin 1975 to 7.4 per cent in 1998, corresponding to a steady increase of real output over thesame period.

Although the manufacturing sector accounts for a low proportion of employment (12.6 percent of the labour force), its share of employment increased from 5.83 per cent in 1975 to7.41 per cent in 1985, and to 12.6 per cent in 1998, matching an increase in real output overthe same period.

In employing 1.6 per cent of the labour force, quarrying, petroleum extraction and miningsector was ranked last in share of employment, despite its paramount importance in the UAEeconomy, reflecting the fact that the oil sector is highly capital-intensive.

Industrialization

In the process of economic development, industrialization has been considered crucial tothe transition. Industrialization is linked to the idea of stimulating forward and backwardlinkages with the rest of the economy. In addition, industrialization creates new employmentopportunities. In common with other developing countries, the UAE, whose economy hasbeen significantly dependent on the export of one primary product, namely oil, pursued astrategy of industrialization to diversify the sources of its national income and reduce itsdependence on oil.

The main factors which have acted as a constraint on UAE industrial development are limitedraw materials, and the size of the domestic market. On the other hand, the abundance of naturalmineral resources, the ready availability of financial capital, a well-established infrastructure,a flexible labour and employment policy, the availability of cheap energy, industrial zonesand various incentives in legislation, plus political and social stability have been the mainresource and incentive for UAE industrialization.

From the UAE Industrial Survey of 1988, 1992 and (MoFI 1988, 1992, 1996), the patternof industrial establishments can be summarized as follows:

• The first industrial establishment in the UAE, in the emirate of Dubai, was a small workshopfor steel boxes and containers, established in 1950.

• The period from 1951 to 1958 did not witness the establishment of any industrial firm.• The increase in industrial establishments began in 1959, the period coinciding with the

discovery of oil in the emirate of Abu Dhabi.• 1977 was a golden year in UAE industrial development, in which 84 new industrial

establishments were recorded, the highest number of industrial establishments in a singleyear during the period 1950–1992.

• The number of industrial establishments grew at an increasing rate during the period1959–1977.

• From 1978 to1995, however, the number of industrial establishments grew at a decreasing rate.

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To some extent industrialization in the UAE has broadened the base of the economy, asshown by increased industrial productivity; a diversification of exports to more than 184industrial products, and an increase in the value of industrial exports from Dh 11 million in1975 to Dh 539 million in 1980, Dh 4825 million in 1985, and to Dh 8070 million in 1990(in constant prices). Nevertheless, industrialization in the UAE has not reduced significantlythe economy’s reliance on oil (Shihab 1990).

Human Development Indicators

The main human development indicators in the UAE can be analysed at two levels: a) nationallyover time and b) internationally (or cross-sectionally), comparing performance with bothdeveloping and industrial countries. The first level, nationally over time, enables us to explorethe rate, structure, and character of human development in the UAE. The latter, internationally,enables us to examine the degree of human development in the UAE compared to bothdeveloping and developed countries.

At the national level, the UAE has achieved impressive improvements in many humandevelopment indicators during the past three decades. At the international level, the UAE hasrecorded high levels of development bearing comparison with the average of the developingcountries, and even with some individual industrial countries.

Educational Institutions

Apositive relationship between education and economic growth is well-established. Educationand training are viewed as major determinants of increasing productivity, and as a factor diffusinggrowth. Education is considered a key element in developing the necessary skill levels forgrowth and modernization in the UAE. The UAE Government offers free education to allUAE citizens, and Arabic-speaking children of expatriates employed in the public sector.

Educational institutions in the UAE consist of public and private sector schools, militaryschools, higher education and vocational training establishments. The existing educationalstructure was established in the early 1970s and consists of a four-tier system covering 14years of education, as follows: kindergarten (4–5 years old); primary (6–11 years); intermediate(12–14 years) and secondary (15–17 years). For higher education (i.e. undergraduate, Masterand Ph.D. programmes) UAE citizens are entitled to choose between study in the EmiratesUniversity or abroad through a generous scholarship system. Primary school education iscompulsory for all UAE citizens. Government policy is to provide staff/student ratios of 1:20at kindergarten and primary levels and 1:15 at intermediate and secondary levels. The existingstaff/student ratios are well within this proposed range. (The staff/student ratio of kinder-garten and primary levels is 1:17; intermediate and secondary levels is 1:10).

The Higher Colleges of Technology, located in several emirates, were established in 1988and are aimed at offering courses of three years’ technical training in skills such as businessadministration, accounting, banking, information systems, computers, engineering, aviationtechnology, and health sciences.

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Encouraged by financial incentives, government civil servants are required to attend yearlyat least one seminar (at local or international level) within their respective fields as a conditionfor future promotion.

In his influential article, Schultz (1961) stressed the role of education in development.He maintained that education could be considered as a process of accumulating capital,which could increase a worker’s productivity and income. He referred to this investmentin education as an investment in ‘human capital’. Human capital is defined as a productiveinvestment embodied in human resources. Improved skills and health result from expenditureson education, training programmes, and medical care. As indicated by Chatterji (1994), theskill level of the workforce in any economy is a factor that has an important bearing oneconomic performance.

Carnoy (1967) concluded that education and income are highly correlated at both individualand social levels. People intuitively recognize this fact and consequently try to become aseducated as possible. The more schooling and certificates people can accumulate, the betterwill be their chances of obtaining secure and better-paid jobs. This desire for well-paid jobshas created demand for education as a mean of economic improvement.

On the supply side, a country’s political institutions determine:

• The quantity of schools and classrooms at the primary, secondary, and university levels.• Who is admitted to these schools.• The kind of education and instructions (values, attitudes, ideas, and aspirations) students

acquire.

Current concern, however, centres upon how to improve the quality of education (teaching,facilities and curricula) and how to provide basic education to the vast majority of the population.Behrman and Birdsall (1983) indicate that it is the quality of education and not its quantityalone (years of schooling) that best explains differential earnings and productivity.

Health Services

Many developing countries struggle against malnutrition and poor health. Expenditure on healthhas been regarded as investment in human capital (Mushkin 1962). Anand and Ravallion (1993)conclude that the quantitative effect of public expenditure on health appears to be sizeable.

The relationship between health and economic development is reciprocal. Economicdevelopment policies tend to improve the health status of the population. Better healthcontributes to economic development. Better health is an important goal in its own right, andis a basic human need. Health increases human potential and improves the quality of humanresources. Health programmes, therefore, aim to cut morbidity and mortality, and to provideadequate nutrition, health care and sanitation.

The UNDP’s 1995 report estimated that 99 per cent of the overall population of the UAEhad access to health services (the percentage of the population that can reach appropriate localhealth services on foot or by the local means of transport in no more than one hour), 95 percent of the population had access to safe water, and 77 per cent of the population had accessto sanitation (for the period 1985–1993).

The UAE Government’s health policies aim at providing a range of facilities and atimplementing programmes aimed at advancing the level of service and health educationthroughout the UAE. There are also preventative medical programmes such as ‘mother andchild health care’, vaccination and inoculations for children, monitoring and notification ofinfectious diseases, and health educational programmes.

In addition, the UAE Ministry of Health (MoH) provides special medical centres for schoolchildren, and health units in every school throughout the UAE. These health units are providedwith qualified nurses as well as first aid equipment. Hospitals, beds, doctors and nurses arelocated throughout the UAE, mainly in accordance with the distribution of the population.Health facilities are, in general, evenly distributed.

There are also a large number of private health facilities. The private health sector makesa significant contribution to the provision of health facilities in all parts of the UAE. Its maincontribution consists in the supply of materials, drugs and equipment to the Ministry of Healthand private retail outlets. In addition there is a large number of private clinics, medicalcomplexes, hospitals and pharmacies. The main noticeable growth in private sector healthservices has been in the number of general clinics. As is shown in Table 3, the number ofprivate clinics not only has exceeded the number of public clinics, but has increased from 50in 1975 to 174 in 1980, to 456 in 1985, to 675 in 1990, and to 896 in 1997.

The number of hospitals (public and private) increased from 19 hospitals in 1975 to 42hospitals in 1990 and to 57 hospitals in 1997. This increase has been associated with increasesin the number of hospital beds. In 1975, for example, there were 1745 hospital beds; by 1997hospital bed numbers had risen to more than 6334 beds.

Numbers of doctors (general physicians) increased from 751 in 1975 to 2766 in 1997. Dentistsincreased from 65 in 1975 to 220 in 1997. The number of nurses rose from 1555 in 1975 to7695 in 1997. According to the Human Development Report 1995, there was a doctor per1042 persons and a nurse per 568 persons (1988–1991).

Table 3. Health services in the UAE (1975–1997)Indicators 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997Hospitals 19 27 40 42 51 57Beds (hospital) 1745 3872 5817 6297 6365 6634General physicians 751 1484 1301 1493 2362 2766Dentists 65 141 173 185 238 220Nurses 1555 4346 6327 7130 7547 7695Pharmacists (public) 60 117 190 237 302 325Public clinics 38 69 107 118 126 125Private clinics 50 174 456 675 798 896Population/bed 320 269 237 288 374 604Population/doctor 743 702 1247 1236 1212 1238Population/nurse 359 240 339 438 313 454

Sources: MoH (Ministry of Health, UAE), Statistical Yearbook (1997).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE), Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1990–1995 (1998).

UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human Development Report 1999 (1999).

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In short, advanced health care has done much to lower mortality levels in the UAE and asa result mortality rates have declined substantially. The crude death rate, deaths per thousandof the population, decreased from 7.3 per 1000 in 1975 to 4 per 1000 in 1992, and to 2.1 per1000 in 1997. Infant mortality rate (i.e. the number of children who die before their firstbirthday out of every 1000 live births) fell in the UAE from 145 per 1000 in 1960 to 65 per1000 in 1975, to 54 per 1000 in 1980, to 19 per 1000 in 1992, and to 9 per 1000 in 1997. Onthe other hand, life expectancy at birth, the average number of years members of a givenpopulation are expected to live, rose in the UAE from 53 years in 1960, to 65 years in 1975,and to 74.8 years in 1997.

It can be argued that the UAE has high health standards compared with other developingcountries and even with some developed countries (see Table 4). Measures of malnutrition,mortality and morbidity show impressive improvement in the last two decades. Epidemics havebeen eliminated and diseases have declined as causes of death. Both crude and infant death rateshave fallen, and life expectancy had risen to 74.8 years by 1997. Credit for continued improvementsince the formation of the UAE in 1971 belongs primarily to the UAE Federal Government,which has consistently accorded a high priority to improving the health of its population.

Table 4. International human development comparisons 1997Indicator UAE All All

Developing IndustrialCountries Countries(average) (average)

Real GDP per capita ($) 19,115 3,240 23,741Human Development Index (HDI) 0.812 0.637 0.919Life expectancy (years) 74.8 64.4 77.7Maternal mortality rate

(per 100,000 live births) 26 491 13Infant mortality rate

(per 1000 live births) 9 64 6Adult literacy (%) 74.8 71.4 98.7Population with access to health services (%) 90 .. ..Daily per capita supply of calories 3,366 2,628 3,377

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1999.

Conclusion

The UAE is a very wealthy country, mainly due to its modest population base and huge oilresources. The large budget surpluses achieved have enabled the UAE to accumulate a sizeablecurrent account balance, held mainly by the governments of the individual emirates and partlyby other private establishments. Progress has been favourable in social and economic development.The successful implementation of human development policy in the UAE, hand in hand withindustrialization, urbanization and modernization, is one of the rare examples of a countrywhich has successfully used income from its huge natural resources for its long-termdevelopment over a very short period (from the early 1970s to late 1990s).

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It is clear that the UAE has achieved impressive improvements in many social andeconomic development indicators during the past three decades. This chapter emphasizesthe high levels of human development in UAE, together with a relatively good record onhuman rights. These are goals which must still be borne in mind in attempts to sustainnational development.

Bibliography

Anand, S. and Ravallion, M. ‘Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and PublicServices’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.7, no.1, Winter (1993) pp 133–150.

Behrman, J. and Birdsall, S. ‘The Quality of Schooling: Quantity Alone is Misleading’, American Economic Review,vol.73 (1983).

Carnoy, M. ‘Rate of Return to Schooling in Latin America’, Journal of Human Resources (1967).Chatterji, M. ‘Training Subsidies, Technical Progress and Economic Growth’, paper presented to the ESRC Development

Economics Workshop on Endogenous Growth, University of Leicester, 25–26 March (1994).Clark, C. ‘Development Economics: The Early Years’, in G.M. Meier and Dudley Seers (eds), Pioneers in Development,

New York, Oxford University Press (1984).MoFI (Ministry of Finance and Industry, UAE), Industrial Directory 1992 (1992).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE) Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1975–1985 (1987).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE) Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1985–1990 (1993).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE) Economic and Social Indicators in the UAE, 1990–1995 (1998).MoP (Ministry of Planning, UAE) Annual Economic Report, 1999 (1999).Mushkin, S. ‘Health as an Investment’, Journal of Political Economy, vol.70 (1962) pp 129–157.Shihab, M. ‘Technology Transfer Process: Its Application to the United Arab Emirates’, A Paper Presented to the

Preparation Phase of the Comprehensive Economic Development Program for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Departmentof Planning, Abu Dhabi, UAE, March (1999).

Shihab, M. ‘Human Development in the United Arab Emirates’, Economic Horizons, vol.17, no.66 (1996) pp 9–31.Shihab, M. ‘Industrial Development in the United Arab Emirates’, April (1990).Schultz, T.W. ‘Investment in Human Capital’, American Economic Review, vol.51 (1961) pp 1–17.UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human Development Report 1999, Oxford University Press (1999).

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Industrialization in the UAE

Shihab M. Ghanem

Introduction

Commercial quantities of oil were first discovered in Abu Dhabi emirate in 1958 and oilexports commenced in 1962, nearly four decades ago. Oil was subsequently found in Dubaiand exports began in 1969. The federation of the United Arab Emirates was formed on 2December 1971, about 13 years after that initial discovery in Abu Dhabi. Undoubtedly, oiland the federation were the two most important factors in the transformation of the sevenemirates politically, economically, socially and culturally, from a collection of subsistencedesert sheikhdoms into a federated group of modern city-states.

In the pre-oil era the vast majority of the population worked in pearling, fishing, tradingand dhow building. According to Al Otaiba (1970), pearling began to flourish in Abu Dhabiabout two and a half centuries ago, and just before the Second World War approximately 85per cent of the population of Abu Dhabi (which was about 55,000 at the time) worked directlyor indirectly in pearling, the industry accounting for 95 per cent of the total national income.It was those living on the coast who were the main beneficiaries of this sea-based industry.The oases’ inhabitants engaged in subsistence agriculture (animal husbandry, the care of datepalms,) and rural handicrafts (the fashioning of silver ornaments, daggers, the weaving ofbishts from camel hair and pottery), although some of the population shifted between pearlingand agriculture according to the season.

After the discovery of oil, it became the mainstay of the economy, and development in the1960s and 1970s, and to a lesser degree after that, focused on physical infrastructure such asroads, ports, airports, water and electricity supplies and on social infrastructure such as schoolsand hospitals. The rapid growth of the construction industry required to meet the developmentin infrastructure attracted large numbers of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled expatriateworkers from a variety of countries, but mainly from the subcontinent and some Arab andEuropean countries. The expansion in population resulted in growth of the building sector,trading, banking and insurance services, while privately owned import-substitution industriesproducing locally needed materials such as concrete blocks, aluminium windows, furnitureand carbonated beverages began to flourish.

The governments of the emirates then decided to enhance the role of the public sector inthe development process by investment in manufacturing associated with oil and gas, such

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as refineries, fertilizer plants and aluminium smelters, as well as other industries requiringlarge investments, such as cement factories. In Abu Dhabi, the largest and richest emirate,public sector industrial projects are shared between two main bodies: Abu Dhabi NationalOil Company (ADNOC), which is the main organ for implementing Abu Dhabi policyregarding oil exploration, production, marketing and processing, and the General IndustriesCorporation (GIC), which undertakes non-petroleum related projects.

This chapter outlines the growth of the industrial sector since the discovery of oil and examinesthe constraints faced. Possible strategies are suggested for the early decades of the new century.

Manufacturing Outside the Oil Sector

Industrial development outside the oil sector was strongly linked to the construction boom,directly via the demands for cement, cement blocks, polyvinylchloride pipes, aluminiumwindows and furniture, and indirectly through the expansion of the food industry to cope withthe large increase in population.

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Table 1. Total number of industrial establishmentsin the Industrial Register of Ministry of Finance & Industry that employ 10 or more persons

Year Total Number of Establishments1990 7051991 7401992 8571993 9491994 10761995 12411996 13881997 15251998 16931999 1859

Source: Ministry of Finance and Industry

Table 1 shows the increase in the number of industrial establishments employing ten ormore people over the past decade, while Table 2 indicates the number of such establishmentsby activity and emirate at the close of the century. Table 2 indicates that industrial activity isconcentrated in Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman and Abu Dhabi. Dubai has 678 out of the 1859 totalnumber of industrial establishments while Sharjah has 581. However, Abu Dhabi hosts manyof the larger industries in the country. Some of the different categories of industry in the UAEare examined below.

Construction-related industries

From the late 1960s industrial establishments related to the requirements of building andconstruction started to increase rapidly in number. At first small factories manufacturingbuilding blocks, tiles, plastic pipes, water tanks, GRP swimming pools, marble tiles and

similar items, made their appearance. By 1973 a large asbestos-cement pipe factory had beenbuilt in Dubai, followed within a few years by another one in Umm al-Qaiwain. When the oilprices jumped in 1973, there were still no cement factories in the country. Cement was importedfrom Belgium, Germany, Kenya, etc. As requirements increased sharply in 1974, othercountries, including Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Romaniaand Lebanon, began to export cement to the UAE. The first cement factory in the UAE startedproduction in Ra’s al-Khaimah in 1975 with an annual capacity of 550,000 tons. More cementfactories were built in various emirates until the number reached eleven with an annualcapacity exceeding 8 million tons. During the economic slump of the mid-eighties these wereworking at just over half capacity with nearly half of that production being exported. Duringthat period, a white cement factory was also built in Ra’s al-Khaimah which still exports asubstantial part of its production to neighbouring Gulf countries.

Most of the cement factories have been built or partly financed by local government, butthe private sector contributed heavily in some cases, such as in Dubai. Except for gypsumand some additives, the raw materials for cement are locally available. Local cement is

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Table 2. Number of industrial establishmentsregistered at Ministry of Finance and Industry employing 10 or more persons as at 31/12/1999

Industrial Activity Abu Dhabi Dubai Sharjah Ajman Ra’s al-Umm al-Fujairah Total

KhaimahQaiwain

Food & beverages 18 82 42 20 9 6 5 182

Tobacco 1 1

Textiles 1 7 19 11 1 1 40

Garments 9 13 53 65 2 1 143

Leather goods 1 3 6 5 1 16

Wood & wooden products 1 13 14 3 1 32

Paper & paper products 8 23 14 11 2 1 1 60

Publishing 7 33 19 3 2 1 65

Petroleum products 5 4 5 7 1 22

Chemicals 22 47 52 14 4 3 1 143

Rubber and plastic products 21 42 56 23 2 4 3 151

Non-petroleum non-metallic minerals 45 99 64 22 22 9 11 272

Basic metal industries 4 21 12 2 3 1 43

Metal products 41 146 78 28 9 6 4 312

Machinery & equipment 5 16 19 1 1 42

Office equipment and computers 1 1

Electrical equipment & parts 6 25 16 1 1 2 51

Vehicles & trailers 5 12 4 4 1 26

Other transport equipment 3 12 6 10 3 1 35

Furniture & other manufacturing 2 64 85 18 3 1 1 174

Recycling 1 1

Handicraft industries 16 17 7 7 47

Total 204 678 581 257 72 36 31 1859

Source: Ministry of Finance and Industry, Department of Industrial Development

generally preferred to imported cement because of freshness. The big increase in demand forcement in the 1990s has resulted in the flourishing of the industry. Some production is exported.

The cement industry has helped the development of a downstream building materials industrysuch as asbestos-cement pipes and sheets, concrete building blocks and tiles. It is natural toconsider manufacturing pipes both because of the need for them in the infrastructure as watersupply lines but also because the import of pipes incurs heavy transport costs due to their largevolume, when most of the volume in fact is empty space. (The same could be said abouttransporting tanks.) In addition transporting pipes exposes them to shock and, therefore, cracks.Moreover, in the case of cement pipes most of the raw materials are available locally.

There are two asbestos-cement factories in the UAE. A pipe factory opened in Dubai in 1973,even before the development of the first cement factory, and a pipe and sheet factory was installedin Umm al-Qaiwain during the late 1970s. However, because of the environmental problemsconnected with asbestos (even though the more dangerous blue asbestos has been phased out),a large number of GRP, PE and PVC pipe factories have appeared in the various emirates overthe years and have taken some of the market share of the asbestos-cement pipes. The many mediumand small concrete block, interlock and tile factories which were established now not only covermost of the country’s needs but also export a substantial portion of their production.

A total of nine factories for making reinforced steel bars from scrap iron have been built inthe UAE but four of these have closed down and the remaining five produce a total of 100thousand tons annually, which is less than one tenth of local demand. Alarge factory is plannedfor Abu Dhabi and once this is in operation it will reduce imports substantially.

The first paint factory was opened in 1975. By 1996 there were 21 paint factories producingabout 100 thousand tons annually with about one fourth of the production exported. Althoughmost of the basic materials for manufacturing paints are imported, the high water content inmost paints for use in building makes it economical to manufacture the paints locally in orderto reduce transport costs. However, many special paints, such as marine paints and motorvehicle paints, are imported.

Many carpentry shops have been established to supply the construction industry with suchitems as doors, windows, partitions, pre-fabricated buildings, with the number of larger unitsemploying more than ten persons reaching 33 in 1996. As for furniture-making factories,those employing more than ten persons reached 64 in the same year.

Food processing and beverages

Factories for making beverages commenced operation in the late 1960s. The number offactories for food processing and beverages with a labour force of more than ten reached 80in 1985. By 1996 there were 130 factories, and by the end of 1999 there were 182. Theseinclude a large sugar factory and a few flour mills. The remaining units are for meat or fishprocessing, milk and dairy products, vegetable oil and animal fat processing, canning of fruits,vegetables and legumes, soft drink factories, mineral water bottling factories and three factoriesfor animal feed.

Textiles, wearing apparel and leather goods

Ready-made garment factories mushroomed during the second half of the 1980s, reachingabout 150 in number. The attraction was the benefits to be gained from access to the UAE

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quota for export to the West, in particular the United States. There was no appreciable increasein the 1990s. In fact some factories closed down because the quota had been exhausted, with143 remaining at the end of the century. Most of these factories are located in Sharjah andAjman, with some in Jebel Ali Free Zone.

Except for four of these establishments where the investment exceeds 10 million, mostof the others are small with a capital investment of less than half a million dirhams for eachfactory. It is a labour-intensive industry, using an average of over 140 people per factory,80 per cent of whom are generally young females aged 17 to 25 years, most from Sri Lanka.

The bulk of production is shipped to the USA and the EU with most of the seconds exportedto Eastern Europe. By the time the quota system is abolished in 2005, this industry will betoo well established to be seriously affected. It is considered the second largest manufacturingindustry in the UAE after aluminium and constitutes about 15 per cent of the non-oil industrialexports. The banks are usually happy to provide the industry with finance. Some of the morefactories are more sophisticated, using a higher level of technology and these are mostly locatedin Jebel Ali. There are also a few factories in the UAE for leather products.

Paper, paper products and publishing

Publishing establishments have developed over the years to meet local demand, with thenumber reaching 65 by the end of 1999, half of which are in Dubai. As for units manufac-turing paper or paper products, 60 were in operation at the end of 1999. A few of these arepaper mills using recycled paper as raw material with one factory in Jebel Ali using pulpto make tissue paper.

Metal products, machinery and equipment

By the end of 1999 there were 312 factories dealing in such metal products as aluminiumwindows, metal furniture, cooking utensils, etc. There were also 42 factories connected withmachinery and equipment such as air-conditioners and electric distribution panels.

The Dubai government built a large cable factory in Dubai in collaboration with a UKmanufacturer, and Abu Dhabi has recently taken a share in the factory.

Alarge number of mechanical workshops exist in the UAE, including an extensive workshopin Dubai Drydock, probably the largest drydock in the world and capable of handling tankerswith a capacity of up to 1 million tons.

Basic metal industries

The most important factory producing a basic metal is DUBAL, the Dubai AluminiumCompany. Its smelter, which started production in 1979, was set up to benefit from the availableassociated gas. DUBAL imports alumina via the adjacent Jebel Ali Port and exports the metalingots produced in containers through the same port. The aluminium produced is of 99.86 percent purity, one of the highest in the world. Production was 170,000 tons in 1990, increasingto 245,000 tons in 1994. The factory has since undergone expansion, and, with current yearlyproduction running at more than half a million tons, it is now one of the largest aluminiumsmelters in the world. Aluminium metal, which is mainly exported to Japan, is considered thesecond most important export item in the UAE after oil. This sophisticated industry has playedan important role in the training of UAE nationals in technology.

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Oil-Related Industries

Table 3 indicates the production and export of oil from the UAE between 1976 and 1995. TheUAE’s proven reserves are estimated at about 98 billion barrels, almost 10 per cent of theworld’s reserves.

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Table 3. Production and export of crude from UAE 10,000 BPDYear Production Export1976 1936 19281980 1702 16051985 950 8321990 2062 17851991 2320 21171992 2240 20111993 2190 19021994 2160 19301995 2160 1936

Source: Development Indicators in the UAE – Achievements and ExpectationsThe Department of Research and Studies

The Diwan of HH Crown Prince, Abu Dhabi, 1996.

Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), which was established in 1971 to overseethe oil and gas industry in Abu Dhabi, has become one of the world’s leading oil companies,with substantial business interests in upstream exploration, development, production andmarketing of oil and gas, and downstream refining, distribution and marketing of petroleumproducts, as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and marketing. It owns andoperates two refineries at Umm al-Nar and Ruwais, a gas treatment plant at Habshan, a gaspipeline distribution network and chlorine industries at Umm al-Nar.

The ADNOC group of companies operates in all sectors of the oil and gas industry, includingdrilling, construction, marine services, fertilizers, shipping and distribution. The group consistsof three main oil operating companies, five support companies providing services to the oiland gas industry, three joint ventures to utilize fully the produced gas, two maritime transportcompanies for crude oil, refined product and LNG and one refined product distributioncompany. The three main oil and gas operating companies are: Abu Dhabi Company for OnshoreOil Operations (ADCO), Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO) and ZakumDevelopment Company (ZADCO).

ADCO, the largest crude oil producer in the southern Arabian Gulf, undertakes exploration,drilling, production and export activities in Abu Dhabi’s onshore areas and the shallowcoastal waters.

ADMA-OPCO operates the exploration, development and production activities of oiland gas in Abu Dhabi’s offshore concession area. Oil and gas production comes from twofields: Umm Shaif and Zakum. The output of oil and gas from these fields is transportedto the company’s centre of operations on Das Island for processing, storage and export viathe island’s terminal.

ZADCO was established in 1977 to develop and operate the Upper Zakum field, one of thelargest fields in the world, on behalf of ADNOC and Japan Oil Development Company(JODCO). Besides Upper Zakum, the company currently operates the Umm al-Dalkh andSatah fields.

In Dubai, oil in commercial quantities was first discovered on 6 June 1966 at the Fateh fieldby Dubai Petroleum Company (DPC) and was first exported on 22 September 1969. DPClater developed the offshore fields of south-west Fateh, Falah and Rashid. Currently productionis about 170,000 barrels per day (b/d).

Arco International Oil & Gas Company (ARCO) made a gas/condensate discovery onshoreat the Margham field and production started in 1982. Current production is about 6000 b/dof condensate.

In Sharjah the BP Amoco Sharjah Oil Company is producing 40,000 to 45,000 b/d andabout 700 mn cu ft/day (cfd) of gas from the Sajaa, Moveyeid and Kahaif onshore fields.Crescent Petroleum markets nearly 5000 b/d of condensate from the Mubarak off-shore field.

Oil refineries

The first oil refinery in the UAE was opened in 1976 on the island of Umm al-Nar in AbuDhabi with a capacity of 15,000 barrels per day to cater for local requirements. This factorywas expanded in 1983 to produce 75,000 b/d of naptha, gasoline, kerosene, diesel and fuel.

In 1981 a larger refinery, with a capacity of 120,000 b/d, was opened at Ruwais in theemirate of Abu Dhabi. Its capacity was upgraded to 132,000 b/d in 1995. Ruwais producessimilar products to Umm al-Nar plus ship fuel and sulphur. Liquefied gas is also producedwhich is sent to GASCO for treatment. The two refineries at Ruwais and Umm al-Nar refineabout 10 per cent of Abu Dhabi’s oil, the rest being exported as ‘crude’. They are amongstthe highest performing refineries in the world in terms of return on investment.

In 1999, the Dubai government-owned Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) openedits condensate processing plant EPCL at Jebel Ali to produce up to 120,000 b/d of aviationfuel, diesel, naphtha and fuel.

In Sharjah, the Sharjah Oil Refining Company Ltd (SOR), the latest addition to the FalGroup, is currently constructing a refinery at al-Hamriyah with a capacity of 35,000 b/d. Thiswill run mostly crude oil and plans to expand to 60,000 b/d.

In Fujairah the 35,000 b/d Greek-owned Metro Oil Corporation refinery went into servicein 1996 but was then closed due to financial problems. It re-opened in 2000 as the FujairahRefinery Company with Fujairah government support. The total capacity will be expandedto 90,000 b/d and the refinery will now produce kerosene and jet fuel as well as fuel oil andgasoline. It is worth remembering that Fujairah is the third bunkering port in the world afterRotterdam and Singapore, supplying 600,000 to 800,000 mn tons of fuel oil per month.Shareholders in the bunkering tank farm include Van Ommeren, ENOC and the Fujairahgovernment.

The UAE has thus been able to rely on itself almost entirely for its requirements of refinedproducts. Moreover it has been able to provide inputs for downstream industries. The GulfCooperation Council together refines about 15 per cent of its total crude and this percentageis expected to rise to 21 per cent in 2007 (EIB Journal, September 1997).

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Liquefied gas

In the early years of oil extraction in the UAE associated gas was flared, but when prices ofoil jumped in 1973 interest in gas rose sharply. In 1974 the UAE produced 500 bn cu ft ofgas of which 1.5 per cent was used by the oil companies, 1.5 per cent by Abu Dhabi to produceelectricity and desalinated water and over 93 per cent flared. By 1980, nearly half of the gaswas utilized either through liquefaction for export or for use locally, and by 1983 Abu Dhabiwas utilizing 92 per cent of its gas.

World gas reserves are estimated at 150 trillion cu m of which 6trillion cu m (4 per cent)are in the UAE. Abu Dhabi has 92 per cent of the UAE reserves while Sharjah and Dubaihave 5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively.

The UAE also has large reserves of non-associated gas. About 55 per cent of UAE gas isused locally whilst the rest is exported. ADNOC owns the gas related projects in Abu Dhabi,Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS) and Abu Dhabi Gas Industries Ltd (GASCO).

ADGAS is a liquefied natural gas project which was established in 1973 and set up on DasIsland in 1977. It produces 2.3 mn tons of LNG and 1.4 mn tons of LPG from the offshorefields crude oil.

GASCO, one of the largest gas processing companies in the world, was set up in 1981 to treatassociated gas from three onshore fields as well as non-associated gas from another field. It suppliesRuwais and Abu Dhabi with gas as fuel for the generation of electricity and also supplies thepetrochemical industries with feed-stock. The majority of gas produced is, however, exported.

Dubai Gas Company (DUGAS) was built at Jebel Ali in Dubai in 1980. It treats associatedgas and collects condensate, butane and propane for export while methane and ethane are sentto the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority for the production of electricity and desalinatedwater and to DUBAL for aluminium smelting.

SHALCO was set up in Sharjah in 1986 for liquefaction and export of gas from the onshorefields. It also supplies Sharjah’s gas requirements for electricity generation and water desali-nation. Moreover, it supplies DUGAS in Dubai with about 95 mn cu ft of gas per day.

The establishment of Ruwais Fertilizer (FERTIL) in 1980 to produce fertilizers for bothdomestic use and export was a joint venture between ADNOC and Total.

One of the most important developments in the UAE gas industry is the Dolphin Project whichaims to develop links between the gas infrastructure of Qatar, the UAE and Oman, with a possiblefuture link to Pakistan. This will allow the export of non-associated gas from the massive offshoreNorth Dome field of Qatar. A statement of principles for the project was signed in March 1999between the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and the UAE Offsets Group (UOG). Theproject is estimated to cost $8 to $10 billion over six to seven years. In the first phase, to becompleted by the end of 2002, the subsea pipeline will transport 1200 mn cfd of natural gas.This will be raised to 3000 mn cfd in the second phase. Dolphin is the largest programme of itskind in the world and will account for nearly 10 per cent of total world gas supply. In the initialphase the supply will be almost exclusively for supplying gas-fired power plants.

A pipeline is currently under construction to supply Dubai with about 800 mn cfd fromAbu Dhabi’s offshore field of al-Bukhoosh via Jebel Ali for electricity generation and waterdesalination. In time, this is expected to be integrated into the Dolphin project.

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Industrialization in the UAE and its Resources

The rationale for industrialization in the UAE is the diversification of an economy which isheavily reliant on oil. A Ministry of Planning publication (1983: p 58) states:

Industrialization is a main aim of the state for the correction of the structure of productionin which the crude oil sector accounts for about two thirds of the GDP. The industrialsector, according to economic criteria, is the sector on which economic efforts should beconcentrated.

The above statement dates back to 1983. Table 4 shows that the non-oil sector’s contributionto GDP rose from 36.73 per cent in 1980 to 77.64 per cent in 1998, while the contribution ofmanufacturing has increased from 3.76 per cent in 1980 to 12.40 per cent in 1998. Even so,reliance on the oil sector is still high.

Exporting refined rather than crude oil enables the UAE to benefit from the value-addedcomponent. Moreover, the availability of associated gas which necessarily accompanies oilextraction provides feedstock for petrochemical industries and fuel for energy. In addition

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Table 4. Gross domestic product at factor cost by economic sector 1975–1998(Dh. million at constant prices)

Sector 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998Agricult., livestock & fishing 367 827 1,440 2,056 3,550 5,509Mining & quarrying:

Crude oil 35,820 70,532 44,707 57,632 49,200 34,002Others 118 235 309 307 450 572

Manufacturing 472 4,191 9,255 9,701 12,500 18,855Electricity & water 287 1,297 2,143 2,461 3,210 2,750Construction 4,770 9,834 8,882 9,687 13,300 14,278Wholesale, retail trade,Restaurants & hotels 4,940 9,094 8,715 11,237 17,800 20,813Transp./storage, comm. 1,608 3,731 4,224 6,211 8,500 10,663Financing, insurance, real estate:

Financing & insurance 825 2,123 5,154 5,126 7,150 10,112Real estate 1,326 4,006 5,176 6,864 11,700 15,935

Other services 516 814 1,645 2,467 1,640 3,008Less imputed bank charges (600) (1,403) (1,025) 1,950) (2,550) (3,774)Government services* 2,551 5,989 11,001 12,968 16,320 18,005Domestic services 54 200 364 499 1,200 1,302Total 53,054 111,470 101,990 125,266 143,970 152,030Non-oil sectors 17,234 40,938 57,283 67,634 94,770 118,028Non-oil sectors % 32.48 36.73 56.17 53.99 65.83 77.64

Source: Economic & Social Development in the UAE1975-80, 1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, Ministry of Planning, UAEThe Annual Economic Report 1999, Ministry of Planning, UAE.

* Includes education, health services, and the various ministries and government departments

industrialization plays an important role in the development of technology and a well-trainednational labour force.

Industrial development requires various factors and resources and some of these will beexamined below.

Labour force

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Table 5. Population and labour force (in 1000’s)1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Male population 386 720 895 1115 1580Female population 172 322 484 729 797Total population 558 1042 1379 1844 2377Labour force 288 541 619 694 1290Percentage of labour force to total population 51.6 51.9 44.9 37.6 54.2

Source: Development Indicators in the UAE – Achievements and ExpectationsThe Department of Research and Studies. The Diwan of H.H. The Crown Prince, Abu Dhabi, 1996

Table 6. Labour force in manufacturing sector1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Labour force in manufacturing (A) 17505 39200 95100 66530 99400Total labour force (B) 288414 541033 619429 694201 955100Percentage of A to B 6.0 7.2 9.5 9.6 10.4

Source: Development Indicators in the UAE – Achievements and ExpectationsThe Department of Research and Studies. The Diwan of H.H. The Crown Prince, Abu Dhabi, 1996

Table 5 indicates the growth of population and labour force in the UAE between 1975 and1995. The population has increased from 558,000 in 1975 to 2.37 million in 1995. Thisincrease has been mainly achieved by the influx of expatriate workers. The percentage oflabour force to total population is over 50 per cent because a large portion of the populationconsists of expatriate workers. Females constitute about one third of the population becausemost expatriate workers are male.

Table 6 shows that the labour force in manufacturing is about 10 per cent of the total labourforce in the country. Surveys of industries conducted by Dubai’s Chamber of Commerce andIndustry (1984), the Federation of Chambers of Commerce in the UAE (1983) and by theauthor in 1987 (Ph.D. thesis 1989) indicated that industry did not suffer from a shortage ofmanpower, since there were no restrictions to the inflow of the necessary expatriate labourforce, skilled and unskilled. There are very few nationals working in the industrial sector.However, with nationals graduating from universities and colleges of technology in thousandsevery year and with the government sector becoming saturated, nationals are increasinglyseeking employment in both the public and private industrial sector.

Industrial areas and infrastructure

When industrial development commenced in the UAE there was no proper town planningand industries were allowed to locate in areas unsuitably close to town centres. Later, whenindustrial areas were designated, some industries were asked to relocate. For instance severallarge enterprises engaged in fabrication for the oil industry were requested to move to

Jebel Ali. In addition to Jebel Ali’s heavy industry area, Dubai municipality has designatedseven areas (as indicated in Table 7), zoned for light, medium, heavy and hazardousindustrial activity.

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Table 7. Industrial areas in DubaiName of area Area in hectares Percentage of area in useAl-Khubaisi 102 93Al-Qusais 312 60Al-Rumool 391 98Al-Aweer 661 65Al-Quoz 1,552 22Al-Safa 114 17Total 3,132 47

Source: Dubai Structural Plan. Study Report by Parsons, Harland Bartholomew & Ass., (1994).

The other emirates have also designated areas for industry with Abu Dhabi, for instance,allocating 1400 hectares in Musafah and 400 hectares in Al Ain. The various emirates havealso seen considerable development in infrastructure and utilities: roads, ports, airports,electricity, water supply, sewerage and telephone lines.

Free zones

Because of the success of Jebel Ali Free Zone, free zones have been developed in all the emirates.With a total of nine free zones, the UAE has more free zones than most other Arab countries.

Table 8 shows the sizes of the various free zones, the date of their establishment, the numberof companies located in each of them and their activities. Jebel Ali is the oldest and largestone in the UAE and today has approximately 1600 companies, of which about 22 per centare industrial, mainly light and medium industries. However, they occupy a greater area thanthis percentage might imply since industrial establishments generally require a great deal ofspace. According to a study dating 1995/96 the percentages of industrial projects to the totalnumber of projects in the free zones were: Sharjah 17.7 per cent, Fujairah 39.8 per cent, Ajman41.3 per cent and Umm al-Qaiwain 100 per cent, (Nawar 1998).

Jebel Ali’s success is due to the fact that it was built around the largest man-made port in theworld (70 berths). It has a developed infrastructure with a modern management system and strictlyimplemented environmental and health and safety regulations. Several free zones, mostly fromthe Arab world, have recently signed consultancy agreements or memorandums of understandingwith Jebel Ali Free Zones Authority management to benefit from its experience. Another importantadvantage is that proximity to the sea permits large projects to use a convenient source of coolingwater, though it should be noted that the construction of a huge inland canal to provide coolingwater in Jubail Industrial Area in Saudi Arabia has facilitated the building of various large projectsseveral kilometres from the sea.

The attraction of the free zones is that foreigners can have full ownership of their projects(except for the land which is usually leased) and there are no customs duties on imports unlessthey cross the fence into the UAE. There are also no restrictions on the movement of capital andrepatriation of profits and, so far, there are no restrictions on bringing labour from overseas.

Raw materials

The most important raw materials for industry in the UAE are oil and gas. Apart from thecreation of more refineries and liquefaction projects, there exists the possibility of developingthe petrochemical industry in a way similar to that achieved by Sabic in Saudi Arabia. TheUAE has been slow to diversify in that direction, with FERTIL, the fertilizer plant in AbuDhabi, being one of a limited number of such developments.

In fact, the Arab region, particularly the Gulf, is ideally placed to develop an advancedpetrochemical industry. This should be accomplished in such a way as to avoid duplicationof projects, thus eliminating over-production and price falls in the region. Several Arabcountries produce the basic products ethylene and methanol from gas, or, in the case of Libya,from naphtha. They also produce smaller quantities of propylene and butadiene and aromatics.Some Arab countries go one step further and produce middle products while a few countries, likeSaudi Arabia, produce final downstream products like PE, PVC, polypropylene and polybutadiene.

Recently the UAE considered setting up a major industrial company, Sina’at, mainly todevelop the petrochemical industry. The proposed capital of Dh 4 billion was to be raised inthe form of issuing shares to the public, but the project seems to be on hold.

Surveys for minerals other than oil and gas have been limited in the UAE, but preliminaryreports indicate the presence of mica, chromes, gypsum, copper and manganese. The only

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Table 8. Free Zones in the UAELocation of Date of Area in No. of CompaniesFree Zone Establishment Hectares at beg. of 1999 ActivityJebel Ali 9/2/85 10,000 1343 74% Trading(Dubai) 22% Industrial

4% ServicesFujairah Nov. 1987 140 80 Trading and

IndustrialAjman 1988 More than 100 375 Trading and

IndustrialUmm al-Qaiwain 1/4/88 110 About 35 Trading and

IndustrialSharjah Airport 8/5/95 1,000 318 67% Trading

23% Services10% Industrial

Hamriyah (Sharjah) 12/11/1995 Approx. 1,000 8 Clean IndustriesDubai Airport 1996 120 35 Mainly high-techRa’s al-Khaimah Dec. 1996 150 0 Clean Industries

(Only Free Zonein UAE operated

by Private Sector)Sadiyyat July 1996 3500 0 Mainly for(Abu Dhabi) CommoditiesTotal Approx. 16120

Source: Prepared by Author

minerals that have so far been exploited on a large scale are those needed for the cementindustry.

The UAE has been keen to develop its agriculture despite the very limited arable land andwater resources, and has achieved production of some vegetables in excess of local needs.Canning of such production could be expanded.

As would be expected, in view of its lengthy coastline, the UAE has a successful indigenousfishing industry, ranked fourth in the Arab world and second among AGCC states in the volumeof its annual catch. With the fish catch rising, but the average catch per boat declining, theMinistry of Agriculture and Fisheries is keen to protect the fishing industry and has placedlegal restraints on fishing to conserve fish stocks. Thus fish processing can expand only in acontrolled way. An example is Ocean Fish Processing LLC which was allowed to be set upin 1999 as an offsets project with an initial investment of US $1.5 million.

Capital

The country has a well developed banking industry. However commercial banks are generallynot geared for investment in industry. The UAE created the Emirates Industrial Bank (EIB)in 1982 to finance industrial projects set up within the UAE and in which participation ofnationals is at least 51 per cent. The participation of the bank can be up to 60 per cent of theproject capital or 20 per cent of the bank’s total paid capital, whichever may be lower. Thebank charges 4 per cent interest plus .5 per cent administrative charges. The bank gives priorityto projects using modern technology and which are capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive. It also gives priority to projects that use local raw materials and produceimport-substitution goods. By the end of 1997 the bank had approved 225 projects with totalloans of Dh 1439 million.

The General Industries Corporation in Abu Dhabi also created a fund of Dh 100 million forthe encouragement of industrial projects in the emirate. The fund can participate with up to50 per cent of the capital of an industrial project. It employs the same criteria as the EIB whenassessing projects for approval and projects are given priority on similar grounds.

As a further stimulus to diversification, Abu Dhabi operates an offsets programme whichaims to encourage small, medium and large industrial projects. The UAE has made it acondition that foreign companies bidding for lucrative defence contracts should invest aportion of the value of the deal in joint venture projects with local partners. The programmeis managed by the UAE Offsets Group (UOG). Under the programme, foreign defencefirms are entitled to hold a stake of up to 49 per cent in the joint ventures. Projects mustgenerate added value within seven years. Between 1992 and 1999 the project financed 31projects, 17 of which were in operation with a total investment of about Dh 2 billion. Theprojects include The Oasis International Leasing Company for leasing aircraft, TABREED fordeveloping innovative cooling systems, a plant for manufacturing fire-fighting materials and afish processing company. In 1999 UOG also announced its participation in the Dolphin project.

Finally one must remember that the UAE now has a large number of experienced businessmenwho in the past would have engaged mainly in trade and contracting. In recent years manyof these have gained some industrial expertise, and have set up small and medium factoriesand even a few larger ones.

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Policy

The development of industry in a country is affected considerably by legislation and policiesof central and local governments. The UAE Government has promulgated laws for the organi-zation of industry and labour. The main legislative instrument governing industrial affairs isFederal Law No. 1 of 1979. Local industrial production is defined in this law as one in whichthe local part of the manufacturing costs is not less than 25 per cent of the total. The lawapplies to all industrial projects other than federal government projects, oil and gas extractionand refining, mineral raw materials refining, and small projects with a fixed capital less thanDh 250,000 or employing not more than ten persons. The law appoints an industrial committeeunder the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance and Industry, the membership of whichincludes the under-secretaries of the ministries of Finance and Industry, Economy andCommerce, Planning, Labour and Social Affairs, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, andElectricity and Water, plus a citizen from each emirate, and two UAE industrialists. Thecommittee studies applications for setting up industrial projects and exemptions and incentivesrequested, and decides by majority. The law requires at least 51 per cent of the capital to belocal, and that the manager and the majority of the board of directors also be UAE citizens.

According to the law, projects are considered in the light of:

• Requirements of the economic and social plan, and the industrial development programmesin the country.

• Agreements with Arab countries.• Local consumption requirements and import substitution.• Extent of availability of local raw materials to be used in the manufacturing process.• Possibility of carrying out the project in one of the areas chosen by the Government.

Because the UAE is a strong believer in laissez-faire economics, there has been a lack ofprotection for local industry despite strong pressure from these industries in the early days ofindustrialization. The lack of protection has, in fact, forced local industries to ensure that theirproducts are of high quality in order to compete with imported goods.

Law No. 1 of 1979 stipulates that industrial projects should employ a minimum of 25 percent of local employees. However, the Minister of Finance and Industry may decide to reduceor waive this ratio if sufficient citizens are not available and, in fact, UAE industries havestill not been able to achieve this minimum.

In 1986, Ministerial Decision No. 51 was passed whereby local products equivalent in qualityto foreign products but up to 10 per cent more in price were to be given preference ingovernment purchases.

A federal labour law was issued in 1980 (Law No. 8 of 1980) which governs the rights,responsibilities and duties of employers and employees. It covers both indigenes and expatriatesbut it does not apply to government employees, small establishments employing not morethan five people, or domestic servants. The law covers such matters as contracts, minimumwages, working hours, vacation, sickness benefits, training, disciplinary code and workdisputes. Trade unions are not permitted in the UAE.

Other laws related to industry include Federal Law No. 14 for the year 1976 regarding theestablishment of the Department of Standards and Specifications, and Federal Law No. 44

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for the year 1992 for the regulation and protection of the industrial ownership of inventionsand designs. There are also various laws related to industry such as environmental and healthand safety laws and regulations issued by the local governments, the free zone authorities orby the Federal Environmental Agency. Industrial projects that wish to manufacture medicineshave to obtain the prior approval of the Ministry of Health.

Conclusion

In this final section we suggest some general strategies that could be suitable for industrializationin the United Arab Emirates.

Because of the small population base and the availability of capital, industrialization shouldbe capital-intensive. A sophisticated or high-tech industrial sector requires a highly trainedand educated labour force. The spread of education, including tertiary education and, inparticular, higher colleges of technology, should be able to produce nationals with the requiredskills. However, it is necessary to ensure that the education system is modern and fully relatedto the requirements of the work market. The education system has tended in the past to dependon learning by heart rather than on developing creativity and innovation.

The Government should think of establishing a higher authority for scientific research. Thefederal or local governments should seriously consider establishing science parks near theuniversities or industrial centres. These should include what are known as incubators forinnovative young educated nationals to develop their technical ideas into commercially viableinnovations. The Internet-City project recently started in Dubai is intended as one such sciencepark. There is also a project in Abu Dhabi called CERT (Centre for Excellence in Researchand Technology) built on the Higher College Technology Campus and this centre concen-trates on high-tech training.

Industries depending on hydrocarbons should be the spearhead of industrial developmentin the UAE. However the UAE should coordinate its efforts in this field with GCC countriesand other oil-producing Arab countries in order to avoid over-duplication of projects withsubsequent negative effects on prices and sales. The UAE should also coordinate researchactivities in this field with the other GCC countries with a view to making the region one ofthe most advanced in the world for the development of new materials and processes in thepetrochemical industry.

The UAE should develop certain industries whose products are particularly required by theregion. Examples of the fields that could be investigated are desalination, solar energy and air-conditioning. The region imports desalination and air-conditioning plants at great cost. Researchmay lead to the development of more effective ways of desalination. The Gulf countries couldfocus on fields such as the ones mentioned above and work together on related R & D projects.

The creation of a federal body or association for the free zones in the UAE could be beneficialto all of them. Coordination of effort in fields such as those related to environment and customswould facilitate the achievement of more sustained industrial development.

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Environmental Development and Protection in the UAE

Simon Aspinall

Introduction

The United Arab Emirates is a predominantly arid land containing habitats and communitiesadapted to survive both small amounts of infrequent precipitation, and extremes of heat withconsequent high evaporative losses. It is an exacting environment. Nonetheless, mankindhas exploited the land now known as the UAE since the Late Stone Age, 7500 years BeforePresent (BP), although then the climate was wetter than it is today. Game would have beenabundant on the Acacia savannah and neighbouring grasslands and even in the deep sandsthe basic necessities of life would have been available. Only the ingenuity and technologyto exploit these resources would have been required to survive in relative affluence. Sincethose times there has been a trend toward increasing aridity, demanding a nomadic hunter-gathering lifestyle. It was solely in the relatively well-watered Hajar Mountains, with theirpermanent running supply, that cultivation would have been possible, a development whichtook place only in antiquity. Terraced fields there attest to such an agricultural economy (seeHeard-Bey, this volume). Today this system has fallen into disuse, although the proximalcause was a shift in the socio-economic base rather than necessarily the increasing irregu-larity of winter rainfall.

The marine environment would, quite naturally, have proved the focus for human activity,assuming freshwater sources existed in the vicinity. That they did is known from the archae-ological record (see Potts, this volume), with evidence from some island localities of continuousoccupation over at least the past four or five millennia (Hellyer 1998, 1999). Even today, inperhaps the driest period the UAE has ever experienced, there are still potable supplies,including on some of the offshore islands where rain itself rarely falls. (The island of Dalma,as can be recalled by many still today, once provided drinking water to the fishing settlementwhich later grew to become the city of Abu Dhabi, capital of the UAE!) Recent anecdotalaccounts provide confirmation of a long-suspected assertion that submarine freshwater springswould once have been utilized to sustain certain coastal and island communities.

In contrast to the past, when the human population was still small and natural resourceswere used sustainably without conscious effort, a burgeoning human population, increasedlongevity and commercial exploitation have served to put mounting pressure on the environment.Commercial fish catches in the Arabian Gulf continue to decline, for example, despite a general

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awareness of basic ecological limitations. The increased effort, measured in an increasingsize of the fishing fleet required to secure the same annual landings, has not gone unnoticed.

Much other wildlife is under threat. In the marine environment, dugongs, turtles and seabirdsmay be being driven close to extinction locally through a range of causes, singly or in combination,and including: insensitive development, habitat loss, illegal persecution and unsustainableharvesting. The scenario is apparently similar in terrestrial settings, with grazing pressure fromdomestic livestock at very high levels and the populations of indigenous ungulates, carnivorousmammals and several species of indigenous birds at a low ebb. Threats to the integrity of thenatural world on a global scale are well documented and a lack of environmental impactassessment or study has allowed, hitherto, large scale and widespread losses of important habitatsand wildlife resources. It is this situation which the UAE is now, institutionally speaking, in aposition to address and redress, with enabling legislation firmly on the statute books.

The UAE has undergone something of an environmental renaissance in recent years. Environ-mental awareness is high on the agenda and reminders are constant of our obligation to thenatural world, and none more so than in the particularly sensitive environment of the southernGulf. There is now, in addition to the governmental structure, a plethora of non-governmentalenvironmental groups and a clear conviction exists across the board amongst federal bodies,individual agencies and non-governmental organizations, together with their domestic andinternational alliances, of the need for environmental protectionism.

Sophisticated environmental legislation has been promulgated, involving several separatelaws. Some apply at a federal level, others only at individual emirate level. There is a clearmove toward consistency across the federation, although each emirate retains, constitutionally,a certain degree of overall autonomy. The task of putting into practice what is enshrined insuch laws, backed up by monitoring and strict enforcement, is now being addressed. The UAEis endeavouring to restore the balance and ensure resources are used both sustainably andequitably, while at the same time maintaining a place for nature.

Before providing a description of the UAE environment and the organizations responsiblefor its upkeep, it is appropriate to provide a brief note of the relationship between Arabtradition and culture and the natural world.

The Holy Qur’an makes frequent reference to animals and plants and instructs all Muslimsto study and appreciate living and non-living things around them. In such a harsh environmentas exists in Arabia, where the vagaries of the weather make for additional uncertainty, thepeoples of the desert lands have had to make their living frugally, even during times of plentywhen a surplus may have been available. Plenty is a relative term, however, and meagre resourceswould have generally had to suffice.

A land management system evolved to ensure lean periods could be weathered. Harim andhima lands were set aside (by individuals, communities or the state) for grazing only duringdrought, something which could be the norm rather than the exception. Nomadism was typicalin many areas, to avoid overexploitation of available resources. Coastal communities weresomewhat better off for food, although water supplies remained similarly scarce. Close to theHajar Mountains, part of the UAE’s population once comprised transhumant pastoralists andfarmers who retired to the hills in spring to cultivate terraced fields, but otherwise residedalong the coast. Their lifestyle was not a choice, but a necessity, thrust upon the communityby the severity of the environment (see Heard-Bey, this volume).

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Modern times have brought inevitable changes, but many traditions survive. The traditionof falconry still continues, for example, possibly remaining as popular as ever. Today, however,the hunt is not necessary to provide fresh meat as was formerly the case, while the chase itselfis certainly more efficient. Many falconers have moved with the times in recognition of thisfact. Captive-bred falcons are particularly popular, serving to assist in the conservation ofwild-raised birds, while high-tech scientific studies and ecological research aim to ensure thatany harvesting of wild birds is sustainable. By a process of education and diffusion, ratherthan legislation, it is hoped that this lead will be generally adopted by all practitioners. Thisexample is given deliberately to demonstrate a system, perhaps alien to outsiders, which cannonetheless succeed as well as, if not better than, any other.

The section immediately following briefly describes the climate, topography, biogeographyand natural ecosystems of the UAE. This scene-setting is followed by an overview of the politicaland institutional framework relevant to the environment, and thereafter by a resumé of the relevantdomestic legislation and international conventions relating to wildlife and the environment.

Climate, Topography and Biogeography

Straddling the Tropic of Cancer, the climate of the UAE is hot; on the coast, humidity reachesover 90 per cent in summer and autumn. Inland it is far less humid, although the temperatureis higher, often exceeding 50ºC before midday in July. The officially published temperaturesare actually the precise air temperature. During the winter period daytime temperatures aregenerally in the mid-twenties, although, unlike in summer, nights can be relatively cool, downto 12–15°C, and less than 5°C in the depths of the desert or high in the mountains.

In most years it rains during the winter months, usually in February or March, but occasionallyearlier. Squalls are the result of the subtropical jetstream re-routing depressions through theMediterranean basin, these then tracking down the Gulf toward the Arabian Sea. Winter rainstake the form of torrential frontal and orographic downpours, which, if occurring in the HajarMountains, runs off rapidly into wadis and thence onto the downwashed gravel plains, perhapsreaching the sea on the East Coast, but invariably braiding widely and soaking rapidly intothe desert on the west side piedmont. Further west and along the coast, rainfall is often trappedon the sabkha (salt flat) surface until it evaporates or soaks away. Inland, surface water seldomremains for more than a day or two, except where artificially ponded or dammed.

Mainly localized thunderstorms occasionally reach the UAE in summer, their annualfrequency varying widely. Generally appearing over the mountains of the south and east ofthe country, these rumbling convective cloudbursts, a break-away from the south-west monsoonaffecting southern Arabia, give rise to severe flash floods. For the most part, the shamal (north-west wind) typical of summer, being drawn toward the low pressure associated with thismonsoon, prevents rain reaching the plains to the north of the Dhofar Mountains and Arabia’scentral desert, the so-called Empty Quarter, or Rub al-Khali.

Even places with the highest average annual rainfall figures may experience lean years. Atthe Hajar Mountain town of Masafi, for example, 350 mm may fall in a ‘wet’ year, whereasas little as 30 mm may be recorded in a ‘dry’ year. As a rule of thumb, rainfall decreaseswestwards away from the mountains. Indeed, many inland localities in Abu Dhabi have had

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no measurable rainfall for over three years (up to the end of 1999). Only through the regularformation of dew can vegetation and wildlife be sustained in such places.

Table 1. Mean monthly maximum temperature (Bateen airport, Abu Dhabi) andnational mean monthly rainfall 1971/72–1988/89.J F M A M J J A S O N D

ºC 24 25 29 33 38 39 40 40 39 35 30 26mm 11 38 34 10 3 1 2 3 1 2 4 10

Source: The National Atlas of the United Arab Emirates (UAE University, 1993)

The UAE is an arid land, but is, nonetheless, one of contrasting landscapes. The principalhabitats, botanical communities and landscape associations of the UAE are described compre-hensively in Western (1989) and, for Abu Dhabi alone, in Roshier et al. (1996) and Boer (1999).

The topography of the country is characterized by rapid changes between the sand andgravel desert which dominates most of the south and west of the country and the solidgeology of the Hajar Mountain chain. At the furthest points inland the high crescentic dunesystems of the waterless Empty Quarter of Arabia are reached. Adune belt with ghaf, Prosopiscineraria, adjacent to an extensive Acacia-clad gravel plain savannah of varying width, abutsthe western side of the Hajar Mountains, with the arid, jagged and shattered mountainsthemselves, and their many associated wadis, rising rapidly to more than 1300 m. Onceover the watershed there is an equally steep descent to the coast of the Gulf of Oman, partof the Arabian Sea. The corresponding alluvial gravel plain on the East Coast is patchy andsmall, and widest in the south, but, for the most part, separates the mountains from the sea.There are few cliffs, except where faulting has occurred, but numerous sandy beaches andcoves. The elevated Musandam peninsula extending to the Straits of Hormuz is Omaniterritory.

By contrast to the north and east of the country, the Arabian Gulf littoral of the UAE is anexemplary development of active coastal sabkha (salt flats), recognized as the largest andgeomorphologically most interesting of their type in the world. It is 300 km long and of variablewidth, but extends continuously 20 km or more inland in places. Isolated sabkha outliers,otherwise surrounded by dune and gravel desert, also exist inland (particularly in Abu Dhabi),more so in the west of the Western Region than elsewhere. The largest such area, the SabkhaMatti, a broad braided palaeo-river course covering several hundred sq. km, extends southwell into Saudi Arabian territory.

The Arabian Gulf coast is extremely shallow and gently shelving. The numerous inshoreand nearshore barrier islands in existence are simply part of a formerly more extensive andonce almost continuous coastline invaded and dissected by post-Quaternary shamallic (north-westerly) storms, and thereafter inundated by a sea-level rise. The present-day sabkha coastit*elf only started to form some 4000 years ago. Many coastal and inshore areas have beenaffected by reclamation, dredging or other development or usage, while a number of islandsare entirely man-made. Other than for oil-related activities, much of such development hasbeen for recreational purposes.

Mangrove is represented in the Arabian Gulf, its most northerly occurrence in the world,by a single species, Avicennia marina, and covers extensive areas, although not continuously.

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It is known to have been more extensive both historically and in the recent past, the reductionin area generally accepted as having been due to clearance (primarily for charcoal, as fodderor other uses) as well as to natural die-back or disease. In the last ten years, however, extensiveplanting of mangrove has been undertaken, often with considerable success. Natural colonizationitself appears to be relatively slow in most areas. Mangrove plays a vital role in the life-cycleof many commercially valuable seafood species and provides a safe nesting, feeding androosting site for many birds, waterfowl in particular.

The larger offshore islands, such as Dalma, Sir Abu Nu’air, Sir Bani Yas, Qarnein and Zirku,are mostly the higher parts of a diapiric salt-dome surface, the clearest evidence for whichoccurs where the migrating salt has erupted through to the surface to form distinctive andobtrusive looking hills. Other islands can be anything from tiny sandy and shelly shoals tolarger ones of raised coral and outcropping limestone with or without a covering of drift deposits.In some instances there are deposits of guano, created by colonies of an important endemicArabian species, the Socotra cormorant, Phalacrocorax nigrogularis. Many islands holdinternationally important numbers of breeding seabirds.

Three biogeographic realms are represented in Arabia: Palearctic, Indo-Malayan (Oriental)and Afrotropical. A Palearctic flora and fauna predominates over most of the peninsula, withthe Indo-Malayan element restricted to eastern UAE and northern Oman (with a relic in Dhofar,Oman) and the third, Afro-tropical, to most of south-west Saudi Arabia, Yemen and southernOman. These realms possess overlap zones, in terrestrial settings at least, and are thereforeof special environmental interest and concern.

From a marine perspective the Arabian Sea is part of the western Indian Ocean faunal province,of which the Arabian Gulf represents a blind arm. The Arabian Gulf possesses a fair degreeof endemism, primarily amongst invertebrate groups such as coelenterates, but taxonomicstudies are continuing and even amongst vertebrate groups new species, of, for example, elasmo-branchs (sharks), continue to be described. Coral cover is high in the Gulf and Straits of Hormuzand off the Batina coast of Oman, but declines southwards due to sandiness, turbidity, cold-water upwelling and increasing water depth.

The Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf possess a variety of habitats: patch and fringing coralreefs, seagrass beds (Gulf only), islands, mangroves, khors (tidal inlets), extensive intertidalflats and saltmarsh and sabkha. The Arabian Gulf is a relatively young sea, post-Quaternaryin date (resulting from the Holocene transgression), being the drowned estuary of theTigris/Euphrates delta. It is shallow, for the most part less than 10 m deep in the western(Arabian) sector, with an average overall depth of 31 m and experiences a small tidal range(ca. 0.5–1.5 m in eastern Arabia). Mangroves, as stated earlier, reach here their northernmostpoint in the world (being limited by winter temperature), while corals are limited by summertemperatures. A heat-induced die-off of around 90 per cent of all coral in the southern Gulfhas taken place since 1995. Water temperatures in the Gulf exceed 33°C in summer, fallingin winter to 16°C in the north and 22–24°C in the south (Chiffings 1994). Acomplete turnover(change) of waters in the Arabian Gulf is estimated to take five to seven years.

The Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea is deep and is influenced by the rest of the Indian Ocean.Upwellings of cold or cool nutrient-rich waters and consequent high levels of productivityare a noteworthy feature, primarily in southern areas, and are responsible for substantialfisheries. Beach seine-netting operations along the UAE East Coast are especially productive.

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International environmental organizations recognize two priority ecoregions in the Gulfregion. Such ecoregions, which can be many thousands of sq km in extent, have been identifiedglobally on the basis of their unique biological diversity and biogeographical functioning(Olson and Dinerstein 1997). The two ecoregions represented in the UAE – the Arabian Gulfand Arabian Sea and the Arabian fog and highland woodlands (both described below) – areconsidered of sufficient ecological and socio-economic importance to warrant concertedaction at governmental and inter-governmental level to maintain sustainable levels of resourceexploitation. Although the desert rangelands are not expressly singled out in the same way,they arguably represent a third ecoregion, a Nubo-Sindian province (part of a much largerSaharo-Arabian or Eremic phytogeographic zone stretching across tropical Africa to south-west Asia). The socio-economic value of the desert environment is not neglected, and itslanduse management rests as a national prerogative (see below).

The conservation value of the first-named ecoregion, the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf,centres primarily on its commercial fisheries, coral reef and mangrove communities (themselvesfish nurseries), internationally important island seabird colonies and numbers of visitingshorebirds, nesting and feeding grounds of turtles, cetaceans (including both whales anddolphins) and dugong herds, amongst others. The Gulf coast is highly significant for migratorywaterbirds, lying on the west Asian-African flyway for intercontinental migrant waterfowl.Both coastal mudflats and marine waters, supporting resources independent of political borders,are, therefore, of common international interest. Hornby (1997) provides a useful summaryof the environmental sensitivity of coastal habitats of the UAE.

The second ecoregion is that of Arabian ‘fog and highland woodlands and shrublands’. Thesouth-east Arabian fog highlands, part of this ecoregion, reach to nearly 2000 m in the UAEand to nearly 3000 m in Oman, but are of restricted areal extent. The flora, of Nubo-Sindianaffinity, is in part relict and unique both to and within Arabia and thus of high conservationvalue. At low altitude is Acacia tortilis savannah ‘parkland’. This changes higher up tosimilarly arid Euphorbia larica shrubland, with, on broken ground approaching 1000 m, anOlea sp. (wild olive) community. The associated higher vertebrate fauna is impressive,including Arabian leopard, Arabian tahr and ibex, as described below.

The climatic regime is all important in maintaining these high elevation communities, withthe formation of fog and dew being absolutely critical. In the Hajar Mountains of the UAE,dewpoint can be approached closely without the formation of condensation and the mountainenvironment is teetering on the edge between survival and oblivion. Human use of such areasis now limited primarily to livestock grazing, quarrying and small amounts of tourism.

The desert environments of the UAE also require description, since four-fifths of thecountry’s land area is by definition desert. In Abu Dhabi, which represents around 80 per centof the entire land area of the country, sandsheets, gravel desert and saline flats, each furthersubdivided, are recognized by Roshier et al. (1996) on the basis of their floral associations.To an untutored eye one piece of desert may look superficially similar to any other (not beinghelped by the ostensibly similar form of most xerophytic and halophytic vegetation), but thisis far too simplistic an impression. The structure and function of even adjoining areas maydiffer appreciably from each other, as a result of, for example, varying soil characteristics,micro-climatic differences and grazing regime.

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Although characterized by low ecological diversity and thus not always valued in the sameway as a biologically more productive landscape, deserts are nonetheless of immense valueto one primary industry – agriculture. Temporarily leaving aside desert greening and cropcultivation, itself sustained only by irrigation using supplies of desalinated seawater or non-replenishing fossil ground-water, traditional grazing by domestic animals (primarily camels,sheep and goats) is a major industry, producing meat, milk and related dairy products. Althoughin an altered format, with traditional nomadism essentially a thing of the past, the relativelystatic livestock herds (mostly tended by expatriate labour) are not regulated or subject to anyformal control. Overgrazing is now widely accepted to be a major landuse issue.

Important Species Assemblages

i. Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf ecoregionMangroves are vital nursery areas for commercially valuable fish and other species, and yettheir incorporation in an integrated coastal zone management plan has still to be concluded.The areal loss of mangal woodland around the Indian Ocean, in its entirety, has been estimatedat c. 50 per cent in the 20 years prior to 1985 (IUCN/UNEP 1985), this mostly resulting fromhuman activity, although the picture in the UAE is different with a premium placed onmangrove conservation.

Reef fish populations have suffered from a natural die-off of corals in the Gulf duringthe last few years. Summer temperatures (and presumably a related rise in salinity) haveexceeded that tolerable to corals which means the whole system is under stress. Any formof resource utilization needs therefore to be related to existing ecological limitations. Thereefs of the Arabian Sea remain substantially intact, such losses as have been noted beingfrom man-made causes.

Turtles in UAE waters are of international importance. Green turtle, Chelonia mydas, andhawksbill, Eretmochelys imbricata, nest on a limited number of islands, while important feedingand probably nursery areas, with high densities of non-breeding or immature animals, areknown in the waters of both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Loggerhead turtles,Caretta caretta, also occur, as do several species of seasnake (Brown 1987).

Thirteen Important Bird Areas (see glossary), have been identified in the UAE, almost allconcerning island seabird colonies and intertidal feeding sites for shorebirds (Evans 1994).Among these only one internationally important intertidal wetland exists outside the ArabianGulf, namely Khor Kalba on the UAE-Oman border. A Directory of Wetlands in the MiddleEast (Scott 1995) includes all of these sites, plus a few more recently identified significantareas. Using definitions derived from the Ramsar Convention (see glossary), the latterpublication (being more habitat oriented) adopts criteria other than simply birds to assesswhether sites are included. Many of the sites in Evans (1994) are merged here to form muchlarger units, thus amalgamating their overall values into cohesive, more readily ecologicallysustainable blocks.

The Arabian Gulf is critical for internationally important numbers of long-distance migrantshorebirds and many sites would qualify as Ramsar sites. Aminimum of 25 of over 100 speciesof regularly visiting waterfowl utilizing the West Asia-Arabia-Africa flyway (Scott 1995)

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occur in regionally (internationally) important numbers in the UAE. In addition to these, thereis the presence of internationally important breeding colonies of at least nine other species,all but one being seabirds (Aspinall 1996a) and all of which are national Red Data species(see glossary) (Hornby and Aspinall 1997).

Socotra cormorant, Phalacrocorax nigrogularis, is the sole regional endemic bird with only14 known extant colonies worldwide, all but one or two of which are in the Gulf (though allfall within the single ecoregion). Some six or more of these colonies lie in UAE waters.Persecution is a problem, as is continuing development of islands supporting colonies. About10 per cent of the world population of white-cheeked tern, Sterna repressa, breeds on theUAE’s islands. An endemic race of white-collared kingfisher, Halcyon (Todirhamphus) chloriskalbaensis, is confined to the type locality, Khor Kalba, on the Gulf of Oman coast of theUAE and has a population of less than 50 pairs.

The continued survival of healthy populations of cetaceans and dugong are also dependenton a concerted international conservation effort. Large herds of dugong exist in UAE, Bahrain,Qatar and Saudi Arabian waters. The Gulf supports the second largest population of dugong,Dugong dugon, in the world, estimated in 1986 at 7310 plus or minus 1300 (Preen et al. 1989).A repeat survey of Abu Dhabi waters was completed in 1999 by the Commission for Environ-mental Research, part of the Emirates Heritage Club, Abu Dhabi, and found no statisticallysignificant change in the number of dugong occupying Abu Dhabi waters, with an estimated2000 to 3000 individuals present (Preen, pers.comm.).

Whales and dolphins have been studied to some degree in the Arabian Sea, primarily inOman. There has been recent fieldwork in UAE waters too (Baldwin 1995), although muchremains to be learnt about the population ecology and migrations of the country’s cetaceans.Important populations of some species, for example Bryde’s whale, Balaenoptera edeni, andhumpback whale, Megaptera novaeangliae, certainly exist, and may do so for other species,for example the finless porpoise, Neophoecaena phocaenoides (Aspinall and Baldwin 1999).Some such species, being isolated, possess behavioural and genetic differences compared withtheir nearest conspecifics, something which warrants further research and conservation attention.

The UAE’s Exclusive Economic Zone, reaching to 200 nautical miles off the East Coast,is known to house many whales, some of which may be resident. Fujairah, which alone ofthe seven emirates fronts the Gulf of Oman (Arabian Sea) coast, has already designated threemarine reserves closed to fishing in order to protect coral reef communities. These may beextended to cover the important cetacean populations present further offshore. The ArabianSea and Arabian Gulf are both part of the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) IndianOcean Whale (Cetacean) Sanctuary dating back to 1979.

Since the UAE is of such major importance for wildlife, it is surprising that formal protectedareas (nature reserves) in the UAE’s marine and coastal environment are rather few. Therehave been popular calls for the designation of a number of sites (see Aspinall 1996b; Aspinalland Hellyer 1997) and the whole issue is currently under review at the level of individualemirates. The coverage afforded is planned to extend, moreover, to important palaeontologicaland geological sites, landscapes (geomorphological features) and to archaeological sites.

The keystone marine communities of the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf – those essentialto the continued successful functioning of the system – are the coral reefs, seagrass beds,mangrove woodlands, intertidal flats and predator-free islands. Flagship species are those

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which, for a variety of objective or subjective reasons, are singled out to promote survival ofthe community in which they occur. Those dependent on keystone habitats (e.g. seagrass,coral reef or mangroves) and which are suitably rare or endangered are hawksbill and greenturtles, dugong, and the endemic Socotra cormorant.

ii. Arabian fog and highland woodlands and shrublands ecoregionThe biogeographically unique fog woodland ecotype occurring in south-east Arabia is, asdescribed earlier, primarily of Palearctic origin. Occurring only in northern Oman and theUAE, its ecological importance centres on its rare mammals, particularly ungulates (e.g. Arabiantahr, Hemitragus jayakari, and ibex, Capra ibex, the latter if still extant) and felids (Arabianleopard, Panthera pardus nimr, especially, and Gordon’s wildcat, Felis sylvestris gordoni).

The flora and fauna is an uneven mixture of Palearctic and Indo-Malayan (Oriental), thelatter forming a minor component, and contains relict populations of some taxonomic groups.Of special interest is the little studied limestone cave fauna of Jebel Hafit, an outlying mountainblock immediately south of the inland city of Al Ain, which may harbour species as yetundescribed by the scientific community. Mammals (Stuart and Stuart 1998, 1999), butterflies(Gillett 1996, 1997, 1998), dragonflies and damselflies (Giles 1998, Feulner 1999), freshwaterfish (Feulner 1998) and freshwater snails (Feulner and Green 1999) of the mountains andwadis have all been documented to some degree, but most taxa await thorough scientific study.

The Arabian leopard certainly, and possibly the Arabian tahr, are the flagship species in thisecoregion. As yet, no formally protected areas exist in the mountainous regions of the UAE,although a number have been proposed (Jongbloed, pers. comm.).

There is unanimous agreement on which higher taxa in these two ecoregions are at greatestrisk in terms of threat to their survival. Many are keystone communities (cf. coral communities,seagrass beds, mangrove etc) or have been identified as flagship species. In marineenvironments, dugong and marine turtles are pre-eminent, whilst in the mountains, populationlevels of the Arabian leopard and endemic Arabian tahr are critically low, although theformer, with an estimated Arabian Peninsula population of around just 100 individuals, isusually singled out as the sole flagship. The similarly endemic Gordon’s wildcat found onlyin the mountains of Oman and the UAE is little known, and suffers hybridization with feralcats.

At a community level, commercial fishes, particularly the grouper, Epinephelus coioides(hamour), and sharks such as Carcharinus spp., are under threat from habitat degradation andoverfishing, and the Gulf’s commercial fisheries undoubtedly pose the threat of producingirreversible damage to commercial and non-commercial species alike, as well as to entirecommunities.

A gross data deficiency precludes assessment of the status of many other species andsubspecies described from the region, particularly amongst lower taxa, but at a communitylevel the longer term landuse issues and impacts are now well established. This applies incoastal and marine and mountain environments, as well as in desert areas as now described.

iii. Desert areasAs already stated, some four-fifths of the UAE land area is desert of one form or another. Theseterrestrial habitats and their geomorphological setting warrant brief description.

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Sand desert is dominant, with high crescentic (mega-) dunes in the deep south of the emirateof Abu Dhabi, in the area known as the Liwa. A sandsheet of transverse and linear dunes withinterdune plains occurs over most of the remaining such area west of the Hajar Mountainsnorth to the Gulf coast of the northern emirates. Vegetation is sparse, dominated by the sedge,Cyperus conglomeratus, and various species of Chenopodiaceae (goosefoot family). Arestricted belt of saxaul Haloxylon persicum shrubland exists some 20 km inland from thecoast. The coast itself is characterized by halophytic scrub, again primarily involving goosefoots,with mangrove in mainly lagoonal settings.

Closer to the mountains is a zone supporting tall ‘ghaf’, Prosopis cineraria, trees. Theseare characteristically widely scattered, although occasionally clumped, in sandsheet terraincomprising low linear dunes. Nearer to the coast such sandsheets may be additionally cloakedwith Crotalaria, Calotropis procera and other woody shrubs. Immediately adjacent to thewestern flank of the Hajar is an extensive gravel outwash plain of variable width. Acaciatortilis is dominant here, very often along with dogbane, Rhazya stricta, and the ecotype isone of savannah.

A number of general accounts exist of the mammal fauna of the UAE deserts (e.g.Duckworth 1996; Gross 1996; Harrison and Bates 1991). Hornby (1996b) provides a first‘Red Data’ list which covers all UAE mammals. Arabian oryx, Oryx leucoryx, is extinct inthe wild in the UAE, but individuals from the large captive herds (see below) will eventuallybe provided for a reintroduction programme. The size of the wild population of severalspecies is now very small, particularly of sand gazelle, Gazella subgutturosa (consideredcritically endangered), and the Arabian or mountain gazelle, Gazella gazella. Rodents,excepting Cape hares, Lepus capensis, have been little studied, despite being numericallythe most abundant of the desert mammals. Reptiles are perhaps no better known or documented(but see e.g. Brown 1984; Gross 1996; Hornby 1996a; Khan 1998), although reasonablythorough attention has been paid to birds (e.g. Aspinall 1996a; Osborne et al. 1996; Wardmanet al. 1997).

Other lower taxa have been studied to varying degrees: e.g. insects (Gillett 1996, 1998);arthropods (excluding insects) (Tigar 1996); butterflies (Gillett 1997) and moths (Legrain andWiltshire 1998).

Grazing management in desert areas is regulated by the graziers themselves, although manyareas now show the characteristics of chronic overgrazing. The problem is not yet beingaddressed and now that the original socio-economic system has changed so radically, it islikely that rigid landuse management practices will eventually need to be introduced. In AbuDhabi, seven sizable desert areas have recently been proposed by ERWDA as protected areas.Similar initiatives exist in Dubai and Sharjah emirates.

One further complexity, applicable in Abu Dhabi emirate, concerns the dissolution ofnomadic practice. In part due to the establishment of political frontiers, the regular cross-country movement once enjoyed in and around the Empty Quarter has ceased to exist. Onlywithin national borders is such movement now easily possible. The erection of fences alsoprevents wildlife moving freely, and such severance may, in disrupting necessary migratorymovements, result in certain populations dwindling. The establishment of transfrontier reserves,primarily for ungulates (but valuable for the entire floral and faunal community), as have beenmooted, may see a relaxation sufficient to allow wildlife to flourish.

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As an adjunct, it should be mentioned that the ex-situ conservation (captive breeding) ofrare breeds of ungulate (hoofed animal) and cats, is successfully in progress in UAE. Anotablebreakthrough has been recently achieved in breeding Arabian leopard and the notoriouslydifficult Arabian tahr, both, as already observed, highly endangered in their mountain retreats.

The success achieved with captive Arabian oryx since a few animals were taken from thelast remaining wild herd at the instruction of UAE President, HH Sheikh Zayed, in the early1960s has been remarkable. While once the species was on the brink of extinction, its futureis now assured, although reintroduction programmes remain fraught with problems (noneinsurmountable). At the present time over one thousand individual oryx, comprising severalseparate herds, are held in UAE collections. Breeding loans of several different species arearranged with reputable overseas institutes and an international Secretariat, working on theconservation of Arabian oryx, is being established in Abu Dhabi under the aegis of Abu Dhabi’sEnvironmental Research and Wildlife Development Agency (ERWDA).

Threats

Environmental protection relies on identification of threats to the integrity of the ecosysteminvolved, whether man-made or natural, thus permitting remedial or prescriptive action andappropriate long-term management. Threats to the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea mirrorthreats which occur on a global scale and include industrial and domestic pollution, eutroph-ication, reclamation, landfill and sedimentation, hunting, persecution, overfishing andunsustainable harvesting, alien introductions including predators on islands, disturbance,mismanagement and development. A lack of environmental impact assessment or study haspermitted large scale and widespread loss of important habitats and indigenous wildliferesources. The introduction and enforcement of the most recent legislation should reduce oreliminate most of these threats.

Threats to the Arabian fog and highland woodland and shrubland communities are many.These include overgrazing, proliferation of invasive aliens, persecution and socio-economicchanges, the latter apparent in the decline of traditional farming and landuse practices.

Most desert areas of the UAE are, as stated above, much degraded as a direct result ofovergrazing, although mostly not beyond possible restoration. Large scale conversion of desertrangeland to irrigated grass and crop land has encroached considerably on the desert in the past25 years, while the tradition of nomadism is now a thing of the past. Coupled with theunpredictability of the weather (a notable drought persisted in the UAE over the last three yearsof the old millennium), these factors have added to the problem of finite resources.

Mismanagement, often overlooked, is in fact an insidious and widespread threat to allecosystems, but to coastal and desert areas in particular.

Agriculture

The main areas of agricultural development in the UAE are in Abu Dhabi, Ra’s al-Khaimahand Sharjah. For many, UAE agriculture is inextricably associated with the production ofdates. Indeed, the number of producing date palms has increased five-fold from under 5 millionin 1986 to over 25 million in 1997 (Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries statistics 1997).

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This aside, there are now nearly 24,000 farms in operation throughout the country, 12,000(50 per cent) of which have been established since 1993, and a wide diversity of crops areproduced (Al Abed and Vine 1999, 2000). Presently, around 2000 sq. km of land is under theplough. Since the modernization of the industry as part of the process of economic diversifi-cation, traditional low-intensity but labour intensive farming practices survive only in somemountain districts, as the country strives for self-sufficiency in food production. The UAE iscurrently estimated to be 30 per cent self-sufficient in agricultural products. Surplus productionof certain vegetables and fruits is now exported fresh, canned, dried, frozen or pickled.

Over ten million tonnes of agricultural produce is produced annually, with guaranteed pricesassured by the Government to encourage the industry. Similar gains have been made in othersectors, including dairy produce, eggs, poultry and livestock. The number of camels (the meatof which is much prized) has more than doubled to around 200,000 animals in the last 20 years,while that of goats and sheep has increased four-fold to 800,000 in the same period. Productioncapacity of certain products, milk for example, approaches domestic demand, but as the humanpopulation continues to grow apace is likely to fall behind. Fodder production for the growinglivestock industry similarly cannot match the demand and much has still to be imported.

Forestry plantations have become a widespread feature of the desert landscape. Afforestation,using a variety of native and exotic trees and shrubs, has transformed many areas of the desert.‘Green belts’and plots, some of considerable size, are often located to prevent sand movementsmothering urban and rural developments. Such greening of the desert, as it is popularlydescribed, serves the dual purpose of reducing airborne sand movement (drift) and of ‘beauti-fication’ of towns and their outskirts. It does, however, require drip-fed irrigation to surviveand uses significant quantities of water, some desalinated, but more of it increasingly drawnfrom recycled sources. The construction of dams, some 40 of which are now in existence inthe mountains, may help reduce depletion of the aquifers at least in eastern regions. As a directresult of abstraction and lack of replenishment, the water table has dropped throughout thecountry, and at its most severe has allowed saltwater incursion to contaminate well-watersupplies of some coastal communities.

Management of the natural woodlands of the UAE, including the Acacia savannahs (of, forexample, the al-Madam and Kalba plains) and the zone of ghaf woodland or the saxaul belt,both in the sandsheets, as well as the zone within the Hajar Mountains is, however, still largelyneglected. The Federal Environment Agency’s (FEA) Biodiversity Committee has made acall for a concerted action in respect of these woodlands.

Commercial fisheries

According to recent statistics (1999), nearly 19,000 persons are employed as fishermen, some15,000 (73 per cent) of whom are expatriates and 4000 nationals (27 per cent). Fish landingspresently cover 100 per cent of domestic consumption.

Keen to protect the fishing industry, which in the UAE is second amongst the Arab GulfCooperation Council (AGCC) states in terms of the volume of its annual catch, the Ministryof Agriculture and Fisheries has introduced a suite of legal restraints (see Law No. 23 for 1999below). The relevant new legislation requires any fishing boat going to sea to have an UAEnational on board, although this is not always followed or enforced. The measure is as muchto encourage nationals to take up the profession, as to prevent operators running small armadas

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of vessels employing cheap labour which only serves to deplete fish stocks further. Fish maynot now be caught during the spawning season and undersized fish must be returned to the sea,while trawling for shrimps has been banned since 1980 to safeguard spawning grounds.

Amongst management tools employed to some effect, artificial reefs have gained consid-erable favour. Although colonized by full-grown immigrant fish and vulnerable to abuse byfishermen, such reefs, quite apart from fostering coral growth, are now seen as a means ofpromoting ecotourism locally. Dubai and Fujairah are pioneering the process, which may leadto a shift in employment toward providing the range of services required by visitors.

Aquaculture is a growth industry with much potential. Plans to develop fish-farming have takenroot under the offsets scheme, with a multi-million dirham public company, the International FishFarming Company (Asmak), being incorporated in May 1999 (Al Abed and Vine 2000). Theinfrastructure will include hatcheries, cage-farms and shrimp ponds, and processing plants,with production targeted to approach an equivalent of 10 per cent of the present-day fishlandings. Similar but smaller private initiatives also exist.

Institutional Framework

The institutional framework which exists in the UAE as a federation, as well as in each ofthe seven emirates, in relation to the environment is described below. As intimated in anearlier section, that institutional responsibility, still in its relative infancy, is in a process ofevolution and development, and it is possible that changes will happen with such rapiditythat some of the organizations described below may be overtaken by events even before thistext appears in print.

Ruling families

Each emirate possesses a ruling family, whose head (or ruler) may make decrees which havethe force of law. These occasionally concern environmental subjects such as the establishmentof protected areas and the introduction of hunting bans in the relevant emirate.

Governmental bodies

Unless stated, the organizations listed below are governmental bodies. The responsibilityallocated to the various bodies is described.

i. Federal GovernmentFederal Environment Agency (FEA)The FEA is the federal governmental body charged with enforcement of environmentalstandards and pollution control as well as policy setting (see Federal Law No.(7) for 1993,below). The Minister of Health chairs the board of directors which oversees the agency’soperation.

In 1998, the FEA, jointly with UNDP, published a draft National Environment Strategy andEnvironmental Action Plan which as yet remains of untested precision and efficacy. FederalLaw No. (24) for 1999, concerning protection and development of the environment, asdescribed later, was prepared by the FEA.

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Anational biodiversity committee set up under the aegis of the FEA(after the IUCN RiyadhForum in 1995) is currently dormant.

ii. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (includes Department of Fisheries)The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries is occupied with both marine (see Law No. (23)for 1999 below) and terrestrial matters. Its fisheries department deals with coastal and marinecommercial fisheries and aquacultural development, including a research programme intofishery stocks and recruitment. This Ministry houses the inspectorate for the Convention onInternational Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in the UAE.

iii. Individual emirate agencies or other governmental bodiesEnvironmental Research and Wildlife Development Agency (ERWDA) ERWDA is an Abu Dhabi government body with jurisdiction in Abu Dhabi but its servicesare on offer to other emirates. Terrestrial and marine research centres both operate under ERWDAalong with a cross-sectoral Environmental Services Unit. The National Avian Research Centre,also part of ERWDA, with responsibility for all bird-related research, runs a captive-breedingfacility and houses the Houbara Specialist Group of the Species Survival Commission of theWorld Conservation Union (IUCN).Department of Environment and Protected Areas (DEPA), SharjahActive since 1998, DEPA runs the Desert Park (natural history museum) and EndangeredArabian Wildlife Centre, as well as having responsibility for designating nature reservesthroughout the emirate, a process which has already commenced.Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing, DubaiThe remit of this body includes nature conservation and the establishment of protected areasin the emirate of Dubai.

In the other emirates, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ra’s al-Khaimah and Fujairah, environ-mental research and protection is developed to a much lesser extent, although Fujairah hasdesignated marine reserves in the Gulf of Oman and is preparing a decree on cetaceanconservation. Ra’s al-Khaimah now possesses (since winter 1999/2000) an Environmentaland Industrial Authority for regulation and enforcement of, for example, permissible levelsof air pollution in the emirate related to local quarrying activities.

iv. MunicipalitiesAll major towns, including the capitals of each emirate, possess a municipality or ‘baladiya’,essentially the local council. Municipalities are responsible for a multitude of activities, whichcan include everything from pest-control and refuse collection to managing parks and gardensand running zoos. In Abu Dhabi, the Food and Environment Control Centre (FECC) is partof the municipality. The FECC deals primarily with issues of public health. Other emirateshave departments within their respective municipalities performing a similar function.

v. Academic research institutesEmirates University, Al Ain. The former Centre for Desert and Marine Studies, part of the Emirates University, had anaffiliation with the Department of Fisheries offices and research laboratories in Umm al-Qaiwain,

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itself part of the Ministry (as above). Recent re-organization at the former institute has meantthis relationship now has an unclear future.

vi. Non-environmental governmental bodiesNationalized and other companiesThe Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and all companies in its group, are boundby rigid Health, Safety and Environment standards. ADNOC, furthermore, is a driving forcein environmental matters (policy, legislation and practices) in Abu Dhabi. Other companiesin the group, including, in particular, the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations(ADCO), also show a high level of corporate environmental responsibility. ADNOC and ADCObetween them operate in exploration and production concessions covering over 75 per centof the land surface of the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Amongst many environmental initiatives,the ADNOC group is committed to reducing or eliminating waste emissions, including workingtoward zero operational flaring in the near future.

Other companies, many from overseas, support environmental initiatives through, for example,sponsorship of research or awareness projects or by conducting their business activities applyingenvironmental regulations from their own country, even when more stringent of those of theUAE itself. Examples include oil companies such as BP Amoco and Shell. It should be notedthat Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) are mandatory across all sectors.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

A number of NGOs working in the environment sector exist in the UAE. Only the principalones are named here: Arabian Leopard Trust (ALT); Environment Friends Society (EFS);Emirates Environmental Group (EEG); Emirates Natural History Group (ENHG); DubaiNatural History Group (DNHG) and Al Ain Natural History Group (Al Ain NHG). Themandate of each, excepting the three natural history groups, varies. Some have a lobbyingand educational and awareness role, others may conduct research and survey, although thedistinction may not always be immediately apparent.

The Abu Dhabi-based ENHG is a non-governmental member of the World ConservationUnion (IUCN), the only current such member, governmental or otherwise, in the country.Certain other organizations, Dubai Zoo for example, are currently planning to submit theirapplications for membership.

Other organizations

A number of other organizations and departments are involved in environmental matters, twoof which are described here on account of their importance in terms of governmental connectionsand scale of operation. The Environment and Wildlife Management section (EWM) of thePrivate Department of the UAE President is responsible for managing wildlife collectionsand farming enterprises on land owned by Abu Dhabi’s ruling Al Nahyan family. This includesthe island of Sir Bani Yas which houses captive breeding facilities for endangered Arabianand other ungulates (Anon 1999; Vine 1999).

The Emirates Heritage Club (EHC), under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister HHSheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, houses the Commission of Environmental Research

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(CER), based on the island of al-Sammaliah 12 km from Abu Dhabi. The Commissionundertakes applied research, retaining a particular interest in the protection of coastal andmarine resources. In 1999 it completed the first phase of a fieldwork programme that willlead to the production of an atlas on which a coastal and marine management plan for AbuDhabi emirate will be based.

Institutional relations

The many alliances of the different institutes are to some extent covered or inferred above,as is the national or international status of individual organizations. Some relevant high-levelinstitutional relations are expanded on below.

In the UAE, the FEA and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), enjoy closerelations, often in conjunction with the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and there is increasingliaison between the Ministries and agencies internally, as is the case between the FEA andERWDAand the FEAand the Abu Dhabi municipality’s Food and Environment Control Centre(FECC). There remains, however, much duplication of effort, to different standards. Thisrelatively commonplace institutional and political hazard is, through a restructuring process,close to being resolved in certain sectors with a routine exchange of dialogue now evident.

Intergovernmental activity

The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC), created in 1981, is an intergovernmental bodywhich tackles issues of mutual economic, political and military interest to member states (seee.g. Anon 1998). The secretariat is based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and all Arabian countriesbordering the Arabian Gulf are members, namely: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAEand Oman. The GCC may give its patronage and support to regional meetings dealing withcommon environmental issues.

The Council of Environmental Affairs Ministers convenes annual meetings of the relevantAGCC ministers. At the sixth and most recent such meeting, which took place in Doha in1999, issues such as ozone depletion, hazardous chemicals and international agreements wereon the agenda, as was an AGCC Regional Strategy for Protection of the Environment inimplementation of Agenda 21 (see below).

The World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), all maintain a presence in the region, advising governments and organi-zations as named above.

The role of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)and Arab League Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ALESCO) includesenvironmental matters of mutual concern. UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere Programme (MAB)is relevant to the region, operating alongside and in tandem with the activities of UNEP/UNDPand other organizations. The Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment(ROPME), with a secretariat in Kuwait, is part of UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme.

Kuwait Action PlanUnder the Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the MarineEnvironment from Pollution, the associated Kuwait Action Plan (KAP) is a regional initiative

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for the Arabian Gulf (see MARPOL below). All AGCC countries are party to the conventionwhich aims to reduce pollution, establish national standards and develop research and monitoringprogrammes relating to all types of pollution. KAP operates through ROPME, as well as withmany national organizations and other institutions.

MARPOLThe Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman are declared Special Areas under Annex 1 and V of theMARPOL (Marine Pollution) treaty, Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of theMarine Environment from Pollution. This is as adopted by all AGCC countries, as well asIraq and Iran, along with the Kuwait Action Plan (as above).

MEMAC/GAOCMAO MEMAC, the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (run out of Bahrain), and the Gulf AreaOil Companies Mutual Aid Organization (GAOCMAO), are regional environmentalmanagement and pollution control initiatives, primarily linked to the oil industry.

UNESCOBoth the Man and Biosphere programme (MAB) and the World Heritage Convention operateunder UNESCO. A World Heritage Site has been unofficially proposed for part of the AbuDhabi coast and islands, UAE (see Aspinall and Hellyer 1997) and has recently been evaluatedby an UNESCO team, although the UAE is not party to the relevant convention. The UAEhas also yet to sign up to the MAB programme.

UNEPUNEP’s Regional Seas Programme includes within it the Kuwait Action Plan (above). OtherUNEP initiatives include collaborative cross-sectoral alliances, for example, with the FEA.

Other national and international NGOs

IUCNThe World Conservation Union (IUCN) is also active in the region, independently and in collab-orative efforts, for example with UNDP and the GCC, as well as, recently, with ERWDA.

A workshop on biological diversity in the Gulf Cooperation Countries was convenedjointly by IUCN/GCC in Kuwait in September 1994 together with Kuwait’s EnvironmentProtection Council. In brief, the main purposes of this meeting were to review the implicationsof the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) for GCC countries and specify requirementsfor implementation; to assess the current status of biodiversity in member states andidentify elements for inclusion in national strategies; to identify regional priorities, agreeregional policies and to specify what support IUCN could give. Progress in these directionsremains unclear.

At the IUCN North Africa/Middle East/West Asia regional conservation conference inRiyadh (Riyadh Conservation Forum) in October 1995, other than general sessions, threecommissions convened. The Species Survival Commission (SSC) endorsed two objectives:the implementation of regional and national action plans that employ all appropriate conser-vation strategies and implementation of international conventions.

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The then Commission for National Parks and Protected Areas (CNPPA) reviewed its draftstrategic plan and discussed the draft regional action plan for North Africa and the Middle East.The Commission for Ecosystem Management (CEM), agreed on the assembly of task forces forintegrated coastal zone and arid-lands management through seminars and the promotion of cross-sectoral collaboration. The Arabian Gulf has clearly to be a priority area for attention.

The IUCN West Asia, Central Asia and North Africa programme includes the Middle East.Recently, meetings have taken place to synthesize a project proposal towards ‘An integratedprotected areas strategy for biodiversity conservation in the Middle East’. This appears to bestill on the drawing board. Training, protected area legislation, pilot protected areas, nature-based tourism and ecotourism are the four priority objectives proposed. IUCN operates closelywith the GCC at a technical level.

The World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA)During 1998, the WCPA (formerly CNPPA) finalized a regional action plan for protectedareas for North Africa and the Middle East. Funding is now being sought for its implemen-tation (Sulayem, pers. comm.).

World Wide Fund for Nature WWF-International anticipates establishing a permanent presence in the UAE capital in thenear future. A memorandum of understanding has recently been signed with ERWDA,permitting WWF to operate independently, but in close association with UAE governmentaland other non-governmental bodies.

BirdLife InternationalBirdLife International, which now has a Middle East office based in Jordan (as of 1997/98),first made inquiries about working in the UAE in the mid-1990s and may shortly establishsome level of representation.

Wetlands InternationalWetlands International, formerly the International Waterfowl Research Bureau (IWRB),completed an inventory of Middle Eastern freshwater and marine wetlands to 6 m below lowwater and published the findings as a directory (Scott 1995). The UAE was well represented.Wetlands International has no permanent presence in the country.

Environmental Legislation

Current legislation relevant to the natural environment and its resources is described below.Much has come into force only in the last decade, and the most recent, at least, has yet to beput to the test. The relevant organizational structure to institute, monitor or enforce suchlegislation is still in its infancy and individual roles and responsibilities may not yet becompletely clarified.

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UAE Hunting Law, Federal Law No. (9) for 1983

This, the earliest piece of federal legislation relevant to the environment, was issued nearlyeight years after the creation of the first governmental environment body, the Higher Environ-mental Committee, although in 1976 a ban on hunting had been introduced by ruler’s decreein Abu Dhabi. The 1983 law specifically regulated the hunting of birds and animals (mammalsand reptiles) and was introduced on the basis of submissions by the Ministers of the Interiorand of Agriculture and Fisheries. It was introduced in recognition of apparent declines beingnoticed in the populations of a number of desert and marine species. Regulations stipulatedby Articles 1 and 2 are wholly unambiguous and read thus:

Article 1

Hunting, gathering or destruction of the eggs of wild and sea birds of various kinds includingdoves, orioles and small birds, with the exception of cormorants, are hereby banned inthe UAE.

Article 2

It is not permitted to hunt the following animals:1. Deer [antelope*] of various kinds [i.e. gazelle, oryx]2. Wild cows [‘seacows’ or dugong]3. Hares4. Mastigures [‘dhubs’ or spiny-tailed agamids (lizards)]

*Note that square brackets are used where the translated animal names are given their common English names.

Article 3 details punishments that may be handed down, including imprisonment for a periodof up to six months and confiscation of transport and tools used in committing an offence, whileArticle 4 revokes any prior provisions ‘inconsistent’ with those included in Articles 1, 2 and 3.

Since the UAE Hunting Law was introduced, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries broughta successful case for a similar decree affording full protection to marine turtles and their eggs(see Law No. (23) for 1999). Implementation and enforcement of this legal protection, for birdsand turtles in particular, remains a somewhat contentious and even openly challenged issue.

In addition to the above law, some individual emirates have introduced their own legislationrelating to hunting or wildlife protection. The Ra’s al-Khaimah government, for example,issued a decree in August 1998 banning the hunting of birds and hares, despite the existenceof the 1983 Federal Hunting Law.

Legislation may even involve single species. A complete ban on the importation of houbarabustard, Chlamydotis undulata macqueeni, a species of particular significance to Arab falconers,was brought into effect by Cabinet Resolution in November 1993. Such a ban is pertinent tothe Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to which the UAE isparty, which bans any form of trade of species as listed on Appendix One of the convention,as the houbara bustard then was.

The Higher Environment Council, the first governmental body with any environmentalprotection mandate, was created in 1975 (Banoubi, pers. comm.). It was replaced by the Federal

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Environment Authority (FEA) in March 1993. The latter became strictly the first UAE-wideinstitution with legal powers to protect and conserve the environment. Now overseen by theMinister of Health, in contrast to the earlier legislation concerning environmental matterswhich fell to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, the FEA is itself entrusted to a boardof directors, chaired by the Minister.

Federal Law No. (7) of 1993 for the establishment of the Federal Environment Agency

The FEA, established by Federal Law No. 7 of 1993, enjoys financial and administrativeauthority annexed to the Cabinet, with an independent budget attached to the state budget.Article 4 of the decree outlines the aims and objectives of the FEA and is reproduced below(translation compiled from two referenced sources, Anon 1993b and Anon 1993c):

Article 4The objectives for establishing the Agency shall be: to protect and develop the environmentwithin the State; to determine the necessary plans and policies to safeguard it fromdamaging activities, particularly those affecting human health, agricultural crops, wildlife,marine life, other natural resources and atmosphere; to implement such plans and policies;to take all suitable measures and actions to prevent deterioration of the environment, tocombat environmental pollution of all kinds, and to minimize effects of pollution for thewelfare of both present and future generations.In order to achieve its aims and objectives, the Agency shall cooperate and coordinateaction with concerned bodies to:–i. Prepare draft laws, legislation and regulations to ensure environmental safety,

protection and development.ii. Conduct research and studies and propose plans and general policies for environ-

mental issues at the State level.iii. Study and discuss plans and policies set by Ministries, agencies, institutions or

companies practising activities that might affect the quality of the surroundingenvironment. Propose solutions to any environmental problems or obstacles impedingthese programmes and projects.

iv. Examine, study, make necessary proposals and suggest suitable solutions for anyenvironmental problems or matters that might be referred to the Agency by theCabinet or any other official or non-official body within the State.

v. Conduct or supervise the conducting of extensive research and studies on pollution,monitoring its negative effects on health and environment, and take all necessarypreventive measures and actions to minimize environmental pollution in all its forms.

vi. Establish the necessary basis and principles for incorporating environmental consid-erations into the process of planning and development in the State, by ensuring thatenvironmental considerations become an integral part of policy-making, and byensuring that environmental matters become part of planning, execution and follow-up of development projects initiated by Government or the private sector, applyingthe measures of environmental impact assessment.

vii. Monitor all public and private development activities that might have an adverseeffect on the environment and has firstly to give approval to such developmental

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activities before licensing them. Before approval, such projects shall be subject toCabinet resolutions.

viii. Collect and implement effective studies on air, water, sea, and soil pollution anddevise ways of protecting the resources of the natural environment.

ix. Take an interest in the development of wildlife and protected areas (nature reserves).x. Carry out studies on the nature of soil, water and energy and propose means by

which they can be protected, and prepare guidelines to prevent the misuse orexhaustion of these resources, with a special focus on groundwater, desert areas andcombating desertification.

xi. Carry out studies on the nature of the coastal zone and the marine environment anddraw policies for protection, conservation and development of their resources.

xii. Determine and develop preventive measures to limit marine pollution, develop andtrain human resources and specialized personnel for implementation of schemes forthe protection of the coastal zone (from pollution).

xiii. Establish a central environmental laboratory with the appropriate technical staffand equipment.

xiv. Specify permissible limits and carry out monitoring programmes for measuringradioactivity in water, air, soil and food.

xv. Endeavour to develop interest in education, information (media), sociological andcultural aspects with a view to increasing environmental awareness and promotingactive public participation in protection and development of the environment.

xvi. Draw up and implement plans and programmes for the training of technical personnelin the field of environment.

xvii. Specify suitable methods for forecasting, anticipating and mitigating natural disasters.xviii.Undertake a comprehensive review of problems of human settlement in cities, villages

and rural areas. Follow up the effects of economic and social development on proposalsfor human settlement programmes, providing suitable solutions particularly for:a) Achieving an ideal distribution of human settlements in cities and rural areas.b) Ensuring the use of environmentally sound technology in design and

construction of buildings.c) Ensuring the most suitable living conditions for town and village planning.d) Reduction of noise and air pollution through use of suitable means of

transportation.xix. Establish appropriate database systems for collecting, storing and exchanging

information with research institutions and environmental organizations and makinguse of these regardless of whether they are inside the State or elsewhere.

Federal Law No. (24) for 1999 for Protection and Development of the Environment

This is the most recent piece of federal environmental legislation, following hot on the heelsof decrees establishing independent agency-level bodies such as ERWDA in Abu Dhabi andDEPAin Sharjah, empowered to undertake research and provide conservation advice. It cameinto force on 1 February 2000. Drafted by the FEA, this law, which carries 101 articles, isparticularly strong in respect of the marine environment, with over 40 articles concerning

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marine transportation and pollution and the respective penalties applicable to a vessel foundin breach of any specified offence. Note that Federal Law No. (23) for 1999, which cameinto effect in mid-April 2000, after Law No. (24), also concerns, but exclusively so, themarine environment.

Article 2 of Federal Law No. (24) for 1999 for Protection and Development of the Environmentoutlines the objectives and general principles concerned:

1. Protect the environment; preserve its diversity and natural equilibrium.2. Fight all forms of pollution and avoid harmful immediate or long-term adverse effects

resulting from planning for economical, agricultural or industrial or constructionaldevelopment or any development programs aiming to upgrade the standard of living;Agency co-ordination with other concerned authorities and departments in order topreserve the environment, its diversity and the natural equilibrium, and consolidateconcepts of environmental awareness and principles of pollution prevention.

3. Develop natural resources and preserve the various living species in the UAE andutilize them in an optimal way for the benefit of present and future generations.

4. Protect society, the health of human beings and other living creatures from anyactivities or acts which comprise a risk to the environment or which may impede thelawful use of the environmental milieu.

5. Protect the UAE environment from the adverse impact created by external activities.6. Undertake the implementation of international and regional conventions ratified or

signed by the State in respect of environment protection, pollution prevention andpreservation of natural resources.

Chapter 1, covering Development and Environment (Articles 3 to 16), introduces foursections: Environmental Impact (Section 1); Environment and Sustainable Development(Section 2); Environmental Monitoring (Section 3) and Plans for Emergencies and for Dealingwith Environmental Disasters (Section 4).

Chapter 2 (Articles 17 to 41) covers the Protection of Water Environments from pollutionin both marine and freshwater environments, including potable ground water, while Chapters3, 4 and 5 deal with Protection of Soil, Protection of Air and Handling of Hazardous Substancesand Wastes. Chapter 6 (Articles 63–68) defines the legal requirement for determining thelocation and boundary of nature reserves in the state.

Liabilities and compensation for environmental damages, Chapter 7 (Articles 71–72) andpenalties, Chapter 8 (Articles 73–90), are explicit and apply, all importantly, both within andoutwith the marine jurisdiction of the UAE, regardless of the nationality of any guilty partyconcerned. The penalties, involving fines and custodial sentence, extend, in the case of nuclearwaste, to the possible imposition of the death penalty.

While the Federal Environmental Agency may be the ultimate authority in respect of the abovelaw, the ‘competent authorities’ in each emirate will be responsible for activating its provisions.

In Abu Dhabi one such ‘competent authority’ would be the agency ERWDA, which itselfcarries a mandate (Law No. (4) for 1996 as amended by Law No. (1) for 1997) to:

. . . protect the natural environment, its wildlife and its biological diversity throughmonitoring and submitting of proposals and recommendations and by carrying out studiesand research required for the protection of the environment and its wildlife.

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Moreover, all Abu Dhabi government departments and agencies:

. . . are required to coordinate with the Agency [ERWDA] in relation to research, studiesand programmes concerning environmental matters and wildlife.

Furthermore:

. . . The Agency’s approval is required for the issuing of any regulations, policies anddecrees related to environmental and wildlife affairs.

Together with a role to evaluate the use of agricultural chemicals, the effect of industrialprojects, assess the impact of town planning amongst many others stated objectives, there is,in this particular instance, a complimentary but at least partially overlapping role between theAbu Dhabi agency and the federal body ultimately responsible for matters relating to theenvironment. It remains to be seen what relationship is developed here, as well as betweenthose competent authorities as exist in emirates other than Abu Dhabi in relation to the abovelaw and to the FEA.

Federal Law No. (23) for 1999 for Protection of the Marine Environment (see Anon 1999b)

UAE legislation covering the protection of the marine environment, Law No. (23) for 1999,as proposed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, came into force on 17 April 2000.Compliance with the requirements of the new law allows for a transition period of one year(unless extended by Cabinet Resolution). Federal Law No. (23) governs the exploitation,protection and development of marine biological resources. Fishing, protection of restrictedareas, processing and marketing of fish, the extension of grants and loans to fishermen andthe export, re-export and transit of fish products are all covered. The new law sets forthprocedures for registration of vessels (expressly limiting their number) and of fishermen andfor licensing of their activities. Catch limits are to be set by the Ministry of Agriculture andFisheries. There is provision to regulate minimum animal sizes caught, introduce close seasonsand restriction of fishing activity in certain areas. Fishing methods are also considered, withbans on the use of certain equipment or particular methods – nylon nets, drift nets, bottom-trawling and the use of narcotics and explosives, for example. The construction of artificialreefs requires Ministry approval as well as that of the concerned authority in the specificemirate, while even fishfarms require permission to operate.

Concern at the number of vessels engaged in fishing (employing solely expatriate labour)has meant that an earlier restriction specifying that fishing boats are not allowed to sail withoutthe owner or his national representative on board has been reiterated in the marine law.Nationals from any AGCC country are also accepted. Foreign vessels are not permitted tofish in UAE waters at any time.

Penalties for breach of any of the articles in law No. (23) include fines and/or imprisonmentand confiscation of boats and fishing tools. Thus the catching of turtles or dugong will meetwith a fine of between Dh 50,000 and Dh 100,000 (US $13,500–$27,000) and/or six monthsin prison, with a second offence attracting a minimum of three years in prison and a fine ofDh 100,000–Dh 200,000. Fishing in the close season or using forbidden methods will bringthree months in prison and/or a Dh 25,000–Dh 50,000 fine while a second offence incurs aminimum one year in prison and a Dh 50,000–Dh 100,000 fine.

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Some elements of earlier environment-related legislation are absorbed and reiterated and thereis necessarily some overlap with Law No. (24) for 1999 (above), capture of dugong or turtlesand collection of the eggs of the latter again being prohibited, for example, although the relevantapplicable penalties are absent from the Federal Environment law (No. (24) for 1999).

What should be noted from the above text is that the legislation establishing and empoweringthe various bodies, whether federal or agencies at an emirate level, provides a mandate forthem to draft and introduce new laws concerning environmental protection. This necessaryprocess has already proved itself to be dynamic and further legislation is planned.

Other environmental legislation

Strict laws exist on pesticides. The import of many chemical insecticides is explicitly banned,prudently leaving permissible only those already licensed for use in agriculture by the EU, US,Canada and Japan, for example. Regulations are also under discussion to phase out leaded fuel.

Conventions and intergovernmental activity

To date the UAE Government has signed all, but has yet to ratify most, of the followingwildlife and environment related conventions:

• Climate Change Convention. • Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).• Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES)

(Ratified).• United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).• Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Environment from Marine Pollution

(see under MARPOL and Kuwait Action Plan, above). Also signed by all other GCC Statesbordering the Arabian Gulf.

• The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the immediate region this has been ratified by Iraq,Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman and, as with the UAE, is also signed by Iran, Saudi Arabia,Qatar and Pakistan.

Eventual ratification of other of the above conventions, as well as the Bonn Convention(Convention on Migratory Species, CMS), the Ramsar Convention (Convention on Wetlandsof International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat) and the Convention concerningthe Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) iscurrently under consideration.

Environmental Education and Awareness

The UAE celebrated its first National Environment Day on 4 February 1998, the fifthanniversary of the inception of the Federal Environment Agency itself. This annual event iscelebrated amid much publicity, with many events held on the day itself and thereafter in thefollowing days and weeks.

While much of the grass-roots effort to increase awareness is undertaken by such govern-mental agencies as ERWDA, a great deal of it is taken on by (non-profitmaking) non-governmental

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bodies, such as the Environment Friends Society (EFS), the Emirates Environment Group(EEG) and the Arabian Leopard Trust (ALT) amongst others, or by enlightened school teachersdevising their own extra-curricular programmes. An attentive press, in both English andArabic, although perhaps more so the former, ensures more than adequate coverage of domesticand global environmental issues and events.

Several conferences on environmental or related issues are convened annually in the UAE,mostly in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Often receiving high-level support and patronage, the rangeof subjects tackled in recent years has included desertification, protected areas, coastal zonemanagement, conservation of Arabian oryx, and industry and environment.

Two of the most recent such meetings, both held in early 2000, were the ‘Dubai InternationalConference on Desertification 2000’, organized by the secretariat of the Zayed InternationalPrize for the Environment in cooperation with UNDPand United Nations Convention to CombatDesertification (UNCCD), under the patronage of the UAE Defence Minister and Crown Princeof Dubai, General HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and the ‘1st InternationalSymposium and Workshop on Arid Zone Environments: Research and Management Optionsfor Protected Areas’, hosted by ERWDA under the patronage of the Deputy Chairman of theAgency itself, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs HH Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

A non-governmental initiative, under the private patronage of Deputy Prime Minister HHSheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Chairman of the Emirates Heritage Club and its associatedcommissions, was the ‘2nd Arab Envirotech Conference’ held in Abu Dhabi in April 2000.This meet, which focused on protection of the UAE’s marine and coastal zone (following upon the recommendations after survey and critical investigation by a multi-disciplinary teamof international experts), demonstrated how, by bringing relevant environmental issues intosharp focus, not only governmental bodies may exert political influence.

Amajor conference, entitled the ‘Environment 2001 Conference and Exhibition’, took placein Abu Dhabi in February 2001, co-sponsored by the UAE Government, UNEP, UNDP andother international bodies.

Although the four conferences above have received specific mention, it would be unjust tosuggest they are necessarily more important than many other similar events that have eitheralready concluded or are due to take place. Conferences and symposia are seemingly perceivedas an important socio-political exercise, and a quintessential part of the process without whichfurther progress would not take place.

Conclusion

The UAE is a small rich country that has developed extremely rapidly. What the future mayhold is not easy to judge. On the one hand there is a desire and the wherewithal to continueto develop the country, and on the other there are delicate life-sustaining ecosystems requiringcareful custodianship. There will be losses, that much is sure, but the UAE has taken up thechallenge with creditable foresight. The institutional structure, supported by clear legislation,is now in existence, even if further legislation is still required. However, the plethora of bodiesworking toward a common goal often duplicate each others’ efforts. Coordination andcooperation would pave the way for greater collective achievement.

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Environment and development are important to the people of the UAE, with a certainpragmatism existing about the whole issue. Dialogue and solution-finding rather than conflictand the risk of defeat are the norm, nonetheless compromises sometimes have to be foundand accepted. A guarantee exists, however, that simple financial aspirations alone will not beallowed to destroy the fragile ecological balance.

Commenting on the award to him in 1999 of the Gold Panda, the WorldWide Fund forNature’s most coveted award, for services to the environment, UAE President, HH SheikhZayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, has the final word:

‘With God’s will, . . . we shall continue to work to protect our environment and our wildlife,as did our forefathers before us. It is a duty – and, if we fail, our children, rightly, willreproach us for squandering an essential part of their inheritance and of our heritage.’

Extract from Sheikh Zayed’s speech on the occasion of the UAE’s first Environment Day, 4 February 1998.

Glossary

ecoregion: a biologically distinct biogeographical realm, based on the total number of species present, level of endemismand presence of unusual ecological or evolutionary phenomena. Ecoregions are the target adopted by WWF-Interna-tional for the conservation of global biological diversity.

endemic: referring to a species or subspecies found only in a limited geographical area, generally a country, socio-political unit or, more properly, a biogeographical region.

flagship species: a species so-called due generally to its popular appearance or appeal, for whatever reason, and thusused to ‘market’ its own conservation, as well as, most often, that of other species sharing a similar environment.

Important Bird Area: an area of land or water the loss of which would jeopardize the survival of a particular birdspecies or assemblage of bird species, whether globally or regionally, and whether breeding, migrant or casualvisitor.

keystone community: a plant and/or animal community, survival of which is vital to and underpins the survival ofthe overall ecosystem as a whole.

Ramsar Convention: the original name for the Convention of Wetlands of International Importance Especially asWaterfowl Habitat, drawn up at Ramsar, Iran in 1971. The UAE is not yet a signatory. Criteria used to select‘Ramsar sites’ are a). those regularly supporting 20,000 or more waterfowl; or b). those supporting substantialnumbers of individuals from particular groups of waterfowl, indicative of wetland values, productivity or diversity;or c). where the site regularly supports one per cent or more of the individuals in a population of one species orsubspecies of waterfowl.

Red Data species: in no particular order of importance: a). an endemic subspecies confined to the UAE; b). anyspecies that is adjudged to be regionally or globally threatened or near-threatened; c). any species with a nationalbreeding population greater than one per cent of the biogeographical breeding population; or having an unfavourableconservation status; d). a species of ‘restricted range’ (<50,000 sq. km) living in a threatened habitat or habitat atrisk from adverse man-made changes and e). any other native species with an estimated national breeding populationof less than 50 pairs (excluding sporadic breeders and recent colonists) and considered to be under threat or knownto be declining in numbers.

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Poetry in the UAE

Shihab M. Ghanem

Introduction

Although the Arabs have known other forms of art such as calligraphy, arabesque, architectureand music, poetry has always occupied the first position in Arabic art since pre-Islamic days.Only in post-Second World War times did new art forms such as novels, short stories, songsand above all, the cinema and television, begin to dethrone poetry. It is worth rememberingthat in pre-Islamic days, the Arabs hung their greatest poems or odes on the walls of their holiestshrine, the Ka’aba in Mecca, perhaps in the same way that we hang painting masterpieces inmuseums today. Those poems known as the seven (or ten) Muallaqat (i.e. hung ones) are stillread and cherished today even by schoolchildren despite their use of archaic words. It is, therefore,ironic that the first Arab to be awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature was not a poet but anovelist, Neguib Mahfouz. However, the art of story-telling was also known to the Arabs sincethe Abbasid era in the form of the fables of Ibn Al Muqafa, and later in the Maqamat of AlHamadani and Al Hariri and in the magical stories of a ‘Thousand and One Nights’.

The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw the revival of poetry and theappearance of several outstanding poets including the Egyptian Ahmed Shawqi (1868–1932),possibly the greatest Arab poet since Al Mutanabi, who lived a thousand years earlier. Thepoems of Shawqi were often published on the front pages of newspapers, and newspaper boyswould try to attract the attention of buyers by calling out that there was a new poem by Shawqiin the paper. Shawqi was elected by major poets from all over the Arab World as the ‘Emirof Poets’, but the Nobel Prize eluded him.

The Evolution of Modern Arabic Poetry

Arabic poetry since pre-Islamic times until the middle of the twentieth century followed thesixteen meters formulated by the eighth century Gulf Arab scholar, Al Khalil bin Ahmed, (oneof these sixteen meters was actually added by his student, Al Akhfash). Slightly modifiedforms were added in the shape of Al Muwashahat during the period of the Islamic civilizationin Andalusia in Spain. The line or bait adhered to the two hemistitches form, each with anequal number of feet, all the second hemistitches ending in the same rhyming letter and soundthroughout the poem. The subjects of poems were usually panegyric, satire, self-praise, elegy,ghazal, (i.e. amatory or love poems), description or gnomic verse.

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Contact with the West in the earlier part of this century led to the development of the Mahjar(or immigrant) school led by Lebanese writers like Jibran Khalil Jibran, Abu Madhi and MikhailNuaima, and the anti-Classical (and anti-Shawqi) Diwan school led by the Egyptian Al Aqqad.The romantic ‘Apollo’ school was led by poets such as the Egyptians Abu Shadi and AliMahmoud Taha, and the Tunisian Al Shabi. However, all these schools adhered to the baitform. In their poetry panegyric, self-praise and gnomic verse became rare and satire was usuallypolitical. Meditative, humanistic, nationalistic and love themes were common.

Just after the Second World War the Iraqi poets Al Sayyab and his compatriot poetess NazekAl Malaikah popularized the modern tafila form, in which the same foot is used throughoutthe poem, but the number of feet changes from line to line with irregular rhyming. Earlierattempts using this form had been made by Ali Ahmed Bakatheer and a few other poets. Theform soon became popular, especially with such socio-realist poets as Abdul Saboor and Higaziafter the 1952 Egyptian revolution and among Western-influenced poets in Lebanon such asHawi and Adonis. In their wake came the tafila Palestinian Resistance poets like MahmoodDarwish and Samih Al Qasim. At the same time, prose poems began to appear, first in Lebanonand Syria and later in other parts of the Arab world; these still face strong opposition fromthose who cannot accept that it is possible to strip Arabic poetry, after 15 centuries, of itsrhythm.

Nabati Poetry in the UAE

It is difficult to find records of verse written in Classical Arabic (i.e. standard Arabic) by poetswho lived in the area known now as the United Arab Emirates earlier than this century. Oneof the exceptions is the argozas of Ibn Majid, the great fifteenth century navigator. However,some good early nabati poetry was written in the vernacular style and the best known of theearlier poets is Ibn Daher who lived in Ra’s al-Khaimah in the seventeenthcentury. One couldfind many maxims and words of wisdom in his poetry such as:

If incomes are obtained by strength and not Allah’s will,Then no lion would ever starve whilst dogs are full.

In another poem he says about old age:

You cannot prevent Allah’s will to make us oldBut perhaps He will reward us for enduring old age.

Nabati poetry is still very popular in the UAE, especially since it is written by many of therulers and sheikhs, including President HH Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan and HH GeneralSheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Crown Prince of Dubai and Minister of Defence. SheikhMohammed is versatile, writing about various subjects including love. In one of his poemshe expresses some of his philosophy of life:

The dark nights and hard daysWe take them as they come and worry not about the future.We walk along an unbeaten trackAnd if the path is difficult I enjoy it more.

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One of his political poems entitled ‘My Hopes’, is dedicated to HH Sheikh Zayed:

O! You, our brothers of Kuwait and Euphrates.O! You, our brothers, north and south in the Arab world.Zayed has called out to us with dedicated resolveA call whose commitment rekindles true hearts.Listen to Zayed! Abandon sleep!He has called us to denounce division.He who follows Zayed may hope to survive.Following Zayed is a duty – a vital duty.

Other well-known nabati poets include Al Khader, bin Yaqoot and Hamad Khalifah BuShihab who is also a well-known poet in Classical Arabic. In fact, nabati poets are numerousand almost every newspaper and magazine now has a weekly page for nabati poems. Thesubjects are usually love, meditation or praise for the leaders. Often the poems end with aprayer to Allah to bless the Prophet (peace be upon him). Occasionally, as with some of Rubaiabin Yaqoot’s work, the poem is a criticism of modern social trends. Here,Yaqoot laments thechange in traditions and some of the effects of modern schooling on girls and boys:

They have taught her dancing and singingAnd made the girl an artist.They trained her to perform gymnastics like an imp.And the boy when he walks swaysHis hair down to his collar,Addicted to alcohol,Sleeping with the bottle in his lap.

Classical Arabic Poetry in the UAE

Among the first Classical Arabic UAE poets to gain importance in this part of the world duringthe twentieth century were Mubarak Al Oqaili (1880–1954), Salem bin Ali Al Owais(1887–1959) and Ahmed bin Sulayem (1905?–1976).

Al Oqaili immigrated to Dubai from al-Ahsa in Saudi Arabia in his youth. He wrote in thefashion of the old classical poets and his ideas were nationalistic and anti-colonialist. Warningsby the British rulers silenced him only briefly, but he escaped imprisonment because of hisblindness.

Salem bin Ali Al Owais was born in al-Hirah, a village between Sharjah and Ajman. Heobtained a basic education and loved reading Arabic books and the few magazines and booksthat reached him or his friends from overseas. He was influenced by old classical poetry andearly twentieth century poets like Shawqi and Hafedh of Egypt. His poetry was often nation-alistic and he wrote several poems about the Palestinian saga. He was a great admirer of Egypt’sPresident Nasser about whose deeds he wrote many poems, including one on the union betweenEgypt and Syria that took place one year before the death of the poet. He wrote of the ill-treatment of the poor divers by pearl merchants and warned the merchants of Allah’s wrath.

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Ahmed bin Sulayem had to emigrate to India because of his nationalistic views, but in 1948was summoned back by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum who appointed him to a seniorgovernment post in Dubai. Bin Sulayem had strong connections with Oman and many of hispoems were about Oman or were addressed to Omani poets and friends.

Three other poets of importance in the UAE were Khalfan Musabah (1923–1946), Sheikh SaqrAl Qasimi (1925–1993), an ex-ruler of Sharjah, and Sultan bin Ali Al Owais (1925–2000). Thethree poets, known as the Hirah group, grew up in the village of al-Hira in Sharjah and were closefriends. Khalfan Musabah was influenced by the Apollo and romantic poets. He suffered a seriousaccident whilst working on a ship and died after prolonged unsuccessful treatment at the age of23. In one of the poems he writes about his ‘medical treatment’ with a branding iron:

‘I want to cure youAnd cure may come with the burn of flesh.Do not make the slightest move and be forbearing –For endurance is the hallmark of courageous men’Allah is the greatest! Oh! When he arose and rolled up his sleeve –Like the son of Zabibah, walking towards the fire,And fetched his huge branding ironIts colour like the tongue of a vulture! –He forced me down upon my knees,His rock-like hand clutching the ball of fire.Alas! For my poor body when it felt that searing ironAs it was stamped, embedded, held there.I thought of the fearful fires of HellAs I dropped delirious, like a ball of tar.

Sheikh Saqr Al Qasimi was ruler of Sharjah between 1950 and 1964 but was then deposedand went into exile. He was, however, allowed to spend the last years of his life in Abu Dhabi.During his exile Sheikh Saqr lived in Cairo and his poetry was published in Egyptian andother Arab magazines. He published a few books of verse and many of his poems were nation-alistic. His poetry is written in the classical style, but his daughter Sheikha Maisoon writespoetry and also paints in very modernistic styles. In one of his poems he says:

They ask me: ‘Wherefore is your poetry so always sadWhen you are the son of a ruling prince?Is this due to failure at love?Or has the arrow of misery pierced you like well-aimed doom?’I reply: ‘Love? Do I cherish a love other than that for my countryIn the face of the darkening catastrophes of tomorrow?

Sultan Al Owais was one of the best known UAE poets and he established the well-knownAl Owais cultural prizes which are open to all Arabs. Most of his poetry is about love andtends towards the physical description of the female form and its beauty. He was perhapsinfluenced by the Andalusian poets and to some extent by the Apollo and modern baiti poets.Abook of his poetry has been published and many of his poems have been published in Englishtranslation. An extract from his poem ‘Rio de Janeiro’ says:

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Ah! For a gracefully shaped nymphAs though God ordained: Be beauty itself!And she became beautiful beyond description.She asked me: Are you in love?I replied: Love is my resort,For it I sing, and in it I seek refuge.And she approachedWith a swinging gait

Another poet of importance is Dr Ahmed Al Madani who was born in Dubai in 1931 anddied in 1995. He was highly educated and studied in Baghdad, Cambridge and the Sorbonne.He published a few books of verse as well as a book about the development of nabati poetryin the UAE. He wrote in the romantic baiti style and also the modern tafila style, influencedby poets of Iraq such as Al Sayyab whom he met during his university days in Baghdad. Inone of his tafila poems entitled ‘A Dubaian Morning’ he says:

Do not imagine that I am unmindful of love’s meaning.Deep inside me, the notes of longing stir my emotionsAnd the endless artistic nightsThrobbing with the strains of lute and guitarAnd poetry fills my dreamy thoughtsRadiating from the heart.Do not think that my love for you is a youth’s infatuationSpringing from desire, with fire bursting in his chest.Shaken by deprivation, he calls: ‘I am in love!’

Hamad Bu Shihab (b.1936) on the other hand is a very staunch believer in the classical baitiform. He is one of the best known poets of the UAE and tends to polish his work. He is agood nabati poet and has compiled an anthology of UAE nabati poetry which includes mostof the important UAE nabati poets. However, he has published only a limited amount of hisown poetry in book form. One of his Classical Arabic poems is about the great benefits of thefederation of the emirates:

Yesterday these Emirates were torn apartIn them destructive men created havoc.And today we are enjoying security and stabilityForcing envious people to admire us.Yesterday these were disunited emiratesSuffering ignorance, poverty, illness and chronic disease,And today the Lord has bestowed upon us his graceIn uncountable abundance.Yesterday, few people knew of our nameAnd today our voice reaches all corners of the Earth.Oh! What a difference between our yesterday and today.

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The author of this chapter, Dr Shihab Ghanem (b. 1940), writes both in the baiti and tafilastyles. He has published eight volumes of Classical Arabic verse and a volume of Englishverse. He has also translated poems into English for a large number of twentieth century Arabpoets and published them in several volumes including a volume consisting exclusively ofUAE poems. In 1984 he won the UAE poetry competition and in 1997 won a Saudi Arabianprize for poetry from Abha. He writes about love, nationalistic topics and meditative poems.In one of his poems ‘Will the Twain Ever Meet’ he says:

The gap yet widensBetween the developing third worldAnd the advanced first world:The third world moves backwardTowards a fourth place –At least materially;And the first world moves forwardTowards a zero!At least spiritually.

Sultan Khalifa (b. 1942), a businessman from Dubai, has published several volumes of classicalArabic and nabati poetry. He writes in both the baiti and tafila styles. Dr Mana Saeed Al Otaiba(b. 1946) who obtained his doctorate in economics from Cairo has published around 30 volumesof classical Arabic and nabati poetry. He was, at one time, the Minister of Petroleum and MineralResources and wrote several well-publicized and amusing poems about the difficulties facedby OPEC ministers in reaching agreement on quotas and prices of OPEC oil. Some of thosepoems were translated into English. Love and sentimentalism are, however, his main themesalthough he occasionally writes nationalistic poems. Other themes include his children and mother.His poetry is in the classical baiti style. In a poem about his daughter Arwa, he says:

O rose in our house! How sweet!Suffusing me with her perfume.‘Arwa’, opening up in my life like a fragrant flowerCrowned by the morning dew.Each time I see her my worries disappear,And my heart simply smiles.

Habib Al Sayegh (b. 1950), a journalist from Abu Dhabi, writes Classical Arabic poetry. Hestarted in the traditional baiti style but has left it almost entirely and tends to experiment in mostof his poems, trying styles which are modern both in form and content. In a sensitive poemabout an Indian youth who was run down by a car whilst working as a newspaper boy he says:

Every morning he says to them in a gentle voice ‘Good morning’Then calls loudly‘Ittihad – Ittihad‘Khaleej‘Ittihad’ . . .He callsAnd calls . . .

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One morning – fatefullyHe was killed by a taxi– May you all live long –In the same streetAt the unlucky top end of the streetBehind the bank, brimming with the accounts of the gentry.

There are approximately 50 other UAE poets writing in Classical Arabic whose namesfrequently appear in literary pages. Some write in traditional baiti style, others in tafila andsome in both styles. Some try to experiment with modern poetry and even with prose poetry.Amongst the better known names are Mohammad Sharif Al Shaibani, Mohammad bin Hader,Salem Al Zamr, Saif Al Murri, Karim Matooq, Arif Al Sheikh, Arif Al Khajah, AhmedMohammed Obaid, Ibrahim Mohammed Ibrahim, Khalid Badr and Jaffer Al Jamri. Severalof the younger poets who have been influenced by post-modernists have, over the past twodecades, attempted to write prose poetry. The form can be difficult to understand.

There are also a number of female poets, most of whom write in the modern tafila or prosestyles. These include Salihah Dhaiban (pen-name Rua Salem) and her sister Amina Dhaiban(pen-name Sarah Hareb), Salihah Ghabesh, Dhabia Khamees, Sheikha Maisoon Al Qasimi,Nugoom Al Ghanem, Aisha Busumait, Kaltham Shaibani and Kaltham Abdulla.

Rua Salem, in a poem lamenting the death of her father, also laments her childhood:

I did not find MasoodOr the shop.Nor did I find my uncle.I only found a mixtureOf Indians and PathansLiving in that placeLiving in every cornerThat gave me in childhood a sense of security.How I long to rest my head on my dad’s chestLike I did when I was a childWhilst my dad played with my hairAnd short locks.For I was a princessOn the bosom of my dad.Oh! If only dad could come backAnd I could again return a child.

Bibliography

Al Tai’i, Abdulla M. Contemporary Poetry in the Arabian Gulf, The Arab Institute for Research and Studies, ALESCO (1974).Ghanem, S.M. Pearls and Shells: Poems from the United Arab Emirates, Dubai, Deira Printing Press (1996).Ghanem, S.M. Coffee and Dates : 20th Century Poems from the United Arab Emirates (manuscript).Nawful, Yousuf, The Poets of the United Arab Emirates, The Cultural and Scientific Association, Dubai, Bin Dismal Printing

Press & Stationery (1994).

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POETRY IN THE UAE

Author Profiles

Ibrahim Al Abed has served as an Adviser at the Ministry of Information and Culture of theUnited Arab Emirates since 1975 and has been the Director of the Ministry’s External AffairsDepartment since 1990. A holder of two degrees from the American University of Beirut, heis an expert on UAE government administration and international affairs. Well versed in thehistory of the region’s development, he has been a member of the UAE team at all conferencesof the Gulf Ministers of Information since 1976 and of all conferences of the GCC Ministersof Information. A board member of the Gulf News Agency, he has considerable experienceof media development, both in the UAE and within the region as a whole. In this regard hehas served as Chairman of the Group of Experts on Information in the OPEC countries andhas lectured on Media Affairs at the University of the UAE. He is author of 12 books on theArab-Israeli conflict and of a number of papers and articles dealing with the politicaldevelopment of the United Arab Emirates.

Mohamed Abdulla Al Roken, a UAE national and graduate of United Arab EmiratesUniversity, received his LL.M. and Ph.D. in Constitutional Law from the University ofWarwick, Coventry, England in 1992. Al Roken is a lecturer of law at UAE University, AlAin, and has been appointed as Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Sharia Law. He is admittedas advocate and legal consultant at all levels of local and federal courts in the UAE and isalso the Vice Chairman of the UAE Jurist Association.

Ali Tawfik Al Sadik joined the Arab Monetary Fund as Senior Economist in 1979. Since1989he has worked at the Abu Dhabi-based Economic Policy Institute of the Arab Monetary Fund,first as Chief of the Analysis and Economic Policies Division and latterly as Director. Al Sadikhas also held the post of Chief Economist of the Organization of Arab Producing and ExportingCountries (OAPEC) and Visiting Assistant Professor, Economics Department, North CarolinaState University, Raleigh, USA. He holds B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees from the American Universityof Beirut and a Ph.D. from North Carolina State University, Raleigh. He is the author of over30 papers on energy, economic development, finance and economic management, as well asArab Economic Integration, (1995); Privatization in the Arab Countries, (co-editor) (1995);Monetary Policies in the Arab Countries, (co-editor) (1996); Policies and Management ofExchange Rates in the Arab Countries, (co-editor) (1997); Policies and Management of PublicDebt in the Arab Countries, (co-editor) (1998); Competitiveness of Arab Economies in GlobalMarkets, (editor), (1999).

312

Simon Aspinall is director of the Environmental Studies Unit of the Abu Dhabi IslandsArchaeological Survey (ADIAS), having worked previously as Environment and Heritageeditor of Emirates News, the UAE government’s English language daily newspaper. Prior tothis he was the founder and head of the Wildlife Management Unit of the EnvironmentalResearch and Wildlife Development Agency, ERWDA, also in Abu Dhabi. In association withthe UAE Ministry of Information and Culture, an increasing amount of his time is spent assistingvisiting TV film crews in the production of programmes concerning the country’s environmentand wildlife. He is a member of the World Conservation Union’s (IUCN) Commission forProtected Areas (WCPA) and maintains close ties with UNESCO, WWF-International, BirdLifeInternational and other international conservation bodies. He has published numerous paperson a variety of natural history and ecological topics, most recently with an emphasis on conser-vation practice, wildlife management and environmental policy issues, and is author of theUAE chapter in A Directory of Wetlands in the Middle East (1995) and of Status and Conser-vation of the Breeding Birds of the UAE (1996).

Gerald Butt, Gulf Editor of Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), is a former BBC MiddleEast Correspondent and is author of five books on the region. He spent part of his childhoodin the Gulf and has been a frequent visitor to the area ever since. Butt is a regular commentatoron Middle East affairs for the BBC and for a range of newspapers and magazines.

Shihab M. Ghanem, a UAE national, studied both Mechanical and Electrical Engineering atAberdeen University and received a double-degree in 1964. He also obtained a Masters Degreein Water Resources Development from Roorkee in 1975 and a Ph.D. in Industrialization fromWales (Cardiff) in 1989. He is a Chartered Engineer, Fellow of the Institution of MechanicalEngineers and Fellow of the Institute of Management (UK). His career includes working asthe Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works and Communications inAden, as Chief Engineer of Eterno Supplies in Lebanon, and as Plant Manager of Gulf Eternitin Dubai. From 1988 until 2000 he was the Director of Engineering of both Dubai Ports Authorityand Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority. In 2000 he was appointed as Adviser to the Chairman forIndustrial Affairs and Director of R&D. He is author of 15 books including eight Arabic poetrybooks, four collections of translations of modern Arabic poetry, and a book on the industrial-ization of the UAE. He has also written a large number of literary articles and technical papersand was the Chief Editor of World of Engineering from 1996 to 1999. He has participated inabout 85 conferences and seminars and has received several prizes and awards.

K. W. Glennie was educated at Edinburgh University (B. Sc., 1953; D. Sc., 1984) and spentover 32 years working as an exploration geologist for Shell in New Zealand, Canada, Nepal,India, the Middle East, London and The Hague. His main research interests comprise desertgeology (present and past), geology of the Oman Mountains, and geology of the North Sea.Since his ‘retirement’in 1987, he has continued to be active in these areas, including organizingan annual course in London on the Petroleum Geology of the North Sea. He was co-convenorof an international conference held in Al Ain, UAE, in December 1995 on Quartenary Desertsand Climatic Change, and also led pre- and post-conference field trips in the Emirates andOman. He is an honorary professor in geology at the University of Aberdeen, and member of

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AUTHOR PROFILES

the geological societies of London, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, The Netherlands, and American Assoc.Petroleum Geologists. Glennie is author of over 40 scientific papers and sole author orcontributor and editor of five books, including Desert Sedimentary Environments (1970),Geology of the Oman Mountains (1974; simplified, updated version 1995) and The PetroleumGeology of the North Sea (4 editions: 1984, 1986, 1990, 1998).

Frauke Heard-Bey studied History and Political Science in Heidelberg and Berlin, obtainingher Ph.D. from the ‘Frie Universitat’ in Berlin in 1967. Her thesis on the political changes inthe capital Berlin between 1912 and 1920 was published in Stuttgart. She married her Britishhusband in 1967 and followed him to Abu Dhabi, where he pursued a career with an oil company.In 1969 the author joined the recently established Centre for Documentation and Research inAbu Dhabi, which is dedicated to the collection of archive material from all over the worldpertaining to the Gulf and the adjacent regions. Frauke Heard-Bey has published in English,German, French and Arabic in leading journals and handbooks for historical, sociological andMiddle Eastern studies, participated in conferences and seminars; and she has been a memberof the IISS since 1973. A second edition of her book From Trucial States to United ArabEmirates. A Society in Transition, first published in 1982, was republished in 1996.

Peter Hellyer obtained a B.A. Degree in International Relations from the University of Sussex,UK, graduating in 1969, and subsequently worked in politics and as a journalist before movingto Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates, in 1978. Currently an Adviser to the ExternalInformation Department of the Ministry of Information and Culture, he was Managing Editorof the official daily Emirates News from 1985–1999. He has contributed sections on politicsand foreign policy to the UAE annual Yearbook for more than 20 years. Also Executive Directorof the Abu Dhabi Islands Archaeological Survey (1992– ), he has published numerous articles,papers and book chapters on the politics, history and heritage of the United Arab Emirates(100). He has authored, co-authored or edited several books on the Emirates, including:Hidden Riches: An Introduction to the Archaeology of the UAE; Waves of Time: The MarineHeritage of the UAE.

G.R.D. King is presently Senior Lecturer at the Department of Art and Archaeology, Schoolof Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He was previously AssistantLecturer in Islamic Art at the Centre for Arabic Studies, American University in Cairo(1977–80); Associate Professor in Islamic Archaeology, Department of Archaeology andMuseology, King Saud University, Riyadh (1980–87); Research Fellow, Classics Department,King’s College London (1988–89). King has carried out archaeological surveys and otherfield work in Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and was Director of the British teamengaged in the international excavation at the Islamic port site of Julfar, Ra’s al-Khaimah,UAE (1989–1992). Since 1992 he has been Director of the Abu Dhabi Islands ArchaeologicalSurvey (ADIAS). ADIAS was appointed by HH President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyanto survey and excavate archaeological sites on the western coasts and offshore islands of AbuDhabi emirate. ADIAS is based at Abu Dhabi under the patronage of HH Lieut. General SheikhMohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and at SOAS.

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Malcolm C. Peck is a programme officer at Meridian International Center in Washington,DC where he arranges professional study tours for international visitors sponsored by the USInformation Agency. Previously he was director of programmes at the Middle East Institutein Washington and Arabian Peninsula Affairs analyst at the US Department of State. He isthe author of The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity (1986) and A Historical Dictionaryof the Gulf Arab States (1996). He has written chapters for several books on Middle Easternsubjects and has contributed entries to The World Book Encyclopedia, Microsoft EncartaEncyclopedia, and The Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East. Peck holds A. B. and A. M.degrees, the latter in Middle Eastern studies, from Harvard University. At the Fletcher Schoolof Law and Diplomacy he earned M. A., MALD, and Ph. D. degrees in international affairs.

D.T. Potts is Edwin Cuthbert Hall Professor of Middle Eastern Archaeology (1991– ) at theUniversity of Sydney, Australia and Honorary Curator of the Nicholson Museum of Antiquities(2001–). Born in New York in 1953, he was educated at Harvard (A.B., 1975, Ph.D., 1980). AFellow of the Society of Antiquaries (London) and of the Australian Academy of the Humanities(Canberra), he taught previously at the Free University of Berlin, Germany (1981–86) and theUniversity of Copenhagen, Denmark (1980–81, 1986–91). His fieldwork experience in theNear East includes excavations in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates,where he has excavated at al-Dur, Tell Abraq, Jebel al-Emalah, al-Sufouh and most recentlyAwhala. He is the founder-editor of the international journal Arabian Archaeology & Epigraphy.In addition to writing many articles and several monographs on his excavations at Tell Abraqin the UAE, he is the author of The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, Mesopotamian Civilization, TheArchaeology of Elam and Ancient Magan: The Secrets of Tell Abraq.

Mohamed Abdulsalam Shihab, a UAE national, is Economic Consultant at the Departmentof Planning, Abu Dhabi. He was educated at Cairo University, Egypt (B.Sc.), University ofArizona, USA(M.Sc.) and University of Salford, England (Ph. D.) and was awarded the RashidPrize for Academic Excellence, the highest academic prize for academic excellence in theUAE for his research ‘Industrial Development in the United Arab Emirates’. Dr Shihab wasa tutor in the Department of Economics at the University of Salford, a Project Coordinatorfor the Abu Dhabi Comprehensive Development Plan, and has been enrolled in the Roster ofExperts for short time assignments, United Nations Industrial Development Organization,Vienna, Austria since February 1990.

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AUTHOR PROFILES

Index

316

Abbasid, 71, 76, 80, 84-90, 305

Abi’el, 58, 64Abu Bakr, 60, 80-83, 86Abu Dhabi, 4, 10-11, 17,

19-22, 25-26, 30, 35-36, 40, 48, 57, 60-66,68, 70-74, 76-78, 82,84, 86, 91-97, 99-100,102, 105-106, 111,115, 119-121, 123-124, 126-128,130-133, 135-137,143-157, 159, 162-164, 166-168,172-173, 178, 180,196-197, 199, 201-204, 208, 218, 221,224, 231-237, 240-246, 248, 254,259-267, 269-272,274-277, 279-280,282, 284, 286-287,290-293, 295, 297-299, 301, 303-304,308, 310

Abu Musa, 7, 133, 147,155, 167, 170-172,179-185, 187-189,192, 194-201

Abu Shadi, 306Achaemenid, 50-51, 61Aden, 147-149, 183afforestation, 218, 288Afghanistan, 13, 43, 117,

163, 175agriculture, 28-29, 63,

92, 103, 110-112, 127,202, 206-208, 227,229, 249, 251, 253,260, 272, 283, 287-288, 290, 292,295-296, 299-300

Ahmed Al Madani, 309Ahmed bin Sulayem,

307-308Ahmed Shawqi, 305Ajman, 41, 64, 66, 73-75,

91, 111, 115, 121, 124,126, 132, 137, 149,

153, 164, 202-203,238, 240, 261-262,264, 270-271, 290,307

Akkadian, 40, 43, 61Al Ain, 9, 17, 22, 27, 36,

38, 49, 60, 62, 64, 71,73, 76, 81-83, 88, 91-92, 95, 101, 108-109,156, 160, 167, 199,243, 270, 285, 290-291, 303-304

Al Bu Falah, 103, 109Al Bu Falasah, 151Al Bu Shamis, 100, 115al-Dhafrah, 103Al Dhahiri, 99al-Dur, 30-34, 40, 51, 53-

59, 75Al Hamili, 99al-Hamriyah, 48, 93, 239,

266al-Hasa’, 118Al Khader, 307Al Liwa, 9, 21, 116al-Madam, 36, 49, 62, 76,

288, 304Al Maktoum, 122-123,

128, 146, 150, 167,237, 301, 308

Al Mazrui, 99Al Qasimi, 91, 93, 123,

125-127, 132, 153,193, 238, 308, 311

Al Qubaisi, 99Al Rashidi, 98Al Sabah, 123Al Sayyab, 306, 309Al Silwadi, 11al-Sufouh, 40-41, 62Al Za’abi, 99, 115al-Ahsa’, 72Al-Arabiyyah, 127Al-Aridh, 14al-cAtik, 79-80Al-Azminah, 127, 130-

131al-Bahrayn, 73, 83al-Basra, 72-73, 85-86,

al-Bidiyya, 95, 97al-Bunana, 84al-Hira, 74, 78al-Jumayra, 73, 75al-Mataf, 90-91al-Qatif, 72-74al-Qusais, 270al-Riddah, 60, 68al-Shihr, 72al-Silac, 77al-Sirr, 72al-Yamama, 72, 81al-Yunaniya, 85alabaster, 52, 55, 65, 67Alexander the Great, 51Ali Mahmoud Taha, 306America, 11, 13, 15, 18,

25, 162, 247, 259cAmr b. al-cAs, 60, 81Anatolia, 13-14, 87Andes, 13, 15-16anhydrite, 11, 20, 24-26Antarctica, 11, 18, 25Arab League, 168, 199-

200, 250, 292Arabian fog highlands,

282Arabian Gulf, 6, 9, 18-19,

21-23, 26-27, 32, 63,66-68, 95, 97, 115-116, 121-122, 126,132, 134, 144, 162,170, 172, 175, 177,179, 185, 197-200,265, 277, 280-284,287, 292-294, 300, 311

Arabian oryx, 30, 72,286-287, 301

Arabian Peninsula, 55,59, 61, 64-65, 68, 82,88, 94, 98, 101, 149,162, 164, 183, 198,201, 285, 303

Arabian Plate, 17, 27Arabian tahr, 282, 285,

287architecture, 49, 55, 68,

77, 92-93, 95-96, 305Ardashir, 59, 97Arfaja, 81-83

arif, 109, 311‘arish, 51, 55arrowheads, 46, 53, 66,

68Arzanah, 74, 234As-Sameeh, 128Asab, 233, 242, 248Asia, 11, 13, 17, 28, 48,

61, 63, 66, 69, 87, 162,174-175, 247, 276,282, 293-294

Asimah, 43, 45, 48, 64,69

Assur, 55Assyria, 49-50atacamite, 48-49, 68Australia, 11, 25, 223Awamir, 98, 102Azd, 52, 74, 79-86

Baghdad, 86-87, 89-90,117, 168-169, 309

Bahrain, 35, 39, 48, 52,58, 64-65, 69, 72-74,79-81, 86, 89, 93, 96,107, 115, 118-125,128, 130-131, 133-134, 147-148, 150,167, 180, 182-183,232, 275, 284, 292-293, 300

Baiti, 308-311Bajir, 79Balghelam, 48, 71, 93Baluchistan, 41, 43, 48,

55, 106, 117Bandar Abbas, 195Bani Lakhm, 74, 78Bani Najiya, 83Bani Qitab, 100Bani Yas, 10, 22, 60, 65,

74, 77-79, 89, 92-94,98-100, 102-103, 105-109, 115, 145, 151,281, 291, 304

Banu Judayd, 83Baramki, 75, 88, 95Barbar, 48, 64Barygaza, 54Basle Committee, 222

317

INDEX

Basra, 55, 169, 199-200Batina(h), 28, 72, 79-83,

88, 111, 115, 281Baynuna, 18, 22, 72 -73,

82, 84, 103bedouin, 21, 98, 100-102,

104, 107-109, 112-116, 151, 156

Beydoun, 10, 13, 27bin Yaqoot, 307Bithna, 45-46Bombay, 107, 125, 197,

200Bosnia, 163, 168, 176-

177Britain, 117-128, 132-

133, 146, 148,166-168, 170, 175-176, 181-182,184-186, 188-190,192, 194, 196, 199-200, 232-233

British Petroleum, 102,105, 108, 232

British Political Resident,117, 120, 182

bronze, 46, 49, 52, 58,63, 66, 68, 76

Bu Hasa, 232-233, 248bulls, 72, 110-111Buraimi, 60, 63, 71, 76,

81-83, 88, 91, 101,108-109, 167

Bushire, 117-120Buwayhid, 87Byzantine, 74, 80

Cairo, 159, 173, 198-201,308, 310

Caliphate, 71, 80, 86-87,89-90, 179

camels, 21, 30, 44, 58,71, 84, 94, 103-104,106-107, 109-110,116, 208, 283, 288

Canada, 223, 234, 239,300

carnelian, 43, 75cattle, 30, 36-37, 39, 44,

49, 71cement, 128, 208, 250,

261-263, 272, 275-276Cenozoic, 16-17Central Bank, 208, 222-

224, 226ceramics, 38, 41, 44, 49-

50, 52, 55, 59, 62, 64,66-67, 75-77, 87, 90,92-95, 97

Characene, 55, 67China, 60, 80, 87, 90, 111Christianity, 59-61, 78-

79, 165, 174, 178

climate, 7, 9, 18, 22-24,27-28, 32, 51, 59, 111,114, 217, 251, 277,279, 300

Climatic Optimum, 19,24, 35-36

Constitution, 7, 124, 131-144, 148, 151-156,163, 165, 190, 199-200

copper, 29, 38-39, 48, 53,65, 115, 271

coral reefs, 281, 284Council of Ministers,

135-139, 141, 152,154, 208

Courts of First Instance,153

Cretaceous, 11-12, 14-16,25, 27

crocodile, 18

Dalma, 30-34, 36, 62-63,65, 71, 74, 77-78, 85,89, 92-94, 96, 106,234, 277, 281

Damar, 72-73dar, 103, 105, 146, 275Das Island, 232, 234-235,

240, 265, 267date palm, 32, 39, 49,

103-104Delhi, 117, 120Demetsjerd, 74, 81Dhaid, 19, 51Dhayah, 44-46, 48, 65,

91Dhofar, 63, 72, 154, 279,

281Dhu’l-Taj, 82diapirism, 10, 13, 24Dibba, 11, 15, 17, 50, 60,

71-72, 74, 79-81, 83,86, 110, 112-113

Dilmun, 39, 48, 66dolomites, 11, 24donkeys, 110, 112-113Duarte Barbosa, 74, 90-

91, 95Dubai, 10, 22, 41, 46, 62,

69-71, 73-75, 86, 88,90-91, 93, 95-97, 99-100, 102, 106-107,111, 115-116, 118-122,124, 126, 128-133,135-137, 143, 146-155, 159, 162-163,167, 169, 202-204,208, 231, 237-238,240-246, 248, 254,260-264, 266-267,269-271, 274-276,286, 289-291, 301,303, 306-311

DUBAL, 244, 264, 267dugong, 29-30, 49, 282,

284-285, 295, 299-300, 304

Ebla, 46, 69Egypt, 54, 61, 81, 127,

166, 173, 262, 307Emalah, 53, 76Emirates University, 9,

27, 255, 290Empty Quarter (Rub’ al-

Khali), 9, 70-72, 82,94, 102, 279-280, 286

Environmentallegislation, 278, 294,297, 300

Europe, 13, 27, 92, 115,123, 177, 247, 264

Failaka, 52, 78falaj, 48-49, 75-76, 84,

86, 92, 109, 115falcons, 115, 279Fateh, 237-238, 248, 266Federal Government, 7,

132, 138, 140, 151,153-155, 165, 208,217, 258, 273, 289

FERTIL, 236, 243, 267,271

figs, 20, 38, 49-50, 57-59, 109, 209

First World War, 117-118,172

fish, 28-29, 31, 44, 47,49, 71, 105-106, 110-111, 113, 263, 272,277, 282-283, 285,288-289, 299, 303

fishing, 20, 29, 37, 63,71, 93, 101, 103, 105,110-113, 117, 202,208, 249, 251, 260,268, 272, 277-278,284, 288, 299

France, 127, 175-176,233, 237, 245, 247

free zones, 270-271, 274-276

Fujairah, 39, 46, 49-50,59-61, 63, 65, 67-69,71-72, 75, 91-92, 96,111, 115, 118, 121, 124,126, 132, 137, 149,153-156, 164, 202-203,239-240, 250, 266,270-271, 284, 289-290

gazelle, 29-30, 49, 286,295

Germany, 117, 237, 247,262, 303

Ghagha’, 65, 71, 73, 77,93, 96

Ghalilah, 44-45Ghanadha, 40, 61Gondwana, 11, 13, 15, 25Gordon’s wildcat, 285Gross Domestic Product

(GDP), 202-207, 209-218, 222-225,227-229, 251-254,258, 268

Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC), 162,166, 168, 196, 219,224, 250, 266, 288,292, 303

Gulf of Oman, 9, 116,156, 162, 180, 280-281, 283-284, 290,293

gypsum, 11, 20-21, 24-26, 41, 57, 250, 262,271

Habib Al Sayegh, 310Hafit (see also Jebel

Hafit), 17, 22, 37-38,41, 45, 65, 285

Hajar (see also JebelHajar), 12-13, 28, 38,44, 53, 71-73, 75, 82,92, 102-103, 109-110,243, 277-280, 282,286, 288

halite, 10, 19-20, 24-25Hamad Bu Shihab, 309Hamad Khalifah Bu

Shihab, 307Harappan, 41, 43-44, 175Hatta, 41Hawasina, 12, 14-17, 24-

26Hellenistic, 62, 75-76Hili, 32, 36, 38-41, 43,

49-50, 62-63, 65-66,91

hippopotamus, 18Hirah, 124, 307-308Hormuz, 10, 13, 16-18,

55, 64, 71, 74, 83, 85-86, 90, 97, 109, 162,176, 179-180, 189,239, 280-281

horticulture, 28-29, 37hunting, 28-29, 36, 101,

105, 115, 287, 289,295, 303

Husn Madhab, 49hydrocarbons, 11, 13, 25-

26, 161, 236, 239, 244,274

Ibn Habib, 60, 80, 83

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Ibn Kawan, 83, 85, 87Ibn Khurradadhbih, 71-

72, 96-97Ibn Majid, 91, 306Ibn Razik, 97, 115ijma’, 152, 159India, 11, 17, 22, 25, 54-

55, 60, 75, 80, 95-97,100, 106-107, 111, 115,119-120, 122, 126, 145,165-166, 175, 181,197-198, 232, 239,241, 246, 308

Indian Ocean, 55, 75, 78-80, 85, 87, 90, 92,95-97, 110, 162, 175,246, 281, 283-284

Indus Valley, 41, 43-44,48, 63, 175

industrialization, 5, 252,254-255, 258, 260-261, 263, 265,267-269, 271, 273-276

Iran, 7, 13-14, 16-17, 25,27, 37, 41, 43, 48, 50,52, 54-55, 61, 63-65,69, 74, 78, 80, 83, 87,89-91, 95-97, 133,147, 155, 162, 165-172, 175-176,179-200, 231, 238,293, 300, 302

Iraq, 35, 37, 52, 55, 59,67, 73-74, 78, 80, 85-87, 89, 117-118, 122,125-127, 157, 162,165, 167-169, 171,174, 232, 250, 293,300, 309

Iron Age, 30-34, 44, 46,48-52, 62, 65-68, 95

Islam, 5, 60, 70-71, 74-81, 83, 95-96, 108,152, 156, 163-165,174, 178

Israel, 127, 172-174Italy, 235, 241, 247Izki, 49

jadd, 98, 115Jamdat Nasr, 37-38, 63Japan, 97, 114, 175, 232-

234, 241, 247, 264,266, 30

Jazirat al-Hamra’, 36, 92Jazirat al-Hulayla, 59, 65,

75, 88, 97Jebel Akhdar, 71, 82-83Jebel al-Emalah, 34, 36-

38, 59, 62Jebel Ali, 10, 128, 237-

238, 244, 264,266-267, 270-271, 276

Jebel Barakah, 35-36Jebel Buhais, 36-37, 45,

49, 51, 53, 62Jebel Dhanna, 10, 17, 77,

94, 234, 243Jebel Faiyah, 17, 19, 36,

53Jebel Hafit, 17, 22, 37-

38, 45, 285Jebel Hajar, 71-72, 75,

82, 92Jebel Kawr, 15Jebel Qamar, 17Jebel Rann, 11, 15Jerusalem, 165, 173-174Jordan, 166, 172-174,

294Julanda, 60, 79-86, 97Julfar, 65, 71-74, 82-87,

89-94, 96-97, 111Jurassic, 11, 15, 26

Ka’aba, 59, 305Kahaif, 243-244, 248,

266Kalba, 40, 44, 48-49, 62,

74, 120, 124, 126, 156,283-284, 288

Kharg, 79Khasab, 72, 112Khatt, 36, 45, 63, 65, 75,

91, 96Khazraj, 81, 115Khor Fakkan, 45, 74, 156Kirman, 87, 90Kosovo, 163, 168, 177Kuwait, 35, 64-65, 69,

78, 89, 96, 117-118,121-125, 127, 132-133, 148-149, 154,165-169, 171, 176,187, 193, 197-198,200-201, 224, 232-233, 276, 292-293,300, 303, 307

labour force, 7, 108, 144,205-207, 209, 221,223, 227, 251-254,263, 269, 274

Lasya Milh, 72-73Law of Treaties, 190, 194Lebanon, 176-177, 262,

306Levant, 36, 62limestone, 11, 14-15, 19,

23-25, 29, 94, 112,250, 281, 285

Lingeh, 180-181, 185,188, 190, 198

livestock, 71, 208, 268,278, 282-283, 288

Liwa, 9, 21-22, 36, 65,71, 82, 91, 95, 103,105-107, 115-116, 286

London, 4, 27, 65-66, 68-69, 95-97, 115-117,119-120, 122, 125,144, 159-160, 178,198-201, 224, 275-276, 302-304

Madinan, 81-83Magan, 40, 43-44, 50,

66-68Makkan, 40, 50Makran, 16-17, 68Manamah, 110Manasir, 79, 102, 107mangrove, 29, 32, 44, 64,

280-286manufacturing, 208-209,

217, 227, 229, 231,253-254, 260-264,268-269, 272-273, 275

Mar Ezechiel, 60Marawah, 36, 60, 67, 71,

77-79, 93-94Marcia hiantina, 33, 49Margham, 237, 248, 266Marib, 101marine environment,

277-278, 292-293,297-299

Masafi, 110, 279Mazun, 59-61, 63Mazyad, 36-37Mecca, 72, 86, 305Mediterranean, 50, 52,

67, 279Mesopotamia, 35, 37-39,

43, 48, 55, 57, 59, 61-63, 66, 97

Mesozoic, 23, 25Middle East, 69, 90, 94,

117, 144, 148, 157,160, 163-164, 176-177, 183, 231, 235,244, 246, 283, 293-294, 303-304

miliolite, 22-23millet, 35-36, 62, 66, 109Ministry of Agriculture &

Fisheries, 272, 281-282, 285, 287-288,290, 295-296, 299

Ministry of Informationand Culture, 4, 157,178, 276

Ministry of Petroleumand MineralResources, 250

Miocene, 11, 17-18, 25,66

Mleiha, 30-34, 36, 45,51-53, 57-59, 62-68,75

Morocco, 199-200Muhammad, b. Nur, 86Murban, 234Musandam, 9, 17, 71-74,

79, 83, 95-96, 109,112-113, 115, 280

Muscat, 17, 72-73, 85,97, 109

Muwailah, 32-34, 48-49,63, 67

nabati poetry, 114, 306,309-310

Nad-i Ali, 50Nadir Shah, 91Namord ware, 55, 68Neo-Tethys, 14-16, 23,

25Nestorian, 59-61, 65, 78-

79, 95-96Nineveh, 49Nizwa, 39, 72, 79, 81, 86,

96North Africa, 157, 160,

163, 293-294Nud Ziba, 44, 50, 65

oases, 63, 71, 92, 101,107, 109-111, 113-114,116, 167, 260

oil refinery, 235-237, 266Old Akkadian, 40, 43, 61Old Hormuz, 90, 97Omana, 54-55Organization of Arab

Petroleum Exporting(OAPEC), 142

Organization ofPetroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC),142, 155, 162, 168,173, 175, 224, 240,247-248, 276, 310

oryx, 30, 49, 72, 286-287, 295, 301

Oslo agreements, 173ostrich, 18, 30, 36, 62, 68oysters, 74, 93, 106

Pakistan, 165, 175, 237,239, 245-246, 262,267, 300

Palaeozoic, 11, 13, 23Paleogene, 16-17Palestine, 165, 172-174,

176Palmyra, 52, 55Partex, 120, 233Parthian, 55, 57

319

INDEX

pearls, 29, 73, 106-107,114, 116, 249, 311

Permian, 11, 13-15, 23,25, 27, 64

Persepolis, 50-51, 59Persia, 51, 118, 184petroleum, 13, 26-27, 97,

102, 105, 108, 118,122, 142, 144, 146,155, 160, 162, 168,173, 203, 206-208,224, 228, 232, 234-238, 240, 244, 250,254, 262, 265-267,273, 276, 310

Phoenix dactylifera, 32,39, 51, 103

Pleistocene, 35Pliny, 54, 64Post-Harappan, 44, 48Post-Imperial Era, 5, 117,

119qasaba, 72-73, 88Qatar, 9, 35-36, 60, 70,

72-74, 79, 89, 93, 96,103, 106, 115, 118,120-122, 124, 128,130-131, 134, 147-148, 150, 167,173-174, 180, 196,231-232, 234, 244-246, 267, 284, 292,300

Qattarah, 48Qawasim, 111, 145, 180-

183, 185-186,188-192, 198

Qays, 83, 87Qidfa, 46-47, 51Qishm, 189Quaternary, 18-19, 23,

27, 64Qudama, 72, 97Qur’an, 81, 278Quraysh, 81

Ra’s al-Khaimah, 17, 20,36, 41, 43-46, 50, 63-65, 68-69, 71-72,74-75, 84-85, 87-93,96-97, 106, 111-113,115, 121, 123-127,131-133, 137, 147,149, 153, 157, 163,165, 167, 170, 180-185, 187-192,198-200, 202-204,239, 248, 262, 271,287, 290, 295, 306

Ra’s Musandam, 71, 79Rajab, 60, 80Rams, 75, 91Ramsar sites, 283, 302

Red Crescent Society(RCS), 169, 177

Red Sea, 10, 14, 17, 55,87, 89, 92, 95

Riyadh, 126, 198, 200,290, 292-293

Riyam, 83, 88, 91Roman, 54-56, 65, 68,

75, 97Ru’us al-Jibal, 9, 17, 25,

71, 92, 112Rub’ al Khali, 18, 25, 63Rumaithat, 103, 107Rumeilah, 49-51, 62, 66Russia, 117, 163, 177,

188, 231Rustaq, 60, 74Ruwais, 235-236, 242-

243, 265-267

Sabkha Matti, 19, 21, 27,71, 103, 280

sabkha, 18-21, 24, 26,28, 46, 70-71, 73, 82,84, 102-103, 279-281

Sahara, 19, 22Saja’a, 243-244, 248Saleh, 159, 239, 248Salem bin Ali Al Owais,

307Salihah Dhaiban, 311Sasaki, 88, 97Sasanian, 50, 59-61, 65,

68, 74-77, 80-81, 83,87-88, 95-97

Saudi Arabia, 9, 11, 19,21, 35-36, 39, 52, 72-73, 76-78, 82, 96,120-122, 125-126,132-133, 147-148,156, 167, 196, 233,250, 270-271, 281,292, 300, 307

saxaul, 286, 288Second World War, 118-

120, 123, 125-126,146, 177, 193, 232,252, 260, 306

Semail Nappe, 13-14, 16-17, 25-26

Shah of Iran, 133, 170,183-184, 188

shamal, 17-18, 22, 26,279

Shapur, 59, 68Sharjah, 36, 45, 48-49,

51, 60, 62-68, 70-76,93, 95, 97, 100, 106,111, 115, 118-121,123-126, 132-133,137, 147, 149, 153-158, 163, 165, 167,170, 180-185, 188-

195, 197-204, 208,223, 238-239, 243-244, 248, 261-262,264, 266-267, 270-271, 275, 286-287,290, 297, 307-308

sheep, 21, 30, 36-37, 39,44, 49, 71, 73, 110,112-113, 283, 288

Sheikh Rashid bin SaeedAl Maktoum, 128,167, 308

Sheikh Zayed bin SultanAl Nahyan, 127, 149,164, 178, 195, 207-208, 218, 232,302-303, 306

shellfish, 28-29, 37, 44,47, 49, 71

Shihr, 83Shimal, 30, 33-34, 41,

43-48, 50, 59, 63-65,68-69, 75, 88

Shiraz, 86Shoufani, 60, 68Shuaiba, 11Shuwaihat, 17-18, 36Sind, 60, 80Sir Abu Nu’air, 10, 180,

281Sir Bani Yas, 10, 60, 65,

74, 77-79, 89, 92-94,115, 281, 291, 304

Sirbeniast, 74, 92Sircorcor, 74Sirhan, 81, 84, 97Sirri, 180-182, 185, 189,

198Socotra cormorant, 30,

281, 284-285South Yemen, 132, 147,

149, 155, 157Soviet Union, 146, 157-

158, 163, 166,174-175, 178

Spasinou Charax, 55, 68Stone Age, 65, 68, 75, 78,

85, 277Strait of Hormuz, 10, 16-

18, 55, 64, 71, 74, 83,85, 109, 162, 176,179-180, 189, 239,280-281

Sudan, 119, 174Suez, 128, 145, 150, 175Suhar, 72-74, 79-81, 83,

87-89Sultan bin Ali Al Owais,

308Sultan Khalifa, 310Sultanate of Oman, 71-

72, 74, 79, 83, 92, 95,112

Supreme Court, 129,135-141, 143, 152-153

Supreme PetroleumCouncil (SPC), 236

Sur, 17, 62-64, 66, 88Susa, 37, 89Switzerland, 223, 304Syria, 46, 55, 67, 78, 84-

87, 173, 306-307

TABREED, 272Tafila, 306, 309-311Taha, 46, 68, 199, 201,

306tajir, 96, 107Taw’am, 101, 108Tehran, 172, 186Tell Abraq, 30-34, 36,

40-44, 47-50, 59, 62,64, 66-69, 91

Tepe Hissar, 37Tepe Yahya, 37Thamama, 235, 242tombs, 37-38, 40-47, 55,

59, 65, 69Triassic, 11, 14-15Trucial Oman, 65, 69,

115, 119, 121, 125,146

Trucial States Council,100, 115-116, 120,126-128, 130, 146,151

Trucial StatesDevelopment Fund,133, 149, 167

Trucial States, 5, 28, 95,100, 107, 115-122,124, 126-128, 130-133, 144-151,159-160, 163, 167,170, 175, 182, 198,200, 231, 233, 249

turtles, 18, 29-30, 278,282-283, 285, 295,299-300

Tuwwam, 60, 71, 73, 76,81-83, 85-86, 88, 91,101

UAE Central Bank, 208,222-224, 226

UAE Currency Board,222

UAE Monetary Agency,208, 223-224

UAE MonetaryAuthorities, 222

Umayyad, 72, 75-76, 80,84-85, 87, 116

Umm al-Qaiwain, 20, 36-37, 41, 51, 54-55, 59,62, 64, 67-69, 73-75,91, 111, 115, 121, 124,

320

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

126, 132, 137, 149,153, 164, 202-203,238, 240, 262-263,270-271, 290

Umm Safah, 49Umm Shaif, 11, 232-234,

240-241, 248, 265UN General Assembly,

195UN Secretary General,

194UN Security Council,

197United Kingdom, 121-

123, 126, 142, 145,163, 167, 233

United NationsDevelopment Program

(UNDP), 209, 224,256-259, 289, 292-293, 301

Ur, 44, 48Uruk, 37, 39

vegetables, 39, 109, 111,208, 263, 272, 288

Vienna Convention, 190,194

Vita Finzi, 17, 27Vita Ionae, 59volcanic lava, 19Vologesias, 55Wadi al-Qawr, 46, 49-50,

67Wadi Bih, 17Wadi Dhaid, 19

Wadi Haqil, 36, 68, 88,97

Wadi Munay’i, 41Wadi Safad, 75, 92Wadi Suq, 30-34, 44-47,

49-50, 62Washington, 144, 157,

160, 276, 304whales and dolphins, 29,

282, 284wheat, 32, 49, 51, 109,

112wildlife, 8, 278-280, 284,

286-287, 290-291,295-300, 302-304

World Bank, 219-220,223-224, 276, 303

Yaqut, 73, 88, 97Yasat al-cUlya, 71, 77Yasat al-Sufla’, 77Yemen, 22, 52, 72, 74,

76, 78-79, 81-83, 86,92, 101, 115, 132, 147,149, 155, 157, 162,174, 281

Yugoslavia, 166, 174,176

Zahlan, 120, 159-160,198, 201, 276

Zakum, 11, 232-234, 248,265-266

Zanj, 85-86, 89Zoroastrianism, 59

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